


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*Alfred Bellenger*  
*April 15 1880*

THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
GREECE.

By WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

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THE FIFTH VOLUME.

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CHAPTER XLIII.

State of the known World, more especially of MACEDONIA, when ALEXANDER, Son of PHILIP, succeeded to the MACEDONIAN Throne.

SECTION I.

*State of Macedonia when Alexander, son of Philip, succeeded to the Throne : Circumstances of surrounding Countries : Aristotle's Treatise on Government : Constitutions of various States : Examples of limited Monarchy in Greece.*

HITHERTO the history of Greece has been that of a small nation, of narrow territory, and, for that narrow territory, a small free population, served by numerous slaves; eminent nevertheless, singularly through successful cultivation of science and arts, especially the military and those called the fine arts; respected thence among surrounding people, and, for an accompanying restlessness of enterprizing spirit feared; yet, through defect of political system, continually turning that spirit, with all its support of art and science, against itself, and thus, unless, as a common disturber, rarely formidable to foreign countries. But we approach now the era when, in altered circumstances, conquest in a manner extended Greece over the civilized world, making such impression on human affairs

that important consequences, which may be reckoned altogether highly beneficial, have affected late posterity, and remain to be transmitted to future ages. To prepare then for the narrative of so great a revolution it may be advantageous to look, somewhat beyond what the course of the preceding history would conveniently allow, to the actual circumstances of the nation which was to produce it, and of the countries over which it was more immediately to extend.

The Macedonian kingdom, for ages before Alexander, we have observed of territory extensive enough to be rather overbearing among surrounding states ; yet, with an uncultivated population, and an often-distracted government, generally weak ; more than once nearly overwhelmed ; but recently raised to be the most powerful state of the known world ; the bordering Persian empire only excepted, unless exception should also be made for distant Carthage. The new dominion acquired, westward, northward and eastward, was over people, not of Grecian blood or language, but whom the Greeks distinguished from themselves by their term barbarian, those of the maritime towns only being Greek. But, southward, the bordering province of Thessaly was esteemed the mother of the Greek nation ; in produce it was the richest of Greece ; and, bound from of old in political friendship with Macedonia, it was become, through the voluntary accession of the prevailing party among the people, in effect, a member of the Macedonian monarchy. So far also this example had been followed by the rest of Greece, that the late king of Macedonia was, in all constitutional form, elected chief of the Greek nation ; succeeding thus to that supremacy which had been previously admitted in the Lacedæmonian and Athenian governments, and at one time, by a preponderant portion of the nation, in the Theban. Thus, Macedonia was now the seat of empire ; and, as formerly under Archelaus, again the refuge and favorite resort of Grecian art and science.

But with these great acquisitions and advantages, seeds of disturbance abounded. In Macedonia itself, claims to the throne against the reigning family, sources, formerly, of ruinous civil wars, had never ceased to be entertained. The recent assassination of the reigning king was suspected to have been promoted by pretenders or their partizans ; and certainly on this subject, if ever obtained, never was made public ; yet that there

were



were still pretenders, waiting only for opportunity, circumstances afterward made manifest. Thessaly then, the oldest ally of Macedonia, the most important, and, while the party actually prevailing there was uppermost, and the family actually reigning in Macedonia continued to reign, the surest, had been, for ages, even among the ever-troubled republics of Greece, eminent for troubles and revolutions. But throughout the Grecian states, opposition of interests, and hatred between republic and republic, and between parties within every republic, remained in vigor. That large and latterly prevailing portion of the nation, whose views to public advantage, or private, or both, had led them to desire the patronage of the late king of Macedonia, Philip, would now of course look toward his successor for continuance of support against adverse republics, or, whom many still more dreaded, their fellowcitizens of an adverse faction; but not with equal hope. Considering his youth, his yet untried character, and the uncertainty whose advice he might follow, the prospect for them could not but be most anxious and disheartening; while, on the contrary, for their adversaries, the recent catastrophe would raise fallen hopes, and stimulate to new exertion.

Nor would the various people called barbarians be indifferent on the occasion. Even those brought under the Macedonian dominion, whether having found more oppression or benefit from it, and whether more or less attached to the late popular king, having been universally bred to predatory warfare, would be on the watch for new things. But the most threatening danger, to Macedonia now, as to all Greece always, since the first extension of the Persian empire to the Grecian sea, was from the overbearing weight of that great empire, with which war was actually begun. Should the administration of the prince, who had succeeded to the Persian throne, be as energetic and able as that of a recent predecessor, Ochus, while a large Grecian military force was in his service, and a large party among the republics, under most able leaders, communicating with his court, and looking to it for patronage, means to obviate the danger would not be within ready calculation.

The countries westward of Greece, sometimes formidable, were so little so now as not to have attracted the notice of historians. The Sicilian Greeks, with all that Timoleon had done for them, apparently

had not recovered strength to give trouble beyond the seas which surrounded them ; and the days of splendor of the Italian were passed ; principally, it seems, through destruction brought upon one another. Carthage, more powerful than all, was probably engaged with the affairs of its extensive acquisitions, deserving indeed the title of an empire, over the rich countries of the north of Africa, and in Spain. Rome had already made progress toward the dominion of Italy ; yet so little was the threatening growth of its power known among the Greeks, that, in the extant political works of the great philosopher of the day, Aristotle, tho he is large on the Carthaginian government, and mentions its connection with the Etruscans, not the name of Rome is found.

In this state of the world, on the verge of a revolution the most rapid, and, excepting the slow rise and fall of the Roman empire, the greatest and most important known in history, what was actually the constitution of the kingdom which was to take the lead in producing it, and what the political circumstances of the numerous connected states, must deserve to be known, as far as, among existing documents, they may be gathered.

The cotemporary philosopher Aristotle's treatise on government cannot then but especially deserve attention. Aristotle was a Macedonian born, so far as his birth-place, Stageira, was on the Macedonian shore ; a small town founded, of what right or through what wrong we are uninformed, by Greeks from the island of Andros. That island was early subjected to the Athenian people. Possibly the object, in migrating, was to obtain more independency ; for, of the severity of the degrading and almost slavish subjection, in which the subordinate Grecian states were held by the imperial democracy of Athens, occasion has occurred to observe large example ; and, for the difference of law, in the Athenian judicature, for Andrian citizens and Athenian citizens, probably a well known comedy, transmitted to us in the Latin language, but from an Athenian original, may be trusted. The colonists claimed, for the town they founded, the rights of a Grecian republic ; but they were obliged to acknowledge the dominion successively of the Athenian people, the Lacedæmonian, and again the Athenian, till the peace of Antalcidas, under the king of Persia's mediation, gave them a short independency, which was ended by the revival of the Athenian maritime power. How far they may have had,

at



at any time, better freedom in connection with the Olynthian confederacy, information fails; but at length, with the other towns which had been of that confederacy, having only to choose between subjection to the Athenian people, and to the Macedonian king, Stageira became, through Philip's successes against the Athenians, reünited to Macedonia. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, is said to have been physician to king Amyntas, Philip's father, and high in his esteem. Aristotle himself, after having studied some years under Plato, at Athens, settled himself at Mitylene in Lesbos, whence, on invitation, he passed to Philip's court, where he lived long, and after his death continued to be highly respected by Alexander, who, during his extraordinary conquering expedition, appears to have corresponded with him attentively. Thus, far beyond any other writer whose works are extant, Aristotle must have possessed means for giving information concerning the state of Macedonia at that period when such information would be most interesting. The deficiency of it therefore, in his extant works, is highly disappointing, tho in his treatise on government the reason is evident. What little notice of Macedonia occurs is however of a very valuable kind; and the treatise will further deserve consideration, for its various information concerning both the principles of government held by the most informed and scientific speculators, and the practice of numerous states, in, perhaps, the most interesting age of his universally interesting country.

In that treatise, stating some principles as fundamental, and then criticizing some of the more eminent of the ideal systems of republican government, which, before him, had been offered for public approbation, especially those of his master, Plato, he proceeds to animadvert on the governments known in practice, which success might most recommend; and, not limiting himself to Grecian, he considers, together with the Cretan, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, the Carthaginian. Observations follow on democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, absolute and limited; abounding with objections to all, especially democracy. This he condemns nearly equally with that usurped monarchy which the Greeks denominated tyranny, which, he says, it most resembled. He then remarks that some had reckoned a combination of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy would make the best government; but the best known example of such a constitution, the Lacedæmonian, was so open to strong objection, that the  
notion

notion had no general favor. In conclusion then he proposes his own idea of the best possible constitution, distinguishing it by the title of Polity.

It may seem that Xenophon's large experience in political and military business, whence the mischief of the prevailing passion of the Greeks for the separate independency of their several little states, and the futility of all projects, tried and possible, for giving them real independency, would be striking to him, with, perhaps, some particular stimulation from his fellow-scholar Plato's romantic project for a republic, led him to the composition of that elegant romance the *Cyropædeia*; the purpose of which is to show how one able man could govern more than half the known world, more happily for the subjects than any of his own fellowcountrymen, struggling with oneanother for power, could manage their single independent towns, in what, no man being master of his own, they miscalled freedom. As a model to be imitated, he could not propose the Persian government under Cyrus; because, for success in the imitation, a sovereign must always be found with the extraordinary union of talents and virtue which he has ascribed to that great prince, and which has rarely, if indeed ever, existed; but, as a model, through observation of which the political principles and practice of his fellowcountrymen might be improved, the consideration of it might be highly useful. It may seem too that, in writing those animadversions on the Lacedæmonian and Athenian governments which remain to us, he may have had in view to propose something better adapted to secure freedom and promote human happiness than either those governments, or the Persian monarchal despotism. But Cicero, reckoning that the better, tho still very imperfect, constitution of Rome might have been improved by a just combination of the three powers, has confessed himself unable to say what the arrangement should be; and so Xenophon at last apparently despaired of improving the tumultuary republican system of Greece.

Nevertheless from Aristotle, who had before him all that Xenophon and Plato had written on the subject, who knew both the Greek republics and the Macedonian kingdom, and who had moreover large opportunity for information concerning the bordering Persian empire, some clear improvement on all former Grecian schemes of government, found in experience, and in his declared opinion, so defective, might be expected. But his treatise

shows,



shows, in a surprizing amount, what influence the common Grecian passion for the separate independency of their several cities might hold on Grecian minds, even the most capacious and acute, when bred in their little illiberal republican principles; and it may still be within our subject to remark that, as hence may be estimated the difficulty of executing what Isocrates was so continually and earnestly urging, the union of Greece, hence also may be judged how just was Philip's caution in so long hesitating, tho invited by a large and apparently a preponderant portion of the Greek nation, to undertake it. Aristotle knew how Greece had been, for centuries, lacerated by the contentions of her little republics, and how, by almost a miracle, they had withstood the efforts of the neighboring Persian empire, never failing of assistance within Greece itself, to subdue them: he knew that, nevertheless, far from independent, after very heroic exertions of many in the common cause, they had been compelled to bow the neck successively to their fellows, the Lacedæmonian people and the Athenian; he knew that they had owed the short period of their most real independency to a mandate of the Persian king, confirming the treaty of Antalcidas; he knew what miseries had resulted from the opposition of Thebes to the revived tyranny of Lacedæmon; truly patriotic as it was at first, but, with success, soon breeding ambition: possessed of this knowledge he was living in the Macedonian kingdom, nearly equal in extent to all the republican territory of proper Greece; he had in view the Persian empire, holding numerous Grecian republics its tributaries, and possessing means evidently ample, with inclination always ready, wanting only good direction, to overwhelm all. Nevertheless, in his treatise, nothing is found proposed for the common benefit of Greece, nothing for improvement of the constitution of the Macedonian kingdom, become the head of the united nation; and so far from proposing any other union, or approving any, his project, offered for the perfection of government, is as illiberal as those of Minos or Lycurgus, and more contracted. He would have republics equal in population and territory to the smaller only, rather than to the larger, of those actually existing in Greece; and, tho some, he allows, held a different opinion on specious ground, he has contended that slavery, the slave belonging wholly to his master, is reasonable, and necessary, and in the course of nature; and, accordingly, he would

Arist. Polit.  
b. 1. c. 4 & 5.

have a few freemen, constituting his republic, served by many slaves. When Minos and Lycurgus lived, the state of the world, or of their part of it, appears to have been such that their plans justly earned the praise of wisdom, as adapted to it. When Aristotle wrote, as well might it be proposed, in modern times, that Geneva, Lucca, or Ragusa, should defy surrounding nations with their own force, as his republic; yet alliance and confederacy seem to have been out of his contemplation. It might indeed be supposed that, intent on physics and metaphysics, he had neglected observation of politics, and wrote on them from fancy, did not his work show that he had been diligent in using his large opportunities for collecting facts, among the transactions of the various states around him, on which to ground theory. What he has proposed however seems rather an idea of a colony of philosophers, to be founded among barbarians, than what could be seriously offered for improving the condition of the whole, or any part of Greece. We are told none of his works were published while he lived. That on government has obvious inconsistencies, which doubtless would have been corrected had he completed it for publication; and, in some parts, it seems merely a collection of notes for future use. Yet his projected commonwealth, will, among other parts of the work, deserve some further observation.

In the small independent state which he proposes, which, in modern days might rather be called a township, he would have his citizens all sovereigns, like the Genoese and Venetian nobles. Were it possible, he says, he would have them served only by slaves; and to these exclusively he would commit mechanical arts, husbandry, and all trade. But, in failure of slaves of sufficient number, or of sufficient ability, he would allow subjects of his citizens, in a condition somewhat above absolute slavery, such as existed in many of the Grecian republics, distinguished from citizens by the name of *Periœcians*. These might be either Greeks or barbarians. But whether one or the other, he would place them in a more degraded condition than the Laconian, and some other *Periœcians*; for, to insure their subserviency, he would never admit them to hold the arms or use the discipline of the phalanx, but would limit their military service to that of the light-armed; and as they were to have no participation in civil power, their superiority in condition to the slave would be utterly precarious.

That



That excellent principle of the British constitution, holding that public good consists in accumulation of private good, he has rejected; adopting the contrary principle, which prevailed among the Grecian republics, of an imaginary public wholly distinct from private good; so that the public was a tyrant, warranted by the constitution to be regardless of individuals. In pursuance of this principle then he would, like the Cretan and Lacedæmonian lawgivers, deny to all his noble citizens the natural rights and dignity and enjoymments of fathers of families; and, contrary to the maxim of the English law, expressed in the emphatical phrase ‘Every man’s house is his castle,’ he would hardly allow a home. As at Lacedæmon, no man was to live at home; all were to eat at public tables; and there (not as at Lacedæmon, every one bringing his own) all were to take the fare publicly provided. As at Lacedæmon, children were to be considered as belonging to the public, and parents were not to interfere in their education. Dignity and civil authority, as at Lacedæmon, were to be the privilege of elderhood only. A legislature he seems to have proposed to make needless by the perfection of his general law, and by the wisdom and virtue which, through education and by his institutions altogether, he would insure to his elders; so that arbitrary decision on new and extraordinary cases would be, in their hands, he reckoned, safe.

With such ideas of perfection in government, the constitutions of the Grecian republics of his age would not be likely to have much of his approbation. Democracy accordingly, which he had had large opportunity to see, especially at Athens, he condemns vehemently; prone, he says, beyond other governments, to give opportunity for the tyranny of one, and itself the tyranny of an ill-informed, passionate multitude. Proper aristocracy, apparently his favorite government among those known in practice, he asserts hardly to have existed in his time, having degenerated everywhere into either democracy or a tyrannical oligarchy. The Greeks of his age, he adds, were solicitous, less for good government than for the acquisition of power and personal importance; and, among their political struggles, prospect of these failing, they usually gave up contest, and submitted to the dominion of rivals. This indeed is no more than the general character of what has been so often miscalled the ardent spirit of liberty. The real spirit of liberty is not an ardent but a sober and reflecting spirit. The

ardent, rarely failing among zealots for democracy, is not a spirit of liberty, but, in the leaders, a spirit of ambition, in the multitude, a spirit of envy, of licentiousness, and, as it has been too often seen, in antient and in modern times, of cruelty.

Arist. Polit.  
l. 5. c. 10.

Proceeding to the consideration of monarchy, exclusively of that violence upon former constitutions which the Greeks denominated Tyranny, he reckons five distinct characters of legal kingdoms; one absolute, four limited. The purely absolute, he takes into consideration as ground for useful remark and argument, considering it however as merely ideal. For one man, he observes, cannot rule multitudes without the consent of some among them, on whom therefore he is effectually dependent. The power of the most despotic tyrants, known among the Greeks, rested on the support of a party, and generally, he says, a party outrageously democratical. 'Tyranny,' he remarks in another place, 'is a compound of democracy and the extremest oligarchy, and therefore the most oppressive of all governments, partaking of the two worst, and replete with the excesses and all the evils of both'. Therefore those commonly called absolute monarchies, as being most nearly so, those of Asia especially, whose people have always been readier for subserviency than the Europeäns, are not exactly so. Among them all a customary system of law, transmitted through ages, is strictly maintained; and the attachment of the people to the system, derived from their forefathers, at the same time supports and checks the royal authority. Hence those governments have not been subject to revolutions.'

Very similar to this was a kind of monarchy of which many instances had been seen among the little states of Greece. The people of a republic, unable otherwise to obviate the evils of civil contest among themselves, agreed upon the resource of electing a king (or tyrant, as they sometimes intitled him) to absolute power, for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional laws. Some had been so elected for life, and some for a limited period; and such monarchy, the philosopher proceeds to observe, differed from the Asiatic only as it was elective, whereas the Asiatic

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῇ ἐνάτῃ καὶ τὰς παρεχόσας καὶ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἔχουσα συγκρίται καὶ δημοκρατίας, διὸ δὴ βλαβερώδη τῷ τὰς παρ' ἀμφότεροι τῷ πολιτείᾳ. Arist. Polit. αὐτοκρατορίας ὡς, ἅτε ἐκ διούτι συγκριμένη κακόν, l. 5. c. 10.



were hereditary. For this difference he reckons it a second kind of legal monarchy.

These we should hardly now call balanced monarchies, or free constitutions; no balancing civil authority seeming to have had regular establishment in them: an efficient limitation appears only in the means of rebellion which the people possessed, as forming the military of the state. Such apparently was the limitation producing that general respect of the Asiatic princes for the laws and established customs, whence revolutions among them were rare.

The third kind of monarchy, in Aristotle's list, was that more liberal and regularly-balanced constitution, described by Homer as universal in those called the heroic ages, and which has occurred for notice in an early part of this history. For this Aristotle refers to Homer: the king, he says, commanded in war, and presided in religious ceremonies and judicial proceedings. On Homer's authority it may be added that, in emergencies he assembled the people, and presided in the assembly<sup>2</sup>. Ch. 2. s. 2  
of this hist.

A fourth kind, the most narrowly limited that could consist with any royal dignity, was seen in the Lacedæmonian kingdom. There the kings, tho their persons were esteemed sacred, and their dignity allowed high, had, as kings, no civil authority: they were merely hereditary commanders-in-chief of the military, and hereditary high priests; partaking constitutionally of civil power only as hereditary senators.

It is then remarkable that, as for his own imaginary republic Aristotle has proposed no legislature, so, in describing these several kinds of existing monarchy, he has said of none where any power of legislation rested; and yet it is fully implied that in none, not even the most absolute of the Asiatic, any more than in the old constitution of the Medes and Persians, was a power admitted in the king alone to add to or alter the law.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle has inferred, from an expression attributed by Homer to Agamemnon, that personal security against the monarch's power was not duly provided for in this constitution. Probably there were deficiencies and irregularities; yet such an expression, as he has noticed, from a prince commanding, at the time, not in his capital but in his camp in a distant country, and represented as speaking in anger, seems hardly to carry any decisive information on the subject.

But, having indicated five characters of monarchy, graduated from extreme despotism to the smallest extent of power which can any way support the eminence essential to royalty, the philosopher disappoints us with declaring that he proposes to consider the two extremes only; the purely absolute monarchy, which he reckons but ideal, and the most limited of the kinds known in practice, that in which the king had no civil authority; because, he says, the others differed from these only as they more or less approached either. The ideal will hardly be an object here; the other, exemplified in the Lacedæmonian constitution, has been in an early part of this history spoken of largely. Incidentally however he is led to some notice of monarchies of the intermediate characters, which will deserve attention.

Arist. Polit.  
l. 3. c. 14.

Arist. Polit.  
l. 5. c. 10.

Proposing to illustrate and ascertain the characteristical differences between legal monarchy and illegal, or, according to the Greek terms, kingdom and tyranny (meaning by kingdom kingly government regularly established, and by tyranny monarchical power founded on the overthrow of a former constitution) he states, for examples of legal monarchy, the Lacedæmonian constitution, the Athenian, as it stood under the last king, Codrus, the Molossian, and the Macedonian; adding, remarkably enough, the Persian, but only as it stood in the reign of the great Cyrus. In the end then he comes to this extraordinary conclusion; ‘At this time,’ he says, ‘proper kingdoms no longer exist, all having degenerated nearly into monarchies and tyrannies; because fealty to a proper king is simply voluntary; and, in these times there is more equality among men, so that none have such supereminent merit as to deserve the elevation. Where power must be supported by fiction or force, it becomes tyranny.’ Consonantly with this, he says, in another place, allegiance to a king may be withdrawn by the people at pleasure. Nevertheless he requires force to be employed, if necessary, for the support of his republic, and of all republics; but he absolutely denies it, how consistently seems not easy to discover, for the support of monarchical authority, however legally founded. How then the pleasure of the people was to be legally declared; what was to be if half desired to remove the king, whether to elect another king, or to establish another constitution, and half to support the actual king and maintain the existing constitution; or if half the opponents of royalty desired a democracy and half an aristocracy, he has omitted to say. Moreover,  
reckoning

l. 7. c. 8.  
l. 5. c. 10.

reckoning election essential to the establishment of proper kingly authority, and voluntary obedience essential to its continuance, and adding that, in his opinion, hereditary succession principally had produced the extensive abolition of monarchy among the Greeks, yet, of his five examples of legal monarchy, three were, as far as history traces them, clearly hereditary. The Athenians are said, in troublesome times beyond any very certain memorials, to have elected Codrus; thus interrupting hereditary succession; and (so little is known of Persian history) possibly Cyrus also may have been king by election, tho more generally and probably supposed by inheritance. Homer, to whom Aristotle refers for the most authoritative account of that monarchal constitution which he reckoned the best, shows indeed that, in the ages he has described, hereditary succession rested on no very certain ground; but, far from warranting the philosopher's revolutionary doctrine, he places the authority of the king, once legally holding the scepter, under the immediate protection of Jupiter.

Ch. 2. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Beyond doubt the science of government has been greatly improved in modern ages; not through greater talents of either legislators or philosophical speculators, but, principally, through the new and extended opportunities for observing what might be raised on the broader bases of the states into which Europe, on the overthrow of the Roman empire, became divided. It cannot now be hazardous to assert, tho against Aristotle, that the broader, at least to such extent, are the surer and altogether more advantageous bases; nor hardly will any be found now to contend that either elective monarchy, or such a republic as he has proposed, is desirable. For examples of legal kingdoms, naming Lacedæmon, Molossis, and Macedonia, which were all hereditary, yet stating no reason for afterward denying any legal kingdom to exist in his time, except that none were elective, it seems to follow that, unless for the hereditary succession (which tho he reckoned it a great defect, yet experience in the course of ages has shown to be essential to internal peace) the Lacedæmonian, Molossian and Macedonian were, still, in his time and in his opinion, legal limited monarchies.



## SECTION II.

*History of Molossis.*

THE Athenian government, in its various changes from kingdom to democracy, and the Lacedæmonian, it has been the purpose of the preceding history, as far as remaining documents allow, to unfold. The early Persian seems to have been classed with them, by Aristotle, only as an example (the less to be gainsaid, as in his age and country very little known) of his favorite tenet, of which he could find few examples in practice, that monarchy should be elective, and of that other, of which, if he could find any example, none seemed in his time to remain, that fealty to legal monarchs should be so purely voluntary that it might be withdrawn at pleasure. What gleanings then may be found of the history of the small obscure kingdom of Molossis, as a portion of the proper history of Greece, for which, in prosecuting the history of the republics, a place equally convenient has not before occurred, may here deserve notice; and will more particularly require it for the eulogy which Aristotle, tho with little explanation, has bestowed on its constitution.

Theopomp.  
ap. Strab.  
l. 7. p. 469,  
ed. Ox.

Molossis was one, it is said, of fourteen small states within the country known by the general name of Epirus; but it was of the largest. Its extent and boundaries however, even in Strabo's time, were not to be ascertained; the devastation insuing the conquest by those among the most flagitious and cruel, tho, as the most successful, the most renowned of conquerors, the Romans, having obliterated indications; and the Grecian geographer's melancholy picture is largely confirmed by the account even of the Roman historian, Livy. To Aristotle's time, with an advantageous constitution, and force sufficing for defence, but not tempting to seek conquest, the Molossian people seem to have been, for ages, in more fortunate circumstances than were common around them. Their territory was, in large proportion, eminently fruitful. The oracle of Dodona, within it, highly revered always, but especially in the earlier ages, gave it a degree of sacred character. Surrounded mostly by lofty mountains, a large invading force might

Strab. *ibid.*

might be checked by very inferior numbers; and the temptation for a small one, with predatory purposes, was much obviated by the circumstances which made difficulty for any such to carry off, if it might seize, plunder. The northern part, against Macedonia, and the eastern, against Thessaly, very high land, to which the approach was everywhere steep and rugged, was itself mostly level enough for cultivation; the soil fruitful, water abounding, and the climate altogether advantageous. If Passaron, the capital of Molossis, was not eminent among cities of the day, it seems to have been because the Molossians were not compelled by circumstances, like the republican Greeks, with exception, as we have formerly observed, almost only for the Eleians, to confine themselves, in crowded habitation, within city-walls. Ch. 3. s. 4.  
of this list.

Epirus, tho mostly held by people of Grecian speech and lineage, had an intermixture of those called barbarians; Illyrians, and perhaps others. Herodotus, however, among earliest, and Plutarch, among late antient historians, clearly reckon the Molossians a Grecian people. Some expressions of Thucydides and Strabo may perhaps be construed either way. But, as it has been formerly observed, Herodotus, Thucydides and Strabo concur in showing that all Greece was of mixed population; and how the distinction of Greek and barbarian, unknown to Homer, arose, and what at last it was, always remained uncertain. Strabo however clearly acknowledging the Macedonian for a Greek nation, assures us that the general language of the Epirots was the Macedonian dialect of the Greek; that where another language, probably the Illyric, was in use, the people commonly spoke both, and that, in habits and manners, most of the Epirots hardly differed from the Macedonians. Herod. l. 6.  
c. 126.  
Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.  
Thucyd. l. 2.  
c. 80.  
Strab. l. 7.

The governments of the Epirot states were, some republican, with annual chief magistrates, as at Athens, Thebes and Rome; others monarchical. That of Molossis, from earliest tradition, was monarchical; and, whether the people may have been more or less allowed the always questionable dignity of pure Grecian blood, yet the claim of the royal family to the oldest and noblest Grecian origin, resting on tradition, but asserted by Strabo and Plutarch, with Aristotle's assent implied, is not found anywhere controverted. They reckoned themselves direct descendants of Neoptolemus Pyrrhus, son of Achilles; who, it was said, after the Trojan war, migrating Thucyd. l. 2.  
c. 80.  
Strab. l. 7.  
from Strab. l. 7.  
Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.

from Thessaly, became king of Molossis. Whatever credit may be due to this lofty pretension, that the Molossian scepter remained in one Greek family, from times beyond certain history till after Aristotle's age, appears satisfactorily testified.

By advantage of situation and constitution, exempt from great troubles, Molossis, had it had historians, probably afforded little for general interest. Nevertheless we learn, from the father of Grecian history, that, some generations before his time, it was esteemed respectable among Grecian states. The tale wherein this appears, like many of that writer, somewhat of a romantic cast, nevertheless may have been true in all its parts; and, for the information it affords of an important change of manners and policy among the Greeks, and of the flourishing condition of several republics about the age of the Athenian legislator Solon, some destroyed before the historian wrote, others little heard of since, while Molossis apparently remained unshaken, it may be reckoned of considerable historical value.

Herod. 1. 6.  
c. 126. Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, under whose rule that little state was eminent among those of Peloponnesus, desiring, the historian says, to marry his daughter to a man of the greatest consideration and highest worth of all Greece, opened his house for any who, from personal dignity and the eminence of their countries, might have pretensions; that so he might have opportunity to estimate their merits. Thirteen guests, rivals for his favor, are thus described. There came from the Greek colonies in Italy, then flourishing extraordinarily, Smindyrides of Sybaris and Damas of Siris. The former was remarked for going beyond all of his time in the luxury, for which Sybaris was renowned. Damas was son of that Samyris, who was distinguished by the epithet of the Wise. Amphinnestus came from Epidamnus, on the coast of the Ionian gulph. Males was of Ætolia, brother of Titormus, esteemed the strongest man in Greece, but who had withdrawn from the society of men to reside in the farthest part of Ætolia<sup>3</sup>.

Leocedes,

<sup>3</sup> Late writers, Athenæus and Ælian, show that Titormus had wide fame for bodily strength; but information of the cause of his avoiding human society, as the early historian reports, might have been more interesting than their extravagant tales of his feats, while he was eminent in it. His retirement probably procured him the title, which Ælian gives him, of the herdman. The company with which his brother associated,



Leocedes, was son of Pheidon, tyrant of Argos; that Pheidon, says the historian, who established uniformity of weights and measures throughout Peloponnesus, and, together with his power (so far, it may seem, beneficially exerted) was remarked for an arrogance unequalled among the Greeks; for, depriving the Eleians of the presidency of the Olympian festival, he assumed it himself<sup>4</sup>. Two came from Arcadia, Amiantus of Trapezus, and Laphanes of Pæos. The father of the latter, Euphorion, was celebrated for his extensive hospitality, and had the extraordinary fame of having entertained the gods Castor and Pollux. Lysanias came from Eretria in Eubœa, then greatly flourishing; Onomastus from Eleia: Megacles and Hippocleides were of Athens; the latter esteemed the richest Athenian of his time, and the handsomest: Diactorides was of Cranon and Scopadæ in Thessaly; Alcon was of Molossis. This simple description of Alcon, combined with what has preceded, enough marks that the Molossians were esteemed a Grecian people, and Molossis then considerable among the Grecian states. One of the Athenians, Megacles, was the successful suitor. His family was of the most eminent of Athens; his father, Alcmaëon, whom we have seen leader of a party there, had, in banishment, been honorably entertained by the great king of Lydia, Cræsus. Megacles succeeding him in eminence with that party, acquired command of the government of Athens; and the great Pericles, who afterward ruled the commonwealth with princely sway, was a descendant of the match with the daughter of Cleisthenes, by his mother, Agaristè, who was her granddaughter.

Ch. 5. s. 5.  
of this hist.

Ch. 12. s. 2.  
of this hist.

What then among curious matters, in this little detail, especially will deserve notice, is the evidence that the republican jealousy, which afterward, in the most flourishing age of Grecian philosophy, went to the extreme of forbidding intermarriage of Greeks of different states, as a just and even necessary policy of republics, had not yet obtained any such force. Farther then will deserve observation the fallen state of seven of the republics, mentioned by the historian as then among the most eminent of

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 11.

Ch. 26. s. 2.  
of this hist.

ciated, in the more authentic account of Herodotus, marks enough that the family was eminent among the Ætolians. Athen. l. 2. c. 2. Æl. l. 12. c. 22.

<sup>4</sup> The disagreement found, among antient writers, concerning that eminent tyrant, has been noticed in the appendix to the fourth

chapter of this history. Inclined, when engaged in that early part of the history to hold to the text of Herodotus, as it stands in our copies, all that has fallen in my way since to observe, including some adverse argument, has tended, I will own, only to strengthen my early opinion.

the Greek nation. Already in his own age, less than a century and half later, Argos had wholly lost its preëminence; Siris, Trapezus, Pæos, Cranon, and Scopadæ remained hardly names for history; Sybaris was annihilated. In unceasing strife, with oneanother, and within themselves, all the Grecian republics were overborne by Lacedæmon and Athens; powerful chiefly through their constitutions, better adapted for conquest; and Greece was no longer a country in which the road to fame was open to its whole population: political and military eminence, and high consideration, were limited to the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens.

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this hist.

We have formerly observed Xenophon remarking that, after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, whatever a Lacedæmonian commanded was, throughout Greece, implicitly obeyed. Before that war the concurrence of Athens was requisite to procure such universal obedience. During the short involution of interests of the leading parties in those imperial republics, even distant Molossis found it expedient to obey their joint injunction. The great Athenian, Themistocles, as we have formerly seen, obnoxious to both, banished from Athens, perhaps in regular course of law, and then, by their joint arbitrary commands, driven from republics friendly to him, hoped at length to find security in Molossis from the liberality of its king, Admetus. Thither however he was pursued by ministers who, in the name of the two imperial governments, demanded the surrender of his person. This the Molossian prince refused; not however without apology, which apparently a reasonable policy required: but Themistocles was thus inabled to prosecute his flight to the surer refuge which he found in the Persian empire.

Ch. 11. s. 4.

When, not long after, that war broke out which under the lead of the two imperial states, divided the republics, during so many years, against oneanother, the northern kingdoms, Molossis and Macedonia, appear to have avoided immediate implication; neither being mentioned by Thucydides in naming the allies of each party at its beginning. But hostilities, which incidental information shows to have been almost incessant among even the smallest of the republics, even those too insignificant to be noticed by the historians of the nation, unless when any interest of an imperial people was materially implicated, had been previously raging among the little states on the southern border of Molossis; and soon this so ingaged the attention of the greater contending powers, that it appears to have become expedient or even necessary for the Molossians to choose their party.

Macedonia,

Macedonia, divided by Molossis from the scene of actual hostilities, was less immediately threatened; yet its politic king, Perdiccas, was led by apprehension of the consequences to take a part. Not friendly to Lacedæmon, but more fearing the wild ambition of the Athenian people, and their means of affecting the interests of his kingdom through their naval power, and yet anxious to avoid provoking their resentment, he sent a thousand men, not publicly acknowledging them as in his service, to act under the orders of the Lacedæmonian general commanding in those parts. At this time the king of Molossis, Tharyps<sup>5</sup>, son of Admetus, was under age, and a regent administered the government. The Molossians, an inland people, had less to fear from the superior navy of Athens, than from the preponderant landforce of Lacedæmon; while, at the same time, the politics of the Athenian democracy, and its ordinary treatment of those whom it styled allies, would be more alarming than any politics yet avowed by Lacedæmon, or any known conduct of its government. The Molossians, in these circumstances, decided openly for the Lacedæmonian alliance, and the regent in person led a body to join the Lacedæmonian commander in Acarnania.

Thucyd. l. 3.  
c. 110.

Here two matters deserve notice, with a view to the principal subject before us: first, the accordance, in the Molossian practice, with what we have observed to have been generally held among the Greeks, from Homer's age to Aristotle's, that it was the duty as well as the right of kings, and consequently of regents, to exercise in person military command; and, secondly, what is more important, the steddiness of the Molossian constitution, in maintaining regular succession to the throne: in Molossis, it appears, a minor was not superseded, as formerly in modern European kingdoms (of which, in our own, the reign of our great Alfred is an example) on account of temporary inability from nonage.

<sup>5</sup> The name of this prince is found variously written, Tharyps, Tharypus, Tharytas. Thucydides informs us that even the Ætolian dialect of the Greek language, little distant as Ætolia was from Attica, could hardly be understood by an Athenian. (Thucyd. l. 3. c. 95. ch. 15. s. 6. of this hist.) Molossis, being considerably more distant, it seems likely

that a difficulty for writing a Molossian name might arise from peculiarities in the Molossian pronuntiation; as with us, greatly as the provincial dialects have within the last half century been wearing out, a Somersetshire man might yet have difficulty to write, or even speak, the name of a man of the Yorkshire dales, after that man's own pronuntiation.



In the progress of the war between the two imperial republics the contest, as we have formerly seen, was so led to other parts as to afford the happy opportunity used by the little states of Acarnania and southern Epirus, with a wise moderation, rare among the Grecian republics, for establishing a lasting peace among themselves. As then the fidelity of the regent of Molossis to his trust appears honorable both to himself and to the Molossian constitution, so the conduct of the young king afterward would also reflect honor on both. Tharyps is said to have used the opportunity of peace all around his little dominion for going to Athens, the metropolis of science, to acquire knowledge under the professors of all sciences there; and he has had the credit, among the later Greek writers, of having become eminent both for learning, and for able and beneficial conduct in the government of his kingdom. Plutarch's eulogy seems to indicate that much of the advantageous character of the north-western Greeks, which, according to the testimony of Polybius, formerly noticed, they maintained to his age, was owing to the improvements introduced by Tharyps.

Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.  
Polyb. l. 4.  
p. 299.  
Ch. 15. s. 6.  
of this hist.

Thenceforward Molossis appears to have enjoyed a fortunate historical obscurity, till the great Philip of Macedonia brought it into notice of Grecian writers, in a way alien to the republican system, by marrying Olympias, sister of its sovereign Alexander. Then we get Aristotle's assurance, that the government was a limited monarchy, and of the more strictly limited, nearly resembling the Lacedæmonian; and further, that it was of great antiquity, being among the oldest known to have subsisted to his time without revolution. In treating of the age following that of Aristotle, a very interesting particular of the Molossian constitution is mentioned by Plutarch. According to immemorial custom the Molossians assembled in Passaron, the capital, to swear allegiance to the king; and, among solemn sacrifices, oaths were mutual, the king swearing to maintain the free constitution, and the people not only to support the king in the royal dignity, but also to maintain it in his family.

Arist. Polit.  
l. 5. c. 10  
& 11.

Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.

T. Liv. l. 45. The Roman historian's account of the destructive ravage of Molossis by his fellowcountrymen, almost to the extermination of the people, in the next following age, may then deserve some observation here: for, whatever may be thought of the coloring which he has endeavoured to put upon

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contests

contests of the Molossians among themselves, concerning the succession to the throne, it is enough evident that the oppression of Roman republican dominion, under which they had been reduced, drove them to the un-availing exertion, for the recovery of their former freedom, which drew on them the flagitious vengeance of the Roman senate; that body which its own historians, in their grossly-flattering pictures, compared, for its dignity, to a congress of kings, yet by facts, which its historians could not conceal, showed itself already, in that boasted era of the republic, a fit instrument for a future Nero. But on that interesting portion of general history this is not a place for more<sup>6</sup>.

### SECTION III.

#### *Constitution of the Kingdom of Macedonia.*

ARISTOTLE, classing together the Lacedæmonian kingdom, the Athenian, the Molossian and the Macedonian, as examples of limited monarchy, indicates their general character to have been congenial with that of the constitution described by Homer, the oldest known to the Greeks, and from which he considered all legal kingdoms, existing in his time, to have been derived. The three latter, however, would differ very considerably from the first, whose extraordinary peculiarities nevertheless were ingrafted on the old general system, to which the others, with less deviation, adhered.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in his life of P. Æmilius, has almost exactly copied Livy for these transactions in Molossis. Apparently he has reckoned that, in relating what was so disgraceful to Rome, commanding in his time, with absolute power almost the known world, prudence required that he should appeal to the Roman writer for his justification. The narrative of Polybius, now unfortunately lost, and known only from a short quotation by Livy's cotemporary, Strabo, was, in Livy's age, in all libraries; and probably other accounts were extant, more free than that of Polybius, who could not but be under restraint from his connection with the Cornelian and Æmilian families. Livy has obviously had in view to soften and apologize for what was notoriously flagitious in the conduct of the Roman Senate and its renowned general; and yet, even in his account, the arrogance, illiberality, and cruelty of the Roman republican government are strongly marked, and must be to all minds, not of Roman republican temper, highly disgusting.

Probably

Probably the Macedonian differed from the Molossian little; perhaps only as, in the course of ages, difference of fortune brought change of circumstances. Of one material difference of this kind we have authentic information. The Molossians maintained themselves within their original limits, or nearly so: the Macedonians, in very early times, extended conquest greatly; so that the territory of the Macedonian monarchy became many times greater than that of Molossis. For the circumstances of these conquests, and the immediate result to the conquered people, information fails; but evidence remains that, in the end, the same, or nearly the same, liberal constitution pervaded the Macedonian kingdom. Not that the union was perfect, or that the system had not great defects. We have observed, in the preceding history, provinces under the dominion of princes owing allegiance to the general government, yet in circumstances to resist it; as formerly, in the modern European kingdoms, districts under the authority of dukes, lords marchers, earls and barons. But as, under the kings of England, conquerors of Cornwall, Wales, and Ireland, the people of those countries were admitted to participate in all the rights of English subjects, so the people of all the countries owing allegiance to the Macedonian crown, participating, we are assured, in the Macedonian name, appear also to have held equal rights as Macedonian subjects. Lyncestis, far from the capital, on the western border against Illyria, had long its own hereditary princes, Greeks from Corinth, a kind of feudatories under the Macedonian kings; yet the people are called by Thucydides Lyncestian Macedonians<sup>7</sup>; and in the sequel we shall have occasion to observe that, in the common government, under one sovereign, there was little if any difference of privilege for the subjects of the different provinces; little even for those not of Grecian race, as the Agrians, who were reckoned among the people called barbarians. But, with this extension of the Macedonian name, all the Macedonian people could not assemble for political purposes, like the Molossian, in one place. Those assemblies of the Macedonians therefore, of which we read, apparently must have been several, in the several provinces.

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Thucyd. l. 2.  
c. 99.

<sup>7</sup> Τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων ἐισὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ελειμιῶται, καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη, ἃ ξύμμαχα μὲν ἐστὶ τοῖς καὶ ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ δ' ἔχει καὶ αὐτὰ.

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 99. Ἀρεῖβᾱιον τὸν Βρομερῶν, Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων Βασιλεῖα. l. 1. c. 8.



Of writers, after the age of Aristotle, information concerning the Macedonian constitution might most be looked for from Arrian. But as Aristotle, for cause sufficiently indicated in his treatise, together with what we know of his situation, has avoided it, so Arrian, high in employment, civil and military, under a despotic government, then pervading the civilized world, appears to have judged it necessary to confine himself to a military history of Alexander. Nevertheless, in the course of his narrative, he speaks repeatedly and decisively of the Macedonian as a limited monarchy. In one passage he sets it in direct contrast with the absolute monarchy of Persia. Classing the Macedonians with the republican Greeks, he says, ‘they were a high-spirited people, whereas the minds of the Persians were humbled and debased by their subjection to a despotic authority<sup>3</sup>;’ and, in the sequel of his narrative, facts are related, perfectly warranting this character of the Macedonian constitution; facts not resting on his single authority, but corroborated by a concurrence of antient testimonies, which will occur for notice in the sequel of this history.

With such assurance that the Macedonian was a limited monarchy, it remains desirable to know what was the extent of the monarch’s authority, and what were the constitutional restrictions upon it. Throughout Grecian history, from Homer inclusively downward, equally in regal, aristocratical,

<sup>3</sup>—Μακεδόνας τε καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Μήδους, ἐκ πάντων πολλῶν τρυφῶσιν, ἀντιθετοὺς ἐν τοῖς πόντοις τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πάσαις ἡδὴ μετὰ κινδύνων ἀσκουμένους, ἑλλως τε καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐλευθέρους ἐς χειρὰς ἔχειν. Ὅσοι τε Ἕλληνες Ἕλλησιν. κ. τ. ε. Arr. de exp. Alex. l. 2. c. 7. A curious instance of that malice, observed formerly to have been so common, in modern times, among men of letters of the continent against Philip, in favor of Demosthenes, and against kings, in favor of republics, and thence generally against the Macedonians, is conspicuous in the Latin translation of Vulcanius here. But all his ingenuity has been insufficient to make his Latin hold well together for his purpose of taking the epithet ἐλευθέρους from the Macedonians, to give it exclusively to the republican Greeks serving in each army, so as to force, as he desired,

the application of the term δούλοι to the Macedonians equally with the Persians. The learned editor Gronovius, disposed as he was to the same cause, has had too much respect for his author to favor such perversion of the intended meaning. By his pointing, he has made it clear for the reader that the Macedonians are included under the epithet ἐλευθέρους. The words themselves indeed sufficiently mark it. Were confirmation needful, Arrian himself has furnished it in the next sentence, mentioning the Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, and Agrians, as the barbarians of Alexander’s army, and thus distinctly marking the Macedonians as, in his estimation, Greeks. The value of the term δούλοι has been considered on a former occasion.

Ch. 5. s. 3.  
of this hist.

and democratical constitutions, the military character and the civil are seen united in every free subject, insomuch that difference of law for the city and the camp are rarely discernible. In every antient constitution, unless where tyranny, whether exercised by a single person, or an oligarchy, or a democracy, denied to some the privilege, it was equally the right and the duty of every member of the commonwealth to attend in arms at the chief magistrate's call; and, very generally, the chief civil magistrate, so far filling the office of the kings of old, was the chief military commander. The extraordinary constitution of Lacedæmon furnished an exception; the kings, hereditary chiefs, as of old, in military business, being subordinate in civil. At Athens the refinements of democratical sovereignty provided a different exception; the polemarch, chief of the war-department, was only third in rank in the college of chief magistrates called archons. At Athens, nevertheless, experience of the necessities of military business, in the course of frequent wars, produced what effectually overbore the principle of that arrangement: a commander-in-chief was elected, with special power to supersede, in command of the forces, the authority of the polemarch, who was thus reduced to the condition of a civil officer, a kind of secretary at war. But moreover the general was vested with a civil power, that of calling, at his pleasure, an assembly of the people, which gave him means for an effectual superiority over all the proper civil officers. Less subject to controul than the kings of Lacedæmon, who were under the separate check of the senate and of the ephors, the general of Athens was dependent on none but the assembly of the people; where the majority, which had raised, was generally disposed to support him; so that the general was, in effect, for the time, king of Athens.

Arist. Polit.  
l. 7. c. 14.

It is observed by Aristotle that, among all the nations which, to his time, had acquired celebrity, a state of war had been principally in the legislator's view; and this more with the purpose of conquest, and the command of neighboring people, than of the maintenance of peace and security. Stating examples, he remarkably mixes Greek and barbarian; of the former, noticing only Cretan and Lacedæmonian; of the latter, Scythian, Persian, Thracian and Celtic. In proceeding then he mentions institutions, similar in Carthage and in Macedonia, having for their object to excite and maintain a military disposition among the people. The assurance

thus

thus that the Macedonians were a military people, and that their military character was supported by popular institutions similar to those of a republic, is important toward elucidation of the character of the government.

It may seem probable that the entertaining of foreign troops for hire, so ordinary among the Grecian republics, originated with tyrants and usurpers. We have observed it remarked by Aristotle, as a criterion for distinguishing kings from tyrants, that kings rested their security on the support of native subjects in arms; tyrants hired foreigners for their guard. Yet how early and how extensively that resource of tyrants was adopted among the republics, insomuch that foreigners, not Greeks only, but barbarians, were entertained by them for hire, and not only to fight their battles in the field, but to defend their walls, and be the protectors of their domestic security, we have also had occasion to remark. Even at Athens we have observed Isocrates complaining of this as a growing evil. But nothing of the kind do we read of in Macedonia. The Macedonian military, mentioned by Thucydides to have been so greatly improved by the king his cotemporary, Archelaus, was, evidently, the national force. At a following time, when the Macedonian throne was contested by rival branches of the royal family, the leading men of Lacedæmon, as we have remarked Xenophon, who lived among them, relating, admonished the expelled king, Amyntas, father of the great Philip, that he should engage a mercenary force to recover his kingdom. This remonstrance seems to imply the backwardness of a Macedonian prince to resort to an expedient revolting to the Macedonians, to whom he still looked for support. In the same age nevertheless, and in an adjoining country, Thessaly, where Amyntas had powerful friends, the great tagus Jason afforded example of the acquisition and maintenance of dominion by a hired force. But the sequel of Xenophon's narrative indicates that Amyntas obtained his insuing success by means less likely to excite alarm and offence in Macedonia; his principal assistance, in addition to the native force, whose attachment he preserved, being obtained from that party of the Thessalian people which for ages, had been friendly to his family. After this again, two princes, claiming the throne against the sons of Amyntas, successively came into the country with hired troops; but both failed. The silence then of

Arist. Polit.  
l. 5. c. 10.

Ch. 35. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Ch. 27. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Ch. 34. s. 2.



Demosthenes on the subject is proof, more cogent than the positive assertion of a friendly writer, that Philip's power never rested on a hired force. Aristotle has observed well, that those who compose the military of a state can choose whether the existing constitution shall remain or be overthrown. Where therefore the whole nation has been, for ages, as the Macedonian, in the habit of holding and using arms, despotism can hardly be <sup>9</sup>.

But this the most powerful of possible checks upon the tyrannical power of a single chief, is that which is most liable to be abused, and become itself tyrannical. Accordingly we have seen its excesses frequent and great among the Grecian republics. Of the Macedonian constitution therefore we want further to know what were the regular popular authorities which, in concurrence with those of the prince, completed the sovereign power. For this important matter, remaining information is indeed scanty. Classed by Aristotle with the Lacedæmonian, yet, in the Macedonian constitution, neither a senate is found, as at Lacedæmon, the guardian of aristocratical rights, nor magistrates, like the ephors, armed with authority to maintain the cause of the lower orders. Two writers, however, Diodorus and Curtius, speak in direct terms of popular assemblies; marking decisively, so far as their authority goes, a constitutional share of the sovereignty, held, as in the kingdoms of the heroic ages, by the people at large; and it is a matter of a kind for which their authority may be least questionable. According to Diodorus, on the death of Perdiccas son of Amyntas, when his brother Philip's claim to the throne was disputed by Argæus, assemblies of the people were held in which Philip's eloquence greatly promoted his cause. On Philip's death he mentions similar assemblies held; and, on Alexander's death, when the question arose, singularly momentous then, and in a case of singular difficulty, who was best intitled to be successor to the newly acquired empire, and, afterward, what measures should follow, all was referred to a general assembly of the Macedonians present, as representatives of the Macedonian people.<sup>10</sup>

Ch. 34. s. 4.  
of this hist.

Ch. 44. s. 1.

Diod. l. 18.  
c. 2, & 4.

<sup>9</sup> Οἱ γὰρ τὰν ὅπλων κέρει καὶ μόνῳ καὶ μὴ μέλλειν τὴν πολιτείαν κέρει. Arist. Polit. l. 7. c. 9. p. 582. ed. Paris. 1654.

<sup>10</sup> Ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τὰν Μακεδόνων ἐγένετο ἀπολογεῖσθαι τοὺς τοῦτο διεκρούοντες. Diod. l. 18. c. 4.

The more immediate subject of Curtius has been the criminal law. ‘Judgement on life and death,’ he says, ‘by the immemorial law of Q. Curt. l. 6. Macedonia, was reserved to the people: the king’s authority was c. 8. ‘unavailing but under warrant of the law.’ The similarity of the law of our own country, derived from our Anglosaxon forefathers, and formerly common to most of western Europe, will here be striking.

Among the antients, very generally, the law for the city and the camp, at home and abroad, were the same. According to the Macedonian constitution then, for decision on life and death, at home the people, abroad the army, was the jury. Strongly distinguished as civil and military law commonly have been in modern times, this may appear to modern minds, among what remains reported, most doubtful, and yet is that to which the most undeniable testimony remains. Among the antients a military power, distinct from the civil, and more arbitrary, seems first observable among the Lacedæmonians, but is first clearly and strongly marked in the history of the Romans. Admitted originally among that great military people, like the tyrannical authority of a dictator, occasionally, on the plea of necessity, the crafty leaders of the Roman councils procured lasting acquiescence under it, by bribing their soldiery with the spoil of the unfortunate people they conquered; and thus, through a union, then peculiar to themselves, of severe discipline and ready zeal, they promoted their conquests. In the sequel of this history instances will occur of practice, among the Macedonians, according to the law mentioned by Curtius. A very remarkable one, of an age later than that to which this volume will extend, it may be advantageous, for immediate illustration and assurance, to notice here.

Polybius lived while the Macedonian kingdom yet existed; and not in diminished splendor; for its monarch, conquered and plundered by the Romans within the same age, was, according to their great historian, Livy, Liv. l. 45. one of the richest potentates of the time. Polybius, in his history of what passed in his own country, Peloponnesus, while his father was a leading man there, relates as follows: The commander of a body detached from a Macedonian army, acting under the king in person, was arrested on accusation of high treason. The detachment, alarmed for their commander, of whose crime they were not conscious, sent hastily a deputation to the king, demanding ‘that the trial of the accused should await their return to head-

Polyb. l. 5.  
p. 357. ed.  
Casaub.

'quarters; otherwise they should reckon themselves unworthily treated, 'and should highly resent it.' Such free communication with their kings, the historian proceeds to say, the Macedonians always held". The circumstances being highly critical, for the king's life was threatened, the return of the detachment was not waited for; and indeed the probability that the main body of the army, actually with the king, was legally competent to try the accused, so that nothing was done against the constitution, will be found strengthened by circumstances occurring for notice in the sequel of this history.

With the assurance that the military law of Macedonia gave to the Macedonian people, on foreign military service, even upon accusation of high treason, the privilege of being tried by their fellow-soldiers, the information of Curtius, that the Macedonian people at home held equal privilege, appears completely supported. Abuses of authority, found under all governments, and prominent in the conduct of all factions among the Grecian republics, would hardly fail in a country agitated as we have seen Macedonia. But, in any monarchy, for the royal authority, limited by the military, to be unlimited by the civil law, controlled legally in the army, to be, by law or custom, uncontrolled in the state, were an extravagance, not merely unlikely, but, it may be ventured to say, impossible.

Through the circumstances thus authentically reported then, we have assurance, with confirmation yet to come in the course of the history, not only that the royal authority in Macedonia was constitutionally limited, but how it was effectually limited; judgement, in capital cases, being reserved to the people; and the maintenance of this important right being assured by the most powerful warranty, the general possession and practice of arms by the people. Hardly have we equal proof that equal security for individuals was provided by law in any republic of Greece.

It were very desirable to know what was the LEGISLATIVE power in Macedonia. But, as we have observed that Aristotle, neither in criticizing numerous governments existing in his time, has noticed a legislature, nor in his project for a perfect government, has proposed one, and that, excepting

" *Ἔχον γὰρ αἱ τοιαύτην ἰσχυρίαν Μακεδόνες* any other language so strongly mark a free  
*πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς.* Polyb. l. 5. p. 357. ed. constitution as the Greek term *ἰσχυρία*, here  
 Cassaub. Hardly will any single word in used by Polybius.



the Athenian, hardly any account remains of the legislature of any republic of Greece, it cannot be surprizing if concerning legislation in Macedonia information fails. Aristotle is large on the office of a legislator ; meaning one authorized by the popular voice, like Minos, Solon, Lycurgus, and others, to frame a constitution, with a system of law to be complete for all purposes. But he remarks justly the impossibility of adapting the most voluminous system of law to every possible case ; whence it was common, among the Grecian republics, he says, to commit much to the magistrate's discretion ; so that in fact, power was by the constitution given him to make the law for the occasion. Possibly Aristotle has been urged to adopt so extravagantly hazardous an expedient, in his own system, by observation of the evils of that opposite extravagance at Athens, complained of, as we have formerly seen, by Isocrates ; where decrees of the multitude, the unbalanced sovereign, at the suggestion of demagogues, favorites of the moment, were so multiplied, with such haste and so little circumspection, that, in many cases, the citizens could not know to which of many laws they were in the moment subject.

Sect. 1. of  
this chap.

Ch. 35. s. 1.  
of this hist.

In the regal governments of the early ages, legislation, not less than capital condemnation, evidently rested with the people at large. But, even in the smaller states this was inconvenient, and in the larger, for regular practice, impossible ; whence appears to have arisen the maxim, so extensively adopted, and so decidedly approved and recommended by Aristotle, that laws, once established, were not to be altered ; but the magistrate's discretion, for decision adapted to the exigency, rather to be trusted. That the legislative system, throughout the Grecian republics, was very imperfect Aristotle has largely shown. The Roman republican constitution, probably derived from Greece, confessedly improved through diligent inquiry after Grecian models, and altogether better than any Grecian constitution of which any account remains, had yet, among its excellencies, great imperfections. Its legislature was extraordinary. Laws, binding upon the whole people, were made by the people at large ; assembled, at the discretion of the magistrate, in two ways, so different that they were, in effect, different assemblies ; insomuch that what the people, assembled in one way, would enact, assembled in the other way they would not enact ; and laws binding on the whole people were also occasionally enacted by the senate, without the participation

Blackstone  
Com. on laws  
of England,  
introd. s. 2.

s. 3.

participation of the people. Such conflicting powers of legislation were likely to produce multiplied, and sometimes inconsistent, enactments. But, the Roman democracy being more constitutionally balanced than the Athenian, a discretionary power was allowed to the prætor's court to adapt decisions to the equity of the case. These decisions, recorded, obtained authority as precedents, for future decision in similar cases; and thus that court seems to have furnished the spring-head of systematic equity, as distinguished from law, in our own country, and throughout modern Europe. Such distinction in the legal system is found necessary under all governments, for correction, as our Blackstone expresses it after Grotius, 'of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality is deficient.' But in our constitution alone has the advantage grown of a separation of the two powers; limiting the courts of law to decision by the letter, and committing the power of relief, where equity may require it, to courts appropriated to the purpose. These, our learned judge proceeds to say, 'have been established for the benefit of the subject; to detect latent frauds, which the process of the courts of law is not adapted to reach; to enforce the execution of such matters of trust as are binding in conscience, tho not cognizable in a court of law; to deliver from dangers owing to misfortune or oversight; and to give a more specific relief, and more adapted to the circumstances of the case, than can always be obtained by the generality of the rules of the positive or common law. This is the business of the courts of equity; which however are only conversant in matters of property. For the freedom of our constitution will not permit that, in criminal cases, a power should be lodged in any judge to construe the law otherwise than according to the letter. This caution, while it admirably protects the public liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals: a man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns; but he may suffer less; the law cannot be strained, by partiality, to inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but in cases where the letter induces any apparent hardship, the crown has the power to pardon.'

This excellence of legal system, not found among the republics of Greece, nor in Rome, nor in modern Europe beyond our own country, will hardly be looked for in Macedonia. There nevertheless the criminal law assured a large degree of freedom for the subject, of which hereafter proof will be

seen

seen in authentic accounts of the practice. The popular power, indeed, under that law, appears to have been most rudely exercised, yet perhaps not more so than in many or perhaps most of the Grecian republics; and the course of proceeding resembled very nearly what we find related, on highest authority, of the Jews; who seem also, conformably to Aristotle's system, to have been without a legislative power, limited to the Mosaic law. In Macedonia, the king, as of old, still executed the office of chief justice of his kingdom, if the authority of the later ancient writers should be admitted, who, in consonance with Homer, have reckoned this not the privilege more than the duty of kings. Thus, like the judges of many Grecian republics, and those proposed by Aristotle for his own imaginary state, the kings of Macedonia would have a hazardous extent of power. But that they had alone authority to make laws binding on their people, any more than the kings of Homer's age, no-where appears.

Ch. 42. s. 6.  
of this hist.

Among the Grecian republics we have observed many REPRESENTATIVE assemblies; the Amphictyonic, representing nearly the whole nation; the Calaurian, the Panionian, the Phocian, and others, representing portions of the nation; and, beside these, frequent occasional assemblies of the representatives of several confederated states. But no mention occurs of a representative assembly in Macedonia; and a general assembly of all the Macedonian people, as already observed, the extent of the country denied. Apparently therefore the Macedonian assemblies, of which we read, must have been several, in the several cities and provinces; which, possibly, and even probably, differed in constitution and laws; and yet perhaps less than those of the modern kingdoms of France and Spain. The Macedonian cities, under their king, as the Thessalian, under their tagus, evidently held their several municipal governments in a considerable degree of independency. The revolt of Pydna, under Archelaus, and the measure resorted to afterward for insuring its future allegiance; the readiness with which, in the early part of the reign of Amyntas, so many towns followed their choice to secede from the Macedonian kingdom and become members of the Olynthian confederacy; the revolt again of Pydna, under Philip, managed by one party, and its restoration to the Macedonian kingdom by another; that fact, of such anomalous aspect, yet so fully ascertained, Philip's gratuitous resignation of his sovereignty over the Macedonian

Ch. 34. s. 2  
of this hist.

Ch. 35. s. 3.  
& ch. 36. s. 1

town



Ch. 29. s. 2. town of Anthemus, for the purpose of its becoming a member of the republican confederacy of Olynthus, and finally his popularity among the republics of the Chalcidic peninsulas, and their general disposition to become members of the Macedonian monarchy, in preference to being subject allies of the Athenian commonwealth, matters all resting on the best authorities, concur to indicate principles in the Macedonian government favorable to liberty. All information indeed makes it probable that the municipal constitutions of the Macedonian towns were nearly analagous to those of the towns of Thessaly, on one side, and of the Chalcidic peninsulas on another, and less liable to be overborne by the power of the Macedonian crown than the Thessalian by a tagus, or the Chalcidic by the imperial democracy of Athens; yet better united, through their common attachment to one royal family, hereditary chiefs of the state.

As of the cities, so we find, of the extensive provinces of Macedonia, indication of power constitutionally resting in the hands of the people; little differing in amount or quality, but as the nature of things commanded; the people of the cities being in large proportion traders and handicraftmen, those of the country husbandmen, herdmen, and hunters. In the course of the previous history of Macedonia, we have observed great vassals of the crown holding extensive lordships, in the inland country, with a princely authority; bearing evident analogy, in office and dignity, to the lords marchers formerly, of England, and over the continent of Europe. Inferior landholders would not be likely to ingage the notice of historians of the Greek republics, who have transmitted these circumstances. But the assurance that the Macedonians all held arms, that the popular institutions promoted a military spirit, and in peace encouraged the chace, as advantageous preparation for the toils of service in war, institutions marked as resting on the customary law of the land, and not depending on the pleasure or immediate needs of the monarch, implies the farther assurance that the landholders held civil rights, inabling them to assert a dignified freedom; and that these civil rights  
extended

extended throughout the provinces of the Macedonian kingdom, is indicated by what presently we shall have occasion to observe. It seems thus altogether probable that each province and each city made regulations for itself, under some superintending controul of the king's acknowledged prerogative. Looking backward then to Homer, and forward to Alexander's history, it seems farther probable that, if laws were made for the whole nation, it was, as formerly in modern Europe, by the nation assembled in arms; its defenders being considered as its representatives. Nor is an instance of this wanting; recorded indeed only by a writer not always to be trusted, yet carrying marks of just authority. Alexander, in the midst of his conquests, having in hunting exposed himself to great danger in contest with a lion, the Macedonians of his army, according to national custom, the historian says, taking the matter into consideration, decreed 'That the king should not hunt afoot, nor without attendants of a quality to be answerable for his safety\*.'

Q. Curt. l. 8.  
c. 1. s. 15.

A constitution capable of assuring freedom to a people, with good government and means for defence (both indispensable toward maintenance of freedom) is of necessity a very complex machine; insomuch that how it may best be constructed has been a question for many ages, not yet decided. Hence it may be the less matter for wonder, if, in looking to the construction of constitutions found, in practice and effect, most providing those benefits, parts of great importance have escaped the observation of very acute inquirers; so far at least as to have failed of due estimation. But especially those most familiar with things are apt to undervalue them. Thus it remained for the foreiner Delolme to show the just importance of some matters in the English constitution, overlooked by

\* The passage in Curtius is altogether, I think, among those of value in the work of that able but licentious writer. It accounts reasonably for a story among the most extravagant, of the many extravagant that were circulated concerning Alexander; and all that it asserts carries all appearance of having been derived from authority cotemporary

with the transactions. 'Fabulam quæ ob-  
' jectum leoni a rege Lysimachum temere  
' evulgavit, ab eo casu, quam supra diximus,  
' ortam crediderim. Cæterum Macedones,  
' quanquam prospere eventu defunctus erat,  
' tamen scivere, gentis suæ more, ne pedes  
' venaretur, aut sine delectis principum  
' amicorumque.' Q. Curt. l. 8. c. 1. s. 17, 18.

the many able English writers who had previously written on it. Still, such is the complexity of a free government, very important points remained for circumstances to bring forward into just notice. The French minister of state Calonne, whom civil discord forced to seek refuge in a foreign land, was led, in his residence in England, to remark the amalgamation of ranks here as a singularity among European nations, and of a most advantageous character; producing a community of interest among the millions composing the population, whence resulted a harmony, a mutual security, and a national strength, unseen elsewhere. Nevertheless, tho intimately connected with this, another matter, of vital importance, remained for another foreigner duly to remark. Local administration in the hands of the people, in divisions and subdivisions, is necessary for the very foundation of freedom in an extensive country. Among ourselves, to whom this is familiar, its peculiarity is apt to escape observation: the supposition that it is, or may be, ordinary elsewhere readily offers itself. But, to the acute foreign observer Divernois, the peculiarity has been striking. Many thousand important offices, very far the greater part of those necessary for local administration, he has observed, are in constant course of performance without salary; and, these being for all ranks, from the peer, through the high sheriff and the juryman, down to the tithingman, and in large proportion taken in rotation, some hundreds of thousands of men thus, each in his degree, partake in the energies of government. Such is the broad basis on which the English constitution rests, and on which legislation by parliament (too generally considered, even at home, but still more by foreigners, as all in all) depends for assurance of its value, and even of its existence. Promotion then being denied to none, but, on the contrary, the ascent easy and ordinary from the condition of the workman for daily pay to that which qualifies for bearing the burthen of tithing and parish offices, and thence to higher, and by degrees to the highest, the English government thus is the completest commonwealth (its ordinary title in queen Elizabeth's days) known in history.

In the Athenian, and probably other Grecian republics, attendance on civil business was required, of the lower people, only in the general assembly  
and



and in the courts of justice; and for attendance there a small pay was given. For the higher public offices no pay was allowed; they were imposed as honorable, but often severe, burthens on the wealthy. It was therefore esteemed a valuable reward, for eminent services, to receive a grant of immunity from such burthens. The mention then, by Arrian, of such immunity granted to Macedonians, concurs with various other indications to imply that the provincial administration in Macedonia was not, as in the modern kingdoms of the continent, wholly directed by officers of the monarch's nomination; but, as in the Grecian republics formerly, and the English commonwealth now, imposed principally on those subjects who were of substance to bear the burthen of offices without salary, and to be responsible for the due execution of them.

Arr. de exp.  
Alex. l. 7.  
c. 10.

How far Aristotle ever avowed to the princes his patrons those political principles, adverse to monarchy, which he has asserted in his political treatise, which, not till after his death, it is said, was published, we do not learn: but, as it is obvious that they could not be agreeable to any princes, so it is not less clear that, not only they were inconsistent with the existence of a government for a country of the extent of the Macedonian kingdom, but also that they were highly tyrannical toward a larger portion of mankind than that for which they proposed assurance of freedom. Thus the admission of them would be not more adverse to the inclination of those princes, than inconsistent with their duty toward that large portion of the population of their kingdom which had supported them in their inherited claims, and which was evidently attached to the constitution, as, for ages, it had stood.

Altogether the Macedonian constitution appears to have borne a very near resemblance to that of the modern European kingdoms in early times; when the combined civil and military powers were divided among lordships, similar in essence tho various in denomination, dukedoms, marches, earldoms, baronies; all of limited monarchal character; intermingled among which the corporate towns had constitutions truly republican. Lordships and townships together acknowledged the sovereignty of one king; especially his right to command their service in arms for common defence. Slavery existed

existed among them, as among the antient republics, but apparently a less numerous and more mitigated slavery. The people, of all ranks, above slavery, in cities and throughout the country, held the important right of judgement on life and death, and of bearing arms for common defence against forein or domestic disturbers of the common peace.

The perfection of civil polity in our own country, raised, in the course of more than ten centuries, within historical information, on foundation formed in times beyond knowlege, has led some eminent men, viewing the improvements at the Revolution and since, and seeing, as in all human institutions ever must be, imperfections yet remaining, to reckon themselves warranted in asserting that, before the Revolution, there was no true liberty here. Surely enough there can be no perfect liberty here, or anywhere on earth : for wherever there is government, the natural liberties of individuals must be subject to controll. But without government they are subject to far severer controll ; the weak being without resource against the strong, and the few against the many. Question therefore about true, or reasonable, or sufficient liberty may be endless. But, compared with most other nations, with necessary exception always for war within the country, or its immediate results, overbearing, for a time, civil establishments, the English nation, it may be fairly said, was always free. Justice is wanting among historians, on that score, even to the Norman reigns. The debt of all posterity to the first of the Plantagenets, the second Henry, is incalculable. With institutions of less value than those of our great Alfred, the Macedonians might be reckoned a free people ; yet we know not that their institutions were inferior. Such improvements as those of our second Henry, and Edward intituled first, not to bring the refinements of the Restoration, the Revolution, and aftertimes, into question, are hardly to be found anywhere else, and therefore not reasonably expected in a country in the circumstances of Macedonia. If then the general deficiency of legislative system in antient governments appear surprizing, it may be well to look at those of modern Europe. In France itself, the wiser and honester of the movers of the late revolution there, anxiously exerting their diligence, with ample powers for searching, to find precedent of revered antiquity for the forms of the free constitution which they desired

for their country, were unable to discover, not only the manner of passing a law in the old French assembly of the Three Estates, but any law that could with certainty be referred to that authority. Even for our own country, tho its history is perhaps altogether more perfect than that of any other nation, antient or modern, yet many important circumstances remain in much darkness ; especially in that highly interesting period, the contest for the crown between the houses of York and Lancaster. Even the character of the constitution, under the Plantagenets, has been found to have been not only imperfectly known but greatly misrepresented. The search among the records of the two houses of Parliament, for precedents for the regency, proposed to be established in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, has produced most important addition to all previous history, and correction for misrepresentations, to which historians, eminent for diligence and ability, in want of it, had been led ; those records demonstrating what none suspected, that in the reigns of the fourth and sixth Henries, the constitution, however less firmly established, was as well understood, and, in critical and difficult circumstances in both reigns, as completely acted upon as it could be at this day.

Toward the character of a monarchy, whence the ROYAL REVENUE arises, and what may be its amount, are important questions. Thucydides shows that, in his time, the kings of Macedonia held very extensive landed property ; and we find no other source of royal revenue intimated, till the customs of some seaports were conceded by the Thessalians to Philip. Yet his predecessor Archelaus, to execute all that has been attributed to him, must have been wealthy. Probably, among the troubles which followed his reign, the royal domains had been injured and diminished. Demosthenes, as formerly we have observed, seems to have thought that to impute to a king of Macedonia bribery with gold would be too extravagant to gain belief : but with timber, oxen, horses, sheep, he did not scruple to insinuate that Philip purchased the treasonable assistance of the ministers of his enemies. At a later period of that prince's reign Demosthenes reckoned him rich, not by his land but by his seaports, where duties were taken on importation and exportation. Those duties seem to have been the only taxes known in the Macedonian kingdom. The kings thus were not dependent upon their subjects for a necessary or perhaps an

Ch. 36. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Ch. 34. s. 1.

Ch. 39. s. 2.



ample revenue in peace. But they had not what would maintain armies, and were therefore dependent upon their subjects for service in arms, whenever their safety or their ambition, or even the good of the country required it. This formed the great security of Macedonian freedom.

Under such a constitution, however inferior to the British, the Macedonian people, in comparison of others, not excepting any Greek republic of which any information remains, might be happy as well as free; tho, for internal improvement, such a constitution was evidently ill calculated, and, even for exertion against foreign enemies, highly defective. Its deficiencies were nearly analogous to those of the French and Spanish monarchies, while yet the kings were unpossessed of despotic power. The Macedonians, under their early princes, we have seen, were conquerors; as with us the Anglosaxons of Wessex. England, becoming under Egbert one kingdom, became only by degrees afterward one state, under one law; the advantageous business, begun by the great Alfred, being completed, not till three centuries after, by the second Henry. But in Macedonia such advantageous yet difficult combination failing, the extension of dominion, as formerly in France, Spain and Germany, unless under a prince of rare abilities, producing distraction, produced weakness. Hence the opportunities for those contests for the crown, which have furnished matter for the larger portion of Macedonian history till Philip's reign. Through the deficiency of combination in the government, opportunity was continually open for the interference of foreign influence. Throughout the reign of Perdiccas son of Alexander, tho a prince of considerable talents, the intrigues of Lacedæmon and Athens, sometimes alternately, sometimes together, troubled the country. Under still abler princes, the important seaport of Pydna was withdrawn from it at least twice; and probably was among those, the best towns of the kingdom, which, at another time, seceded from it to become members of another state. But, except in that remarkable instance, occurring in extraordinary circumstances, the very inconveniencies and defects of the Macedonian government assisted to deny opportunity for any party, not headed by a popular claimant of the crown, to give any great extent to revolutionary intrigue. Generally, if portions of the people might be gained, yet antipathy of portion to portion obviated extensive seduction. But as formerly France, when neither the king was absolute, nor a good government,

Ch. 13. s. 4.  
& ch. 16. s. 4.  
this hist.

Ch. 34. s. 1.

Ch. 26. s. 2.  
& ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this hist.

government, with one legislature and one jurisprudence, held the country together, was wounded through a duke of Burgundy or a town of Rochelle, so Macedonia was assailed through a prince Argæus, or a town of Pydna.

SECTION IV.

*Comparative view of the Constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome. Indications of the Thracian Constitution. Despotic Government unknown in Europe before the rise of Republican Government in Greece.*

IN proceeding to the states most connected with Macedonia, Thessaly stands foremost for attention. Already occasion has occurred to observe some remarkable particularities of the political division and political union of that eminently fruitful and wealthy country, called the mother of Greece; and also of the old and intimate connection of a powerful party, among its many republics, with the Macedonian kingdom. That connection indicates a similarity of manners and character in the people of the two countries; at least in those of higher rank; and this we find also marked in accounts of antient authors. Neither Macedonians nor Thessalians were given, like the men of leisure in so many of the republics, to science, the fine arts, and all that the Greeks included under their term Philosophy. Neither had public buildings, especially temples, equal to some even of the smaller and more obscure of the Grecian cities. Both delighted in personal magnificence; and especially, like Cleisthenes of Sicyon and Saphanes of Arcadia, recently noticed, in a splendid hospitality. But, tho their public buildings were inferior, their private dwellings are likely to have been superior to those of the other Greeks; which, in the flourishing ages of the republican system, appear to have been generally very mean. What little remains from antiquity concerning the palace and court of the great king of Macedonia, Archelaus, cotemporary of Pericles and Thucydides, and patron of Euripides and Zeuxis, indicates even splendor in his palace and court.

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Ch. 34. s. 1.  
of this hist.

A striking general analogy between the constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome, with some important differences, may here deserve

notice; for the Roman constitution, derived from Greece, being more completely laid open to us than any of Greece, will assist toward an investigation of the character of Grecian governments.

Ch. 20. s. 4.  
of this hist.

The Thessalian constitution, the Lacedæmonian, and the Roman, it is observable, originally all acknowledged one hereditary chief. Afterward Lacedæmon had two chiefs, both hereditary; Thessaly one, not hereditary, but appointed for life; Rome generally two, but at times more, sometimes ten, elected annually. All these chiefs, or boards of chiefs, were supreme military commanders; the Roman especially exercising a despotic authority. The lives of Roman citizens, on military service, were not guarded by law against the power of consuls, or military tribunes, as those of the Macedonians against that of their kings. The spoil of conquered neighbours bribing the Roman people to allow despotism, even to their ordinary chief magistrates, in military command, prepared them for tolerating that extraordinary magistracy the dictatorship, which put the whole state under military law, subject to no rule but the supreme magistrate's will. The kings of Lacedæmon had no such authority over the Lacedæmonian people, tho Lacedæmonian military commanders would assume it over those whom they called allies. The proper powers of the tagus of Thessaly are little defined by antient writers. But all the three constitutions acknowledged a division of the free population into a higher order, arrogating to itself exclusively the magistracy; and a lower, which participated always nominally in the sovereign power, and sometimes exercised it effectually and almost exclusively. Both orders, in all three, were served by slaves. All three held dominion over subdued neighbours. The sovereignty of the Lacedæmonians we have seen most severe: the Helots and Messenians, tho not only Greeks, but, if they were distinguished, the Messenians at least, being of the same Dorian origin as the Lacedæmonians, all were in a state of absolute slavery: those even of the Lacedæmonians called Pericæcians, inhabitants of the country, associated indeed in the Lacedæmonian name, were however denied the Spartan; and, tho not slaves, were yet held in a degrading subordination. The dominion of the Thessalians over the Penestians was less harsh than that of the Lacedæmonians over the Messenians. The character of that of the Romans over the conquered people of Italy, whom they flattered, as the Athenians flattered

Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this hist.



flattered their subjects, with the title of allies, tho avoided by their historians, becomes, in large amount, known from effects, of which memorials remain. The old free population, by drafts for service in unceasing wars, and in other ways less indicated, was nearly annihilated. Its place, for cultivation of the land, was supplied by slaves; the cruel treatment of whom, mostly born to better hopes, produced those called the servile wars, which brought Rome, more than once, to the brink of ruin. In the Lacedæmonian and Roman states then, the citizens of the capital arrogated to themselves the powers of government exclusively; those of the other towns, or provinces, with whatever privileges, here more, there less, being really but their subjects. In Thessaly the citizens of no one town appear to have held any acknowledged preëminence: but, from their separate rights, or claims, evils the most monstrous resulted. So unable was the general assembly of the Thessalian people to maintain its proper sovereign authority that, unless when the one first magistrate, the tagus, could command all, either by popularity supporting military force, as the great Jason, or by a hired military, as the tyrants his successors, the towns would often severally choose their own political as well as civil measures, and make their own wars and their own alliances, with foreign powers or with one another. A feeling of the enormous mischief of this laxity of their executive government would doubtless contribute to direct that attachment of the higher orders and principal landholders, all who had the clearest interest in the establishment of civil order, and the least hope from its disturbance, to their kinsman (as, from a claimed common descent from Hercules, many of them reckoned him) the king of Macedonia.

The constitution of Lacedæmon (how far as established by Lycurgus is not known) acknowledged in later times two sovereign assemblies, one composed of those of commanding rank, another of wider admission for the population; but, for what were the common and what the several powers and privileges of these different assemblies, information fails. It appears however that, in later times at least, only when public misfortune and danger pressed on the few who held the lead, the more numerous assembly was admitted to any participation of counsel. Two different assemblies, each severally sovereign within the same state, might seem, in speculation, too strange an anomaly to hold in any government, had we

not

not full assurance of the actual exercise of sovereignty, in the Roman, through ages, by three; two, as before mentioned, differently constituted, of the people at large, and one, a select and comparatively small body, the senate. Yet, judging from consequences, the evil of this strange competition of bodies for the same authority over the whole state, in the Lacedæmonian and Roman governments, appears to have been hardly equal to that of the division of powers in the Thessalian, each holding authority too independent over different portions of the state.

But there was another monster in the Lacedæmonian government, which the Roman adopted, without any known parallel in the Thessalian. More tyrannical magistracies can hardly be imagined than the ephoralty of Lacedæmon<sup>9</sup> and the tribunate of Rome; tho the purpose of both was to obviate tyranny. Nevertheless, such was altogether the deficiency of the antient republican system that, on comparing the histories of the three governments, a resource so extravagant may seem to have been rather beneficial. This considered, and combined with what we learn of the distractions of Thessaly under its sovereign assembly, and the oppression under single tyrants, the line of policy adopted by the Thessalian nobles, in cherishing, for so many generations, as it appears they did, their connection with the kings of Macedonia, and at length making their country in a manner a portion of the Macedonian kingdom, may seem to have been not only necessary for their own welfare, but, for the body of the Thessalian people, wise, liberal and patriotic.

In the course of this history we have seen, among the Grecian republics, various forms of sovereign assemblies, with the legislative and executive powers in no known instance accurately separated. Thus also it was, we know, at Rome, with a constitution improved upon the Greek, whence it was derived. Ordinary public business, indeed, was necessarily intrusted to magistrates; king, tagus, consul, archon, Bæotarc, whatever might be their title. But, in the democratical states the people always claimed the right to controul and even direct, whenever they chose to interfere, every measure of executive government; and often, as any popular orator's view to his own ambitious purposes led him to persuade, they did interfere. Neverthe-

<sup>9</sup> Thus Aristotle, 'Οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι φάσιν, ἣ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτῇ μεγίστων τυραννίδων (λέγουσι.) Polit. l. 2. c. 6, and αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ, κ. τ. ε. c. 9. again Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν εἶχει

less, with the extravagance peculiar to that constitution, when the popular mind was strongly pointed to a particular object, they would, under similar stimulation, commit absolute power, with the title of general autocrator, to one man, a popular favorite of the moment. In the aristocratical states, as distinguished from the oligarchal, a few directing the ordinary business, all were called together for legislation; and, in difficult cases, even for authorizing the measures of executive government. This, indeed, whether with one or more persons of supereminent dignity at the head of all, appears to have been, from before Homer's time, very generally looked to as the principle of regular and legal government.

But the assembling of all, being, in small states inconvenient, in large impossible, representative government arose among the Greeks, and became even familiar. We have seen, in the Amphictyonic council, an example of antiquity beyond history. The Calaurian and the Panionian, later yet very early, were of similar character. Not till aftertimes we find notice of the several congresses of Thessaly, Bœotia, Phocis, Achaia, Elis, and Arcadia. We have observed formerly that the Amphictyonic, originally proposed as a general council of the Greek nation, lost much of that valuable character through the great early revolution, called the return of the Heraclids. Not till some ages after, the alarm, occasioned by the expectation of invasion from the overbearing power of Persia, produced a substitute for it, in the assembly of deputies from the several republics, held at Corinth. But the immediate general danger being, beyond hope, soon overborne, the purpose of a general congress was considered as fulfilled, and no such meeting ever acquired regular and permanent establishment. A partial congress was produced by the circumstances which led to the Peloponnesian war; and the eagerness of the Corinthians for engaging the Lacedæmonians in league against Athens, made Sparta, instead of their own town, which, in the general danger, appears to have been reasonably preferred (a sense of general danger often enforcing general prudence) as most commodious for the meeting of deputies from within and without the peninsula. During that long war frequent occasion occurring for the states, associated under the lead of Lacedæmon, to communicate by their representatives, something of form and order seems to have been settled by custom for the composition and proceedings of those congresses; but it does not appear that they ever obtained establishment as constitutional assemblies.



The Athenian democracy ruled those states which had engaged in its alliance, with more avowed despotism than, as far as may be learnt from history, any other of the republics which ever acquired imperial sway over states to which the title of republic continued to be allowed. The attendance of their deputies was commanded constantly at Athens: the congress of the Athenian confederacy thus was a permanent assembly. Its power and privileges however went little beyond representing grievances, and offering petitions, from the subject states; its further office being only to communicate to those states the commands of the imperial people. When, afterward, the revolting tyrannies of Athens and Lacedæmon produced opportunity for Thebes to rise to empire, under the lead of men singularly deserving popularity, those states which desired to form confederacy with the Theban government sent their deputies to Thebes.

Conformably to Aristotle's observation on the antient governments in general, the objects of all the representative assemblies of Greece appear to have been military rather than civil, defence or conquest more than domestic regulation or peaceful prosperity. Such indeed was the general partiality of the Greeks for the independent sovereignty of their several towns, and such the occasions of animosity between them, that none, even of the constitutional provincial congresses appears to have been provided with power to prevent occasional war between town and town, or even to prevent some municipalities within their proper jurisdiction from avowedly taking part with external enemies. Numerous and striking examples of this will have been observed in the histories of Thessaly and Phocis.

Excepting the council of Amphictyons, little information has reached us of the constitution or proceedings of any of the constitutional assemblies. Of that of Bœotia most might be expected; no part of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, having equally engaged the notice of historians and orators. Yet it remains uncertain, concerning that eminent confederacy, even what was the number of the great presiding officers, the Bœotarchs; whether ten, or only five, or sometimes one number, sometimes the other. Their office, we find, was elective, but who were the electors nowhere appears. Clearly it was annual; and of its character this important matter is fully authenticated, that, for all the cities of the Bœotian league, the Bœotarchs filled the office of the kings of the early ages, presiding in the general council, and commanding in the field; those cities being never-

theless qualified each as a separate republic, having its own legislature and its own administration. In Thessaly a similar authority was vested in one great officer, the Tagus; who so far more nearly approached the condition of the kings of old, as his office, tho elective, was for life. Indeed, no first magistrate of any other government of Greece, not even the kings of Lacedæmon, except as their dignity was hereditary, seems to have held so exactly the place of the kings of Homer's age as the tagus of Thessaly.

The state of the Grecian republics southward of Thessaly, and of their connexion with the Macedonian kingdom, for which we have fuller information, it has been the purpose of the preceding narrative to explain. Some remarks on the people called barbarous, whom Philip's arms or policy either united with Macedonia, or brought to subordination, may yet be requisite.

The extensive, and, at one time, very powerful nation of the Thracians, through intercourse with the Greeks for ages, in war and in peace, especially with the Athenians, came of course under notice of the three great historians, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, and, after them, of the great orator Demosthenes. In the accounts of all these writers, who all had superior opportunities for information, the barbarian character is strongly marked in the manners and institutions of the Thracian people; but with that most remarkable temperament, formerly occurring for notice, so recorded by Demosthenes as to leave no reasonable doubt of its existence, or of its efficiency. Living in arms, deifying and worshipping war, illiberal and destructive in warfare, merciless to strangers, tho unresisting, and delighting in bloodshed even of women and children, (such anomalies are sometimes found in individuals, as here in a nation) capital punishment, for whatsoever crime, was denied by their institutions absolutely and effectually. Well then may it deserve observation, that throughout modern Europe, in its early age, in our own not less than in other countries, the same principle was carried into practice, so far that, tho private war was largely tolerated, no capital punishment was, for any crime, warranted by law. Among Europeans the inference is naturally ready, that people with property and arms and courage must be free; that they will not submit to despotism, and that it cannot be forced upon them. This however, in an extended view of the world, is seen not completely founded; Asia, through all ages, and the greater part of Africa, have

Ch. 14. s. 2.  
Ch. 18. s. 6.  
& Ch. 36. s. 4.  
of this hist.

abounded with contradicting examples. But, in Asia and Africa, despotism has been maintained through the arbitrary use of the cimeter and bowstring by the sovereigns; habitually tolerated, authenticated, and even venerated by the people. Securely it may be affirmed that, where capital punishment is forbidden, despotism cannot be. Monarchy however prevailed in Thrace; limited by that power which a people, holding arms, possess to maintain established law. At one time we have seen the nation united under one chief, the most powerful of any of his day known to us, except the king of Persia. When afterward divided, submission to one hereditary chief seems to have remained a general principle of the several governments; and hardly more of their policy is known.

The country north of Thrace and Macedonia as far as the Danube, was occupied by the Triballians; of whose political institutions our information goes no farther than that they acknowledged one hereditary military chief, by Grecian writers intitled king. Westward, the Illyrians, holding the country bordering on the Adriatic, were more known to the Greeks, who had settlements on their shores. Their government was a hereditary monarchy, with the regal authority liable to restriction, as in Homer's days, by popular power, supported by the universal use of arms. In the sequel of Grecian history an instance will occur of a very ill-judged use of this power by the Illyrian people, when the regal authority failed of its just efficacy; and of great public calamity ensuing. Had we more of Illyrian history, instances probably might be found of abuses of the regal power, for want of a steddier balance, more numerous, and, to individuals, injurious, but less producing great public misfortune.

It has been observed by Aristotle, and, after him by other antient writers, that the people of Asia have always been more disposed to bear despotism, those of Europe to assert freedom. In looking through history, to earliest times, indeed it seems evident that, as a principle of government, despotism has been of Asiatic growth; first introduced into Europe, as far as accounts show, by the thoughtless violence of democracy, giving to a favorite party-leader autocratical powers, either for opposing an adverse party at home, or conducting a favorite enterprize abroad. It must have been by a deep policy, with extraordinary able management, that the Roman senate gained that resource against popular leaders, the dictatorship; which popular leaders afterward turned against the senate and the whole free constitution.



The republican temporary despotism was the germ of the imperial permanent despotism, which extinguished the republic. But till after the general abolition of the antient monarchies of Greece, and the general establishment of republics, that any European people ever acknowledged an absolute sovereign, no warrant appears among antient writers.

## SECTION V.

*Causes of Deficiency of Information concerning the Politics and Constitutions of Greece in Philip's age. Indications in Letters of Isocrates; in a Speech reported by Arrian: Measures of Philip, for improving the Constitution of Macedonia and of the Grecian Confederacy.*

IN the extant speeches of Demosthenes the reserve and caution, becoming a great politician, are not less remarkable than the fire and energy, for which he has been so justly admired as an orator. To those who seek information or illustration of historical matter it must be disappointing, and may seem surprising, to find how little can be gathered from him, not of the constitution only, but of the state of parties; not in Macedonia alone, but throughout Greece; especially of the governments with which he had the closest political connection, the Arcadian, Eleian, Ætolian, Acarnanian, and, more particularly, the Bœotian. Even for Macedonia, where cause is less obvious, his reserve is remarkable; especially in those speeches in which he has not scrupled to express his exultation at the revolt of Pydna, and the change of politics of Olynthus and Byzantium. On the other hand the still greater reserve of the opponents of Demosthenes, friends of the Macedonian alliance, might appear still more surprizing, had we not the assurance of Isocrates, with confirmation from Xenophon and from the whole tenor of Grecian history, that democracy denied freedom of speech. And this, strange as it may appear to those who have had no experience of a democratical mixture in government, cannot appear strange among ourselves, where county-meetings, too frequently, and the common-hall of London, continually, exhibit perfect examples of that tyranny of a multitude. Hence the extraordinary fact, that more eulogy of Philip is found in the speeches of his great enemy, Demosthenes, than in those of Æschines,

Ch. 42. s. 8.  
of this hist.

certainly his political friend, and accused of being his pensioner. For it was little less dangerous at Athens to speak well of the Macedonian king and his government, than, under either the late republic of France, or the following usurpation, to apologize for the mild despotism of the unfortunate sixteenth Lewis. Such then having been the reserve of orators; of one party from policy, of the other from fear; and the authorities, whence Cicero gathered his judgement of men of that age in Greece, and found ground for his splendid eulogy of Philip, having perished, any authenticated circumstances that may afford light on the general character of the political state of the country, at the important crisis of Alexander's accession, must deserve consideration.

Ch. 48. s. 9.  
of this hist.

The inability of Plato, Xenophon, and, after them Aristotle, to propose any mode of government for Greece united, which could, even in theory, satisfy even themselves, we have already observed. Isocrates appears to have had no less difficulty: tho' decided in regard to one point, on which, differing from the first and the last of those eminent philosophers, he agreed with the second, inasmuch as he thought it desirable to have one man of superior dignity for president of the nation. The opinion, in which he persevered, that thus most readily, and surely, and even only, the continually convulsed state of the nation could be ameliorated, it appears he entertained long before Philip of Macedonia had acquired the power, or established the character, which at length drew toward him the regard of so large a portion of the Grecian people as their best protector, and the hatred of the rest, as the most formidable obstacle to their purposes. Beside the tract purporting to be a speech of Archidamus son of Agesilaus to the Lacedæmonian people, which has been formerly under our observation, there is extant a letter of Isocrates to the same prince, bearing all appearance of authenticity. This letter marks, within itself, that it was written after that prince's accession to the throne, but several years before any of the extant letters of the same writer to Philip. The purpose, the same as afterward to the king of Macedonia, was to excite the king of Lacedæmon to interfere as a mediator in the quarrels of the republics with one another, and of each within itself; and, having established peace throughout Greece, to proceed, after the example of his father, Agesilaus, to direct the united arms of the nation against Persia.

The

The passages in that letter principally to our present purpose are these :  
' I wonder,' Isocrates says, ' that, among men of influence, or of eloquence,  
' the general state of the Greek nation, altogether so wretched and so  
' disgraceful, has never appeared an object for their consideration and  
' regard. There is not, in all Greece, a place which is not suffering under  
' the miseries of war, sedition, massacre, evils unnumbered. Perhaps the  
' largest share falls to the Greeks of Asia, whom, by our treaties, we have  
' surrendered; not simply to the barbarians, but also to others, Greeks by  
' origin and language, but barbarians in principle and manners. If we  
' considered rightly what materially concerns us, we should not allow  
' armed bodies to be collected under leaders of no responsibility; herds of  
' outcasts and vagabonds, yet forming really more powerful armies than are  
' maintained by all the Grecian states. Engaged under pretence of war  
' against Persia, they plunder a small part of the king's territory; but, by  
' force or otherwise, entering Grecian cities, they have overthrown them  
' wholly; killing some citizens, expelling others, plundering property, and  
' committing all sorts of enormities, even against women and children.

' Farther then it seems surprizing that these enormities appear not at  
' all to have engaged the care of any of those states which have affected to  
' take the lead in Greece. Your father Agesilaus, indeed, as an individual  
' in a situation of power, is an exception; but he stands alone. His  
' earnestness to give freedom to the Greeks, and repress the barbarians,  
' was constant. But even he erred in one material point. Wonder not if,  
' addressing you, I say where I think he erred in judgement; for I  
' am accustomed always to declare my mind freely; and I should prefer  
' incurring ill-will so, to gaining favor by praising what is not praiseworthy.  
' So much with regard to myself. With regard to him then, superior in  
' all other matters, most temperate, most righteous, a most able statesman,  
' he was bent eagerly upon two objects, each separately good, but, for  
' execution together, impossible: he would at the same time make war with  
' Persia, and restore, in the Grecian states, his banished friends; which,  
' without also providing for them preponderant power in their several  
' republics, could not be. Thus, through his zeal in favor of those con-  
' ccurring with him in political sentiment, evils and dangers arose for all  
' Greece;



‘Greece; and, from insuing troubles, means for war against the barbarians were lost.

‘Through this error it is now become evident, that, to make war successfully upon Persia, it is necessary first to reconcile the Greeks with one another, and put an end to our madness of strife among ourselves. ‘Formerly I have urged advice on this subject, which I cannot yet forego. ‘I put it now for consideration to you, of birth illustrious, as I have before ‘observed, of the race of Hercules, the acknowledged hereditary military ‘chief of the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, bearing the title and dignity ‘of king, and holding besides the highest personal reputation of any ‘individual in Greece, whether you should yield to my persuasion; or, ‘in any opinion that worthier matters may engage your attention, you ‘should neglect it. My opinion however I will freely urge, that you should ‘direct your mind especially to two things; first, to put an end to ‘wars and civil contentions, now raging among the Greeks with one ‘another, and then to check the barbarians in their injurious conduct, and ‘deprive them of their over great share of advantages<sup>10</sup>.’ The consonance

<sup>10</sup> The learned French editor of Isocrates, Auger, has given the following account of this letter: ‘Hæc epistola in nullis extat Isocratis editionibus. In Photii bibliothecam transtulit Hœschelius, ab Andrea Schotto allatam ex Italia. Ego huc induxi, ratus eam esse Isocrateam, vel saltem in stylo Isocrateo. Vide Phot. bibl. p. 330. ‘Hanc eandem reperi in duobus codicibus bibliothecæ regiæ.’ Of a letter admitted by former editors, as addressed by Isocrates to Dionysius of Syracuse, Auger speaks thus: ‘Extat hæc epistola in editionibus Volsii, Stephani, et Aldi 1514, sed non arbitror eam esse Isocratis; cujus nempe dictio longe abhorret a dictione Isocratea. Mihi videtur scripta fuisse a rhetore aliquo, vel sophista, ad principem virum, vel ad aliquem quem favor in eminenti loco posuerat.’

Much as I desire to avoid ingaging in questions on such subjects, I reckon I ought not to avoid declaring that I think the learned editor is right in his opinion of both these letters; unless that the latter

seems far more likely to have been a meer play of fancy, under the Roman empire, than to have been really addressed to either Dionysius of Syracuse, or to any man in the situation of those to whom any party in the Greek republics would have given the title of tyrant. The whole manner corresponds with the diction to mark it for spurious, and of that later age, and probably never really addressed to any one. The letter to Archidamus, on the contrary, not only is in diction, as the learned editor says, Isocrateian, but also shows a knowledge of Grecian politics of his age, which the following rhetors and sophists, judging from their surviving works, appear to have been neither solicitous to acquire, nor to have supposed, for readers of their age, at all important for them to regard. But I know nothing of its kind, I will venture to own, carrying within itself evidence of authenticity more satisfactory, to my mind, than the letter to the king of Lacedæmon.

of the picture here given of the state of the Greek nation, in its settlements in Europe and in Asia, with that of Xenophon, formerly noticed, who wrote nearly about same time, or not long before, will be obvious.

In another extant letter, written some years before that to the King of Lacedæmon, Isocrates has described his feeling of his own situation, as an Athenian citizen, which may also be to our purpose here. He had among his pupils, as formerly has been observed, the sons of the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason. These young men, after their return to their father's court, sent an invitation to him to visit and make some stay with them there. He excused himself thus: 'For the sake of 'the society of Jason and Polydamas'', I should most willingly accept 'your invitation. Indeed I think familiar communication between us 'might be advantageous for all. But many hindrances occur. I am 'little equal to the journey; and wandering from one's own country ill 'becomes those of my age; especially one, who, in earlier years, never 'left it. Moreover I fear the people; for I must speak the truth. 'Alliances made by us with other states I see presently broken. If that 'should happen with your government, how could I escape dangerous 'accusation? It is here difficult.'

Those conversant with the antient historians, and knowing the deficiency of cotemporary testimony to historical matter from Xenophon's time to that of Polybius, will value such effusions of sentiment and scraps of information as these, from one engaged in the public affairs of the intervening age. In the sequel of this letter Isocrates shows himself an honest monitor, and no friend to absolute monarchy, or to a government, however well administered, supported by a military force of interest distinct from that

<sup>11</sup> Instead of the name Polydamas, hazarded in the text, all the known copies of the works of Isocrates, it seems, give Polyaces. Jason, as Auger has justly observed, is a name well known: of Polyaces, he says, 'in historia nullibi apparet. I cannot myself doubt but the same eminent person, first the opponent, afterward the associate of Jason, has been intended, whose name,

in our copies of Xenophon, is repeatedly given Polydamas. Thus this letter of Isocrates would afford a pleasing testimony to Jason's fair observance of faith and friendship, with a man of character represented, by Xenophon, as so excellent that it might be desired to have more account of him. Ch. 27, s. 1, of this hist.

of

of the nation. Its purpose, far from being of a flattering tenor, is to dissuade the youths from aiming to succeed their father in his invidious eminence. When, in the most promising state of that eminence, he shortly after lost his life, they were probably too young to take a leading part in such a crisis. What may have been their fate among the following crimes and troubles of their country, among which their uncles, successively attaining their father's dignity, were assassinated, and the worthy Polydamas also perished, we have no information.

To form then a just estimate of Philip's policy toward the Grecian republics, it will be expedient to recollect that, when the confederacy under the lead of Lacedæmon had brought Athens to submission nearly unconditional, the Athenian government was, according to the common Lacedæmonian custom, totally altered, with the view to its being held in complete subserviency; half the population or more was driven into banishment, and a Lacedæmonian governor commanded a garrison in the citadel. But when Athens was reduced to beg the king of Macedonia's mercy, nothing of the kind followed. On the contrary such was Philip's magnanimous forbearance toward his most virulent enemies, that shortly his Athenian friends found themselves in danger from it. So far had he been from arbitrarily commanding, as the Athenians were wont, the banishment of citizens from Grecian republics within their power, so far from denying, like the Lacedæmonians, the resort of any to his own kingdom, that his capital and even his court were open to those of all descriptions. An extant letter from Isocrates to his son, afterward the great Alexander, is valuable for large information comprized in few words. This letter was sent at the same time with one to Philip himself; and Isocrates appears to have intended it as a vehicle for unasked advice, which might, with least hazard of offence, and perhaps with best effect, be conveyed in the form of commendation of the young prince's judgement and conduct. Of the numbers professing philosophy, who flocked to Pella, and who were admitted even to Alexander's conversation, Isocrates thought many were objectionable: of some he disliked the mode of exercising the talents of their pupils, as unsuitable for one who was to be a statesman; but moreover, the principles, the doctrines, and even the manners, of many he disapproved highly. Possibly Philip may have had a view beyond the  
philosopher.



philosopher. Hazardous as the admission of exceptionable characters might be, yet to deny means for acquiring a general knowledge of mankind to one who, as a statesman, would have necessarily to communicate with men of all characters, were also hazardous. Possibly moreover Philip might depend on his own power in advice and observation, together with the prince's talents for discrimination, to obviate the evil which Isocrates had apprehended.

After these valuable cotemporary notices of the state of Philip's court, a description of the earlier circumstances of Macedonia, in a speech reported by Arrian, as having been delivered by Alexander to the Macedonians of his army in Persia, may deserve some attention. Contrary indeed to what that writer has usually admitted, it is not wholly without rhetorical extravagance. This may mark it as not derived from the generals, whose authority he preferred whenever he could have their guidance. They, on account of their situations, would be likely to avoid the matter in question; which nevertheless, as clearly interesting, has been, in Arrian's judgement, proper to be given on the best authority he could find for it, and which he thought not unworthy of credit.

‘ The Macedonians,’ Alexander is stated to have said, ‘ were poor and Arr. 1.7. c. 9.  
 ‘ wandering herdmen, clothed in skins, living among mountains, and  
 ‘ fearing residence in the better parts of their country, for the frequent  
 ‘ inroads of neighboring people, Illyrians, Triballians, and Thracians,  
 ‘ with some or other of whom they had almost continually to defend,  
 ‘ in bloody contest, their scanty herds and flocks. Philip introduced  
 ‘ that order, civil and military, which gave them such superiority over  
 ‘ the barbarians, that they no longer wanted safety from situation, but  
 ‘ could provide it by their valor. Towns then arose, garments of leather  
 ‘ were changed for cloth, and wholesome laws, and improved manners  
 ‘ made the people respectable; so that the barbarians, whom they had been  
 ‘ accustomed to fear, were compelled to acknowledge their dominion. The  
 ‘ greater part of Thrace was united with Macedonia; and, the towns of the  
 ‘ coast, being recovered to the Macedonian dominion, the people had  
 ‘ again, at their own command, the advantage of importation and ex-  
 ‘ portation by sea, for which before they were dependent on others.  
 ‘ Those who obtained command in Thessaly had been often their terror :

‘ Philip so altered things that the Thessalians and Macedonians now are united nearly as one people <sup>12</sup>. Communication with the southern states of Greece commonly was difficult, sometimes shut : success in the war with Phocis made it, for following times, sure and easy. Both the Athenians and the Thebans had aimed at the conquest of Macedonia. Philip so humbled both, that instead of paying tribute to Athens, and obeying the mandates of Thebes, those states owed their safety to Macedonian generosity. Finally, settling the affairs of Peloponnesus, and establishing peace throughout Greece, Philip was elected general in chief of the whole nation for war against Persia, not more to his own honor than that of the Macedonian people.’

It is obvious that the description of the Macedonians here, as wandering herdmen, would not apply to the inhabitants of Pella, Edessa, Anthemus, and some other towns, but only to that, far however the greater part of the country, where were no towns. What were the new laws we should be glad to know, and still more how they were enacted ; tho, that no unpopularity ensued, from any assumption of unwarranted power by the prince, is implied in all antient history. Those laws probably were directed to the regulation of military as well as civil matters, and mostly in the wilder parts of the kingdom ; first established where, according to the cotemporary testimony formerly noticed, Philip held command before he succeeded to the throne. Ch. 34. s. 4. of this hist. The tribute to Athens, which is found also mentioned by Demosthenes, was no acknowledgement of superiority in the Athenian people over the king or people of Macedonia, but simply a composition for allowance to import and export goods at the towns on Macedonian shore, held by Athenian garrisons, or by people whom the maritime force of Athens compelled to acknowlege the Athenian dominion of the sea ; precisely such a tribute as, in modern times, many European states have been in the habit of paying to the pirates of Barbary.

All information considered, it seems not likely that, through any improvements in the peaceful latter years of Amyntas, or in the two short reigns of

<sup>12</sup> *Ἀπείφνη*. What I have hazarded, as a paraphrase of this word, is warranted by Arrian, as to the matter of fact, in speaking elsewhere of the connexion of Thessaly and Macedonia. The word itself, unwarrantably rendered by Vulcanius, and unnoticed by Gronovius, sometimes severe in criticism on the translator, may deserve the notice of future editors, and perhaps of lexicographers.

his elder sons, both turbulently ended, the state of Macedonia was altogether better at Philip's accession than at the death of Archelaus; whose reign, eminently beneficial, had been followed by violent and lasting troubles. Among the institutions of Archelaus, we have seen, was the Macedonian Olympic festival. It is unlikely that a man of the great and just purposes eminently demonstrated in the measures of that prince, attested by his cotemporary Thucydides, would, in such an institution, be without a view beyond a passing amusement for himself, and the little popularity to be gained by furnishing such for the many. The respect in which the whole Greek nation held its four great festivals, the Olympic, Delphic, Nemean and Isthmian, a respect such as to be of power to stop war for a time, when most raging among the republics, could not have failed to engage his attention. Macedonia, as a portion of Greece, we find, was not excluded from an interest in those festivals, nor from a claim upon its princes and people to respect their sacred character, the benefit of which of course they were intitled to enjoy; yet from situation and circumstances the Macedonians could little conveniently attend the celebration, and but imperfectly profit from the temporary peace which it produced. Macedonia wanted, for its civil government, not equally with republican Greece, yet materially, an improved union of its towns and provinces. Archelaus, we are assured, cultivated peace; but how far his views, in any of his institutions may have extended, his untimely death has left for uncertain conjecture only.

Ch. 34. s. 1. &  
Ch. 39. s. 2.  
of this hist.

The immediately following troubles of the country would effectually prevent any early repetition of the festival, and deny all attention to what are likely to have been his objects in the institution. Accordingly no further account of the Macedonian Olympiad is found till it was revived by Philip, on the conclusion of the Olynthian war. When all the towns of the Macedonian, and many of the Thracian coast, previously claiming each to be an independent sovereign republic, tho mostly in vassalage under the Athenian people, were united to the Macedonian kingdom, then was the season which Philip saw advantageous for reviving an institution which would bring his new subjects, before often warring with one another, to friendly association among themselves and with his old subjects; joining in the ceremonies of an amusing religion, and partaking together in the

Ch. 39. s. 2.  
of this hist.



entertainment of theatrical exhibitions. These, which had originated in religious ceremony, seem to have been considered as a regular part of the Macedonian festival.

Ch. 42. s. 7.  
of this hist.

The next occasion on which the Macedonian Olympiad is found mentioned was when Philip, elected military commander-in-chief of Greece, became, through the union, ordinary in the republics, of civil with military office, the civil as well as military head of the whole nation, stateholder as well as captain-general. Then it was no longer merely an object of policy, but a pressing duty, to devise means for allaying the immoderate jealousies of the Grecian people among themselves, the offspring of their republican system, which denied social intercourse between those of the several towns of one nation, forbade intermarriage, rendered them more violently and inveterately hostile toward one another than toward the most dreaded foreign enemy, and always kept numbers of every state, sometimes half the population, in banishment. Experience of the result of his previous experiment, on a smaller scale, is likely to have been favorable toward trying it on a larger. Bringing eminent men, from all the many republics, to associate at the same time with one another, and with those of his kingdom, in religious ceremony and in festival, might do much. But the Peloponnesian Olympiad had often afforded example for more. Not only treaties of peace between the republics often, by mutual agreement, were proclaimed there, but the discussion of interests in question between them had been sometimes referred to that meeting. Altogether it seems obvious that this institution of Philip was of a kind to do more toward harmonizing Greece than his venerable Athenian friend's project of war with Persia; from which alone it does not appear how the desired civil advantages should so result as to have a chance for permanency, tho it might promote opportunity for originating them.

Analogy between the political circumstances of the kingdoms of northern Greece, including Macedonia, and of the feudal governments in modern Europe, having been previously observed, the opposite policy of Philip and of some princes at the head of those governments, may also deserve notice. The French constitution formerly acknowledged a general assembly of representatives of the whole kingdom, as alone competent to make laws binding on all, and to impose taxes. The court avoided to allow its  
meeting.

meeting. The Spanish court, at the head of a constitution perhaps more perfect in most of its parts, yet more defective in union of its parts, used a similar policy. To maintain separation and division, even to incourage and foment jealousies and antipathies between the people of the different provinces, and, holding all subjects under strict restraint, to allow freedom least to the high nobility and great landowners, were prime maxims of state. The success of this policy is too well known: the imperfect liberties of the French and Spaniards were, with little struggle, overborne, and in France a milder and more liberal, in Spain a more oppressive and degrading despotism was established. But the final result we have seen most unfortunate for the royal families of both countries. In one a combination of demagogues finding means to establish their own communication, and spread their influence among all the disjointed millions, who were without means to communicate among one another, subverted the monarchy; over the other, by extent and natural advantages singularly favored with means too defend itself against foreign aggression, a foreign tyrant's command sufficed to bring the royal family to his prison, and the nation very nearly to his obedience. The king of Macedonia's premature death, and circumstances following, prevented the perfection of his scheme. But its policy, bringing together, and blending in friendly union the numberless portions of the nation, habituated for ages to multiplied division, with resulting jealousies, antipathies, and bloody contests, was clearly the very reverse of that which established despotism in France and Spain. The tendency was to give importance to the combined and enlightened people, to afford scope for display of talents in extensive free communication, and to found the security of the throne on a general sense of common interest in the maintenance of the constitution.

After the endeavour to illustrate the civil circumstances of the Grecian states, both republics and kingdoms, what memorials remain concerning Philip's court may deserve some consideration, not only for more complete illustration of his policy, but also to prepare for the history to come.

Perhaps deriving admonition from the error of his immediate predecessor, his brother Perdiccas, who is said to have devoted himself too exclusively to philosophy and the society of speculative men, Philip, not neglecting

neglecting these, directed his attention diligently to what a kingdom in the circumstances of Macedonia farther urgently required. That the Macedonians, even of rank and large property, were unlettered, and many of them little practised in that communication among men which produces advantageous manners, is strongly indicated by the observation imputed to Alexander, if it may be trusted, that among the republican Greeks in his court, formed in the schools of philosophy, they appeared like wild beasts among men. It is however obvious that the purport and force of such speeches depend much upon occasion and circumstances; and it must always be doubtful whether the words, on which the force rests, are very exactly reported. Nevertheless it appears probable that the best manners of the Macedonians differed from those of the republican philosophers; possibly better in some respects, worse in others; resembling rather those of our forefathers in the feudal ages, whose time was divided between feats of arms, field-sports, and revelling. Some establishments calculated to improve those manners, and to form men for political business and extensive communication with mankind, were either instituted, or extended and improved by Philip. Advantage for this purpose had been prepared for him by his brother's conduct, tho accused of extravagance. Many republican Greeks, eminent for acquirements in the most eminent schools, and recommended by manners formed in various communication among men of business and men of leisure in the republics, especially Athens, frequented Philip's court; and with some, in absence, he communicated by letter. A chosen number, together with some principal Macedonians, were associated under the title of the King's Companions, or the King's Friends. The Athenian orator Æschines we have formerly observed among those admitted to this honor. Accounts remaining are very defective, but it seems rather indicated that, originally one, this body was afterward divided; the title of the king's friends being limited to those admitted to his society and table, while the companions became considerable military bodies of horse and foot; analogous to the royal guards of modern kingdoms. Republican Greeks appear to have been numerous in both.

Whether then anything of the kind before existed in the Macedonian court, or the idea was borrowed from Asia, or originated with himself, a small number of Philip's most confidential friends formed a body, whose  
office



office more nearly resembled that of lords of the bedchamber than of any other with us. Their title was somatophylakes, literally body-wardens ; or, for a more modern courtly phrase, it might perhaps be rendered lords of the body-guard. Arrian has given us the names and descriptions of seven at one time composing this body ; which seems to have been their limited number, till, on a particular occasion, Alexander added an eighth. To this highly-confidential office only Macedonians, and of the highest rank, were admitted. But among Macedonians, it is observable in Arrian's account, there was no distinction for those of the original kingdom and those of the afterward acquired provinces : all appear to have been esteemed equally competent for this, or indeed for any high office. A prince even of a people esteemed barbarian, tho their territory was reckoned within Macedonia, was among those, as occasion will occur hereafter more particularly to observe, most honored in Philip's court, and most attached in mutual friendship to his successor. Possibly indeed this prince may have been acknowledged of Grecian race, tho his people were not ; but in the sequel we shall find his people also distinguished by their sovereign's attention and esteem.

Philip's care of his son's education has been eulogized by antient writers. His attention to extend to the rising generation of Macedonian nobility advantages of literature and science, not otherwise easily open to them, tho it has not equally met deserved praise, remains yet satisfactorily attested. It is well known that in our own, and other modern European kingdoms, formerly, it was customary, and esteemed advantageous, for boys of good birth and liberal fortune to attend, not only princes, but great subjects, especially those in high civil employments, as pages. Philip formed a large establishment of pages, sons of the first men of his kingdom, and to these he afforded the utmost opportunity for literary instruction, under the philosophers who attended his court. But, in giving them the benefits of Grecian scholarship, he desired to obviate the illiberality and coarse insolence, which he had often had occasion to observe in democratical manners, by introducing, as a corrective, something of the polish of Asiatic courts. Constantly therefore they were by turns about his person, keeping guard, at night, in his antechamber. When he rode, one of them was to take his horse from the groom, Arrian says after the Persian custom, and hold it

Arr. de  
exped. Alex.  
l. 4 c. 12.

while

while he mounted. When he hunted, in attendance on him, they partook of the sport. When he was employed with his ministers, they studied under philosophers ; of whom some, together with the boys, followed him even on military expeditions. Thus military education and civil proceeded together. Nor does it appear that Philip's purpose of improving the polish of the Macedonian court was at all threatening to the freedom of the constitution ; balanced as it was by the free allowance, and even large encouragement, for the resort of republican Greeks. Tho Aristotle's principles of policy could not be approved, yet no restraint upon discussion of political topics has been noticed by historians : on the contrary, even Arrian's cautious accounts of conversations show that great freedom on such subjects was usual, even at the king's table and in his presence. Whatever Philip's desire of power may have been, it is evident that he found it greater through his talent for cultivating popularity than it could have been by his military force. How small this really was, and how unequal his revenue to either the maintenance of a large standing army, or to the political corruption which interested malignity imputed to him, becomes, in all accounts of his son's reign, abundantly manifest.

Such then, as far as information remains, was the state of the Macedonian government and court, at the time of Philip's death.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

Affairs of GREECE from the Accession of ALEXANDER Son of PHILIP to the MACEDONIAN Throne till the Conclusion of the War with the Northern Nations, and the Restoration of disturbed Union among the GRECIAN Republics.

## SECTION I.

*Authorities for the insuing History. Alexander's Boyhood: First Measures after his Accession to the Macedonian Throne: Election to the supreme Dignity in Thessaly: Admission to his Seat in the Council of Amphictyons: Election to the Office of Stateholder and Captain-general of the Grecian Republics.*

THE extraordinary splendor of fortune and celebrity attained by Alexander son of Philip, and the interest of a large portion of the world, through following ages, even to the present day, in the consequences of his achievements, so engaged the attention of writers and the curiosity of readers, that more histories of him have been published, more by cotemporaries, and more by writers of after times, than are known of any other person. Letters and all sciences being in his age highly cultivated among the Greeks, men qualified to record great transactions would be numerous. But among many and rival authors, inducements to the undertaking would be various, and interests opposite; and some would have better, and others inferior, means of information. And, tho' literary works abounded, copies of them, in failure of the advantages of printing, were few and dear. Thence public reading was a profession: companies assembled to hear; and a library, or sometimes a single work unpublished, was a fortune to



the possessor. Few could study in the closet; few could compare, otherwise than by memory, one account with another. Thus great opportunity was open for ingenious writers, if unscrupulous, to put forward any report, especially of transactions in parts so remote and little known as those into which Alexander penetrated. Hence, while we lament the loss of all the many histories written by his cotemporaries, we find the most judicious of the later antient authors, who compiled from them, complaining of difficulty, often found, for satisfactory selection, among extravagancies and contradictions.

Nevertheless, to the modern inquirer, entering upon investigation of the events of Alexander's reign, it must be gratifying to find that materials were given from authorities higher, and more various, than, as far as accounts of such matters remain, for any other portion of antient history. Narratives of his campaigns were written by two men of the highest rank in the army under him, Aristobulus and Ptolemy; and published, not while he lived, when freedom, which might have been restrained by unworthy, must have been by just considerations; nor so long after his death but that numerous witnesses to most of the transactions related were yet alive. The narratives of Nearchus, and Onesicritus, who commanded his fleet in the extraordinary voyage along the shore of the Indian ocean, for some extravagances admitted in them, were less respected by antiquity; and yet are found quoted, for some important matters, by highly respectable antient writers. A report of his marches and incampments by the two principal engineers of the army, Diognetus and Beton, was published. The royal daybook, as it was called, being a register of the daily transactions of the king himself, noted, it is said, by Eumenes of Cardia, his principal secretary,<sup>1</sup> and Diodotus of Erythræ, probably assistant secretary, would have been of the highest value, had it been transmitted complete. Being however but a dry register of facts, little inviting for the audiences at public readings, copies of it probably were little multiplied, and it remains quoted only for the last days of Alexander's life, of which however it gives a very interesting detail.

Athen.  
Deipnos.  
l. 10. c. 10.

<sup>1</sup> Ἀρχιγραμματοῦς. Plut. v. Eum. init.

Nor has the history of Alexander, like that of the Roman republic, rested on those partial to him. Party-spirit remained high among the Grecian republics, in his day, and one party held constant connection with the Persian court while it existed; so that partiality on one side was combated by partiality on the other. Of nine authors his cotemporaries, whose names and characters are transmitted to us, the five already mentioned included, some were warmly adverse to him, and the works of all were before those later antient writers on whom we now depend for the history. These are Diodorus and Strabo, of the Augustan age; Curtius of date unascertained; Plutarch and Arrian, cotemporary with Trajan and Adrian; to whom may be added Justin, the abbreviator of Trogus Pompeius, beside other writers who afford occasional assistance. Dissatisfaction with numerous preceding accounts induced Arrian, as he has expressly declared, to compile and publish his own; and, tho' of the latest age, being yet, by situation in life, and practice in business, military and political, far the most qualified for a historian of Alexander, he has always held the highest estimation. His method, indeed, is most satisfactory. He has professed to rely principally on the accounts of the generals Ptolemy and Aristobulus. But those officers, often employed on different services, appear each rather to have proposed to publish his own memorials than a complete history of their king. Their joint testimony Arrian has admitted as decisive: where they have differed he has stated their differences; and where one has omitted, apparently as not having been within his observation, what the other has related, he has named the one whom he followed. For matters derived from neither he has noticed the failure of their authority. In all that remains from antiquity no example is found of equal care to examine differing accounts, and avoid to mislead the reader's opinion. The annals of Diodorus, then, and several works of Plutarch, are valuable for light they afford on the affairs of the Grecian republics of the age, of which Arrian, unfortunately for posterity, has furnished little. Strabo elucidates and confirms much through his geographical researches, which led him occasionally to notice historical circumstances. Curtius had talent, as well as materials, for better things than he has done; whence, among his theatrical matter, adapted to the public fancy of his age, but misplaced

in history, and therefore offensive to sober judgement even when amusing by its ingenuity and eloquence, some information, not given by others, but still more, some illustration and confirmation of matters reported by others, may be gathered. Altogether thus, whatsoever the fanciful or the interested ingenuity of many able antient writers, using opportunities offered by remoteness of scene, and scantiness of means for comparing accounts, may have been tempted to add or alter concerning events in the plainest narrative singularly interesting, it may be affirmed that, for the more public, and all the more important matters, no part of antient profane history has been transmitted more authenticated than that of Alexander <sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> The singular state and the interesting character of the history of Alexander led the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Polite Literature at Paris to propose, as the subject for its prize, in the year 1770, a Critical Examination of the antient Historians who have written on it. Of the works offered that year none satisfying the Society, they repeated the proposal of the subject in the year 1772, when the prize was adjudged to the baron of Sainte Croix. His treatise, tho composed at a very early age, has been much noticed by the learned, and always with such high approbation, that there can be no hazard in referring those to it who may desire information on a subject of criticism, as extensively interesting as perhaps any relating to antient history.

It may perhaps be due from me to acknowledge obligations of more than one kind to the baron of Sainte Croix. Through introduction from my very learned friend, then also a very young man, for one who had already acquired so much literary fame, Mr. Villoison, I was kindly entertained by him in November 1776, and again in March 1777, in his house at Mourmoiron, in the county of Avignon, which he made his residence when, after the death of his uncle the

general Sainte Croix, who commanded at Belleisle when taken by our army under general Hodgson, and gained the esteem of that army, he quitted the military service. His conversation was among the stimulants to me, in recollection afterward, to apply myself to the work which has been my most gratifying amusement for now above forty years. He had had an idea of undertaking such a work himself, which I endeavoured to incourage; but he said, adverting to the restrictions upon the press in France, and the advantage which familiar acquaintance with a free constitution, through association in its energies, offered in England, 'Only an Englishman could write a history of Greece.' A letter from him, marking, by its conciseness, his apprehension of dilating, and obscurely indicating that his family had suffered in the recent revolution, reached me in the year 1801, when the First Consul's view of his interest led him to desire present peace with this country. The much to be lamented death of Mr. Villoison has since been announced in the newspapers. Farther of the baron of Sainte Croix my inquiries have gained me no intelligence.



The extraordinary fame acquired by that prince in early manhood would of course excite curiosity for the circumstances of his earlier years. Many accordingly remain reported. Elegance of form he is said to have inherited from both father and mother; not large, yet with more than ordinary power of limb; and the many portraits of him, in coins yet extant, so agree in advantageous representation of his features as to give assurance that his countenance was of the best models of masculine beauty. The anecdotes regarding his mind are mostly consonant enough to the character he afterward so splendidly exhibited; indicating, together with that bold and enterprising spirit which directed his brilliant course, the inheritance of a large share, conspicuous even in boyhood, of his father's uncommon readiness of judgement, and superiority of talent for communication among men. These however are unsupported by any claim of coteremporary authority, nor has Arrian noticed them; one important matter only excepted, which is fully warranted, that he had the advantage of education under Aristotle, the man, perhaps, of the most acute and capacious mind of all the Greek philosophers from whom any writings remain, superintended by a statesman and military commander, perhaps excelled in no age anywhere, his father.

The splendid festival, which had been engaging the numerous concourse Ol. 110, B. C. 336. attracted by Philip's politic magnificence to the Macedonian court, ended of course abruptly on his death. Tumult, immediately insuing, appears however to have subsided on the quickly following death of the assassin. Alexander's friends assembled about him. Arming themselves they conducted him, according to the custom, growing out of the frequently convulsed Arrian, l. 1. c. 26. state of the government, and extensively the custom of early times, in military procession, to the throne, and without opposition seated him there.

In the complicated, new, and variously difficult circumstances in which Philip's tragical and wholly unexpected death left the government, Alexander's conduct, at his early age, displayed most advantageously the result of his excellent education; being indeed rather what might most be wished for than what ordinary experience among mankind would warrant to expect. What credit should be given to tales of violent preceding differences between Alexander and his father, disgraceful, if true, certainly, to

both, and possibly current in report in their age, tho coming to us only from writers of centuries after, must be left to the judgement of their readers. But toward the justness of such judgement the combined consideration is necessary, of the state of parties in Macedonia at the time; of the common violence of faction throughout Greece; of the inducements to propagate scandal in the Grecian cities, not only as a political engine, but as a profitable merchandise, which even idleness found highly alluring; of the talents of those, both politicians, and traders in scandal, who had a pressing interest in spreading such tales; and of the opposite indication of Alexander's public measures, on succeeding to the throne, as they remain concurrently reported by antient authors.

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 6.

We have Arrian's assurance that the repudiation of Alexander's mother, and Philip's second marriage, produced, as was likely, some degree of breach between father and son; insomuch that five of Alexander's most intimate friends either were banished, or thought it prudent to withdraw from the court. Hence however it is the more to Alexander's credit that, on his father's death, no animosity appears to have influenced his measures. His father's friends and principal counsellors remained his friends and principal counsellors. Not the philosopher Aristotle only, his preceptor, but all the able statesmen and military men, whom Philip's penetration had selected, in the course of his busy reign, for his ministers, his generals, and, in all departments, his immediate assistants, were retained and principally trusted by Alexander. His young friends, who had fled from Philip's anger or suspicions, namely Harpalus, Erigyius, Laomedon, Nearchus, and Ptolemy son of Lagus, were recalled, and we shall find all becoming afterward eminent under him; but no new man, no favorite peculiar to himself, appears to have been immediately raised to any of the first offices, civil or military.<sup>2</sup> According to custom he was to address the Macedonian people; how assembled, unfortunately we fail to learn; but his

<sup>2</sup> The scandal against the mother of Ptolemy, distinguished from others of that name as son of Lagus, that he was really son of king Philip, has no countenance from Arrian. Ptolemy, Warlike, appears to have been a favorite name among the Macedonians, and another Ptolemy son of another Philip, we shall, in the sequel find of

his father's popularity, and his claim to succeed to it, we are assured were his theme. 'The king's name,' he told the anxious many, 'is Diod. l. 17. changed; but the king, you shall find, remains the same.' A more powerful testimony to Philip's popularity in Macedonia, or to Alexander's respect for him, can hardly be imagined; and tho reported only by Diodorus, yet by the concurrently warranted fact, that the king's confidential assistants, Philip reigning, remained the king's confidential assistants, Alexander reigning, affords it a basis on which it well may rest.

Funeral obsequies were of course an immediate care of the new court, and Diod. ibid. they were celebrated with just magnificence. Inquiry concerning the crime which produced the catastrophè was also immediately instituted. That a plot for a revolution had been formed seems fully indicated. Amyntas, son of Antiochus, of a branch of the royal family which had formerly claimed the throne, fled, and took his residence at Ephesus, then ruled by an aristocratical party, under patronage of the Persian court. Hieromenes, Arrhabæus, and Alexander, sons of Aëropus, of another branch, had been Arrian, l. 1. c. 18. engaged in the plot, according to Arrian, notoriously. Nevertheless, whatever information the inquiry produced, severities appear to have been avoided. Even the retreat of Amyntas from Macedonia was, the historian says, the result rather of disgust than apprehension. Alexander, son of Aëropus, had been among the foremost, on Philip's death, to attend his son in procession to the throne; and this the young king magnanimously accepted as atonement, insomuch that he not only forgave the discovered treason, but continued to receive his kinsman and namesake as a friend, and even distinguished him with favors.

Quiet being preserved in Macedonia, which, according to Plutarch, not

of high rank in Alexander's army, whence possibly the careless or impudent story-mongers of antiquity may have taken their ground. A third Ptolemy, not less eminent, is distinguished as son of Seleucus. Gronovius has given a note on these several cotemporary Ptolemies, altogether good, but stating a difficulty about the time of the appointment of Ptolemy son of Lagus to the confidential office of *σωματοφύλαξ*, lord body-warden, the solution of which ap-

pears to me obvious. Arrian has meant, in the sixth chapter of his third book, where he mentions the recall of Alexander's five fugitive friends, to speak only generally of the dignities to which they were afterward raised: in the twenty-sixth chapter of the same book he mentions the occasion on which Ptolemy son of Lagus was appointed lord body-warden, as he had also mentioned the promotion of Harpalus and the others, as they occurred.



without large confirmation from Arrian, had been formidably threatened<sup>3</sup>, Alexander and his able council could direct their views abroad. Among the people of the Grecian republics the news of Philip's death could not but make great impression; exciting great fears in one party, and great hopes in the other. The party depressed by the event of the battle of Chæroneia, still held through the liberality of the conqueror, and the vigor of the Grecian institutions and character, almost all its former means; and it was still headed by the most renowned orator and politician the world had known: this party would of course look eagerly for opportunity to recover its lost eminence. The other party which had been relieved by the prevalence which that battle gave to the politics of Isocrates and Phocion, would look with terror toward a return of that democratical oppression which remains exhibited to us, in pictures from the life, by the correct hands of Isocrates himself and of Xenophon. The immediate measures of Demosthenes at Athens, formerly noticed, were then as a signal for his party throughout Greece to rally and prepare for action, and for those who dreaded democratical empire to tremble.

Ch. 42, s. 7,  
of this hist.

The attention of Alexander's council was first directed, as first required, more especially to Thessaly; the oldest, the closest and the most valuable ally of the Macedonian kingdom. There fortunately that attachment to the reigning branch of the Macedonian royal family, which had enabled Alexander's grandfather to recover his lost throne, was found remaining in

<sup>3</sup> —Προδοσίαι—Πᾶσα δὲ ὕπουλος ἡ Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμυνίαν ἀποβλήπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας. Plut. de sort. Alex. p. 327. Diodorus relates that Attalus, commanding jointly with Parmenio in lesser Asia, engaged in treasonable practices, of which information was given to Alexander; that Hecataeus was sent with a considerable body of troops to arrest, or, if that could not be, to dispatch Attalus by assassination, δολοφονῆσαι, and that in consequence Attalus was assassinated. Here it may be observed that the march of troops into Asia under Hecataeus, if real, would be notorious, and the death of a man of Attalus's eminence would be notorious. But conspiracy and assassination are commonly secret matters, which nevertheless Diodorus has had the habit of reporting with

as much assurance as if he were himself an accomplice. Neither Arrian, nor even Plutarch, tho mentioning other conspirators, have a word about the conspiracy or assassination of Attalus, which Arrian, had he given any credit to it, would the less have omitted to notice, on account of that eminent person's situation in military command. Further reasons might be adduced for discrediting Diodorus's tale, for which however among the various and contradictory histories of Alexander which disgusted Arrian, he may, probably enough, have found what he thought authority to be followed. But as, even in his account, the circumstances had no consequences, tho perhaps requiring this notice, they seemed no object for the text.

vigor;

vigor ; and, by election of the general assembly of the states, Alexander succeeded to the honors and power enjoyed by his father ; nowhere distinctly described by antient writers, but sufficiently marked as including, with the military command in chief, a presidency also in the political administration. Apparently it was the office and dignity to which the title of Tagus, peculiar to the Thessalian constitution, was appropriated ; a title familiar with Xenophon, but neglected by writers under the Roman empire, our principal informants for the history of these times ; even the Greeks being then become careless of Thessalian titles and of the long-perished constitution itself to which they belonged. The Thessalian states moreover assured Alexander of their support for his election to the greater office, held also by his father, of commander-in-chief and head of the confederacy of all Greece.\*

This ready success was of very great importance ; not only for the high value of the connection with Thessaly, but as necessary toward the maintenance of the connection formed by Philip with all southern Greece. Alexander could now proceed securely to Thermopylæ, where the Amphictyonic council was assembled, in which, without opposition, as far as we are informed, he took his inherited seat. This again was an important step toward what was next in view, his election to the office of stateholder and military commander-in-chief of the confederacy of the Greek nation. In opposition to this Demosthenes was continuing to exert all his abilities and all his diligence. The moment, highly critical for both king and people of Macedonia, was perhaps yet more awful for every thinking man of every Grecian republic. Vehemently as all who had concurred in politics with Isocrates dreaded the restoration of empire to the Athenian democracy, and miserable as the view was of returning to that state of division, jealousy, fear, trouble, and various wars, which, with the flattering name of universal independency, had followed the battle of Mantinea, and much as many might have been hitherto satisfied with the prospect under the Macedonian supremacy, doubts and fears could not but arise, when, for the known talents, the large experience and the tried liberality of the late king, it re-

\* Πρώτους δὲ Θετταλοὺς ὑπομνήσας τῆς ἀρχαίας ἔπεισε τὴν πατροπαράδοτον ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφ' Ἑρακλείους συγγενείας, καὶ λόγοις φιλανθρωπικοῖς, ἔτι δὲ μεγάλας ἐπαγγελίας, μετεωρίσας, Diod. l. 17. c. 4.

mained,

maintained, in the existing most critical circumstances, to see what would be the character and what the conduct of a youth scarcely beyond boyhood. This chance however, notwithstanding every exertion of Demosthenes in opposition, obtained the general suffrage. According to established usage among the Grecian republics, those states which proposed to maintain, with the new king, the treaties of friendship and alliance made with his predecessor, should send embassies to assure him of it, carrying compliments of congratulation on his accession. From the republics which had already profited from the Macedonian alliance to secure them against the dominion of the democratical leaders at Athens, embassies were hastened, and quickly the measure became general. Alexander received all with an ingaging attention, referring always to his father's popularity in Greece, to which he declared his earnest desire to succeed.<sup>5</sup> Athens, omitting to concur in this compliment, might fear to remain alone in a situation indicating hostile purpose. At length therefore it was decreed that an embassy should carry the congratulation of the Athenian people to Alexander, with the profession of desire to maintain the friendly connection formed with the late king his father.

Athens, having thus concurred in friendly communication, nothing remained to forbid the proposal of a meeting of all the republics, by their representatives in congress, conformably to former practice, to consult on common concerns; and the war already begun with Persia pressingly required such consultation in common. Accordingly Corinth was named for the place of meeting; preferred, apparently, by Alexander now, as by Philip formerly, not only as, by its situation on the isthmus, most equally convenient for the republics within and without the peninsula of Peloponnesus, but also because, being deep among them, and far from Macedonia, it was, of all convenient places, the least liable to jealousy of the interference of an overawing power that might controll freedom of debate. Accordingly, as, in the congress which had appointed Philip to the chief command, the motion for the purpose had been freely and warmly opposed by the deputies of some of the Arcadian towns, so now there was equal freedom of speech and vote. The

Arrian. l. 1. c. 1. Lacedemonian deputies not only declared their dissent to the proposed

<sup>5</sup> Ταῖς πρεσβείαις χρηματίσας φιλανθρώπως, παρεκάλεσε τοὺς Ἕλληνας τηρεῖν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν πατρὸς-  
γάδοτον ἑννοίαν. Diod. l. 17. c. 2.

appointment



appointment of a Macedonian king to the chief military command, but asserted a right of superiority in their own state. Not unreasonably indeed it might be expected that the kings of Lacedæmon, successors of those the allowed military chiefs of the Greek nation, and with them all the Spartan elderhood, accustomed, after the example of their predecessors, to claim imperial dignity and power, tho in adverse circumstances they had conceded the point to Philip's approved talents and wide fame in mature manhood, would be indignant at the proposal for a Macedonian youth, hardly beyond boyhood, to be supreme in military command over all Greece. The terms in which their dissent is reported to have been declared are consonant to all we read of the combined pride and coldness of the Spartan character: 'It had been the custom of the Lacedæmonians,' they said, 'to obey none, but on the contrary it was their admitted privilege to lead others.' Alexander nevertheless was chosen by a great majority; the opposition of Lacedæmon, as far as appears, only making the vote not unanimous.

That opposition, concerning which and its sequel all writers concur, affords most satisfactory evidence of the important historical truth, that Alexander's election was the result of choice in the republics, and that the reports of some antient authors, the favorite authorities of many modern, that a military force attending him left the assembly no freedom of choice, have been merely the 'malicious calumnies of a disappointed party. That some votes were decided by fear is not improbable. Fear of one-another we have continually seen a powerful agent among the Grecian republics; but no account of any value shows it in any degree likely that Alexander had led any army from Macedonia, or had even collected any among the friendly republics. The freedom of the assembly indeed is warranted, not only by what all admit, the declared dissent of the Lacedæmonian deputies, but still more by what followed. The Lacedæmonian government not merely avowed its approbation of the conduct of its deputies, but refused obedience to the decree of the congress of the nation, denying its contingent of troops for the army to be employed in the common cause against the foreign enemy. If blame were imputable to the Macedonian administration, it may seem to be for an over-scrupulous lenity, in refraining from any measures against Lacedæmon for such contumacy.

What

What indeed, in the instance immediately before us, should have been the course for the superintending administration to take, might probably have been matter of much question among even the most dispassionate Greeks of that day. The most regular, in theory, apparently, was to refer the matter to the council of Amphictyons. But the revival of this long-disused course by the Thebans, producing the sacred war, would not recommend it ; and, the composition of the council of Amphictyons, we have observed, was not such as could make it a satisfactory or fit tribunal for decision of such causes. Looking then for precedent to former times, even those usually called the best times of Greece, we have seen the Lacedæmonian oligarchy taking upon itself, on two occasions, to punish with death the leading men of Thebes, and on a third a large portion of the male population of Platæa ; and we have seen the less scrupulous democracy of Athens, in the three instances of Scione, Melos, and Sestus, not only murdering the whole male population, but selling all the women and children to slavery ; a fate decreed also for Mitylene, tho not executed. Such conduct would have been perhaps as little prudent for Alexander as fitting in itself. Possibly then the young prince and his council took the wisest and best course, in avoiding any measures against Lacedæmon ; not so much as reproach or remonstrance remain reported ; and this forbearance appears consonant to the whole conduct of the congress, as far as accounts go ; marking, in those who led its counsels, a scrupulous respect for a free constitution, and prudence derived from practice in communication with a free people. On this subject further light will come from events at intervals following.<sup>6</sup>

For

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, whose principal object has been a military history of Alexander, is very concise on the business at Corinth, as having nothing of military character. But his account, and equally that of Diodorus, implies that an army was needless, and that any show of military force would have been adverse to his purpose, which evidently was to conciliate the republican Greeks, as his father had conciliated them. Plutarch gives a very different picture, in his too usual way ;

lively, but without regard either to authority or probability, and without just consideration even of the honor of his fellow-countrymen, which it was his constant purpose to exalt : Alexander, he says, by the suddenness and rapidity with which he led a Macedonian army into Bœotia and onward, deterred opposition. Those who, adverting to the common character of Plutarch's narrative, will consider at the same time what Demosthenes has said about Macedonian

troops

For the moment it appears that matters were advantageously composed, and quiet was established throughout Greece. War with Persia remained in the contemplation of all, to be conducted by a youth of twenty, as commander-in-chief. Asia, as we have formerly seen, was always a favorite field for Grecian adventurers in arms; and youths, and possibly some beyond early youth, eager for adventure, might reckon their personal chance of advantage not less for the change of their expected leader from a prince of consummate experience in politics and war for one so new in both. Preparation therefore was zealously put forward among the republics, while, in autumn already advanced, Alexander, returning into Macedonia, directed his attention to the same point there.

## SECTION II.

*Unquiet state of Greece: Macedonia threatened by the Northern Nations: Measures of Demosthenes: War in Thrace; on the Danube; in Illyria.*

SMALL as the opposition was, in the congress at Corinth, to the continuance of the Macedonian supremacy in the person of the youthful Alexander, by which those, throughout Greece, joined by interest and concurring in sentiment with Isocrates and Phocion of Athens, were relieved from the alternative of subjection to the rod of democratical empire, or an immediate renewal of contest in arms to avoid it, yet circumstances remained of anxious aspect. War was to be diverted from Greece by being carried into Asia; a wide and alluring field for the range of unquiet spirits; some of whom the quiet perhaps might be glad to spare; and so far the policy of Isocrates was to be followed. But Isocrates was no more, and the prince in whom he had confided and who had respected him, was no more. Thinking men, among the Greeks, might feel somewhat the less, through the habit of untoward prospect; yet, that so much depended on a youth of twenty, however advantageously

troops in Greece, and what even were the probable means of Alexander for leading an overbearing army thither, may estimate for themselves the credit due to him in this instance. But Diodorus, without notice of any military force under Alexander in Thessaly, places him at the head of an army in Bœotia. Apparently here, as the learned Dodwell says of him on another occasion, Diodorus has confounded times and circumstances. On a following occasion we shall find Alexander, in Arrian's account, consistently with all probability, at the head of an army in Bœotia.



he might have shown himself in various communication on arduous and difficult matters, would remain an awful consideration; while the consummate politician who, in his public speeches, had not scrupled to boast of his connection with the Persian court and of his means to employ Persian wealth to promote the interest of his party, remained the leader of that still powerful party. Should the war be successful, the ultimate result was doubtful; on the other hand, should it be unfortunate, the lot of the now prevailing party could hardly fail to be wretched.

Before the usual season for beginning military operations, however, intelligence reached the Macedonian government, and quickly became public, which imperiously checked the prosecution of purposes previously entertained, and made most serious consideration of new measures necessary. Concert among the nearly surrounding barbarous nations had been so ably managed, that Macedonia was at once threatened on three sides; on the west by the Illyrians, on the north by the Triballians, and those Thracians, whom the Greeks distinguished by the epithet autonomous, or independent, and on the east by men whom Arrian distinguishes only by the title of traders, but whom his phrase, describing their armour, suffices to mark for Greeks<sup>7</sup>.

About the Grecian seas we have formerly observed men abounding, in character resembling the pirates of the same seas in modern ages, or buccaneers of the western Indies, and not widely differing from European smugglers, or mixing those characters; all mariners, and many of them traders by profession, but robbers when opportunity offered; originally subjects of various states, but owing allegiance, unless for present profit or present distress, to none. When Athens was all powerful at sea, it was the interest of the Athenian government to hold such people in order. But it was among the deficiencies of democratical government, which we find strongly represented by Demosthenes himself, that it could, less than any other government, restrain the irregularities of those to whom it committed authority; so that pirates and irregular traders were commonly licensed by the Athenian naval commanders, for their own profit, and that of those who served under them. The reduction then of all the little commercial and piratical republics of the northern shores of the Ægean under

Ch. 40. s. 4.  
of this hist.

ἡ Ὀπλισμένη.

the

the superintendence of the Macedonian government, which commanded the land and was also powerful at sea, gave a new check to the opportunities of the piratical and smuggling traders, evidently a powerful set of men. Thus they would be prepared for connection with the anti-Macedonian party in Greece, especially at Athens, to whom their habits of communication, in the way of trade, with the barbarians of the northern continent, would, among other considerations, make them objects to cultivate an interest with<sup>8</sup>.

Demosthenes was at this time exerting his utmost diligence to excite troubles for Macedonia. He wrote to the Persian satraps of the western provinces, urging them to use the advantages of the moment, when a boy of contemptible talents was captain-general of the Greeks<sup>9</sup>. Tho not remaining directly said, it seems largely indicated, that Demosthenes was the politician who brought about the northern confederacy, and that the traders were his agents for the extensive communication among the barbarous nations. Influence failed with the eastern Thracians, who perhaps, both chiefs and people, found the dominion of the Macedonian king not less liberal than either that formerly of their great sovereigns, Teres and his successors, of their own nation, or, as far as it was experienced among them, that of the imperial people of Athens. Habitually and perhaps constitutionally impatient of peace, yet they might look toward war in Asia, in fellowship with the Macedonians, as likely to afford gratification in its way, beyond any other. But the traders gained those Thracians of the northern highlands, whom the Greeks styled independent, seemingly not because they had a freer government, or had been more independent of foreign powers, but because they had avoided political connection with the great body of the Thracian people. Beyond the independent Thracians, northward and westward, was the country of the Triballians, extending from the northern boundary of Macedonia to the

Plut.  
Demosth.  
p. 856.  
Diod.  
Arrian.

<sup>8</sup> Difficilior, cogitanti mihi, scopus est, quid, hoc loco, faciant mercatores. Gronovii annot. in Arr. I like annotators who will not, as too many do, pass difficulties unnoticed, however little they may solve them. I commit my solution of this difficulty to those who will study the history of the Greek republics among the cotemporary writers. But the phrase "Ὅσω πυκνοτέρα τῇ φάλαγγι, the subject of the learned editor's next note, seems, for explanation, only to require attention, which he appears to have omitted, to the order stated by Arrian to have been given by Alexander, λύσαι τὴν τάξιν.

<sup>9</sup> Παιδα καὶ μαργίην ἀποκαλῶν αἰλόν. Plut. Demosth. p. 856.

Dambe. These had been among the most formidable of the people with whom Philip was engaged, in his war with the northern nations. They acknowledged monarchical government; and, whether the condition of the many had been worse or better since Philip's victories extended his power among them, the king's ambition would be checked and his importance lessened. From whatever motives however, the negotiation of the traders was successful here, and together with the independent Thracians, the king of the Triballians became their ally for the purpose of war with Macedonia.

In this critical emergency, the defence of Macedonia against the Illyrians, who most threatened immediate inroad, was committed to Parmenio; in the late king's estimation, the ablest general of the age. Alexander himself took the lead of the army for the offensive war which it was judged advisable to hasten against the Grecian enemy, apparently rebelling subjects, the traders. Their purpose seems to have been to seize some strong maritime position, perhaps Amphipolis itself, which might insure their communication with the sea, and with any maritime allies. Athens especially; trusting that the Macedonian arms would be required for defensive war, against the Illyrians and Triballians. But the rapidity with which Alexander assembled an army at Amphipolis so disconcerted them, that they abandoned, not only the coast, but all the rich plain, left Philippi and its goldmines, among the lower hills, behind them, and withdrew to the mountains; where, in a situation singularly strong, they were joined by their barbarian allies.

Alexander resolved upon the bold, perhaps rash, measure of attacking them there; for Arrian attributes both the resolution, and the manner of execution, to himself. In modern times missile weapons, of power beyond the imagination of former ages, give, to the more civilized, a decided superiority over uncultivated nations. In antiquity, on the contrary, a superior defensive armour, and a tactic adapted to close fighting, principally set the Greek above the barbarian. The shield of the Grecian heavy-armed was very large and strong; the Macedonian, improved whether by Archelaus or by Philip, was superiorly so, and, being rectangular, formed, in close array, a kind of wall. The Macedonian phalanx thus, with its long spears powerful to offend where it could reach, was, on even ground, nearly invulnerable. But it had eminently the defect of unfitness



to act on broken ground. There the arrangement of the shields, becoming necessarily disordered, the soldier was exposed to wounds from missile weapons, unable to return them. The traders, were heavy-armed, and formed in phalanx, but too weak in numbers to meet the Macedonians in open field. The Thracians, apparently numerous, were, by the custom of their nation, middle-armed, and excelled in that discipline. Carrying, for defence, a target, or small shield, for offence two javelins, not too weighty to be used as missile weapons, tho utterly incapable of standing the shock of the phalanx, yet they could wound from a distance, when opportunity offered; and when it failed, they could, by their lightness, avoid action with the heavy-armed. Suited thus for highland warfare, they were especially qualified to support the small body of their heavy-armed allies, in guarding the pass. The traders and Thracians having thus together their station on the verge of a quick declivity, where the road was inclosed between precipices, formed there a rampart of waggons; and placed, before these, other waggons, prepared to be set in motion down the steep, so as to act as an artillery against an approaching enemy.

Alexander, informed of all circumstances, in giving orders for assault upon a force so advantageously posted, and in so uncommon a manner prepared, directed that his phalangites, in advancing, should observe carefully the ground and its resources; and that, when the waggons should be put in motion, all who could find security from projections of rock, should, hasten to such shelter, and that the rest should lie flat on the ground, covering themselves with their compacted shields. Arrian, himself an experienced officer and an eminent tactician, and professing to follow the narratives of generals who served under Alexander, proceeds to say, this was so executed, that the greater part of the road remained clear, while the waggons rolled down the hill, and, of the soldiers reduced to depend upon their shields for protection, none were killed. The momentary danger being over, the phalanx rapidly formed, and advanced, giving the regular military shout, while the bowmen, whose shots far exceeded the cast of the Thracian javelin, discharged their arrows from behind, and from the heights on each side. Alexander's bold and active temper would not allow him to be merely a spectator of the action, in an age when it was usual for commanding generals to be personally engaged. He took himself the lead of  
a body

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 1.

a body of heavy-armed foot, distinguished by the title of hypaspists, who seem to have been selected for their ability for rapid movement in complete armour, together with the Agrians, who were, like the Thracians, middle-armed. The enemy, disheartened by the failure of effect of their stratagem, galled by missile weapons, unqualified to stand the shock of the phalanx, in front, and attacked by Alexander in flank, took to precipitate flight, and even abandoned their camp, containing their women and children, constant companions of the wild hords in their warfare. These, with the attending slaves, less unhappy in their change of lot, would be probably, the most valuable portion of the booty; the whole of which was presently sent off under an escort, to be sold, among the Grecian towns of the coast, for the benefit of the victorious army.

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 2.

The extensive territory of the Triballians, reaching to the Danube, was now open to the Macedonian arms, and if the chief desired to carry war thither, the recent event might have sufficed to make a shortsighted soldiery willing. But the country was not without inviting circumstances; mostly plain, of highly-fruitful soil; and tho its people were without science, and little versed in arts of luxury, yet they were not without what, with those natural advantages, supported large population; so that, not only subsistence might be gained by the sword, but also booty which the institutions of the Grecian republics made of sure value; men, women and children for the slavemarkets. It appears probable, from the sequel that assurance had been received of the safety of Macedonia under the able management of Parmenio. Thus Alexander's immediate counsellors, with a view to check future attempts against their country, might be led to approve the ambition natural for a youth of Alexander's age, to emulate his father's glory, and like him carry war as far as the Danube. Such an expedition however had been so far provided for that vessels, adapted to the navigation, had been ordered from Byzantium to proceed up that river. The army then descending from the mountains, the Triballians were so aware of the inferiority of their arms and discipline, for contest in the plains, that, without an attempt to defend their cultivated fields, they fled with what property they could carry, their king Syrmus leading. The islands of their great boundary river were the first choice for refuge; but these not sufficing for all, the remainder occupied the extensive woods and marshes on the banks of the Lyginus, a tributary stream.

stream."<sup>11</sup> Uneasy however there, and in want, they issued to attack the invaders, but were defeated, with much slaughter. Alexander then, in a march of three days, reaching the Danube, made an attempt upon one of the islands; Arr. l. 1. c. 3. but his vessels not sufficing to carry a competent force at once, the garrison was too strong for him, and he received a check.

Beyond the Danube was the country of the Getes or Goths. Degrees of barbarism, were not in those parts, it appears, to be measured by degrees of latitude, or distance from Greece. Circumstances reported by Arrian would indicate the Getes to have been of more settled life, and thence more civilized, than the concurring accounts of the three early historians, all personally acquainted with the Thracians, represent that nation; even the part bordering on the Grecian colonies. Where Alexander reached the Danube, the land beyond was, in Arrian's account, to a great extent, as one field of wheat, of the most luxuriant growth. Skilled therefore apparently not inconsiderably in husbandry, but ignorant of navigation, beyond that of a canoo, the Getes depended upon their great river for complete security against invasion from the southward. But, Alexander had provided means beyond their contemplation. The vessels from the the Euxine were capable of carrying horses, and they had never seen such before. Fifteen hundred cavalry were thus put across, apparently by night, while four thousand foot also passed, some in canoos of the country, and the rest on skins, the soldier's ordinary bed, stuffed with straw. Arrived thus on Gothic ground, not far from the capital city, which stood, not on the river, but near it, the corn was found of height to conceal the march of the infantry. The Getes had assembled, according to report, to the number of ten thousand foot and four thousand horse. The phalanx, on emerging from the corn, presently took the closest order. Advancing then with shields hardly admitting any sight of what bore them, and with spears presented in even line, the cavalry at the same time moving with a regularity wholly new to the Getes, previously wondering how such a force could so suddenly cross their great barrier of water, in extreme surprize and alarm fled. Their capital, unfortified, having been supposed safe, with the river on one side, and an extent of their own

<sup>11</sup> There is, in our copies of Arrian, an error of transcribers here, for which Gro-  
novius has proposed an ingenious and pro-

bably just correction, which has been adopted for the text.



country on all others, was abandoned, and so hastily that booty was found there, in kind and amount, highly gratifying to the Macedonians.

The provocation to this hazardous enterprize is little intimated by the historian, yet its policy perhaps may be gathered from the result. Gratification to the soldier by booty, we have often had occasion to observe a common and even necessary object in antient warfare; and the attainment of this, in a situation and by means so unlooked for, and with so many apparent obstacles overcome, would promote the notion that nothing was impossible for the army under its bold and fortunate young commander. Yet it may possibly have been less with any direct view to such an enterprize, that his able counsellors procured vessels from the Euxine to be brought, by a laborious and hazardous navigation, so far against the stream, than to insure a supply of provisions for the army in a hostile country, so remote and so little known, or means of retreat in case of misfortune. Conquest, to be retained beyond the Danube, was evidently not the purpose. The body of the army quickly recrossed the river, leaving the care of the booty to a detachment, which hastily followed with it.

Advantage from these measures, so largely successful, soon became manifest. The hazardous enterprize beyond the Danube might have afforded hope, for Syrmus and the Triballians, of delivery from an overbearing enemy; but the rapid return of the victorious army produced such despondency, that Syrmus presently sent an embassy to ask respectfully, upon what terms he might have peace for himself and his people; and, shortly after, ministers came from all the surrounding states, professing the purpose of friendship and desiring a return of it. A kind of congress was thus formed, in which the ministers of the Celts, or Gauls, the extent of whose settlements, in this age, eastward of that afterward called Cisalpine Gaul, is unascertained, were noticed for the lofty tone with which they offered friendship, anxious at the same time to obviate hostility<sup>12</sup>. All were so received that treaties

Arrian. l. 1.  
c. 3.  
Strab. l. 7.

<sup>12</sup> The account of the embassy of the Gauls, in which Arrian and Strabo concur, the latter informs us, was from Ptolemy. It is left uncertain where exactly this branch of the widely-spread nation of the Celts lived; and it seems a little presumptuous in some modern authors, I think the respectable Guischart

among them, on such grounds as moderns can have, to deny a fact so warranted as this embassy. Were Ptolemy's authority not itself sufficient, Strabo and Arrian were likely to be as well qualified to judge of it on the score of probability as any moderns: at least they would have more ground within their reach.

of peace and friendship were concluded with all, sanctioned, for each nation, by its peculiar religious solemnities.

The confederated powers westward of Macedonia, the Illyrians, under Cleitus son of Bardylis, and the Taulantians under Glaucias, tho foremost to threaten, had still delayed to act; apparently disconcerted by the early and complete overthrow of their allies on the eastern side, the Thracians and traders. After the quickly insuing defeat of the Triballians, they might have expected invasion of their own country to be the next object of the victorious army. But information that Alexander was engaged in the hazardous project of carrying war beyond the Danube, with perhaps exaggerated intelligence of difficulties and dangers deep in the northern continent, encouraged them in their former purpose of invading Macedonia, and inabled them to induce neighbours, before hesitating, to favor their purpose. From their own mountains they could descend with their light troops into the Macedonian plains; but the Macedonian phalanx could not with any ease or security, enter their country, but through that of the Autariats. These, apparently subjects of the Macedonian crown, but holding their own free constitution, were engaged to refuse passage for a Macedonian army; and then the confederated princes formally renounced the alliance concluded with the late king of Macedonia, Philip; and, for the losses of power and dominion sustained from him, proposed to revenge themselves on his son.

Alexander had fortunately settled, and mostly concluded, treaties of friendship with all the northern powers, when information of this revived danger for Macedonia reached him. His temper, stimulated by recent success, would want no urging to adopt the advice of able counsellors, that the best defence for a country, threatened with invasion, was to give the enemy employment at home. But the contumacy of the Autariats was an obstacle requiring the first attention. Fortunately among the friends about Arrian, l. 1. him was one who best could obviate it. Bordering on the country of the Au-<sup>c. 5.</sup> tariats was that of the Agrians; within the Macedonian kingdom, but Strab. l. 7. themselves not of Grecian race. Nevertheless their prince, Langarus, now serving with Alexander, had been his companion from boyhood. Bred in the Macedonian court, Langarus yet was popular in his principality; for, undertaking that the Agrians should so keep the Autariats in awe as to prevent any serious opposition to the Macedonian army in traversing their country, he

effected what he promised. Here we find marked, at the same time, something of the liberal constitution of the Macedonian kingdom and of the liberal character of Philip's policy. The hereditary chief of a distant province, which seems to have been much in the circumstances of our counties palatine of old, was so made his own and his son's friend, that, holding power to be a valuable friend, he had the disposition also.

Thus relieved from a threatening difficulty, Alexander advanced into Illyria so speedily as to reach Pellion, the capital, before the promised assistance of the Taulantians had joined the Illyrian forces. Cleitus therefore, fearing to meet the Macedonians in the field, directed his attention to the protection of the city; and with this view took a position so advantageous, that Alexander, ably advised, rather than attack him there, proceeded to plunder the country around. Thus, while his own army was gratified, the Illyrians, naturally impatient of confinement in a stationary camp, became so irritated that their prince could no longer restrain them: they would be led to battle. Yielding then to the pressure of the moment, against his opinion of what prudence required, he sought to obtain from the favor of his gods a success, of which, with his human means he had no clear hope. The singular and horrid rite is said to have been of ancient custom in the country: Three boys, three girls and three black rams, were, with prescribed ceremonies, killed together at the altars. His army then quitted its advantageous position, confident of divine favor. But no courage, no enthusiasm could inable men, with the Illyrian arms and discipline, to contend with the Macedonian phalanx on ground suited to its action. The Illyrians, overborne, took to profuse flight; and, their camp becoming the prey of the conquerors, the relics of the victims of the abominable sacrifice, found

Arr. I. 1. c. 6. there, assured the Macedonians of the truth of what had been related to them.

The arrival of Glaucias however, soon after, with the Taulantian army, gave encouragement and opportunity for the dispersed Illyrians to reassemble under their king. The country abounded with rugged mountains and productive valleys; affording thus choice of strong posts, and abundant subsistence for forces holding them. It was that country which, in a modern age, became famous through the stand made against the Turks, in the fulness of their power, by another Alexander, commonly described by his name in the Turkish corruption, Scanderbeg, and which the exertions of the



the Turkish empire, surrounding it, have never yet been able completely to subdue. Here the united Illyrians and Taulantians took a position so strong, that the Macedonians again judged attack upon them unadvisable. But while they hesitated, scarcity, especially of forage, began to press; for all near had been carried off by the enemy, and opportunity for wide range of cavalry was not open here as among the northern plains: abundance was to be obtained only by going far, and not so without venturing through dangerous passes, among lofty mountains and extensive woods. The arms, and the art of war, of the Illyrians and Taulantians, ill adapted for pitched battle, were excellent for harassing an enemy. The combined kings therefore would not quit their strong position; but so watched opportunities for partial action, that at length it was judged necessary for almost the whole of the Macedonian horse to go out in body for supplies. Its return, so ably the enemy's measures had been concerted, was intercepted. The commanding officer's vigilance avoided a snare prepared for him; but he could not advance without meeting destruction almost certain. He took a position however which he maintained till the whole Macedonian infantry was led to his relief. By an able movement then, tho not without both difficulty and hazard, employment was so found for the enemy, that the cavalry, yet still not without difficulty and hazard, at length joined it, and immediate danger ended.

Want however pressed more than ever, and opportunity for advantageous action the wary enemy as much denied as ever. The resource at length was a feigned flight. The enemy followed; but cautiously, keeping the highlands. Little regularly disciplined, but, taught by severe experience, they had, since their defeat, been obedient to their prudent leaders. But now, supposing victory in their hands, they could no longer be restrained to due observance of order. And here we find illustration of what was observed in treating of the Thracian constitution, that wherever the people are the army, popular power will insure popular freedom. Irregular and defective as the Illyrian constitution may have been, the monarchy was not absolute. Probably Alexander's able advisers may have reckoned upon the licentious use of popular power by the Illyrians, and possibly they may have hoped for the further advantage which ensued. Cleitus and Glaucias, not remitting their caution so as to quit the hills, yet misjudged in chusing a station; or, confidence increasing as they proceeded, in failure of one directly in their course

Ch. 43. s. 4.  
of this hist.

such as they might desire, they ventured to incamp for once upon disadvantageous ground. Alexander, with his forces ably disposed for the purpose, attacking them there, put them completely to rout. Cleitus retreated to his capital; but, whether more doubting the strength of its fortifications, or the fidelity of his people, when the disgrace of defeat had befallen him, and the pressure of a victorious enemy irritated them, he presently fled after his ally, Glaucias, who had withdrawn into his own country.

Whether any treaty of peace, with either princes or people, followed this victory, the historian, attentive principally to military affairs, and now attracted by the importance of what occurred elsewhere, has omitted to say. Intelligence reached Alexander of commotions in Greece; so serious that composition with the Illyrians and their allies was highly desirable. The recent victory afforded facilities, and hard conditions appear not to have been insisted on. It seems likely that Alexander, deferring to able counsellors, was satisfied to have the treaty made with his father, with little variation, renewed, and that the Illyrian and Taulantian princes, reckoning it fortunate that their unsuccessful aggression produced no worse consequences, gladly rested on it; for as far as the silence of historians may afford indication, the Macedonian western border remained in peace.

### SECTION III.

*Combination among the Grecian Republics under Demosthenes: Revolution of Thebes: Greece again divided against itself: Destruction of Thebes: Composition with Athens, Eleia and Ætolia, and Peace restored throughout Greece. Repetition of the Macedonian Olympic Festival.*

IT was Alexander's fortune now, as in his wars with the northern nations that the enemies by whom he had been pressed were already brought to terms of accommodation, when new ones required his utmost attention. The disposition of the party in Athens, adverse to the Macedonian alliance, had been so openly demonstrated in the conduct of Demosthenes, its principal leader, and the connection of that party with a party in almost every republic of the nation, was of such notoriety, and its connection also with the Persian court had been so avowed, that Alexander's able council, whether more or less assured of what had produced the formidable confederacy

deracy of the northern nations, now so fortunately overborne, could not be wholly unprepared to expect adverse movements among the Grecian republics. The absence of the authority, chosen by the congress of the nation to moderate between discordant republics with contending parties in each, affording opportunities, the circumstances of the Greek nation were become as uneasy and threatening, for families of property and for domestic life altogether, as in any period described by Xenophon or Isocrates.

At this time, according to Plutarch, in consonance with all other writers, Demosthenes held a complete superiority in the Athenian assembly. Nevertheless the combination that he could form within Greece, appears not so extensive as to have been formidable to the Macedonian confederacy, had it not been supported by powerful connections abroad. According to Plutarch he had such consideration at the Persian court that rescripts had reached the satraps, commanding their attention to him as agent for the affairs of the empire with the Grecian republics, and prescribing the sums of money which they should advance him for the service. Of all the jarring portions of the Greek nation, nowhere was opposition in politics so violent as at Thebes; nowhere, in one party, such vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes; in the other, to the patronage of the king of Macedonia. From earliest history indeed no part of Greece appears to have been the scene of such constant and violent hostilities within itself as Bœotia. In the fabulous ages it afforded principal subjects for the tragic poets: within historical times, nowhere else do we read of the fate of Grecian towns, suffered from Greeks of the same province and political association and claim of common rights and common lineage, like that of Platæa, of Thespiæ, and, even while Pelopidas and Epameinondas were, if not the leaders on the occasion, yet among the leading men, that of Orchomenus. On the conclusion of the sacred war, the interest of Thebes, then the ally of Macedonia, prevented, as we have seen, the rebuilding of Thespiæ and Platæa, and the restoration of Orchomenians and others, banished for opposition to Thebes. Through the battle of Chæroneia afterward, these benefits were obtained, and all the Bœotian towns were delivered from the dominion of the Theban people. Philip superintending, a liberality, unusual in Grecian politics, was extended to the defeated party: Few or none were banished: injoyment of civil rights was ingaged for to all. That party however before commanding, now inferior; holding liberty, but not power; would

Plut. Demost. p. 856.

Plut. Demost. p. 855, 856.

Ch. 39. s. 8. of this hist.



would not cease to desire the lost superiority; and if power, in the hands of those who had been its adversaries, were ever exercised illiberally or indiscreetly, little under controul, in civil matters, from the military head of the nation in distant Macedonia, they would of course be more eager to regain their lost superiority. Sources of fermentation and disturbance were so ready, in the population of a republic so composed, that the regular means of a republican constitution could not inable those who desired quiet, to maintain it. This had been so strongly felt that, under a vote, as we have seen, of the Amphictyonic confederacy, and evidently with the approbation, and probably at the desire, of the party in Thebes which favored the Amphictyonic and Macedonian alliance, a garrison from the Amphictyonic army was placed in the Cadmeia, to be ready to assist in keeping the public peace.

Arr. l. 1. c. 7. At the time of which we have now to treat, two officers, Amyntas and Timolaus, commanded in the Cadmeia with joint authority. From their names, among other indications, it seems probable that one was a Theban, the other a Macedonian. Such combined command we have seen familiar and ordinary among the Greeks; and the association of a Macedonian with a Theban may have been here required, less by any ambition or assumed authority of the Macedonian government, than by the habitual jealousy of Thebes entertained among the Bœotian towns, together with their habitual subordination to Thebes; whence, tho averse to the single superiority of a Theban, even of the friendly party, yet they had difficulty to claim, for a citizen of any other state, equality with a Theban.

This resource of maintaining a garrison in the Cadmeia, the mildest perhaps that could be effectual for restraining open turbulence, would not however soften animosities or cheer disappointment. Those Thebans who had been first in their own city and in all Bœotia, some of them looking to be first in Greece, habituated to activity in ambitious pursuits, could not rest in domestic quiet or in civil inferiority, under those they envied or hated. The vigilance, the experience, the talent of gaining the minds of men, in which Philip excelled, might perhaps, in course of time, have introduced more harmony among a population so inheriting hostility within itself, and through life exercised in it. But the ablest ministers, whom Alexander could employ or the Thebans of his party elect, while himself engaged in distant warfare, could hardly fail to find difficulties insuperable, when, in  
opposition

opposition to them, sometimes in open assembly, but still much more by secret negotiation, the able and indefatigable Demosthenes was exciting and combining insurrection<sup>12</sup>.

Banishment, on account of party differences, was so ordinary among the Greeks, that if some eminent Thebans left their country, by sentence of exile, or without it, when after the battle of Chæroneia their city yielded to the Amphictyonic army, it may have been thought, by writers of the time, little matter for notice. The defeated party, generally, could not but be uneasy under power in the hands of those to whom they had been violently hostile; and some might dread, possibly not without feeling that they had earned, personal animosity. Finding themselves therefore uneasy, and perhaps unsafe, at home, they may have emigrated; and plots, unmentioned in history, may afterward have given occasion for banishments. Some eminent Thebans, however, we are assured by Arrian, were in banishment, the mass of their party remaining in the city. Arr. l. 1. c. 7. Yet so the purpose of commotion was concealed, that Amyntas and Timolaus, commanders of the garrison of the Cadmeia, thinking the protection of their fortress needless for themselves, resided in the city below. Possibly indeed their residence in the town rather than in the citadel may have been pursuant to instructions, for dissipating fears, obviating jealousies, cultivating popularity and infusing confidence.

Such appears to have been the state of things, when a rumor was circulated, unknown whence arising, that the young king of Macedonia was dead. Tho this, if credited, could not fail to affect the public mind strongly, to alarm those desirous of resting under the existing order, and to excite hope in the large adverse party, yet the men in power seem to have thought no measures in consequence necessary. In one night both the commanding officers of the Cadmeia were assassinated in the city where they resided. Criers then immediately went around, summoning the people instantly to assemble. Alarm was universal. The people meeting, in various expectation, were surprized to find, not the magistrates, but the exiles, with those resident citizens known to be most friendly to them, in possession of the bema. The first speaker began with boldly asserting that

<sup>12</sup> Αἱ δὲ πόλεις, πάλιν τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀναρρήπιζοῦσιν αὐτὰς, συνίστασι, κ. τ. ε. Plut. v. Demosth. p. 856.

the rumor, which all had heard, of Alexander's death, was perfectly authenticated. He proceeded then to urge the expediency of using the opportunity, offered by the gods, for breaking the accursed yoke of Macedonia, and asserting their freedom. The magistrates, meanwhile, uninformed of the catastrophe of the military commanders, and anxious, in such an emergency, for their support, waited hesitating. The bold leaders of the conspiracy, thus alone speakers, presently proposed to the assembly, That the alliance with Macedonia should be renounced, and that the garrison in the citadel should be expelled. Acclamation was ready from those prepared : others, in fear and uncertainty, were silent ; the conspirators assumed that the sovereign people had decreed as had been proposed, and proceeded diligently to give efficacy to this mandate of the surprized assembly. All whom they could trust, and as many more as they thought they might restrain, were collected in arms. Siege was laid to the citadel, and works of contravallation and circumvallation, such as are first noticed in extant history to have been used by the Lacedæmonians against Plataea, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, were begun.

Æsch.de cor.  
p. 548.

Thus, by a principal city, in nearly the middle of Greece, revolt was declared against the general confederacy of the republics. Nearly about the same time, and clearly in concert, the Perrhæbians, subjects of those who assumed to be eminently Thessalians, nearly as, in modern times, the Grisons and other Alpine people were subjects of the Swiss, rose in revolt. The Thessalian general assembly, inquiring into the business, and informed of the revolution at Thebes, were so satisfied that the new Theban government was connected with the party of Demosthenes, now prevailing in the Athenian assembly, and that from them had come the instigation for their subjects to revolt, that they declared war against both Athens and Thebes.

These circumstances, reported to Alexander in his camp in Illyria, left no room for deliberation but about the manner in which the rebellion, so effectually begun against the general confederacy of Greece, and the war so immediately threatening Macedonia itself from Thessaly, should be most advantageously met. Alexander's temper, not less than the antient principles of monarchy, and the most accredited examples of former times, decided that he should himself go where danger in the field,



field and difficulty in council were likely most to occur. Speed was urgently required. With a small chosen body therefore he took the shortest road, but of singular difficulty, over a country of rocky and wooded mountains, at this day the least known of all Europe, from either antient description, or modern examination: the provinces of Eordæa and Elymiotis, and the craggy summits of Tymphæa and Paravæa, are the names, and all the description that Arrian gives. The distance was, comparatively, not great, yet the historian mentions it as an extraordinary march, that, in seven days he reached Pellenë in Thessaly; and that, having crossed that plainer country and passed the strait of Thermopylæ, he was, on the sixth after, in Bœotia.

The revolution at Thebes appears, in all accounts, to have been ably conducted; hardly less than that, more celebrated, by which formerly the same city had been delivered from subjection to Lacedæmon. The narrative of Diodorus, valuable here for what has not fallen within Arrian's purpose of a military history, marks it to have been planned at Athens: Demosthenes, he says, furnished a large quantity of arms, for which no payment was required. Apparently, and further indication will insue, Persia was the paymaster. At the instance of Demosthenes the Athenian people voted assistance in arms to the Thebans; who, however, perhaps jealous of Demosthenes and the Athenians, desired that events should be waited for before any Athenian force were sent to them, and so none immediately moved. As if aware then that, to contend successfully against the popularity of the Macedonian government, its liberality must be emulated, the able leaders of the revolution seem, against ordinary republican practice, to have checked all violence in their followers: beyond the assassination of the two military commanders, the careful historian who most gives the particulars, mentions neither bloodshed, nor even any banishment.<sup>13</sup> But it was not the same thing to contend now with the established popularity of the Macedonian supremacy, as formerly with the power of Lacedæmon; odious through a conduct certainly very different from

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 8.

Arrian, l. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, in his life of Demosthenes, arms which Demosthenes furnished, but giving a summary of the revolution and its consequences, as far as Demosthenes was concerned, says many were killed with the following war no doubt many were killed.

Arrian. l. 1.  
c. 7.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 9.

that, less described by antient writers, by which it had risen, but most advantageously characterized by that remarkable testimony, in the Persian war, the refusal of the people of the other republics to act, even in naval service, with which the Lacedæmonians were so little conversant, under any but a Lacedæmonian commander. The arrival of Alexander at Onchestus in Bœotia, beyond all expectation, and beyond even supposition of what was possible, as it surprized the Theban leaders, so it greatly alarmed them. Not the force he had brought was formidable, but the effects among the Theban people ; the animation arising among those whom terror and necessity only had induced to acquiesce under the late revolution, the fears of its decided friends, and the revived uncertainty of the many, less determined to either cause. Alexander had hoped, so his historian says, by the uncalculated rapidity of his march, to have the satisfaction of composing matters without bloodshed ; and he was so near succeeding, such was the evident temper prevailing among the Theban people assembled on the occasion, that the bold leaders carried a vote for opposing him only by an extraordinary fiction. They ventured the hazardous assertion that the Alexander, now with the small force at Onchestus, was not the king, son of Philip, who certainly was dead, but another Alexander, the son of Aëropus ; of the royal family, but not even commander of that small force ; for Antipater, they said, commanded in chief. Thus, with difficulty, was obtained the rejection of a proposition for negotiation. The able leaders then hastened measures for obviating, as far as might be, proposals from either side. A body of horse, attended with light-armed foot, was sent out to attack the guard of the captain-general of Greece, who had yet committed no hostility against them, but, on the contrary was known to be anxious for an accommodation ; killed some men, unprepared to expect such hasty overbearing violence, and pushed on so far as to insult the main body with ill language. Arrian, mentioning that provoking language was used, has not specified it. Diodorus relates that Alexander, in serious earnestness to avoid the necessity of using arms, had caused proclamation to be made, inviting all Thebans, without distinction, ' to partake of the common peace of Greece.' The reply to this, he says, from the ruling Thebans, was a proclamation by a herald of powerful voice, inviting all those in Alexander's army who would concur with the great king

king (meaning the king of Persia) and the Thebans, to join them 'in giving liberty to Greece, and abating its tyrant.' Diodorus, having drawn this part of his narrative evidently from a writer warm in the Democratic, in opposition to the Macedonian interest, with much appearance of his having been an informed cotemporary, the testimony to this open avowal of the patronage of Persia is highly remarkable.<sup>14</sup>

Arrian has not stated the amount of force that Alexander led from Illyria into Boeotia. He has mentioned the Agrians, middle-armed highlanders, peculiarly qualified for such a march. Some cavalry he would probably take, but perhaps no heavy-armed. Combining what he has indicated with the assurance of Demosthenes, that Philip never led more than a small escort from Macedonia into Greece, and considering the probable means of Alexander to conduct and maintain a Macedonian army there, it seems not likely that the force he led was much greater than had usually attended his father. Among the northern nations, all hostile, he could support his army from what, in success, he could take there. In Greece, on the contrary, his business was not to find enemies, but to support friends, and to conciliate, if it might be, those who were not so; at any rate not to irritate by injuring the country at large. The soundness then of the judgement, probably that of able advisers to whom his good sense led him to defer, which trusted in the popularity of that cause of which the king of Macedonia was the acknowledged head, soon became manifest. Nowhere the consequences of the revolution in Thebes were so dreaded as in Boeotia itself. The new liberality of the leaders, avoiding injury to persons and estates, was mistrusted, or came too late. It does not appear that they gained any effective partizans out of Thebes; while all the principal men and best forces of the north of Greece hastened to join the standard of the general autocrator of the nation, looked to as their constitutional chief, the legal and willing protector of their common

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus's narrative, even of the military transactions attending this revolution of Thebes, is more worthy of attention than his accounts of battles commonly are found. Differing widely as it does from Arrian's, it shows its foundation on the same facts, the differences being hardly other than might be expected between the report of a military man, meaning to represent

things as they were, and that of a politician, such as Diodorus appears to have drawn from, earnest to put forward the interest of his party and exalt the fame of those who had suffered in its cause; tho perhaps here and there may be distinguished a dash of the coloring more peculiar to the philosophical Greek writers under the Roman empire.



rights. Thus Alexander was soon in circumstances to take offensive measures.

Well informed, then of the disposition of a large portion, even of those within the walls of Thebes, to concur with those who had thus placed themselves under his command without, avoiding hostile measures, he approached the town, passed it, and incamped on the farther side, near the gate leading to Eleutheræ and Athens. Here he seems to have had a double purpose; to show himself ready yet for negotiation, and even to invite it; and further, to be in a situation to intercept hostile reinforcements on the only side on which it was likely any might approach. Desire of negotiation prevailed in Thebes, notwithstanding any ingaging conduct of the new rulers. The unambitious of all descriptions, whose first objects were peace and safety, could not but desire it. Nevertheless the watchful and active and well-judging diligence of the new leaders was so effectual, that all endeavors to obtain a popular vote for negotiation failed.

The able men, thus far successful in their hazardous enterprize, had not undertaken it in any vain confidence in even the utmost strength of Thebes, with the utmost assistance that could be hoped for from their party among the other towns of Bœotia: they looked to Athens, and the talents of Demosthenes, now ruling there, and the influence of Demosthenes and his party in other republics, and to the power of Persia, ready with its wealth, under the direction of Demosthenes, to support all. But Demosthenes, and his principal partizans within Greece, evidently had been disappointed in their expectation of the amount of difficulties to be met by Alexander, from his barbarian enemies on three sides of Macedonia, while they were preparing troubles for him on the fourth. The

Plut. Demos.  
p. 856.

northern wars being advantageously ended, and Alexander, beyond all expectation, already in Bœotia, and the northern Greeks flocking to his standard, the general hopes of the party fell, and the power of Demosthenes, in the Athenian assembly, was immediately shaken. Anxious to hold still what he could, he undertook an embassy to the king of Macedonia, surrounded by his republican Greek allies. But those republicans were the most vehement and determined enemies to the great orator, and his partizans throughout Greece. Going therefore no farther than the Bœotian border, he returned, without executing in any degree his commission. His adversary Æschines, some years after, speaking of

Æsch. de  
cor.

this

this curious fact to the assembled Athenian people, told them that Demosthenes took fright, but without saying at what. Diodorus, relating the same fact, mentions the supposition entertained, that the connection of Demosthenes with the Persian court, and an apprehension of giving umbrage there, by making himself the instrument of friendly negotiation between the Athenian and Macedonian governments, impelled him to the very irregular step which, apparently, must have been difficult for him to excuse to the people his sovereign.<sup>15</sup>

The disappointment to the Theban leaders, at the failure of support from Athens, must have been great and disheartening. Nevertheless contemplating the change to insue to themselves, with even the best terms that could be hoped for from negotiation; that, from chiefs of their city, aspiring to be chiefs, or among the chiefs, of Greece, there could be the choice for them but of emigration, or of living without power under the

<sup>15</sup> We find this extraordinary fact stated by Æschines to the Athenian people, and virtually admitted by Demosthenes through omission of notice of it in replying. Æschines, speaking of what was then in the memory of all present, has not mentioned the time or occasion of the embassy. Diodorus, giving it to Alexander's first coming into Greece, nevertheless mentions, as what occurred at the same time, the removal of goods from Attica into Athens, in fear of immediate invasion from the army under Alexander; which, according to better authority, clearly marks the matter as following the destruction of Thebes, where Plutarch places it.

The connection of Demosthenes with the Persian court, having not only been imputed to him by his personal adversary Æschines, and implied by his respectable cotemporary

Isocrates, with the additional testimonies of the later antients, Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, Arrian and Justin, but avowed and gloried in by himself, as a measure of policy that should do him credit with his fellow-citizens of his party, one cannot but admire the management of some among the antients, and among the moderns Rollin eminently, to put that connection out of sight, for the purpose of maintaining their assertions, that the great orator was a pure Grecian patriot. A passage of the versified historical anecdotes, by John Tzetzes, of the twelfth century, may deserve notice; not for any confirmation of the imputation against Demosthenes, but for evidence of the effect of the management of his partizans and of his politics. The story, says Tzetzes, was well known to a few, but not generally, and therefore he would tell it:

Φέρεται δὲ λόγος ὅτι πολλοῖς, γνώριμος δὲ βραχίσιν,  
 Ὡς ὁ Δαρείος, ὁ Περσῶν ἐκείνος ἀνικηράτωρ,  
 Ἀκηκόως Ἀλέξανδρον μέλλειν σφατεύειν Πέρσαις,  
 Χρήμασι δεξιῶσαθαι πολλοῖς τὸν Δημοθέην,  
 Ὅπως ἂν ἀσχυλῇσιν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι.  
 Ὅδὲ Θεβαίους δυσυχῶς ἐγείρει κατ' ἐκείνου.

Joan. Tzetz. Hist. Chil. VII. 139.

The measure of the verse here is of the kind called *εἰς πολιτικὸν*, and, with attention to the marked accent, will be familiar to the English reader.

rule

rule of those who would suspect and perhaps hate them ; and possibly still cherishing some hope, founded on their knowledge of the congenial feelings of numbers in different parts of Greece, they so persevered in their exertions to prevent any vote of the assembled Theban people in favor of a capitulation, or any negotiation, that none ensued.

- Arrian. l. 1. Alexander nevertheless persevered in avoiding offensive measures ;  
c. 7. waiting the result, which time might produce, with a patience indicating a just deference to well-judging counsellors about him. But he had not yet acquired art or authority to infuse or command such patience in all under him. Soldiers, commonly uneasy in inaction, are especially so when they reckon themselves superior to the enemy. Impatience would naturally arise, and perhaps some indignation, among the Greeks of the Amphictyonic confederacy, at the delay, required by no necessity obvious to them, of measures for relieving their friends and kinsmen blockaded in the Cadmeia.
- c. 8. Opportunity was observed, by those nearest the Theban circunvallation, for advantageous assault upon it, and they broke in. Whether Perdiccas (a general bred under Philip, who commanded that part of the army) directed or encouraged the measure or no, he was not so deficient as not to be presently where his duty would require, when his troops were engaged. His brother officer, Ptolemy, seems, according to Arrian's account, scrupulously to have avoided, in his narrative of the affair, both to accuse and to acquit him ; whence irregularity may be suspected. The measure however was clearly rash. Perdiccas was presently overpowered. Amyntas, commanding the division next in the line, hastened to his support ; but even their united force was unequal to that presently brought against them.

Alexander, quickly informed of all circumstances, ordered the bowmen of the army, together with the Agrians, middle-armed, to the relief of his distressed divisions. Middle-armed and bowmen were troops adapted to cover a retreat, but not to meet and overbear the Theban heavy-armed. It may seem that Alexander's experienced and judicious advisers, knowing what difficulties Philip had found in his endeavours to restrain the excesses of republican troops, and moderate the violence of republican counsels, feared the consequences of success in arms against the Thebans, and desired, if possible, still to bring matters to issue by



a negotiation. But the light troops did not suffice to inable those first ingaged to effect their retreat. Perdiccas was severely wounded, and Eurylotus, a Cretan, commander of the bowmen, was killed.

The Theban chiefs, on the other hand, holding their leading situations through a policy which necessarily conceded absolute power, nominally, to the rash many, tho with the hope that it might be only nominally, were likely to want authority for restraining zeal within the bounds which prudence would require. Possibly, also, abandoned as they were by those of the other Grecian states, in whose coöperation they had confided for means of ultimate success, and perhaps not without some mixture of despair with their small hope, they thought an unforeseen opportunity, like that now offering, pushed to the utinost, might afford them the best chance for overcoming the hardly superable difficulties before them. Their troops however, led by that contagious influence which directs multitudes reckoning on their power, would not be contented with defeating the attack on their lines; but, with or without orders, would make their success at once complete, by defeating the whole opposing army. They so pressed on the retreating enemy, that it was found advisable for Alexander to lead out the whole of his heavy-armed to oppose them. In their eagerness to profit from victory, supposed already theirs, they had lost much of that good order in which they had met the adverse phalanx. The reverse then was rapid. Presently overborne, they fell back toward their contravallation. The garrison of the Cadmeia, from their lofty situation, anxious observers of all events, seeing their foes approaching in disorder, issued and attacked them in flank. Such then was the contagion of alarm and the deficiency of command among the Thebans, that hardly an attempt was made to defend their lines. For all immediately to take regular arrangement there was impossible. Those nearest the city therefore pushed forward toward the gate, opened to receive them. Who should go and who should stay, in the failure of order, being uncertain, all became eager to reach the protection of the city-walls. But before such numbers, in such confusion, could enter, the enemy was upon them, and the gate, to shut it against the pressure being impossible, came into his possession.

In this change, almost instantaneous, from extravagant hope to ruin, for the Theban leaders to restore any order or hold any command,  
among

among their dismayed people, even those most attached to them, would be difficult; and the disposition of a large proportion always adverse to them, and confident of favor from their enemies, would make any salutary measures nearly impossible. In this imminent wreck therefore, the greater part of the wealthier men, serving on horse-back, successors of those, who, under Epameinondas, had been the most renowned cavalry of Greece, considerate of their personal safety when all other consideration appeared hopeless, fled by a gate opposite to that by which the enemy had entered. This example was presently followed by most of the infantry who obtained knowledge of it, and could find opportunity. Regular resistance to the enemy was attempted only about the temple of Amphion, and not there long maintained. Then Plataeans, Thespians, Orchomenians, Phocians, and others of the conquering army, who, having formerly suffered from Theban tyranny, had dreaded a renewal of it through the recent revolution, gave a loose to the furious passions. Ranging the town, careless of commands which rarely any could hear, they slaughtered equally the resisting and the unresisting; not sparing even women and children; even the sacredness of temples not affording protection. A kind of intoxication of fury urged their destructive course, so that

Arrian. l. 1. c. 9. says the historian, the extent of the calamity exceeded, not more all previous apprehension of the sufferers, than all previous purpose of the perpetrators.

Whether by any precaution, within human foresight, or by any exertion, not made in the emergency, Alexander, or any of his generals, could have prevented or lessened these horrors, accounts remaining will not warrant a decision; but, that the temper which produced them sprang from the political constitution of Greece, and was nourished by events and circumstances prior to any Macedonian influence among the republics, is abundantly evident. The slaughter, we are told, was not all from the avowed enemy. Slaves of the Thebans themselves, who through the circumstances and incidents of their servitude, bore ill will to their masters, in a spirit of vengeance, joined in the work of bloodshed.

As far, however, as any constitutional course was established for matters of common concern among the Grecian republics, what followed these violences appears to have been conducted in a constitutional course, exactly

exactly analagous to the proceedings on the conclusion of the sacred war. Representatives of the republics were assembled <sup>16</sup>. Alexander, limiting himself to the proper office of stateholder and military commander-in-chief, referred decision on all matters of common interest to the congress. Such is the direct assertion of Diodorus; and Arrian's concise account, and all anecdotes reported by Plutarch and others, concur in marking the character of his interference, as far as he used any; that it was to compose differences, soften animosities, and obviate severities. To reduce Thebes lower than the recent destruction had brought her, could apparently be no more for the interest of the king of Macedonia, than of the Grecian people altogether. But the sovereign assembly consisted in large proportion of Thessalians, Phocians, and Bœotians; born hostile to Thebes, and educated in sentiments of animosity; the Bœotians especially, moved, in addition to a sense of past injuries, by recent fear of renewed and worse oppression, and ready to use the public avowal of Persian patronage, by the Theban rulers, to confirm and aggravate the old accusation, that Thebes was always the ready tool of Persia to enslave Greece. The assembly proceeding to deliberation with a prevalence of such sentiments, the decree resulting was, that the Theban state should be annihilated; the town utterly destroyed; the surviving women and children sold to slavery, families of proved attachment to the conquering cause only excepted; that the territory should become the property of the conquering allies, including the friendly Thebans, to be duly divided among them; and, for assured execution of these resolutions, that a garrison, from the allied army, should hold the strong fortress of the Cadmeia.

Uncreditably severe as this decree was, and unbecoming the character, which the Greeks affected to claim, of general humanity, liberal patriotism, and universal regard and respect for the Grecian name and blood, yet, in the course of Grecian history, we have had occasion to observe example not only furnished but exceeded. Arrian remarks that 'destruction still more severe had befallen Grecian states, from Grecian hands directed by Grecian minds, especially Plataea, Melus,

<sup>16</sup> Arrian's expression on the occasion of the nation, wherein representatives of rather implies that the representatives only all the republics, at least, might attend. of those republics, whose troops composed the victorious army, formed the congress. Diodorus speaks of it as a regular congress

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 14.  
Arrian, c. 9.  
p. 21.

Τοὺς δὲ συνέδρους τῶν ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ συναγαγών,  
ἐπέτρεψε (ὁ βασιλεὺς) τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ πῶς χρῆσθαι  
τῇ πόλει τῶν Θηβαίων, &c. τ. ε. l. 17. c. 14.



‘and Scione;’ but, he adds, ‘those were small states: the amount of lives lost, and of political importance overthrown, by the destruction of Thebes, was so much the greatest, ever to that time experienced in Greece,’ (apparently the historian would limit his observation to times regularly historical, and after the return of the Heracleids) ‘that the impression on the general mind was the stronger, and the catastrophë became matter for the more extensive and pointed remark.’

But, as in the course of human affairs is not uncommon, with works of destruction works of charity went hand in hand. Orchomenus, Plataea and Thespiæ, so often, and sometimes so cruelly oppressed by the Thebans, appear to have been at this time not absolutely desolate, but in a state of great depression, with scanty population, under the jealous rule of the imperial people of Thebes; who, to insure their submission, had destroyed the fortifications, and forbidden the restoration of them. The emigrated families were now invited to return, and houses were built for them. Thus Orchomenus, Plataea and Thespiæ, were restored to the rank of free cities of Bœotia; walls were added for their defence; and the favored Theban families, whose residences were destroyed in the general ruin of their town, were settled among them.

That Alexander took any part in these works, either of destruction or restoration, is not said. But anecdotes remain of his interference in favor of objects of the vengeance of his republican friends. Arrian has given credit to the report that his influence preserved the house, which had been Pindar’s residence, from demolition, and all persons connected by blood with Pindar, from slavery. Plutarch’s purpose, in his life of Alexander, has been, evidently enough, not to favor him, but to exalt his own fellowcountrymen the Bœotians, and, as the most eminent of them, especially the Thebans. Yet his anecdotes, tho some with a contrary object, all really tend to Alexander’s credit. One, however embarrassed with absurdities, may deserve notice for the favor it has found from some antient, and many modern, writers. A noble lady of Thebes, Timocleia, violated by the commander of the Thracian troops (whether there were Thracian troops in Alexander’s army matters little) revenged herself by a stratagem through which she put him to death. He inquired for treasure. She told him much had been thrown into a well in her garden, to which she conducted him. He in-

cautiously

cautiously looking down, she pushed him in, and overwhelmed him with stones. Taken in the fact by the barbarians under his command, she was not destroyed by them, as many unoffending women and children, we are assured, were by Greeks of the army, but carried immediately before Alexander, as to a civil judge in a peaceful city. Walking up to him, with a firm step and unabashed countenance, he asked who she was? She answered boldly, 'I am the sister of Theagenes, who fell at Chæroneia, fighting at the head of the force he commanded, against your father, for the liberty of Greece.' This sufficed for the generous prince. Admiring her fortitude, he so interfered in her favor, as to save her and her children from the slavery to which all the women and children of her party, without distinction of rank, had been condemned by the decree of the republican congress <sup>17</sup>.

Plutarch, who has commonly undertaken to know much of the thoughts of those whose lives he has written, avers that the catastrophè of Thebes remained through Alexander's life a sore in his mind. It may indeed well be believed to have grieved him at the time, and to have been always of unpleasant recollection; unless for the acts of generosity, which it put in his way to perform. The antient and the recent fame of that city; the claim of the Macedonian royal family to be descended from the Theban Hercules; the connection of his father with Thebans, the most eminent men of their age; the attachment of a large portion of the citizens to his family and to himself, all must have tended to make him deplore the calamity of which he has by some been accused of being the author, but which, according to all appearance of fair testimony, it is no way likely he could have prevented. The most disgraceful circumstance, the deliberately cruel sale of the women and children, might appear most within his power to have checked. But, to stem the violence of temper of the republican Greeks, which Philip, with large experience and established influence in aid of very superior talents, could do but very incompletely, it seems hardly reasonable to expect of Alexander, a youth of twenty-one, with

<sup>17</sup> In justice to Plutarch it should be recommended to the reader to judge of him from his own words, or those of a faithful translator, and not reckon him answerable for the improvements of this favorite story, found in the narratives of some modern historians.

whatever support from able advisers. At the head of an army only in small part his subjects, and new in presidency over a confederacy of republics, such as we have seen those of Greece, to prevent a measure on which that army and the republics furnishing it were bent, must have been of difficulty which no rational politician will now undertake to estimate. It may seem fairest to gather his disposition rather from accounts of what he did than of what he failed to do; especially afterward, in matters for which he was completely master. If we may trust Plutarch, not always his friend, throughout his following life he never denied favorable attention to any application from a Theban<sup>18</sup>.

Plut. v. Alex.  
F. 761.

Diod. l. 17.  
C. 14.  
Plut. v. Alex.

Arrian has not undertaken to state the numbers killed on either side in this bloody business. Diodorus and Plutarch, less scrupulous, concur in reporting the Thebans slain to have been six thousand; the surviving sold thirty thousand. The slain would hardly be very exactly numbered; but of the sold an account would be taken, and made public in the distribution of prize-money to the conquering army. According to Arrian, hardly any Theban, who did not fly, survived, except the known friends of the conquerors; yet the slaves of both sexes, spared as objects of profit, together with the Theban women and children condemned for sale, may well have amounted to the number asserted.

Arr. l. 1.  
C. 10.

Of what passed at Athens, what may have been the contest between the parties of Demosthenes and Phocion, during this, one of the most momentous periods of Grecian history, scarcely any memorials remain. In this deficiency, the concise mention, by Diodorus, of the vote of the Athenian assembly for military support to the Thebans, is important: it shows that the party of Demosthenes had gained an ascendancy. But that vote, it seems evident, was never so acted upon that any military assistance was given to Thebes. Yet when the city was taken, the fugitives mostly directed their course to Athens, as the refuge in which they had best hope; and the result showed that they had ground for depending upon a strong feeling, among the leading Athenians, of an interest in their fate. Information of the catastrophè arrived in the season of the greater Eleusinian mysteries. It

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch's expression is stronger, even think may be fairly enough interpreted as in to some appearance of extravagance; but I the text.



produced immediately an order to stop that ceremony, held so awfully sacred. Such then was the apprehension of immediate invasion from a powerful army, adverse to the pretension of the Athenian people to be sovereigns of Greece, that those who had property in the country very generally directed their utmost diligence to bring everything portable within the walls. Meanwhile an assembly of the people was held. Demosthenes and the principal men of his party avoided to come forward; perhaps more fearing some passionate vote of the multitude, of which Athenian history affords so many examples, than any vengeance of the young king of Macedonia, or even of the republican Greeks, his allies. The friend of Phocion, Demades, whose talents as a speaker were held by some even superior to those of Demosthenes, took the lead. He advised that an embassy should be now, tho late, sent to Alexander, the ally of Athens, the captain-general of Greece, to congratulate him on his safe return from the northern wars, and to apologize, as best might be, for the recent counsels of the government. The embassy accordingly was voted. Demades, known to have been highly esteemed by the late king of Macedonia, Philip, and therefore supposed likely to be more acceptable than most others to Alexander, was appointed its chief,<sup>19</sup> and Æschines, as we learn from Demosthenes, was a member.

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 11.

Demosth. de  
Cor. p. 319,  
ed. Reiske.

Alexander of course would be apprized of the political contest at Athens, and, aware that one large party was as decidedly friendly to him as the other was vehemently hostile. Continuing however to follow his father's example, he received the embassy, not only with politeness, but with favor. Professing himself gratified by it, he added assurance that notwithstanding the measures which their assembly had lately been persuaded to sanction by its decrees, his esteem for the Athenian people, and

<sup>19</sup> According to Plutarch, in his life of Phocion, the party of Demosthenes so prevailed in the assembly that the embassy was composed of his friends, and Alexander refused to receive it; but the dismay, and resulting discontent, on its return, were such that the party of Demosthenes was obliged to give way, and Phocion was placed at the head of a second embassy. It must be for the reader to weigh Plutarch's assertion against the omission of all notice of the failing embassy by Arrian and Diodorus. For the rest it is not unlikely that Phocion may have been one of the embassy with Demades, not as an inferior, and yet may have allowed Demades, who, in all accounts, had more the talents both of a courtier and a negotiator, to be, as the other historians say, the leading speaker.

friendly

friendly disposition toward them, remained unshaken. Yet, whether from himself, or, required by a vote of the general confederacy of the Greeks, he demanded the surrender of ten Athenian citizens, to be dealt with according to the common law of Greece; accused as common enemies; authors formerly of the troubles ended by the battle, so calamitous to Athens, near Charoneia, and recently of those which had produced the destruction of Thebes. Of the ten, the most known from remaining history were Demosthenes, Chares, Lycurgus, Ephialtes and Charidemus.

This demand was communicated, as we have seen was the custom of the age, in a letter from Alexander to the Athenian people. An assembly was summoned, to consider it. Those demanded, and their friends, were in extreme alarm; and, even among those not of their party, many desired that the humiliation to the republic, and perhaps also the severity expected toward the individuals, might be avoided. But the austere principles of Phocion led him, it is said, to insist that, for the common good, those individuals ought to be surrendered, and even to be forward to surrender themselves. Where party was so violent, as at this time at Athens, and such pressing interests were afloat, reports on light and mistaken grounds would gain currency, and calumnies against eminent men would abound. The fame of Phocion, like that of Isocrates before him, has extraordinarily escaped the spirit of calumny. But imputation went against the two great orators on this occasion. Demosthenes, it was said, and his principal friends, had the meanness to solicit favor from their opponent, Demades, and he had the meanness to sell it; pledging himself, for five talents, about a thousand pounds sterling, to use his utmost interest and diligence to obtain from Alexander, and his allies, a remission of the demand for the surrender of the ten orators. The currency of such a report tends at least to mark the character of the times at Athens. The character of Demades has not been transmitted pure, yet, considering the common conduct of his party, as well as what a just attention to the dignity of the commonwealth, and perhaps the best interest of his party, would require, it may be believed that a bribe would not be necessary to lead him to the line of conduct he took. In pursuance however of a decree, prepared, it is said, by him, another embassy was sent to Alexander, soliciting that favor for the republic, disposed as it was to concur in every-thing for the common good of the nation, that its obnoxious citizens might be left

to

Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 15.  
Plut. v. Alex.  
& Phoc.

Plut. v.  
Phoc.

to the judgement of its own tribunals. The petition or remonstrance, said to have been very ably drawn, produced its effect; incompletely only so far as it was insisted still that Charidemus should be banished from the territories of the confederacy. Charidemus was that friend of Demosthenes who served him as a spy at the Macedonian court, where he was hospitably entertained at the time of Philip's death, of which he so diligently and dexterously forwarded the intelligence. It has been, consonantly with all likelihood, also supposed that he was the person whom we have seen formerly eminent, with that name, as son-in-law of the king of Thrace, and esteemed, as a military commander, by Iphicrates; and in the sequel we shall again find him eminent in another remarkable situation.

Ch. 42. s. 7.  
of this hist.

Amid the deficiency of our information concerning this interesting transaction, in which, on one side, the dignity and independency of the Athenian republic, on the other the authority of the general confederacy of Greece, were implicated, the usual moderation of the party of Demades and Phocion seems indicated, and in the conduct of Alexander his father's liberality is conspicuous. Plutarch, who has preserved some things meriting attention for reasons wide of his views in reporting them, has attributed to Alexander, on this occasion, an observation which deserves notice; that prince, he says, admonished the embassy that, in case of Plut. v. Alex. misfortune to him, their commonwealth, conducting its affairs justly, must P. 749. command Greece. Plutarch's object here, evidently has been to raise his reader's idea of the importance still of the Athenian commonwealth, stripped, as it was, of naval empire and subject republics; and to this the story is justly adapted: but, if true, and there seems no adverse probability, it clearly marks also Alexander's just consideration of the situation he held; that he was, not by violence, but in all legitimate course, the successor to the authority formerly held by the governments of Athens and Lacedæmon, as chiefs of the Greek nation; and that this authority, by being deferred to a king of Macedonia, was not put out of course, but might afterward be committed to any other power, regal, aristocratical, or democratical, as a general assembly of the republics of the Greek nation might decide.

The transactions at Athens, quickly known throughout Greece, were admonition for the political leaders everywhere. Among the Arcadians, inland men, depending on agriculture and not on commerce, a bold honesty,  
with



with a mistaken policy, has, throughout Grecian history, been occasionally observable. All the other republics, where a disposition to favor Thebes against the Macedonian connection prevailed, had temporized; but some Arcadian towns had gone so far as to declare their disposition by public acts, voting succour. The failure however of the party of Chares and Demosthenes to maintain a leading influence at Athens, produced the immediate downfall of the cause of imperial democracy, even among democracies. Those of Arcadia, with the wild despotism peculiar to that species of government, by a vote, condemned the leading men who had persuaded to the Athenian connection, to death, as guilty of treason by misleading the public mind. The Eleians were more moderate. They hoped, and it appears not without reason, to find such liberality in the Macedonian supremacy, that a decree, which they passed, for the restoration of all their fellowcountrymen who had been banished for their attachment to it, or had fled in fear of worse, would be accepted as satisfactory atonement. The Ætolians, generally characterized as almost barbarians among the Greeks, appear, on this occasion, in the account of Arrian, to have held the more dignified conduct. They simply sent an embassy to Alexander, to apologize for measures recently directed by bad advisers, and to declare their desire of future friendship with Macedonia, and of concurrence in that confederacy of Grecian republics, of which the king of Macedonia was the head. No indication appears of any purpose of the Macedonian government, under Alexander, any more than formerly under Philip, to interfere, as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians and Thebans often had done most arbitrarily and violently, in the internal affairs of any republic. All apologies were accepted. The Lacedæmonians persevering in refusing to acknowledge Alexander as captain-general of the nation, and to place their contingent of troops under his orders for war against Persia, no measures of compulsion were taken. Freedom of decision, for its own affairs, being allowed to every state, and disturbance of the public peace only forbidden, quiet, in uncommon degree, appears to have prevailed throughout Greece.

Arrian, l. 1. Alexander returning, under these favorable circumstances, into Macedonia, the occasion was judged proper for a celebration of that festival, called the Macedonian Olympic, interrupted by his father's death. Both

Diodorus

Diodorus and Arrian expressly mention it as a regular celebration of the festival instituted by Archelaus. It were highly desirable to know what, in such circumstances especially, passed, of public importance, at a meeting which was so adapted to promote, or afford means for, most important political measures, in a country constituted like Greece. But the historians under the Roman empire, whether treating of Greek or Roman affairs, Tacitus almost alone excepted, have rarely attended to the character of great political measures, and the springs of great revolutions. The ensuing expedition against Persia and its consequences, within as well as without Greece, not stopping to consider the mechanism which produced them, seem to have ingrossed the minds of the authors of all extant antient works on this interesting portion of history.

## CHAPTER XLV.

Summary View of the History of PERSIA, from the Reign of DARIUS NOTHUS to the Accession of DARIUS CODO-MANNUS.

## SECTION I.

*Circumstances of Persia in the Reigns of Darius Nothus and Artaverxes Mnemon.*

BEFORE we proceed with Grecian affairs, a view, such as remaining memorials furnish means for, of the recent history and actual circumstances of the vast dominion of the kings of Persia, will be requisite; and, as preparation for the narrative to follow, more advantageously introduced here than in the previous general prospect of the political circumstances of the then known world.

When the victorious progress of the great Cyrus first extended the empire of the east to the verge of the Grecian republics, from which before it had been divided by extensive kingdoms, the Greeks, tho their superiority in the art of war, acquired in contests among themselves, had brought their troops into request as mercenaries, never yet had shown themselves, toward the greater powers of the age, a formidable people; and, small as their states were severally, with clashing interests, they might well appear to the mighty conquerors of little account among nations.

But, beside skill in arms, the superiority which the Grecian institutions were adapted to give through cultivation of talents and advancement in science, raised individuals so educated to notice and estimation among the new lords of Asia. So early as the reign of the first Darius we have seen a Greek, from the colonies in Italy, principal physician in the distant court of Susa. Wherever indeed we have light on the practice and policy of  
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the Persian government, we find it liberal to persons of the various nations under its dominion ; and, as if considering itself intitled to paternal command and owing paternal duties everywhere, scarcely distinguishing between those born its subjects, and those becoming so, whether by conquest, or voluntary submission, or even as suppliants : all were admitted to share its favors who might earn them by services. This policy, certainly adapted to a system of conquest and extensive empire, and ably used by the great Cyrus, did not however originate with him, having long before been practised by the Median and Assyrian governments.

Nevertheless Grecian fame might have remained always limited, as it was afterward under the military despotism of Rome, to excellence in arts and sciences, but for the impulse given by the Persian invasion, and especially that under Xerxes ; compelling the ever-jarring republics to submit themselves to a temporary union under men, fortunately then ready among them, of uncommon talents and energy. The superiority of the arms and tactics, peculiar to the nation, gloriously demonstrated under the conduct of these men, in its defence against the unnumbered armies of Persia, forced the Persian officers, afterward superintending the western provinces, to respect them ; and produced the policy of engaging Grecian troops for the Persian service, as they had before been engaged for the Egyptian, and perhaps others, yet never led to any improvement of the discipline of the native troops of the empire upon the Grecian model. The Persian government, in the habit of considering all nations as made to be its subjects, required the service of the people of its several provinces, armed and trained in their several ways ; and appears to have reckoned that, where its force could not compel, its wealth might sufficiently command.

Of the liberality then with which the Persian government would reward Greeks in its service, and maintain faith with them, even in unfortunate circumstances, we have seen eminent examples in the instances of Gongylus, the fugitive from Eretria, Demaratus, the exiled king of Lacedæmon, and the illustrious Athenian, Themistocles. The effect of this policy, highly threatening to Greece, was fortunately checked by the successes of the Grecian arms on the eastern shores of the Ægean ; begun under Leotychidas and Xanthippus, and greatly extended under Cimon ; which to the spirit of patriotism and self-esteem, excited by the victories over the Persians, in

Greece itself and on its shores, added the power of the opinion that it might be not only more honorable but more profitable to take plunder in war against them, than to receive pay in their service,

The insuing divisions, however, of the Greeks, among themselves, afforded great opportunities for the Persian government; which, as we have formerly seen, were not wholly neglected. But, under the first Artaxerxes and the second Darius, the energy of that vast body became so slackened, that it could no longer controll its own limbs: its provinces, under their several governors, became almost as much divided as the Grecian republics; and it was no longer one government commanding a vast and well-compacted empire, with which the Greeks had to contend; for equally wars and negotiations, hostilities and alliances, however the king's name might be used for ostensible authority, were oftener affairs with the several satraps, generally more or less hostile to each other.

The appointment of the younger Cyrus to a superintending command over all the western division of Lesser Asia, checking this irregular state of things, made a great and alarming change for the Greeks; then indeed united under the lead of Lacedæmon, but far from disposed to rest in such union. Fortunately however for them, the ambition of Cyrus had a more immediate and greater object than the conquest of Greece; and, toward the attainment of that object it was important for him to conciliate the Greeks. With the failure then of his great enterprise, things returned nearly to their former course; and, the renewed distraction of the western provinces inviting, and the example of the Cyreian Greeks, returned from the center of the empire in defiance of its power, encouraging, Agesilaus, with a very small army, and mostly of Asian Greeks, so succeeded in offensive war against the vast empire of Persia, as to overrun some provinces, and alarm even the distant throne.

At the very time when Cyrus reckoned the Grecian force in his army indispensable toward the success of his attempt against his brother's throne, there were Greeks in confidential situations about his brother's court. Two of these, Deimon and Ctesias, published histories of Persia. The latter was physician and surgeon to the king; and, if his word may be taken, sometimes employed in important state affairs. Beyond reasonable doubt however, in his medical office, he was often about the person of Artaxerxes. Fragments

of his work, of some extent, remain: of Deinon's, a quotation or two only has been transmitted. But both works were intire before Plutarch, when, among his lives of eminent Greeks and Romans, he fancied to insert that of Artaxerxes Mnemon; alone, of those commemorated in that work, completely a foreiner to both Greece and Rome. Plutarch professed to write Plut. v. Alex. init. lives, not histories. Artaxerxes cannot have been his object either for glory of actions, or for any eminence of character. The variety and importance of events, in a reign of more than common length, over an empire of far more than common extent, population and wealth, were what would make his biography interesting. Plutarch appears to have consulted and compared the works of Deinon and Ctesias; but his life of Artaxerxes, beyond what he has gathered from Xenophon of the expedition of Cyrus and the return of the Greeks, is little more than a tissue of family intrigues, dark plots, private conversations, and private crimes. What it affords principally worthy of historical notice is the assurance, consonant with all other remaining information, that the Persian government had fallen so much into the hands of the eunuchs of the palace, and was so managed by them, that, even to persons with the advantage of approach to the royal person, which Ctesias possessed, its counsels would be hardly known at all, its measures but imperfectly, and even events the most important, in the provinces, often very uncertainly.

But little as came to public knowlege of the counsels of the court, and even of the public transactions of the empire, at any distance from the scene of the business, yet the affairs of the western provinces, on which the Greek colonies bordered, and among which Greeks were employed, became necessarily open to be known among the Greeks, with more or less exactness; and generally with more than to persons in the capital of the empire. Judging then from Plutarch's account of the life of Artaxerxes, the discretion of Diodorus may be commended for confining his narrative generally to transactions in which Grecian interests were implicated, or Grecian officers employed. Those transactions, as they have occurred for notice in the foregoing history, show the administration of Artaxerxes neither able nor fortunate. His contests, or rather those of his satraps, with the Greeks, we have seen far from glorious. His attempts to recover Egypt were wholly and rather disgracefully unsuccessful. It is said to have been about  
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Strab. l. 11.  
p. 507, 510.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 8 & 10.  
Plut. v.  
Artax.  
Ol. 98. 4.  
B. C. 385.

the twentieth year of his reign, and the fifty-second of his life, that he undertook in person an expedition against the Cadusians, inhabiting the country between the Caspian and Euxine seas, now Circassia and Georgia. So ill was this expedition planned or executed, that after considerable loss, the great king obtained by treaty, with difficulty, through efforts of policy, safety for himself and army, by a dishonorable retreat.

For the general mildness of his government, however, according to the concurring assurances of Diodorus and Plutarch, Artaxerxes Mnemon was popular; till, as the latter says, toward the end of his reign, finding himself lowered in general esteem by his failures in military enterprizes, he turned, whether from provocation or fear, to a course of cruelty. But as far as particulars stated by those writers indicate, it seems probable that the cruelty of Artaxerxes was not toward his people at large, nor perhaps toward any, in his intention, beyond a just, and even necessary, severity, principally exercised against great men, disturbers of his and the public peace; tho, being after the manner of oriental jurisprudence, hasty, it might often be ill-judged, and thence unjust. Among those disturbers, his sons are said to have been eminent. Of a very numerous acknowledged male progeny, three only were of that legitimate birth which qualified them, according to the laws of the empire, for succession to the throne. But so unfortunately unascertained was the law concerning the course of succession, that each of the three claimed priority of right. The pretensions of the two younger, a preference for primogeniture being admitted by the Persian law, are not apparent in antient accounts; yet they seem to have had in public opinion some speciousness, possibly founded on the decision in favor of Xerxes, son of the first Darius; for the old king, to end a dispute so threatening to the peace, not of the royal family only, but of the empire, resorted to the hazardous expedient of associating his eldest son, Darius, who had already reached his fiftieth year, in the royal dignity and authority.

Ch. 8. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Thus Artaxerxes may seem to have done the office of a parent to the empire, as well as to his son. But, of this paternal kindness and not less of the imperial office, Darius is said presently to have shown himself most unworthy. The circumstances, as related by Plutarch, for their consonance with the general character of Asiatic history, in the scantiness of our information concerning the great empire in question, may deserve some notice.

Plut. Ar-  
toxerx.

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It was customary in the Persian, as, we find, [in other eastern courts, for the king, in rewarding merit, to promise the favored person, for a present, whatever he would ask ; in confidence, no doubt, supported by experience, that abuse of so wide a license would rarely occur ; the fear of future resentment, from a hand unrestrained by law, offering a powerful check. But Darius, no longer in the condition of a subject, equally unrestrained by a sense of fear and of decency, asked one of his father's concubines. If such an abuse of confidence would, in every part of the world be offensive, most especially it would among the southern Asiatics. Nevertheless Artaxerxes, pressed, whether by the rigor of the custom or regard for his promise, conceded the woman demanded. She was a Greek, of superior education and accomplishments ; formerly a favorite of Cyrus, the king's brother, taken when he was killed ; and of course now of advanced age. Presently however, whether stimulated most by a sense of affront, or whatever other feeling, Artaxerxes, if before wrong in concession, now more so in exertion, took her away again. To do this, and maintain it, as Plutarch says he did, in giving participation in dignity, he must have retained more than an equal share of authority. To prevent then, in all contingencies, the future possession of the woman's person by his son, he caused her to be consecrated a priestess of Aneitis, whom the Greeks considered as the Median Diana.

Darius was thus likely to be exasperated ; and about the same time Teribazus, the most powerful satrap of the empire, versed in great commands, eminent for important services, and actually holding the situation of first minister, received from the old king an affront unprovoked, of a kind especially to excite resentment. It was usual, we have seen, for the kings of Persia, then as now, to give their daughters in marriage to the great men of the empire. Artaxerxes, after having promised one of his daughters in marriage to Teribazus, using the power which the magians are said to have warranted to Cambyzes son of Cyrus, for the king to dispense even with the moral order held sacred for all Persians, married her himself. Teribazus and Darius ingaged in plot together to assassinate Artaxerxes ; but, powerful as they were, to have means for their purpose they reckoned it necessary to gain some of the eunuchs of the palace. One of these betrayed them ; and as they were proceeding with a chosen band,

band, to execute the abominable design, they were met by the palace-guard; Teribazus, resisting, was killed on the spot; Darius, with many of his accomplices, being taken, was, in the summary course of Asiatic justice, presently condemned and executed.

The wretched old king, having, by this series of shocking circumstances, lost his eldest son, his chosen associate and successor, might perhaps fear resentment from the two younger, whose claims against their elder brother he had resisted, rather than hope for gratitude through any favor in his power. In a situation thus to feel keenly the want of a friend, in whom he might confide, he brought forward Arsames, one of his illegitimate sons, as his confidential agent and principal minister. Of the legitimate surviving princes, the younger, Ochus, bold and ambitious, is said so to have impressed the weak mind of his elder brother, Ariaspes, with apprehension of a cruel death intended for them by their father, as to have driven him to end his own life by poison. Ochus remaining then alone to claim the legal succession, the power, the talents, the popularity of Arsames, and his favor with their common father, still remained threatening to his right; and, as Asiatic courts have been through all ages constituted, to his safety. Arsames however was assassinated, and his death was attributed to the son of Teribazus, in association with Ochus.

It was when the court was in this state (if Plutarch may be trusted for the more secret horrors, and Diodorus for the more public events and the dates) that the great rebellion of the western provinces broke out, which has been formerly noticed; and among these troubles of his family and his empire, in the next year (eminent among Grecian epochs by the battle of Mantinea) the forty-fourth of his reign, and about the seventy-sixth of his age, Artaxerxes Mnemon died.<sup>1</sup>

Ch. 28. s. 8.  
of this hist.  
B. C. 362.  
Ol. 104. 3.

<sup>1</sup> For these numbers Diodorus, who, though often inexact, was a chronologer, has justly obtained general credit in preference to Plutarch; who, for his desultory kind of history coherence of times being unimportant, has not scrupled to give sixty-two years to the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and to his life ninety-four.



## SECTION II.

*Reign of Artaxerxes Ochus: Fortune of a Grecian Family: Revolt of Phenicia and Cyprus suppressed; Egypt reconquered: Administration of Bagôas in the East and of Mentor in the West of the Persian Empire. Circumstances threatening to Macedonia and all Greece: Death of Ochus, and Troubles ensuing: Accession of Darius Codomannus.*

OCHUS had so made his party good with the eunuchs of the court that he was immediately master of the palace. Nevertheless, tho clearly legal heir to the throne, he so feared the power or the popularity of his father's spurious progeny, that, to obviate disturbance from them, he kept his death secret; and, among orders in his name, issued a decree associating himself, as his brother Darius had been associated, in the imperial dignity. In the course of ten months, while he maintained this imposture, he managed, on the principle and nearly after the manner of the modern Turkish government, the assassination of all his illegitimate brothers, to the number of eighty. Announcing then his father's decease, he assumed the imperial authority as sole sovereign, taking the name of Artaxerxes; to intimate, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, for on them is our dependence for this portion of history, that he proposed to emulate his father's mild virtues, and general cultivation of peace, which had endeared his memory.

What troubles ensued, or whether any, in the center, or on the northern, eastern or southern frontier of his extensive empire, tho probably all would not be quiet, the Greeks, our only informants, appear not to have known. Their intelligence was limited to the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, Ægean, and Euxine seas; a wide extent however, where revolt was throughout actual, or ready.

At the northern point, where the Euxine and Ægean meet, Artabazus, Ch. 36, s. 3  
satrap of Lower Phrygia, maintained the opposition in which, with the & 6, & ch. 37,  
hired advantage of Grecian troops, we have seen him formerly successful. s. 5, of this  
hist.

At the southern extremity, Egypt, long since asserting independency under native princes, and, notwithstanding divisions within itself, baffling the

efforts of the Persian empire against it, continued to baffle them. For the large interval, the early defection of the great satrap Orontes from the confederacy in revolt, afforded great relief to the imperial government; but still, in that important portion of the empire, the adverse disposition remained.

Nevertheless, during the first five years of the reign of Ochus, nothing passed, even in the provinces most within the sphere of Grecian intelligence, of which any report has been transmitted; unless the rebellion said to have been obstinately and ably maintained by Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, but of which account remains only from the Roman biographer Nepos, should be attributed, as seems probable, to that period. In the sixth year, while the Athenians were engaged in that impolitic and ill-managed war with their subject-allies, in which their great general Chabrias wasted his life, and the profligate Chares acquired the lead, which he so long held, of the councils and armies of the republic, preparations in the Pienician harbours, with undeclared purpose, alarmed all Greece, and especially Athens; where, as formerly it has been observed, the effect sufficed considerably to promote the disadvantageous and disgraceful treaty of peace, which the Athenians then concluded with those who, with the flattering title of allies, had been their subjects. What use was made of the naval preparations, which perhaps did not equal report, we have no information; but it was about this time that, for the reduction of the Lower Phrygia, the great land-force was sent which, with the assistance of hired Grecian troops, and of the talents of their Theban leader, Pammenes, the friend of Epameinondas, the satrap Artabazus defeated.

It is likely to have been a part of the policy of the Persian government to alarm the Greeks, with the view to keep their forces at home; while the object of its armaments, at least the first object, was, evidently, not war with them, but the recovery of its own revolted provinces. It may probably have been at this time that Ochus conducted, in person, as the mention of the business by Isocrates implies, an expedition against Egypt, in which success totally failed him. Nevertheless war was still prosecuted against the revolted satrapy of Lower Phrygia, and, after four years further resistance the satrap's financial means apparently so failed, that he could no longer maintain his Grecian mercenaries. Dismissing them, therefore, to the number of about four thousand, and leaving his satrapy, he had the

Ch. 36, s. 6,  
of this hist.

Ch. 37, s. 5,  
of this hist.

Isocr. or. ad  
Phil. p. 374.

the good fortune to find hospitable refuge in the court of Philip king of Macedonia.

The fortune of a Grecian private family, deeply implicated with the great political events of the age, here becomes matter for history. The Lower Phrygian or Bithynian satrapy, situated at the north-western extremity of the Persian empire, was separated from the capital, not by great distance only, but, by circumstances of the intervening provinces, both natural and political, which would make communication always slow, often precarious, and sometimes perhaps nearly impossible. It was a critical command, obviously important and necessarily hazardous. For the great officer therefore succeeding to it, whether by any right of birth, or by pure grace of the crown, it would be a matter of obvious prudence to advert to that connection with the Grecian republics, which, not only his predecessors in the same command, but all the satraps of the western provinces had been for a long time in the habit of cultivating. It is so gratifying, in the course of eventful history, to meet, beyond expectation, an old acquaintance of pleasant character, that the desire is natural to give credit to the indications that Artabazus, satrap of Lower Phrygia, was son of his predecessor in the same satrapy, Pharnabazus, the associate of the eminent Athenians, Conon, and Iphicrates, and afterward successively the opponent and the friend of Agesilaus. Ch. 25, s. 1 & 3, of this hist. Xenophon's narrative shows that Pharnabazus reckoned on a right to his satrapy, independently of the king's favor. Artabazus, who succeeded him in it, had a son named Pharnabazus. On the highly probable supposition then that Artabazus was son of the elder Pharnabazus, communication with the Greeks would, from early years, be familiar to him; and if he was that son of Pharnabazus who, on occasion of his father's conference with Agesilaus, described by Xenophon, pledged himself in friendship to that prince, and was afterward entertained by him at Lacedæmon, he must have been familiar with Grecian manners, and probably with the Grecian language<sup>1</sup>. Ch. 24, s. 5, of this hist.

What

<sup>1</sup> I know not that the parentage of Artabazus remains mentioned by any antient writer; an omission which, if he was son of Pharnabazus, who in the preceding command of the same

satrapy had so much communication with the Greeks, may seem extraordinary. Nevertheless the circumstances of Pharnabazus son of Artabazus, reported by Arrian, (b. 2. c. 1.) on



Diod. l. 16. c. 2. What however we are assured of is, that he married a Grecian lady of the island of Rhodes, recommended to his regard, it seems likely, by a superior understanding concurring with beauty. The numerous progeny she bore him, eleven sons, it is said, and ten daughters, indicates the permanence of his attachment; and the eminence to which the connection introduced two of her brothers, afforded them opportunity to show that talents were the inheritance of the family.

Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 672. It appears indicated, in mention of Artabazus by Demosthenes, that his revolt, so long maintained, had originated in that kind of contest which we have seen so ordinary among the satraps, amounting to actual war between them; each claiming to be the more loyal subject of the crown. His opponents, with possibly better interest in the court, had readier means of communication with it. We have seen, in the report of Xenophon, Ch. 24, s. 5, of this hist. his predecessor Pharnabazus, whose character remains altogether advantageously represented, declaring he should not, in certain cases, scruple decided opposition to the chief of the empire; and to this extreme possibly Artabazus may at length have proceeded. When, in consequence of the vigorous and persevering measures pursued by Ochus, he was at length compelled to fly from his satrapy, one of his wife's brothers, Memnon, accompanied him to the Macedonian court. Another, Mentor, with four thousand Grecian soldiers under his orders, engaged in the service of Nectanebos king of Egypt.

But while one of the most distant provinces was thus recovered to the Persian empire, new revolt was brooding in a quarter where hostility would be far more dangerous, and loss of territory far more injurious. At this time, hardly twelve years since the suppression of the great rebellion of the west, the cities of Phenicia are represented in a state of riches and prosperity, and even freedom, largely indicating that the terms granted them, on returning to allegiance, had been favorable, and that, in the administration insuing, the old liberality of the Persian system had not been discontinued under Artaxerxes Ochus: Sidon appears to have been the wealthiest mart

an occasion which will occur for future notice, combined with the fact of the succession of Artabazus to the Bithynian satrapy, and the sentiments which we find put into the mouth of the elder Pharnabazus by Xenophon, concerning his right to that command, strongly favor the supposition that Artabazus was son of the elder Pharnabazus.

then

then in the known world, unless Carthage might surpass it. Nevertheless, a new rebellion arose, in manner marked by Diódorus concisely but perspicuously, and with all consonance to probability. The governing satrap had his residence at Sidon, in a splendid palace belonging to the crown, with a paradise, as it was called, containing a pleasure-garden, and an adjoining park for beasts of chase. His business appears to have been to receive the regulated tribute; to transmit what was to go to the royal treasury; with the rest to maintain a sufficient military force for keeping the public peace; and to interfere with arbitrary authority wherever that peace might be threatened: but, under this impending controul, the country, with a constitution of republican character, was governed by its own magistrates, according to its own laws and customs. Nor Sidon alone, but every Phenician city appears to have had its own municipal government, in a considerable degree of independency; and all were united under a supreme council, composed apparently of deputies from each. It may seem then to have been beyond liberality, rather negligence or weakness in the satrap, which allowed this subordinate government to form for itself a new capital, where the supreme council held its sessions; the purpose apparently having been to withdraw itself from his inspection, and its proceedings from his ready knowlege. Thus arose the town called Tripolis, Tripletown, from the three cities, Sidon, Tyre and Aradus, having contributed principally to its construction and population. These circumstances considered, it cannot appear wonderful, that the satrap, whether the same, or rather a successor, possibly erring as much now in rigor as before in easiness, should earn the imputation, from among those who had been so indulged, of acting according to the historian's phrase, injuriously and proudly.

But before the severer course was resorted to by the satrap, the plan of rebellion seems to have been already formed, and great preparation for acting upon it made. The revoltors not only were largely provided with arms, but had a considerable fleet at their command; whether gaining to their party that large portion of the royal navy which Phenicia commonly furnished, or using only the means which the maritime commerce of the Phenician ports afforded. But moreover communication had been so held with the king of Egypt, and apparently also with the satrap of Lower Phrygia, that alliances had been formed, or were ready, with those avowed enemies of Persia. The

title

title of king, with which Tennes, the chief of the Sidonians was qualified, would not mark rebellion against the great king, sovereign of the Persian empire, who, we find, allowed many princes, his vassals, to hold it, but it implies combination and order, civil and military, among the revolters, over whom he presided.

Such appears to have been the state of things when one important link in the chain of revolt was broken, by the necessity to which Artabazus was reduced of abandoning his satrapy. That event, highly threatening to the Phenician revolters, would be alarming also for the king of Egypt, Nectanebos. Egypt could hardly be invaded by a power to which Phenicia was hostile. It was therefore highly important for Nectanebos to support the Phenicians, and, at the request of Tennes, he allowed Mentor, with the Greeks under his command, whom he had engaged for service in Egypt, to stop at Sidon.

The sequel is very defectively related by the historian. A force being acquired so considerable among Asiatic armies as four thousand Greeks, with a commander of ability before and afterward conspicuous, no military measure is noticed as following. But the king of Persia, Ochus, whether before yielding to indolence, which has been imputed, or rather, as seems probable, embarrassed by circumstances of his wide empire, unknown to the Greeks, had now resolved to take, in person, on the spot, the direction of arms and negotiations in the troubled western parts. In a constitution like that we have observed in Phenicia, party-divisions would rarely fail. Comparing what we are informed of events now with what we have heretofore seen ordinary among the Grecian republics, it may appear even probable that Tennes found himself and all his party needing support against fellow-citizens more than against all other enemies. Whether the first overture went from him, or came from the king of Persia, Mentor was gained. The sovereign of the Persian empire and the subordinate prince of Sidon came to terms, and the city of Sidon returned under the Persian dominion. According to the historian numerous executions followed, ending with that of Tennes himself, ordered by Ochus in pure wantonness of cruelty and ill faith; the Sidonians destroyed themselves and their families to the number of forty thousand persons, each firing his own house; and immense wealth came to the royal coffers from the sale of ruins, among which the gold and silver of the richest city of the world were melted.



The credit due to this part of the story must be left to the judgement of those versed in Asiatic history, and familiar with the manner and character of the writer. It is however ascertained that Mentor, and the Greeks under him, did not fear to enter into the service of a sovereign so represented a monster; and, for what may have been fictitious and what exaggerated, in the extant reports of his actions and character, the sequel will at least assist conjecture.

Among the Phenician towns, and probably within each, was a party for, and a party against, the revolt; and not Tennes alone was accused of treachery. In the want of union, therefore, when Sidon was reduced, the other towns, being little capable of resistance, yielded without an effort. But it is remarkable that, tho the Sidonians are said, with their town to Diod. l. 16. have burnt all their ships, yet the Persian king had presently a fleet <sup>c. 45.</sup> superior to any of the age; unless the Carthaginian, not likely to come within contact, should be excepted. Either then the report of that destruction was fictitious, or the many other seaports of Phenicia and Syria repaired it; perhaps in the spirit of civil contest, or perhaps through loyalty to Ochus, with ready zeal; for of his cruelty, through all the sequel of his reign, no specified example is found.

A commanding fleet, however, enabled him to proceed from the recovery of Phenicia to that of the island of Cyprus. The population there was mostly Diod. l. 16. Grecian; yet, not Mentor only, bred in a satrap's court, but other Greeks, <sup>c. 46.</sup> of the highest character among the republics, engaged in his service. Superior forces of sea and land thus coöperating, the whole island was soon reduced to acknowledge again the sovereignty of the Persian king. Apparently there was little bloodshed, all being quickly settled by a liberal composition. The nine cities of the island, allowed to hold their several municipal governments, were each placed under the superintendency of a chief of a party, answerable for due remittance of the tribute to the supreme government of the empire. These appear to have been mostly Greeks, and they mostly took the title of king <sup>3</sup>.

The

<sup>3</sup>—'Εἰς τὴν Κύπρον ἐπισήσας στρατηγοὺς Φωκίωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Εὐανοραν. Diod. 16. 42.

Κατὰ τὴν Κύπρον Σαλαμῖνων πολιτοκρουμένων ὑπὸ Εὐαγόρου καὶ Φωκίωνα, κ. τ. ε. Diod. l. 16. c. 46.

It seems to have been reasonably doubted among the critics whether this mention of the name of Phocion, tho twice occurring in our copies of Diodorus, should be taken for evidence that the great Athenian statesman and

The possession of Cyprus, after that of Syria and Phenicia, was principally necessary toward the Persian king's next object, the recovery of Egypt. He could now, without interruption, supply and assist, by sea, his own forces acting there, and preclude such advantages to his enemies. The enterprize nevertheless was of very considerable difficulty; the amount of which may be estimated, in some degree, from the failure of great efforts to accomplish it in former reigns, repeated in the course of above sixty years since the revolt. Grecian troops had been formerly employed for the purpose, under the most eminent Grecian generals; but they had been opposed by Grecian troops in the service of the Egyptian kings, who had also had some of the most eminent Grecian generals in their service; at one time, as we have seen, the king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus.

Isocrat. Or.  
ad Phil.

It seems likely that Ochus, bred in the center of the empire, separated by the great desert from the provinces communicating immediately with the Greeks, would not readily believe the superiority of the Grecian military, and thence, in his first expedition against Egypt, may have incurred the disgrace noted by Isocrates, who says he earned there the character of being unfit either to preside over an empire, or to command an army. He gained however a lesson from which he showed himself capable of profiting. His resource was certainly not the most honorable for the Persian name, nor without obvious hazard to the empire; but it was perhaps, in the decay of the Persian military system, and in the circumstances altogether in which the empire had devolved to him, what alone could afford any reasonable hope of success. The season was favorable for ingaging Grecian troops of the best quality of those who could be expected to go out for hire; that remission of the sacred war in Greece then occurring, and that consequent suspension of the hostilities

B. C. 351.  
Ol. 107, 2.

and patriot, the friend of Isocrates and Philip, lent himself for hire to fight the battles of Persia, for the subjugation of Grecian settlements. Plutarch, who has given that eminent man military fame unnoticed by any other writer, mentions nothing of his commanding in Cyprus. Cornelius Nepos says, that, tho he commanded armies often, yet no account of his military services remained; meaning perhaps no detailed account; for testimony to his ability and success

in military command in Eubœa remains to us at this day, as observed in the fifth section of the twenty-eighth chapter of this history, from Æschines. Whether then, in the passages above cited, Diodorus has intended the great opponent of Demosthenes, or some other person of the name of Phocian, or his transcribers have corrupted a name of nearly the same orthography, must be left in doubt.

of

of the Greeks against one-another, which preceded the war, soon after beyond all expectation breaking out, of Olynthus, supported by Athens, against Macedonia. Then it was that Persian agents, as formerly related, went to all the cities of Greece to hire troops; and two men of the first Ch. 28. s. 5.  
eminence in two of the principal republics, Lacrates of Thebes, and of this hist.  
Nicostratus of Argos, were engaged as commanders. It was about the same time that the Thebans sent their begging embassy to the Persian court; perhaps not then at its usual residence beyond the great desert, but, on account of the great objects of business in view, within readier reach from Greece, in Syria. The circumstances already noticed were obviously favorable, and might even invite such a solicitation; so that we may reasonably believe the historian that the embassy was successful, obtaining for the republic it represented what, in modern times, would be called a subsidy. The Grecian force engaged for the Persian service all passed by sea to Sidon; where joining the troops under Mentor, the largest Grecian army was formed that perhaps ever was employed in a foreign service.

Providing thus the most effective military means, Ochus seems, in the B. C. 350.  
historian's plain and probable account, to have taken ably and vigorously Ol. 107, 2.  
the best measures for obviating danger to himself and his empire from such an engine as an army of foreigners. He assembled an Asiatic army, balancing by numbers, in a great degree, if not wholly, the superiority of the Greek in discipline. Dividing then his Grecian troops among his Asiatics, Diod. l. 16.  
he gave separate commands to Nicostratus, Lacrates and Mentor, and c. 47.  
associated with each a Persian colleague. Jealousies, which such an arrangement could hardly fail to produce, arose, and proceeded to a very threatening extreme: yet Ochus, holding the command in chief himself, observed all so watchfully<sup>3</sup>, and interfered so judiciously, while he checked the evil of the spirit, fostering the good, that he not only obviated the danger from contention among one-another, but excited in the Asiatics an emulation in action against the enemy, which even drew praise from the Greeks. The difficulties, which the nature of the invaded country opposed, were singular;

<sup>3</sup> 'Αυτὸς δὲ (ὁ βασιλεὺς) τὴν, λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἔχων, ἐφῆδρευε τοῖς ὅλοις πραγμασι, κ. τ. ε.  
Diod. l. 16. c. 47.



and those arising from the skill and valor of the enemy are also mentioned as great. Diodorus ascribes the former success of Nectanebos against the armies of Ochus to the abilities of Diophantus, an Athenian, and Lamius, a Spartan general. These, in the delay of further measures against him, had been dismissed; but a considerable body of Greeks had been retained, or newly engaged, under another Grecian general, Cleinius of Cos. The overbearing force, however, of the Persian army, directed by the abilities of the Grecian generals serving in it, and supported by an unfailing treasury, succeeded as might be expected. Cleinius was killed in an early engagement. The Greeks in the Egyptian service then seem to have become extensively ready to desert or betray it; and Nectanebos, driven successively from all the strong holds of his country, fled into Ethiopia. Thus Egypt, alienated above sixty years, was, in a few months, recovered to the Persian empire.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 47.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 51.

Diod. *ibid.*

Plut. de Is.  
and Osir.  
p. 363.

In this expedition Ochus gained extensive credit among the Greeks for talent, exertion, and liberality. The Egyptians would not be likely to speak of him generally so well. His ill success against them in the early part of his reign, after so many previous failures of the Persian arms in repeated efforts during half a century, seems to have led them to designate the inefficacious perseverance by representing him, in hieroglyphical symbol, as an ass; and, according to Plutarch, they called him commonly the ass. If then the historian Deinon, a cotemporary, as quoted by Plutarch, should be believed, he resented this insult with wit, imprudence, and illiberality; all especially unbecoming a great prince: 'Your ass,' he said, 'shall eat your god,' and so he had their sacred ox, the representative of their god Apis, butchered and served at his table. Possibly some violence against the Egyptian superstitions may have furnished foundation for this story; which however must remain, like most of the many stories of witty words, reported by antient writers, and often the facts connected with them, uncertain whether they should not be principally attributed to the ingenuity of the reporters. It was not till after his successes that the Egyptians gave him another symbol and name, the sword; by which, according to Plutarch, still in his age, they distinguished him in their catalogue of the Persian kings; he says, for his cruelties, but specifying none; and from  
the

the narrative of Diodorus, it might rather seem to have been, as indeed the symbol itself implies, for his military successes, and the vigor of conduct by which they were obtained.

It has been usual, in the oriental courts, from times beyond history, to commit occasionally the highest public offices, civil and even military, to eunuchs: even the great Cyrus, according to Xenophon, approved this policy. A eunuch, named Bagóas, said to have been an Egyptian born, was the colleague of Mentor in military command, in the war of Egypt. The account of him altogether marks uncommon vigor of mind, with a temper of some violence, but capable of correcting itself. His dissensions, as reported by Diodorus, first with the Theban general, Lacrates, and then with his colleague, Mentor, supported by the troops on each side, were of the most ruinous tendency to his sovereign's service; and, on the latter occasion, his own life was in imminent danger. Reckoning then that he owed his preservation to Mentor's generosity, with reconciliation a friendship grew between them, which was ever faithfully maintained by both. The historian's account of the conduct of Ochus also, in a business so critical, when it was most important for him to have the best services and completest coöperation of all under him, implies temper and judgment. Notwithstanding any misconduct into which passion or mistake or both, had led those two eminent persons, he conceived so highly of them that, on returning to his capital, he made Bagóas his prime-minister, and he committed to Mentor a command more extensive than had ever before been intrusted to any subject; not excepting that given by the partiality of the second Darius to his favorite son Cyrus. It is said to have included all the western provinces of the empire, from the Euxine sea to the border of Ethiopia. In farther favor then, he not only pardoned the rebellion of Mentor's brother-in-law, Artabazus, but restored him to the satrapy of Lower Phrygia, and advanced Mentor, brother of Memnon, who had fled with Artabazus, to offices of trust and power. Evidently, like the younger Cyrus, he saw the general superiority of the Grecian character, and he appears equally to have used it with generosity, dignity and discretion. His liberality in rewarding that part of his Grecian army, which, after the conquest of Egypt, he dismissed, would promote that honorable report of him, in his own age, which the narrative of Diodorus

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 47 & 52.

indicates to have prevailed, and would facilitate the levy of Grecian troops for him in the sequel, when, as the same narrative implies, he used their services even in the interior of his empire.

If Diodorus should be believed, Ochus, returning from the war of Egypt to his capital, abandoned himself, for the rest of his reign, above eleven years, to luxury and idleness; committing the supreme direction of affairs in the body of his empire, eastward of the great desert, wholly to Bagóas, in the western provinces to Mentor. All however that seems reasonably to be inferred is, that no wars, or material troubles, disturbed the center and east of the empire, or none of which information reached the Greeks. Of wars with some of the northern nations, however, we find notice; and the historian mentions that Ochus was never at a loss for Grecian troops, which Mentor forwarded to him as his occasions required; thus implying that his diligence, and watchfulness, and vigilance, and just policy, which had been so advantageous in the Egyptian war, did not afterward wholly cease. That the business of the west meanwhile was ably and faithfully conducted, under the administration of Mentor, the Greeks had more opportunity to know. Everywhere throughout his extensive viceroyalty, the rebellious and contumacious were brought to order; and the order was such that the country flourished under it. Never, since the march of the army under Xerxes to Greece, had the Persian empire shown itself so formidable. Egypt and Cyprus being recovered, and subordination throughout the west of Asia restored, the Persian government could again extend its arms into Europe. The effectual check to Philip, king of Macedonia, at Perinthus and Byzantium, evidently came from Persia, and was probably managed by Memnon, whose command is mentioned by Aristotle, as well as by Diodorus, to have extended to the Propontis.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 75, 76, 77.  
Arist. Econ.  
Diod. . 17.  
c. 50, 51.

Under this vigorous administration it was that the Persian court became the ally of the Athenian democracy, in opposition to the growing power of the Macedonian kingdom, and of that large portion of the Grecian republics, including a balancing party in Athens itself, which preferred the presidency of the king of Macedonia to that of the Athenian many, under the patronage of Persia. The favorite project of Isocrates, for composing the troubles of Greece by uniting the nation in war against Persia, had originated, evidently



evidently, during the weak reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon; when the successes of the Greeks in the service of Cyrus, and those afterward obtained by Agesilaus, afforded encouragement for it. Early in the reign of Ochus farther encouragement arose, from the defeat of his first measures against Egypt, and the insuing revolt of Phenicia and Syria. It was when thus almost all the west of the empire was in rebellion, that Isocrates addressed to the king of Macedonia that styled the oration to Philip, wherein those circumstances are mentioned as existing. Probably none understood better than Isocrates the particular interests of Athens, and the complicated politics of all Greece; but Philip would have earlier and better information of affairs in Asia, and of the characters of men in leading situations there. Apparently he bore patiently, with little answer, his venerable friend's reproaches, on a subject on which it would have been hazardous to Or. ad Phil. open himself in writing. The new aspect, which, after the conquest of P. 374+

Egypt, the west of the Persian empire assumed, would itself be an answer for him to Isocrates, and the more important circumstances would be known to all Greece; while also the intimacy maintained between the leaders of the high democratical party at Athens and the Persian court, or the governors of its provinces, through whom possibly alone any communication may have existed, was notorious. Then followed the bold and extensive project of the singularly able orator politician, which was defeated by the event of the battle of Chæroneia; a project which would have been rash and unwise, but for assurance of support from Persia, and confidence in the satisfaction, not perhaps of all, but of a large proportion of his party, his Theban friends especially, with the great king's patronage. Philip, even after his complete success against the combination within Greece, thought the state of things not such (for so the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to him clearly indicates) that he should be led to offensive war against Persia. The former obstacles to political union in Greece were indeed, in large amount, removed; but the jarring spirit still was extensive there. So much the funeral oration of Demosthenes largely shows; while Persia, with all her provinces obedient, still possessed all the vigor to which she had been lately raised. Isocrates, in the letter last mentioned, shows himself aware that Philip continued to differ from him in opinion concerning war with Persia; and thence he proceeded to declare that, but for

for his extreme elderhood, he would take the journey to Macedonia, to confer with the king on the subject on which he had been so many years so earnest, and always with full persuasion that what he advised could alone save Greece from destruction.

B. C. 339.  
Ol. 107. 2.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 5.

Such was the state of things when, in the year following that of the battle of Chæroneia, the twelfth after the conquest of Egypt,<sup>1</sup> Artaxerxes Ochus king of Persia died; the historian says poisoned by his minister and favorite Bagóas. It has failed few writers of the history of princes to find occasion for noticing the frequency of the imputation of their death to poison, and the general uncertainty of such imputation. Arsces, said to have been the youngest son of Ochus, was raised to the throne. All his other sons are reported to have suffered the fate which, after so many ages, remains common for persons in their unfortunately lofty situation among the Asiatic realms, and in the Turkish empire, even in Europe; wherefore, tho neither their number is mentioned, nor whether poison or what else was the instrument, yet that they were put to death may appear not improbable; and, Bagóas continuing to hold the office of prime minister, it must seem that all measures of importance would have at least his sanction. Yet there are accompanying stories which must throw doubt largely over these anecdotes of the Persian court, were they not in themselves open to much doubt. Diodorus says it was in revenge for the slaughter of the god Apis, twelve years before, and the contempt altogether expressed by Ochus for the Egyptian superstitions, that Bagóas, after having conducted the affairs of the empire ably and faithfully twelve years, murdered his sovereign, through whose favor he held his lofty situation. But this, it appears, did not satisfy the appetite of after-ages for strange stories. Ælian, not indeed a historian, but a professed story-teller, has not scrupled to relate that Bagóas gave the mangled flesh of the body of Ochus to be devoured by cats, and the bones to be made into sword-hilts; yet that he enjoyed this delicious revenge of the honor of his ox-god but in secret, causing another body to be publicly buried with royal honors for that of the king. It is with a view to the history of literature, and a just estimate of the credit so very variously due concerning political and military matters, and historical facts generally, to those whom the modern learned have so generally ranked together as classical writers,

that this story, unknown or rejected by Diodorus, Plutarch, and even Justin, has been so far noticed here.

Arses lived only to the third year after his elevation; destroyed then, according to report, by Bagóas, who remained always prime minister. A prince, descended, according to Diodorus, from the second Darius, by a brother of Artaxerxes Mnemon and the younger Cyrus, (but, as Xenophon's account implies, by a different mother) had escaped the proscriptions of the royal family under both the late reigns. Not only spared by Ochus, but, for military merit, in war with the fierce nations of the northern frontier, raised to the satrapy of Armenia, he had maintained friendship with Bagóas, who favored his succession to the throne. Before called Codomannus, he now took the name of Darius. It would hardly be with the same view with which Bagóas is said to have preferred the helpless youth of Arses to the abler age of his elder brother, that a prince in the vigor of manhood, versed in the business of government, and eminent as a soldier, would have in preference the support of a wily politician; yet, according to Diodorus, Bagóas, who had found himself unable to govern young Arses, proposed to govern Darius. Very soon after the elevation of Darius, however, he died; and the story transmitted is that, attempting to administer a poisoned potion to the king, he was compelled by him to drink it himself. How these circumstances should, with any certainty, be known, is left for conjecture; and to reconcile them with other reported circumstances, of readier notoriety, has been omitted by the historian. Friendly correspondence between the minister Bagóas and the Grecian satrap Mentor, appears to have remained uninterrupted while the former lived; and yet, after his death, not only the great viceroyalty, first committed to Mentor, by Ochus, was continued to him, but the favor and confidence with which he was honored by Darius appear to have equalled that enjoyed under any former prince, and, as we shall see in the sequel, were extended to his family after him. Under his government the west of the empire, except as far as hostilities were carried by Philip king of Macedonia, seems to have been generally quiet and flourishing. The court and the central provinces, disturbed by the circumstances, whatever they may have been, which produced or followed the death of Ochus, remained evidently in a troubled state when Darius Codomannus acquired the throne.



## CHAPTER XLVI.

## ALEXANDER'S Expedition against PERSIA ; First Campaign

## SECTION I.

*Preparations of Greece and Persia for War ; Transactions previous to the passage of the Grecian Army into Asia.*

IT was not till after the death of Artaxerxes Ochus, and the commencement of troubles in Persia, attending and following it, that Philip of Macedonia, yielding at length to the instances of his excellent friend Isocrates, avowed the purpose of delivering the Greeks of Asia from the Persian dominion, and, as we have seen, began hostilities by sending a military force into Æolia under Parmenio. The death of Arsaces had followed, and Darius Codomannus had succeeded to the empire, when Alexander, having happily terminated his wars with the northern barbarians, and composed the affairs of Greece, violently disturbed by the circumstances among which the revolution in Thebes was prominent, had opportunity to prosecute the great enterprize.

Meanwhile the change which had taken place in the circumstances of Persia was not encouraging for it. The new king, Darius, coming to the throne with the advantage of reputation as a soldier, appears to have begun his reign with vigor and prudence. The troubles of the court and the center of the empire were composed, so far, at least, that he could give some attention to the extreme west and to Greece ; and he made formidable preparation of land and sea-forces, not only with the purpose of resisting the invasion of Asia, but openly threatening to retaliate by invading Europe. This demonstration, however, seems not to have been followed by any effectual exertion. During Alexander's wars with the northern people and  
in

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 6 & 7.

in Greece, Parmenio maintained himself in Æolia with the small force which had been placed under his orders by Philip, and afforded support to friendly Greeks there who had revolted against the Persian dominion. Diodorus attributes the remission of the vigor, which had been apparent in the new king of Persia's early measures, to his contempt of Alexander's youth. But it was from no such sentiment that he would allow Parmenio to retain the footing in Asia which he had acquired. Of what was passing in the great empire, beyond the western frontier, the historian evidently could tell nothing. But it seems probable that the ingagement of Alexander in the wars raised by the policy of Demosthenes, with support from the treasury of Persia, provided for Darius a leisure not unwanted for arranging the various business of his vast dominions, and perhaps for attention to wars elsewhere without, or within them. When, however, the leisure arrived for Alexander, on the conclusion of the Theban war, to turn his arms toward Asia, the attention of the Persian government to preparation against him was renewed. According to Diodorus powerful armies were assembled, a large fleet was equipped, and commanders of high reputation were appointed. Among these the Greeks, Mentor and Memnon, connected with the Persian empire, not only by long service under it, but by the marriage of their sister with the satrap of lower Phrygia, were eminent. Through their agency a large body of Greeks was engaged, and no small portion of the Grecian people, with Demosthenes at the head, was disposed to the Persian cause. A curious and interesting fact, incidentally noticed in an oration of Æschines, shows the publicity of this connection, and, in no inconsiderable amount, its character; and remaining uncontradicted in the reply of Demosthenes, yet extant, may be esteemed fully authenticated. It was not long, the orator says, before Alexander passed into Asia, (apparently it was after the conclusion of the Theban war,) that an official communication was made from the Persian court, in the form, then usual, of a letter from the king of Persia to the Athenian people. In this letter, abounding, according to the orator, with reproaches in haughty style to the Athenians for their late conduct, (no longer directed by Demosthenes and his associates of the Persian party, but by Phocion and the Macedonian party,) he especially assured them 'That they should have no more money from him.'

Æschin. de  
cor. p. 632.

The actual crisis for the people of Macedonia, who, by their late king's

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 16.

successful career of twenty-four years, had been established in a state of civil security, perhaps hardly at that time known elsewhere, the prospect could not but be anxious and awful. They did not want, like the subjects of the Grecian republics, war abroad to give them peace at home. But their country, tho to a great extent rich in soil, yet uncultivated and thinly peopled, wanted the improvement which the attention of the government to arts of peace should have provided; and, for improvement of the government itself, good in general principle, but very defective in various points, and wanting accommodation to the new circumstances of advantage in which the kingdom was placed, peace was needful. Well therefore, however in opposition to the earnest remonstrances of the Athenian patriot Isocrates for the good of republican Greece, might they be disposed to recommend to their youthful sovereign, to consider first his duty to his proper kingdom; and with that view, to follow a course that might have invited another youth. It is said that the two of his council the most esteemed by his father, Antipater and Parmenio, advised him to use the existing opportunity, of peace more than commonly assured, to marry; and not till an heir to the throne he had inherited, and to the increase of dominion he had in view, should be born, to hazard his people's happiness and his own life in pursuit of such acquisition.

But the sober office of kings, to provide for all, to whom they should be fathers, domestic quiet and permanent welfare, was less of the taste of Alexander's years. His ardent mind, tho far from insensible to love, and also far from insensible to his people's prosperity, was bent upon war and conquest. That the considerations which, after long deliberation, had decided Philip's mature judgement, should, with the added force of paternal example, lead Alexander to the same decision, can indeed hardly be imputed to him for blame. Among the Macedonians themselves, tho sober men would fear the result for their country, yet many of warmer and less thoughtful tempers would exult in the prospect of war in the rich provinces of Asia, against a people accustomed to shrink before Grecian arms, where they might find reward for their recent labors and perils, undergone in a comparatively poor country and rough climate, against the fiercest of barbarians. The venerable Isocrates no longer lived to promote their wishes by his authority and the eloquence of his pen; yet, among his numerous surviving partizans, in Athens, and throughout Greece, many would be disposed



disposed and able to assist the cause. The amount then, and the superior quality, and the ready will, of the military force that Greece at that time could furnish, when, after wars hardly ceasing for centuries, all now was peace at home, might not only invite a youth of military disposition, the acknowledged head of that force, to put it in action, but even urge for the consideration of the soberest statesmen, whether the present opportunity of the union of that force should not be used. Thus only, it might be urged, there could be hope to provide future security for the country; to obviate invasion which had been threatened; to give a turn to the public mind favorable to the union so happily formed; to strengthen the Grecian cause by associating that large portion of the Grecian people which, for ages, had been accustomed to acknowledge vassalage and pay tribute to Persia; and thus to set at a greater distance the boundary against an enemy, however generally failing in exertion, always of most formidable power.

Justin probably had some warranty for his assertion that official returns were made of the military force of every republic of Greece at this time, and that the total exceeded two hundred thousand men. Comparing all extant authorities, little as Justin's alone may be, this report may seem not extravagant. The republics had been for so many years in almost a constant state of warfare, that not only for every citizen to be familiar with arms would be required, but a large proportion must have had practice in either field or garrison service; and it appears probable that a great part of Justin's stated number might have been put on duty for a campaign within the country, whether in war among the republics, as that by which Epameinondas acquired fame, or against a foreign invader, as that earlier, more glorious for the nation, in which the host of Persia was nearly annihilated at Plataea; but, for war in Asia, other considerations were necessary. The professed purpose, important not only for credit and glory, but as a step to any ulterior purpose, was to withdraw all Grecian cities from foreign dominion. The maintenance, and, if it might be, the increase of popularity for the chief was the more necessary, as Greece, however grown in military numbers, was now, not less than at the time of the Persian invasion, poor in purse, and divided in political sentiment; the heads of a large party, now as then, actually holding friendly communication with the foreign enemy. Till therefore the first purpose, the liberation of the Grecian states, was so far attained that war might be carried into

the country beyond them, pay, and not plunder, must maintain the army.

Information concerning the revenue of the late king of Macedonia, Philip, tho much declamation remains imputing to him corrupt influence through his wealth, we have observed to be very loose and uncertain. But the concurrence of antient writers is complete in asserting that, at his death, his treasury was found exhausted. From Arrian we have report  
 Arrian, l. 7. of a speech of Alexander, declaring that his father, with not sixty talents  
 c. 9. in his treasury, perhaps twelve thousand pounds sterling, left it incumbered with a debt of five hundred talents, about a hundred thousand pounds sterling. Nevertheless, whether from confidence in the solidity of the sources of the Macedonian revenue and in the faith of the government, or from zeal for the Persian war, credit did not fail. Alexander borrowed eight hundred talents, about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, to put forward his proposed expedition. The debt however, thus altogether not more than two hundred and sixty thousand pounds, is said by Plutarch and others to have been considered as threatening ruin to the royal revenue of Macedonia <sup>2</sup>.

In such circumstances Alexander, however he might have a view to great undertakings, could not employ numerous forces. But encouragement was not wanting for great enterprize with a small army. The force which, under Clearchus, had defied the power of the Persian empire in its center, and afterward, under Xenophon and others, maintained that defiance in retreating to its extremity, was originally less than thirteen thousand men. That which passed from European Greece under Agesilaus was no more than eight thousand foot. On account of the difficulty  
 Ch. 24. s. 3. of this hist. of transport across the Ægean, and the obstacles to a march through Bœotia, Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace, he carried no cavalry. Yet, through his popularity among the Greeks of Asia, and the prospect of profit which war against Persia afforded, he soon raised such a force of cavalry, and so added to his infantry, as to be in circumstances to make the Persian provinces find subsistence and pay for all.

Agreement, more than common about military numbers, is found in

<sup>2</sup> Even those later antient writers, and numerous moderns, their disciples, who have represented the riches of Philip as the great instrument of his successes, have not scrupled to paint, in strong colors, Alexander's poverty. I am not aware that any one of them has proposed to reconcile the striking contradiction.

antient accounts of the army assembled under Alexander for the Persian expedition. The most particular extant is from Diodorus. All the republics of Greece together, he says, furnished no more than seven thousand foot, of their civic troops. Five thousand mercenaries were added; whether at the common expense of the confederacy, or paid by the Macedonian treasury, remains unsaid. The Macedonian foot are stated at twelve thousand. Thus the whole of the heavy-armed, or infantry of the phalanx, would be twenty-four thousand. The Odrysian Thracians, Triballians, and Illyrians, probably all, in their national manner, middle-armed, are reckoned together five thousand; the Agrians and bowmen one thousand: the infantry thus of all descriptions thirty thousand. The Agrians, were highlanders of northern Macedonia; middle-armed, but eminent among the middle-armed. The commanding officer of the bowmen was a Cretan, and it seems likely that those under him were mostly Cretans.

The greater part of Greece, as we have formerly observed, is a country little adapted either to the breeding of horses, or to the action of cavalry; insomuch that some, even of the more powerful states, had none on their ordinary military establishment. Six hundred are said by Diodorus to have been now furnished by the republics south of Thermopylæ. Small as this force may seem, it was rather beyond the proportion of cavalry to infantry most ordinary in the armies of southern Greece. But Alexander, with other very great advantages, unpossessed by Agesilaus, had not his difficulties for cavalry. His Thracian dominion almost touched on Asia, divided only by the narrow channel of the Hellespont. The transport thus was easy; and Macedonia and Thessaly had more horse, and better, than all Greece besides. Each country furnished fifteen hundred. Thrace and Pæonia added nine hundred. Thus the whole cavalry would be four thousand five hundred, and the army altogether thirty-four thousand five hundred. Alexander's generals, who published histories of his wars, would probably be disposed rather to extenuate than amplify his numbers. According to Plutarch, Aristobulus stated the infantry at thirty thousand, the cavalry at four thousand, but Ptolemy allowed the cavalry to be five thousand; and another writer, Anaximenes, reported the horse to have been five thousand five hundred, and the foot forty-three thousand. Arrian states only in general terms, that the infantry, including light-armed of all descriptions, exceeded thirty thousand, and the horse five thousand, so that the whole would approach

Diod. l. 17.

c. 17.

Arrian.

Plut. de fort  
Alex. p. 327.



approach thirty-six thousand. Tho not exactly confirming the detail of Diodorus, he little contradicts it; perhaps indeed not at all; our copies of Diodorus differing. As a rough sketch therefore of the composition of the army, that detail may perhaps be considered as reasonably exact.

Small as the force, in the highest estimate, may appear, to contend with the myriads of Persia, yet it was such as Persia had never measured her strength with since her overthrow at Plataea, in the middle of Greece. Her great advantages however remained, in the immense superiority of her revenue, and in the political dissensions of the Greeks. Yet, on the other hand, through those very dissensions zeal was the more ardent among the partizans of the Macedonian connection. The prevailing voice thus was for war with Persia, under the command of the young king of Macedonia, elected captain-general of Greece. The forces were assembled at Amphipolis; from the northern parts by land, from the southern by sea, and thence, in spring of the year, before Christ three hundred thirty-four, OL. 111. 3. B. C. 339. marched together to the Hellespont.

Tho our information of what passed meanwhile in the Persian empire is very defective, evidently something had again checked the vigor of its councils, or perhaps required their earnest direction another way. Through some cause, however, the exertion and the precaution, which the circumstances wanted on the threatened frontier, failed. Of Mentor, whose talents and whose fidelity had been so valuable to the late king, Ochus, and whose merit Darius had the discernment so to appreciate as to continue him in the great command in which, on his accession, he found him, no farther mention is found. It seems altogether likely that, about this time he died; and that to his loss may be attributed the defect of management, civil and military, and the failure of proper combination, which all accounts indicate to have ensued in the western provinces, and especially in those most exposed to attack from Greece. The military command, in the moment perhaps the most important in the empire, had been committed to his brother, Memnon, whom we have seen formerly, in exile from the Persian dominion, residing at the Macedonian court, and recalled when his brother-in-law Artabazus was restored to his satrapy of the Lower Phrygia. Mentor's commission was for the district separated by the narrow water of the Hellespont only from the Macedonian dominion. The service of Artabazus himself apparently  
might

might have been valuable in his satrapy, within which Mentor's command lay: but he had been called to attend the king's immediate councils<sup>3</sup>, where doubtless also his knowledge of Greece and the Greeks, from much communication and long acquaintance, might also make his information and advice highly important. Yet there is appearance that a jealousy of his Grecian connection may have occasioned his removal, and that, tho ostensibly in high honor at the Persian court, he was nevertheless there reckoned a hostage for insuring the fidelity of his Grecian brother-in-law, in the critical command intrusted to him. His satrapy meanwhile was committed to Arsites, as lieutenant-governor. This great officer, as Arrian shows, was on terms not perfectly confidential with Memnon, whose command, otherwise critical, was the more so, as the immediate command against him was in the hands of the consummate Macedonian general Parmenio. We learn variously, and from Arrian decisively, that the satraps were high treasurers of their respective provinces. Mentor's commission seems to have been simply military. For pay for his troops, the tribute assessed on certain Greek towns acknowledging the supremacy of the Persian crown, was placed at his disposal; but for extraordinaries he seems to have been dependent on the satrap, or his vicegerent. Wanting money then, his credit with the citizens of the commercial Greek town of Lampsacus, on the Propontis, enabled him to borrow of them what supplied his immediate need, pledging the general taxes for repayment. But, with the season for collecting the taxes, his need returned and he was obliged to refer repayment to a future day. Again he was reduced to the same necessity, and, at length, the failure was such that he could no longer procure corn sufficient for the regulated distribution to his troops for their subsistence. In this distress, it appears he had the popularity and talent to persuade both the townsmen to wait patiently for repayment of their loan, and the soldiers to acquiesce under a short allowance.

Arist. Econ.  
l. 2. p. 692.  
ed. Paris,  
1654.

This information from the cotemporary philosopher, who lived in the courts of Philip and Alexander, concurs with Arrian's report of following matters to give all probability to that of Diodorus, of those more immediately insuing. Memnon received orders from his court to reduce the

<sup>3</sup> This, not here said by Diodorus, becomes evident from what followed, as reported both by Diodorus and by Arrian.

Grecian town of Cyzicus, on the Propontis, which, under incouragement probably, from Parmenio, had revolted, and refused the accustomed tribute. From Æolis, where he was opposing Parmenio, he hastily crossed Mount Ida; but failing to surprize the town of Cyzicus, which had been his purpose, he could do no more than plunder the territory, from which he collected valuable booty, and then hastily returned. His short absence however was not unattended with inconvenience. Parmenio had used the opportunity for taking Grynium, a considerable town, one of the four of the lordship which the family of the Eretrian Gongylus had injoyed from the munificence of the Persian court, and he proceeded to lay siege to Pitana. Memnon's approach relieved that place, and a Persian force, probably cavalry, being collected to strengthen his Grecian army, the Macedonian general Callas was defeated in the Troad. The walls of Rhœteum, however, after no very severe loss, for Callas appears to have been an able officer, afforded him refuge, and Memnon, held still in check by Parmenio, could little prosecute the advantage gained.

## SECTION II.

*Passage of the Grecian Army into Asia: Alexander's Visit to Troy: Difficulties for the direction of the March: Measures of the Persian Generals: Battle of the Granicus.*

SUCH nearly appears to have been the state of things in that critical angle of the Persian empire, when Alexander arrived with his army at Sestus on the Hellespont. There he found his fleet of a hundred and sixty triremes, with round ships, as the Greeks described vessels of burthen, in number together ample for the speedy passage of the strait. The Persian government, possessing a fleet of overbearing force, had unaccountably neglected to provide that it should be where it was so urgently wanted. Memnon, with an army barely able to maintain contest with the small force under Parmenio, and watched by that force, could not attempt to face Alexander. Parmenio himself therefore, whose local knowlege, acquired in his command in Asia, would add to the value of his general superiority of

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 11.



of military talent and experience, was sent for to superintend the transport<sup>3</sup>. Under his direction the army crossed the strait from Sestus to Abydus in all quietness, Alexander having, meanwhile leisure for whatever amusement might invite him.

Those who have experienced the emotions, natural to all who have had the advantage of a classical education, on first approaching Athens, on first approaching Rome, on first even seeing the Mediterranean or the Adriatic, or any scene interesting to the imagination through acquaintance with the admirable authors of classical antiquity and the persons and events they have celebrated, will conceive what might be those of Alexander on this occasion; a youth of twenty-two, bred under Aristotle, approaching the ground described by Homer, in that poem which had been from childhood his delight, as to this day it has remained of all ingenuous minds fortunate enough to be acquainted with it, and must continue to be while letters exist: but to estimate the keenness of his feeling the further consideration is necessary, of his own reputed consanguinity with the principal heroes of that exquisite poem, of his father's glory, worthy of such an ancestry, and of what he had himself already, at his early age, acquired. With his mind thus stimulated, before quitting Europe, he would visit the tomb or barrow of Protesilaus, near Eleüs, about twelve miles from Sestus. Protesilaus, leading the landing of Agamemnon's army on the Asiatic shore, is said to have found it so otherwise guarded than on Alexander's arrival that he was presently killed by Hector. In honor of the hero so falling, and to intercede with the gods for better fortune for himself, Alexander had sacrifice performed in his presence on the barrow. Earnest then to explore the site and territory of Troy, he embarked at Eleüs, and crossed to the place on the opposite shore, reputed the station of Agamemnon's fleet; whence it derived the name, retained to Alexander's age, of the Achaian port. It was his fancy, it is said, to take the tiller from Menœtius, the master of the trireme, and be himself the steersman during the passage. Midway he lay on his oars, while, on the deck, a bull was sacrificed to Neptune and the Nerëids,

<sup>3</sup> Arrian giving no account of transactions in Asia before Alexander's arrival there, we depend upon Diodorus for information where Parmenio was while Alexander was

ingaged in the wars with the northern nations and the disturbances in Greece. It is therefore highly satisfactory to find that the two narratives meet in perfect harmony.

and, from a golden ewer, he poured libations upon the waves. It was further his fancy for himself, full-armed, to be the first to land. As thanksgiving offerings then for his quiet passage, he directed altars to be raised where he embarked and where he landed, to Jupiter Apobaterius, the protector of debarkation, and to Minerva, and Hercules. After these pious offices he proceeded to the place where Troy had stood <sup>4</sup>.

At this time Chares, the first great patron of Demosthenes in his political career, afterward his associate in the administration of Athens, was residing in the neighbourhood, at the seaport town of Sigeium. Eminent men of Athens, we have seen formerly, taught, by the experience of ages, the danger of political eminence there, commonly sought establishment in some state beyond the ready reach of an arbitrary vote of the Athenian many, where, in case of need, they might find security, and Sigeium was the retreat of Chares. How far he remained yet in favor with any party, or in what degree he was obnoxious at Athens, we have no information; but that his politics were little founded on any principle beyond that of his own advantage, is indicated in all accounts. He hastened now to compliment Alexander on his arrival in Asia. Others, Greeks and Asiatics, Arrian assures us, did the same, but Chares alone was of eminence for the historian to distinguish by name.

On the site of antient Troy was, at this time, only a village; still however retaining the venerable name of Ilion, and farther supporting respect by temples, revered, among other reasons, for the relics they contained. In a temple of Minerva were consecrated suits of armour, said to have been preserved from the time of the Trojan war. Alexander performed sacrifice there, on an altar dedicated to Jupiter with the title of Hercius, the protector of boundaries; and, together with that

<sup>4</sup> These particulars are mentioned by Arrian; but with his usual caution, introduced, or qualified, with the expressions 'Ο πλείος λόγος κατίχει,—Λέγουσι δὲ—Καὶ τὰυτα λέγουσιν—Λόγος κατίχει—Οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν—Ὡς ὁ λόγος, thus intimating that, tho worthy of notice, he did not reckon them resting on authority equal to that to which he deferred for matters of more importance, which he has related without such qualification.

An inept note of Gronovius, urging diffi-

culty where there is absolutely none, as if Menætiſ might not have been the regular master of the royal trireme, tho Alexander indulged his fancy to take the helm during the passage of the Hellespont, can be worthy of notice only that it may not impose on those utterly unacquainted with marine affairs. The matter indeed is little enough important. The compliment to Alexander from Chares, immediately after related, is of other weight.

chief of the greater Grecian deities, he addressed vows to Priam, as a hero or demigod; with the purpose, Arrian says was reported, of averting the anger of the everliving spirit of the king of antient Troy from the progeny of Achilles, of whom, through his mother, he was reckoned to be. Dedicating then, in the temple of Minerva, the armour he bore, he took away, as in exchange, one of the antient panoplies, to be carried before him in future, on solemn occasions, and especially on going into battle. Having gratified his curiosity, and, whether more to satisfy his own mind, or to gain credit for assurance of divine favor to his purposes, having fulfilled offices of piety in his day reckoned becoming, he hastened to rejoin his army, which had completed the passage of the strait, and was already assembled in camp near Arisbë.

Still for proceeding on the great professed object of the expedition, the liberation of all Grecian cities from the dominion of Persia, various difficulties were before him. In all those cities were contesting parties, and, in some of the most powerful, the prevailing party was adverse to the proposed change, called liberation. Generally the Persian government had so much protected and so little oppressed the Grecian settlements in Asia, that many reckoned their allegiance to the Persian king rather an advantage than a misfortune. Mostly however the Persian government favored either that superiority of one eminent man, which the Greeks described by the term tyranny, or that government by the most eminent individuals, which they called oligarchy. But this preference resulted only from the particular circumstances of the case which required it. The liberal despotism of Persia would patronize democracy in its subject states, if, the peace of the country was maintained, and the tribute to the crown regularly remitted. Everywhere however one party being adverse to the Persian, very generally it was the democratical party. Hence Philip, who had avoided, as far as might be, whatever would mark predilection for any party principles in proper Greece, had been induced to profess himself the patron of democracy in Asia; and Alexander, in this as in so many other things, followed his steps.

The line of march then, for reaching the principal Asiatic-Grecian cities, was not of easy choice. The lofty and extensive highlands of Ida immediately intervened. The shortest road, but otherwise most disadvantageous, abounding with opportunities for an opposing force, was



directly over those highlands. The more circuitous way westward, by the towns of the coast, would apparently on many accounts have been to be preferred; but Mentor's attention, fixed, by various considerations, principally to that line, had provided obstacles. A third remained, by the eastern roots of the mountains. This was much more circuitous, yet among its difficulties and dangers it had also its advantages. By taking that road it might be hoped that contest with the powerful body of Grecian troops in the Persian service would be avoided; instead of the able Memnon, satraps would command; and, the country being all hostile, the army might live at its expense; whereas, among the Grecian settlements, subsistence must be paid for<sup>2</sup>, and offence cautiously avoided. In these circumstances Parmenio's previous opportunities for observation and inquiry would be highly conducive toward the best decision. Alexander resolved upon taking the circuitous inland road.

Whether through meer remissness, or by what troubles prevented, the Persian court intermitted that just attention said to have been given, on the first accession of Darius, to the invasion threatened from Macedonia, we still fail to learn. It seems to have been assumed, or hoped, that Memnon's Grecian force and his interest among the Grecian cities, together with the disposition of a party in every city, if not to favor the Persian supremacy, yet to profit from Persian patronage for maintaining itself against an adverse party, would suffice for the security of the coast, with its numerous and wealthy commercial towns; and that the satraps, who were as princes of the interior country, with vassals, deeply interested in its protection against a plundering enemy, would make such an extent of continent as Lesser Asia, so divided by lofty mountains, the grave of any invader. But tho Memnon's military means were crippled by deficiency of pecuniary means, yet how justly the Persian court reckoned upon his talents and fidelity, and how well altogether he deserved the estimation which historians have concurrently attributed to him, seems not least indicated by the difficulties which Alexander resolved to encounter, in preference to those which Memnon had prepared for him.

<sup>2</sup> If, for this, not said by Arrian, but perhaps obvious enough of itself, authority were desired, the conduct of the Cyrcian Greeks, returning from Upper Asia, among the Grecian towns on the coast of the Euxine, but

more particularly that of Agesilaus among those of the coast of the Ægean, may be referred to, as related, on the authority of Xenophon, in the third section of the twenty-fourth chapter of this history.

The country through which he was to pass was the satrapy of Lower Phrygia, called by Arrian, and some others, Phrygia next the Hellespont; but, Bithynia forming a large portion of it, and Dascylium, the satrap's principal residence, being within that country, we find him sometimes intitled satrap of Bithynia. Long held by Pharnabazus, and after him by Memnon's brother-in-law, Artabazus, in his absence, Arsites now presided, with a title, as given by Arrian, corresponding with ours of lieutenant-governor<sup>6</sup>. Alexander, with the purpose of reaching the Grecian settlements southward, to avoid the heights of Ida, was necessarily to stretch far eastward, and begin even in a northerly direction. Percotë is mentioned as the town first in his way. Lampsacus next, a considerable Grecian city on the Propontis, was not friendly. A mutual interest having led it to be upon good terms with the satrap, Memnon's influence would easily prevail there; and its population was numerous enough, and its walls strong enough, to enable it to dare a siege. Alexander, therefore, to whom quick progress was highly important, leaving it on his left, proceeded by Hermotus to Colonæ.

The direction thus taken, and the rapidity with which it was pursued, seem to have surprized as they alarmed Arsites, and all the governors of provinces bordering on his satrapy. Spithridates<sup>7</sup>, ruling the extensive and rich country, formerly the kingdom of Cræsus, and afterward the satrapy of Tissaphernes, had probably expected that Mentor's military force and military talents, and the walls of the Æolian Greek towns yet in the Persian interest, would long employ Alexander before he could reach Ionia, which was an appendage of his satrapy; and that, before danger could approach any part of his country, beyond that held by Greeks, a royal army, might arrive to overwhelm the daring invader. The military force on which a Persian governor depended for preserving the peace of his country, as we have formerly observed, was principally cavalry. Spithridates, and four other eminent men, by Arrian intitled generals (apparently governors of districts, who commanded each the troops of his district) hastened, with all the force they could collect, to

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, intitling Spithridates τῆς Λυδίας Ἑλλησπίντω Φρυγίας ὑπαρχος. de exped. Alex. καὶ Ἰωνίας σατράπης, adds καὶ Ἀρσίτης ὁ τῆς πρὸς

l. 1, c. 13.

<sup>7</sup> In Diodorus's orthography Spithrobates. support

support Arsites. Meanwhile Memnon's activity appears to have equalled or even exceeded Alexander's. Having ascertained the hostile army's course, with his heavy-armed Grecian foot he outstripped its march, and joined the satraps at Zeleia in Bithynia. Possibly the heights of Ida afforded him a shorter way, which, tho rugged and difficult, might be well-known to him or those under him. The army, thus assembled to oppose Alexander, consisted, according to Arrian, of twenty thousand Persian cavalry, and nearly an equal number of regular heavy-armed foot; not probably all Greeks, for among Grecian mercenary soldiers men of various nations were often admitted, but all trained in the Grecian discipline of the phalanx. The light-armed foot, after the common practice of the Grecian military writers in stating numbers, Arrian has omitted to notice<sup>8</sup>. Probably they were several thousands, tho time and circumstances would not have served for assembling them in numbers equal to their usual proportion in Persian armies.

Arrian, generally scrupulous, has undertaken to state what passed at a council of war, of which Memnon was a member, through whose communication indeed it may have become known. Memnon, he says, delivering his opinion to the council, said, 'We are considerably outnumbered by the

<sup>8</sup> This we have had occasion formerly to observe of both Thucydides and Xenophon, and thus there is in Arrian's account no absolute contradiction of Diodorus, who makes the Persian infantry a hundred thousand. Not that it seems probable the fighting men were so many. But Herodotus, in enumerating the army under Xerxes, not only specifies the light-armed soldiers, but also the followers of the camp; often, in Asiatic camps, more numerous than the fighting-men. Thus the army at Zeleia may have been of the full number reported by Diodorus.

That Arrian in stating the foot of the army at Zeleia as near twenty thousand, meant to speak of heavy-armed foot only, Greeks, or armed and trained in the Grecian discipline, I think sufficiently evident in a collation of his expressions: 'The Persian 'generals incamped at Zeleia' he says, ξὺν τῇ ἰππῳ βαρβαρικῇ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοῖς

μισθοφόροις. l. 1. c. 13, and these phrases follow, Περσῶν δὲ ἰππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν εἰς δισχυρίους, ξένοι δὲ πεζοὶ μισθοφόροι ὀλίγον ἀποδείοντες δισχυρίων. c. 15. ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, c. 17. τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, p. 35. Among the μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, we know from Xenophon, men not of Grecian birth were often admitted: but ξένοι μισθοφόροι seems to have been a description for none but heavy-armed soldiers trained in the Grecian manner, mostly Greeks, or passing for such. The heavy-armed mercenary Greeks of Alexander's army are termed by Arrian ξένοι μισθοφόροι.

Gronovius's proposed amendment of the monstrous statement in our copies of Justin, making the Persian infantry, at the ensuing battle, six hundred thousand, is ingenious, and it may be but justice, even to a writer so given to extravagance as Justin, to reckon it probable.

' enemy



‘ enemy in regular infantry. I cannot therefore recommend a battle against  
 ‘ a very superior force of the best disciplined troops, commanded by the  
 ‘ most practised officers in the world. A great superiority in cavalry is our  
 ‘ advantage, and it should be used. The enemy, if he advances, should  
 ‘ be allowed neither to eat nor rest. Our horses feet would suffice to  
 ‘ destroy the harvest growing in his way ; and even if towns could afford  
 ‘ him shelter and refreshment they should not be spared.’ Arsites ex-  
 claimed against this : ‘ It is our duty,’ he said, ‘ with the ample means we  
 ‘ possess, to protect those committed to our care ; nor will I patiently  
 ‘ suffer a single house or a single inhabitant within my province to be  
 ‘ injured.’ In this sentiment the other Persian generals concurred.

It is evident, from Arrian’s narrative, that he reckoned Memnon’s counsel wise ; and Alexander’s advance, undertaken perhaps in some confidence that a blow might be struck against the satraps before Memnon could bring his regular infantry to their support, highly hazardous, if not even rash. He thought that Alexander’s army might have been effectually stopped, if not even destroyed, by the execution of Memnon’s plan<sup>9</sup>. The Persian generals, he says, were jealous of Memnon ; not suspecting him of infidelity to the cause he had engaged in ; but, knowing the king valued him highly for his military talents, they supposed he would desire a protracted war, that the need of his services might not cease. On the

<sup>9</sup> Memnon’s ought, I suppose, to be the plan for England, should an enemy ever, in any great force, invade our island. Even should it be our misfortune that he commanded the sea, and could pour successive myriads of infantry upon us, our management still must be wretched if we could not maintain the Persian superiority against him. We should be beyond measure superior in cavalry and in artillery. Landing should of course be diligently watched and vigorously opposed. But, that once effected, no battle should be fought. A battle might be desirable for the commanding general’s fame, but at no rate for the nation’s good. Whichever way the invader turned from the coast, the country should be waste before him. A superior cavalry should attend all his steps ; he should find

nothing to eat, and he should never sleep in quiet. The more his myriads the sooner he would starve. Nearly thus, after so many battles in which Roman generals, eager for fame, lost their armies and their lives, and brought Rome to the brink of ruin, Fabius baffled Hannibal ; and thus, before him, without the glory of a battle, Gylippus destroyed the Athenian army in Sicily. When invasion was expected from Bonaparte, measures in pursuance of such a system, at first earnestly recommended by government, and zealously put forward by the country, were suddenly countermanded, and a contrary purpose declared ; at which I must own I wondered and shuddered. Those who then led our military councils were not Wellingtons.

other

other hand personal motives for the determination of the Persian chiefs are obvious ; but mixed with considerations both of public welfare, and of the special interests of the crown, committed to their charge. Their vassals' property and their own would suffer from the execution of Memnon's plan ; with them the king's revenue must also suffer ; distress must come upon thousands, for whose relief no provision had been, nor perhaps could be, in adequate amount, made ; and, should the completest success against the enemy follow, whether they might most incur the approbation or indignation of the distant court for the means, was perhaps a question for their serious consideration. Jealousy then of a foreiner in high command, whatever his merit, could only in very extraordinary circumstances, in any country, be otherwise than patriotic and reasonable. The sentiments of Arsites were accordingly approved as becoming a Persian patriot, and it was resolved to give Alexander battle.

Near Zeleia an advantageous position offered itself at the ford of the river Granicus, which seems, in Arrian's account, who knew the country, to have been the only passage of that river, readily practicable for an army, between the highlands of Ida, where it has its source, and the Euxine sea. Issuing from the heights at once a plentiful stream, it crosses the plainer country in a deep and rocky channel. At the ford it is still rapid, and of varying depth, with loose stones in its bed. But there the rocks of the right bank receding, leave a low flat, in the dialect of the north of England, \*where the thing is familiar, a baugh<sup>10</sup>, of considerable extent, tho of length against the stream no more than that the Persian cavalry, in line, might occupy nearly the whole bank, from where the cliff recedes, to where it again meets the water. The Persian generals then, confident in their native strength, and perhaps most of them little knowing, from any experience of their own, the value of their Grecian foot, occupied the flat with their cavalry, and placed the Greeks, as a reserve, on the higher ground behind it, the boundary of the torrent's violence in winter floods. The immediate command of this powerful body of foot was committed to a Persian general, Omare, while Memnon was with the Persian generals at the head of the left wing of their cavalry ; whether desired for his

Arrian. l. 1.  
c. 17.

<sup>10</sup> This word, lost in the common speech of the south, remains nevertheless in names of places, with varied orthography, Howe, Ivinghoe, Luton Hoo, and others.

advice,

advice, or rather required through jealousy, as may seem indicated by the circumstance, added by Arrian, that his sons were with him there <sup>10</sup>.

Alexander approaching the ford early in the day, and informed by his forerunners of the enemy's position, hastened with some of his principal officers to examine it. Parmenio, observing the difficulties presented, Arr. l. 1. recommended incamping for the night, in expectation that the enemy, c. 41. inferior in infantry, would leave the passage free before morning. Against this Alexander urged 'the advantage, for the great business they had undertaken, of beginning with a blow that might surprize and terrify, and the importance of not allowing the long-established opinion of Grecian superiority to slacken for a moment.' But what Memnon had recommended in the Persian council of war would hardly escape Parmenio, nor probably Alexander; who, with a most acute mind, had already, for his years, large experience in military command. The opportunity which was offered for a battle, once missed, might not be found again, and the greater difficulties and dangers that Memnon's advice would have prepared, might remain for them. Alexander resolved immediately to make the attack which the Persians appeared resolved to wait for.

On his side of the river it appears the bank offered no material obstacle to regular formation at his choice. With the purpose then of forcing the passage, he gave his line an extent, as nearly as might be, commensurate with the enemy's; his horse holding the extreme of each wing. On his farthest right, which was first to come in contact with the enemy, he placed that superior body of heavy cavalry intitled the royal companions. To prepare for the attack by these, and support it, they were attended by the Agrians, middle-armed, eminent for skill with the dart, and by the whole body of bowmen. Parmenio's eldest son, Philotas, commanded all. Next in the line were the Macedonian heavy horse, and that commanded by Socrates, with the Pæonian middle-armed, all under Amyntas son of Arrhabæus. Adjoining these were a select body of the royal companion-

<sup>11</sup> Diodorus says that Memnon was associated with a Persian general, the satrap Arsamenes, in the command of that wing; (Diod. l. 17, c. 19.) which Arrian's account neither contradicts nor warrants, but leaves it at least doubtful whether Memnon had any

command. What has led Guischardt, in his commentary on the battle of the Granicus, to attribute to Memnon the command in chief there, he has not said, and I have been unable to discover.



infantry, styled hypaspists <sup>12</sup>, under Nicanor, Parmenio's second son. The phalanges held the center, under Perdiccas son of Orontas, Cœnus son of Polemocrates, Craterus son of Alexander, Meleager son of Neoptolemus <sup>13</sup>, Amyntas son of Andromenes, and Philip son of Amyntas; names, for their recurrence in the sequel, deserving notice here <sup>14</sup>. Next the phalanges, on the left, was the Thracian horse, under Agathon; then the auxiliary Grecian horse of the republics south of Thessaly: the extreme of the left wing was held by the Thessalian horse, under Callas son of Harpalus, who had distinguished himself in service under Parmenio, in Æolia. All the light-armed of the army thus were given to the right wing, to check the enemy's efforts against that division of the cavalry with which it was proposed to make the first impression.

The custom of war of the heroic ages, when the chief generals were the most forward combatants, remained, in large amount, to the most polished times of Greece. Brasidas we have seen, in the days of Thucydides, and in those of Xenophon, even the sage Epameinondas, when on his life the fortune of his party throughout Greece depended, so fell. Among the Persians the prowess of the satrap Pharnabazus, and still more the death of the younger Cyrus, are eminent examples. But yet more recently, and especially more an example for Alexander, his father Philip, according to the unsuspicious testimony of the hostile great orator, had been wounded in battle in every part of his body. Such example a

<sup>12</sup> I have been unable to ascertain what distinguished the hypaspist from the phalangite, the ordinary hoplite or heavy-armed. Gronovius, giving for ἵπασπιστής the Latin *scutatus*, and the lexicographers *armiger*, are unsatisfactory. Guischart has supposed that the hypaspist, tho bearing a proper panoply, was altogether lighter armed than the ordinary hoplite; on what authority he has not said, and I have not found; unless the circumstance that the hypaspists were always among Alexander's chosen bodies for rapid enterprize might be reckoned a sufficient foundation. But we have formerly observed, after Xenophon, young Lacedæmonians so excelling in vigor of limb and practice in arms, as, with all the incumbrance of the

arms of the phalanx, to overtake their lighter armed enemies in flight; and Arrian mentions, on many occasions, Alexander's selecting the more active and vigorous of his phalangites to attend him, together with the hypaspists, for rapid and rugged marches. The question therefore remains whether the hypaspist was chosen for his lighter armor, or for his superior power to carry the heavier.

<sup>13</sup> Meleager is afterward so described: to his name alone his father's is not added here.

<sup>14</sup> The account of the phalanges, in our copies of Arrian, is rather confused, but I think he has meant to number six, as in the text above.

youth like Alexander, exulting in vigor of mind and limb, would not be backward to follow. Modern weapons have produced a necessity for the modern practice of generals, in land-service, to observe and direct from a distance comparatively secure. But, in naval war, the commander of the largest fleet, like the generals of old, in no situation of advantage to see and direct, such still is imperious custom, mixes in battle equally with the lowest seaman. Alexander accordingly, committing the command of the left wing of his army to Parmenio, took himself the immediate lead of the right; which, in pursuance of the concerted plan, was first to meet the enemy.

Meanwhile the Persian generals, watching, from the opposite bank, all movements, gathered, from the splendor of the armour and habiliments of Alexander and his immediate attendants, where he had his station; and, as far as time and circumstances would allow, they drew their choicest troops toward that point. This movement could not be so made as to be unobserved from the Grecian army; and, its purpose being conjectured, Alexander was confirmed by it in his plan. Could he defeat that part of the hostile force, he trusted, judging from large and able information of the character of Asiatic armies, that the rest would not long stand.

An advanced body, infantry with cavalry, the former under Amyntas son of Arrhabæus, the latter under Ptolemy son of Philip, crossed the river first, and began the battle. The Persian cavalry carried javelins, light enough to be thrown by the arm, in which then, as still at this day, being trained to it from early youth, they were highly dexterous. In closing they mostly used the cimeter. The Grecian horseman carried a lance for close action, but no missile weapon. The Grecian advanced bodies were received with such firmness, by numbers very superior, on ground of great advantage, that they were quickly compelled to retire, with considerable loss. Nevertheless the employment they gave, inabled the main body, led by Alexander himself, to cross the more quietly. But on approaching the bank it suffered, and on reaching it was so met in stationary fight that, Arrian, following the account of the Macedonian generals, characterizes the action by comparing it to a contest of heavy-armed infantry. Alexander's lance was disabled. Turning to Aretes,

Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this hist.

his master of the horse<sup>15</sup>, for another, that officer could only show him one equally injured, so warmly had he also been engaged. The extraordinary skill of the Persian horsemen, to disable an enemy's lance, has heretofore occurred for notice in Xenophon's account of an action where he was engaged under Agesilaus. There the Persian, hardly equal in numbers, as the candid historian allows, overbore the Grecian cavalry; but these were Asiatic Greeks, and very recently raised. The very superior practice of those under Alexander, animated by his example, gave prevalence to their superior formation and superior weapons against very superior numbers, and the Persians gave way.

Singularly formidable in desultory action with a large field, the Persian cavalry, tho they would sometimes charge in a sort of column, as in the battle noticed from Xenophon, seem to have been quite unqualified by their discipline to charge in line. But, if a discharge of javelins on a gallop, or, at most, a rush afterward at a point, did not break the enemy, so excellently were their horses trained to stop and wheel, that they would instantly withdraw on a gallop, confident of outstripping pursuit, and prepared to turn and renew action in their own desultory way.

A short leisure was thus afforded to Alexander, and Demaratus, a Corinthian, of the band of royal companions, was the first to supply him with a sound lance. Hardly sooner was he thus provided than he observed a powerful body of Persian horse returning to charge, and a leading officer considerably advanced before it. In the warmth of mind of the moment he rode onward so hastily, that, before his attendants could join him, he had, with his lance, killed the leading officer, but, almost in the same instant, lost part of his helmet by a stroke from another's sword, whom yet, with his shortened lance he killed also. Nearly surrounded now by enemies, one of them was aiming a sword-stroke at him, which might have been fatal, when Cleitus son of Dropis, one of his lords of the body-guard, arrived so critically as to disable the uplifted arm by a wound in the shoulder. It was afterward found that the first killed by Alexander was Mithridates, a son-in-law of Darius,

<sup>15</sup> *Ἀνατολὸν τῶν βασιλικῶν* is the title of Alexander's attendant, which it has been ventured so to render.

commander



commander of the cavalry of the army, the second Rosaces, a man of great eminence; and the officer wounded by Cleitus was Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, who died, not long after, of the wound. So the Persian great still held it their office to be foremost in battle, and so, beyond just policy, they performed the supposed duty.

Through the retreat of the Persian cavalry first engaged, and the check in their return to onset, by the death of their principal officers, the right wing of the Grecian army had leisure to gain footing on the plain ground of the meadow. Meanwhile the left wing, under Parmenio, had severe contest with the Persian right. In this contest the Thessalians, always esteemed among the best of Grecian cavalry, particularly distinguished themselves; and the Persians, weakened, as before mentioned, to strengthen their other wing, were compelled to give way<sup>16</sup>. Through the employment given by the Thessalians, the Grecian infantry of the left wing crossed the river with little loss, and formed on the meadow in regular order. The Persian cavalry, plied with missile weapons by the Grecian light troops, while the protended spears were advancing, having looked in vain for example or orders from their officers, killed or disabled, presently took to disorderly flight.

The infantry thus abandoned, was however, alone, a formidable army, but it wanted a head. The Persian, Omars, its commander, probably unversed in Grecian tactics, and, in Arrian's account, unprepared by instructions or previous concert for the circumstances, was at a loss for measures<sup>17</sup>. Nevertheless he stood, and the troops under him stood, where they had been stationed, witnesses of the flight of the cavalry which should have rallied, if not for farther action by itself, yet for their support, and

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 19 & 21.

Arrian. l. 1.  
c. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Tho it may be hardly too much to say, of the numerous descriptions of battles which remain to us from Diodorus, that not one is altogether rational, yet credit seemingly may be given him for his testimony to the discipline of the Thessalian horse, and the credit it gained at the battle of the Granicus. Arrian has wholly omitted notice of what was done by the wing under Parmenio; perhaps because the generals, to whose accounts he trusted, had described only what they were witnesses to in the right.

But it may be ventured to add, of Diodorus that this part of his compilation is among those for which he has been most fortunate in his choice of authorities; and what he has related of the battle of the Granicus, supplying Arrian's deficiency, harmonizes with all that Arrian has related.

<sup>17</sup> Εξεστράπη Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοὺς ξίλους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ὧν τὸ εἶφος ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτάχθη, ἐκπλήξει μᾶλλον τι τοῦ παραλόγου ἢ λογισμῷ βεβαίως, ἔμενε. Arr. l. 1. c. 17.

witnesses also of their enemy's measures for attacking them. Alexander, allowing no distant pursuit of the defeated cavalry, collected his troops, and, according to the practice introduced by Epameinondas and adopted by Philip, directed his attack not against the whole line, but, with a condensed force, against the center of the Persian Greeks. Their resistance was brave, but unavailing. Presently broken, through the superior conduct of their enemy, his cavalry fell upon their disordered ranks. To rally then was impossible; to fly useless; and quarter was little given. About two thousand are said to have been made prisoners, wounded, or falling as if wounded, and so avoiding the immediate fury of pursuers. Thus Alexander's victory was complete.

The number slain, of the Persian army altogether, Arrian has not undertaken to say; whence it may be conjectured that those who have undertaken it had no good authority to follow. But, in his and in all accounts, the loss, whatever in numbers, was important in quality. Nine men, of great eminence, are named as having fallen. Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, Rosaces, said by Diodorus to have been his brother, and Mithridates, the king's son-in-law, have been already mentioned. Pharnaces, the queen's brother, Arbupales, described by Arrian as of the royal family, Mithrobuzanes<sup>18</sup>, satrap of Cappadocia, Omares, commander of the mercenaries, and two other generals, are also in Arrian's list of the killed in the field. Arsites, that writer adds, having fled to the capital of his satrapy, unable to bear the consideration that his advice, prevailing in the council of war, had produced so great a calamity, added himself with his own hand to the number of great officers lost.

On the Grecian side none of the rank of general, but no less than twenty-five of the order of companions, apparently most in the contest about Alexander's person, were killed. Of the other cavalry little more than sixty are said by Arrian to have fallen, and of the infantry, only about thirty; numbers for which, likely enough, he had the authority of Macedonian generals, yet, judging from his own account of the action, probably much extenuated. Funeral honors for the slain were Alexander's next care; in which nothing that could gratify their surviving friends, and excite emulation among their surviving comrades in arms, was omitted. The substantial reward of perpetual immunity from taxes

<sup>18</sup> Otherwise written Mithrobarzanes.

(what taxes indeed we should be glad to know) for their parents and posterity, would especially ingage the gratitude and attachment of the more considerate among them. The twenty-five companions were honored by employing the celebrated Lysippus to represent them in statues of brass, which were placed in the city of Dium in Macedonia. Liberality was extended, against the common practice of the Grecian republics, even to enemies: the rite of burial was performed for the Persian slain, and even for the mercenaries in the Persian service; tho the survivors of these, prisoners, as traitors to their country taken in the actual use of arms against it, were condemned to slavery. They were of various Grecian republics; some Athenians. To the wounded of his own army Alexander gave the most flattering personal attention. Not only he saw that whatever their cases needed was supplied, but inquired of each into the circumstances of the action, and encouraged the boastful tale of their several deeds.

To send home report of a victory so glorious, obtained with loss, not indeed satisfactorily reported to us, yet, for the greatness of the occasion, probably altogether small, was a grateful part of the business before him. Athens, for the sake of his hereditary friends there, those who had honored his father, and whom his father had honored, as well as for their leading influence among the republics, was perhaps intitled to his distinguishing attention, and received it. Three hundred complete suits of Persian armour, sent as a present to the Athenian people, were dedicated in the temple of Minerva, with this inscription, ALEXANDER, SON OF PHILIP, AND THE GREEKS, EXCEPTING THE LACEDÆMONIANS, OFFER THESE, TAKEN FROM THE BARBARIANS OF ASIA <sup>19</sup>.

## SECTION

<sup>19</sup> The origin of the name of Asia is utterly uncertain, but, already in the time of the father of profane history, it appears to have designated among the Greeks the continent now so called, as far as it was then known. He distinguishes the country since called Lesser Asia, by the description of Asia within the Halys.

Nevertheless the name Asia has been used by later antient writers with various

narrower significations, a matter not unnecessary to be adverted to for duly understanding them. The diligent authors of the antient universal history have collected those significations. Names of countries have mostly originated from the names of the people possessing them, and have been extended, or contracted or changed, as possession has altered. Thus Græcia had its name from the Greeks, and within it, Laconia



## SECTION III.

*March into Lydia: Surrender of Sardis: Circumstances of Ephesus and other Grecian Cities of Asia. Opposition of Miletus: Late arrival of the Persian fleet: Miletus taken. Efficiency of the Persian fleet obviated by Measures ashore. Pecuniary Distress of Alexander.*

THE consequences of the victory of the Granicus were very great. It was not a little matter that, in Greece, the hopes, the influence, the activity, of the Persian party were instantly checked. But in lesser Asia, the result amounted to the immediate conquest of a large portion of that extensive and rich country. The Persian cavalry being dispersed, and the Grecian force in the pay of Persia, the largest to that time known in a foreign service, annihilated, even Memnon was at a loss for resources. His situation indeed, among the satraps, after losing the present support of his brother-in-law Artabazus, seems always to have abounded with difficulties. Apparently now he despaired of Æolia; no longer indeed important as a frontier country, for the victorious enemy was within the frontier. He hastened to Ionia, where his early presence might assist to lessen the impression of the news to arrive, and where his exertions might most contribute to check the conqueror's progress. The large satrapy of lower Phrygia, including Bithynia and Æolia, was by the death of Arsites so left without a chief capable of directing effectual resistance, that Alexander proceeded immediately to reward the merit of Callas, the general commanding his Thessalian horse, by appointing him to the office and dignity of its

Laconia, Bœotia, Acarnania, Thessaly and Macedonia, from their possessors the Lacons, Bœots, Acarnans, Thessals and Macedons. In more modern times England and France so obtained their present names. That longer form of those Grecian names which would indicate the people to have had them from the name of the country, instead of giving their name to the country, has been the produce of modern fashion only. Nevertheless many antient people have gained names from the

places they inhabited. Thus Peloponnesian became a collective name for all the various inhabitants of the peninsula of Peloponnesus. The names Spartiat, or Spartan, and Lacedæmonian, distinguished those Lacons who inhabited Sparta or Lacedæmon. The Dorians who obtained possession of Corinth were called Corinthians; and when Athens acquired renown, those previously called Attics took the name generally of their capital, and were called Athenians.

satrap.

satrap. Alexander's measures then were conciliating and politic. Numbers of the people had fled to the mountains: protection being promised, they returned to their houses: the Greeks of the town of Zeleia, who had acted with the enemy, he pardoned, as having been under compulsion: Dascylium, the capital of Bithynia, the favorite residence formerly of the satrap Pharnabazus, being held by a garrison, Parmenio was detached against it: the garrison withdrew on his approach, and the town submitted. The revenue of the province was then put in course to come into the king of Macedonia's treasury. In the adjoining satrapy of Lydia, including Ionia, still larger and richer, tho' it had lost its chief, Spithridates, yet a Persian governor, Mithranes, with a regular garrison, held the castle of Sardis, the capital. That fortress was both by nature and art of uncommon strength, and the city had, within its walls, a large population. The wealthy Lydians, indeed would desire to avoid war at their doors; perhaps careless whether a Persian or a Macedonian garrison held their castle, and whether their tribute went to Babylon or Pella; or perhaps they might rather desire a change of dominion. Even the satraps we have seen, as feudatory princes, often at war with the sovereign or his officers, and, in one remarkable instance, avowing a claim of right to defection: but the officer intrusted with the care of a fortress of singular importance and strength, with a competent military force, was in a different situation. Nevertheless Alexander, after marching from the Granicus through a great extent of country as in peace, was met, about seven miles from Sardis, by Mithranes, accompanied by the magistracy of the city, all together throwing themselves on his mercy and generosity. How Mithranes could excuse himself to his sovereign and country does not appear. Alexander, however, as policy would persuade, received him well and treated him with honor; and, pursuing still his father's liberal system, gratified the Lydians by granting to the whole kingdom its antient constitution and laws<sup>20</sup>.

Ch. 24, s. 5  
of this hist.

Arrived at Sardis, he ascended into the citadel. The strength of that fortress engaged his admiration. With any firmness of resistance it must either have delayed his farther progress most inconveniently, or made it very

<sup>20</sup> One cannot but here recollect, and to him a conduct directly tending to defeat recollecting admire, those writers, antient a politician's purposes, ill usage to those and modern, who would represent Philip who betrayed an important trust to serve as one of the deepest politicians the world him.  
ever saw, and yet do not scruple to impute

Ch. 2. s. 2.  
of this hist.

hazardous. Apparently felicitating himself on the easy acquisition, he resolved to build there a temple to Jupiter. He was looking for a situation, when a supervening thunder-shower fell, and with particular violence about the palace of the antient Lydian kings. This was esteemed to indicate the deity's preference of the spot, and he ordered the temple to be there erected. It may seem however little likely that a pupil of Aristotle, whose sublime conception of the one God, in whom all nature lives and moves and has its being, has been formerly noticed, would be very solicitous about the place where a cloud might drop, unless through a politic regard for the superstition of the many, who reckoned the air, in the division of portions of the world among their numerous deities, the particular seat of the reign of Jupiter.

The pressure however of matters of more serious importance allowed little leisure, in this great capital, for those of ceremony or amusement. With a rapidity beyond hope or foresight a great dominion had already been acquired behind the Grecian states; those states themselves remaining yet under the dominion of Persia, from which it was the professed object of the expedition to deliver them; an object now of increased importance, as, in an enemy's hands, they intercepted the communication with the Grecian sea. But this object presented no small difficulties, as in every one of those states was a party, in some a preponderant party, zealous for the Persian supremacy, and especially attached to the able and popular Memnon, to whom the king of Persia had committed the chief command over them. On the other hand, however, in every one also an opposing party was not less zealous in the cause of the Grecian confederacy, under Alexander; and especially in the two most important for wealth, population, and situation, Ephesus and Miletus, circumstances pressed for his immediate attention.

In Ephesus, the contention between an aristocratical or oligarchal (for historians rarely distinguish them) and a democratical party, had been recently violent. Ionia is, by the Grecian writers, often intitled a satrapy; but at this time, and indeed generally, Ionia was united with the Lydian satrapy. Tho it appears to have been the ordinary system of the Persian government liberally to allow the people under its extensive dominion to rule themselves in their own way, interfering only when its supremacy was threatened, yet commanders of provinces, looking, whether

to



to their own interest, or their opinion of public interest, might often contravene this system. In Ephesus, under Persian patronage, the aristocratical had been the ruling party. The publication of the late king of Macedonia, Philip's, declaration that he would himself pass into Asia, to deliver the Grecian cities there from Persian bondage, would of course excite fermentation of party politics. Assurance then arriving that a force under Parmenio, esteemed the ablest general of the age, had actually crossed the Hellespont, the democratical Ephesians rose and overpowered their opponents; and, while Demosthenes was endeavoring to persuade all Greece that Philip was the most odious and dreadful of tyrants, they erected a statue to him, as the great vindicator of freedom, the patron of democracy. As often happens however in such insurrections, they had illjudged their time. Memnon, then commanding in Eolia, at some hazard for that province, repairing to Ephesus, restored the superiority to the friends of the Persian supremacy. The statue of Philip then was overthrown, and the sepulchral monument erected in honor of Heropythus, leader of the democratical cause, who seems to have fallen in it, was demolished. No capital execution, no exile, no personal severity of any kind, appears to have followed against the defeated; but a body of Grecian mercenaries was left in garrison, for the security of the order of things now established. Memnon's policy, liberal at the same time and vigorous, might have been effectual for its purpose, but for the battle of the Granicus, and its consequences, Alexander's rapid march southward, the ready submission of the extensive Persian provinces in his way, and finally the surrender of Sardis. With these unexpected events hope rose as a meteor before the democratical party, and they became eager for a new revolution. The Grecian mercenaries of the garrison, whom report would reach of the fate, both of their fellows slain at the Granicus, and of those who survived, took alarm. Amyntas son of Antiochus, a Macedonian of regal descent, who had fled his country, suspected of treasonable practices against the reigning family, was residing at Ephesus under Persian protection. In concert with him, the Grecian mercenaries, they betraying their ingagement, he the hospitality afforded him, seized two triremes in the harbour of Ephesus, and deserted in them. Servile fear being thus removed from the many, no noble passion took its place, but democratical fury broke loose. Syrphax, a leader

of the aristocratical party, fled for refuge to the temple (that so celebrated of Diana, tho not named, seems implied in the historian's account) with his brother's children and his own son. Regardless of the sacredness of the asylum, the people dragged them out and stoned them to death. All who had been accessory to the invitation of Memnon, to the overthrowing of the statue of Philip, to the destruction of the monument of Heropythus, with the added imputation of spoliation of the temple, were then demanded for massacre, in the forms of democratical justice.

Information of these circumstances was hastened to Alexander, with solicitation from the triumphant party for his support in the superiority, which neither party could maintain without foreign patronage. The object was of such importance that he allowed himself only three days at Sardis to make arrangements for the government of the rich and extensive countries of which he was become the sovereign. The general direction, civil and military, in Lydia and all the appendant districts, which together had formed the satrapy of Spithridates, he committed to Asander son of Philotas ; <sup>21</sup> but the superintendence of the treasury and collection of taxes he made a separate department under Nicias ; and the custody of the citadel he made also a distinct command under Pausanias, one of the order of companions. It appears to have been in proposed indulgence to the people of Argos, who had distinguished themselves among the democratical republicans of Peloponnesus by zeal in favor both of his father and himself, and also as a mark of his confidence in them, that he left the Argians of his army for its garrison.

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 18.

With his diligence, one day fortunately sufficing for the march from Sardis, he arrived at Ephesus in time to command mercy. Of the fury of civil contest among republicans he had seen a disgusting amount at Thebes, when he had neither experience nor force to enable him to choose his measures. Knowing now, says the historian, that, in popular commotions, not the guilty only, not even party-opponents only suffer, but that private resentment, private avarice, all evil passions, finding opportunity of gratification, use it,

<sup>21</sup> We find all the Macedonian names addition of the father's and other progenitors' Greek ; and, as among the republics, and names. Philotas, father of Asander, could formerly among the Welsh, distinction of the not be the young friend of Alexander of that many of the same name was provided only by name, son of Parmenio.

he forbid farther severities, and he was obeyed. The antient democratical government was, under his sanction, established. The chiefs of the party, banished by the aristocratical party, were reinstated. A delicate question then occurred. A tribute had been assessed upon every Grecian city for the Persian treasury. When formerly delivered from the Persian yoke, as it has been commonly phrased, by the Athenians, or Laecdaemonians, a tribute still had been required for the Athenian or Lacedaemonian treasury; but on pretence of using it for the common good of Greece. Was then such tribute now to be still required for the benefit of the Grecian cause against the Persian? Alexander, wanting revenue much, nevertheless considered popularity as what his circumstances and views wanted yet more. The tribute apparently was not of oppressive amount, yet he would not take it for himself. The venerated temple of Diana at Ephesus was in such a state through age, that it had been in contemplation to rebuild it. Not remitting the tribute then, he directed that the sums formerly raised for the Persian king should in future be paid to the goddess. His conduct altogether was highly popular. Widely, says Arrian, as he earned favor and praise, he succeeded nowhere more completely than at Ephesus. Arrian, l. 1. c. 18.

The circumstances which produced the easy acquisition of that important city, and the judicious use of opportunities for popularity there, appear, after the battle of the Granicus, to have been principal leading steps to his great following fortune. Ephesus was the first Grecian city, southward of mount Ida, that embraced his party. After its example deputies now c. 19. arrived from Magnesia on the Mæander, and from Tralles, offering allegiance. Parmenio was dispatched, as the king's commissioner, to accept it, taking with him five thousand foot, and two hundred horse of the body of companions. The selection of so eminent a military man for an office nominally civil, and the amount of force committed to him, indicate that there were in those cities either strong parties in the Persian interest, or mercenary garrisons, supposed more faithful to their engagements than that of Ephesus. The friendly, however, on Parmenio's arrival made their offer good. Apparently information had been received of a similar disposition among the many Ionian cities northward, and also in those of Æolia which had not been formerly gained by Parmenio during his command there. A nearly equal force



force being sent in that direction, under a commander of far less note, Alcimalus son of Agathocles, so the example of Ephesus assisted the fame of Alexander's victory and liberality that this mission was also, without effort noticed by historians, completely successful. The proposal offered to the several states was simply to join the general confederacy of the Greek nation, decreed by the congress of Corinth; and, on a declaration of accession to this, a democratical constitution was warranted to all the cities, and exemption from tribute.

Within Ionia, Miletus alone now remained in connection with Persia; but Miletus was the most powerful of the Asiatic-Grecian cities, or second only to Ephesus. Its constitution was already democratical; yet such had been the politic liberality of the Persian supremacy, and such the popularity of Memnon's administration, that, little feeling the tribute assessed on their lands, the Milesians resolved to persevere in allegiance to the Persian king. Over-late, indeed, the Persian court had adopted that measure which so much assisted this determination, the appointment of Memnon to the chief command; yet which probably the Persian king, with all his despotism, might have been unable, for the opposition of his satraps, previously to manage. Memnon, on retiring from the Granicus, where so many fell, aware of the jealousy to which, as a foreigner, and especially as a Greek, he must be liable, had, for his first step, sent his wife and children to the capital, as pledges of his fidelity. Opportunity to use his services was much opened by the circumstances of the battle of the Granicus. Accordingly the liberal and well-judging monarch, consideration of the long and able and faithful services of his brother Mentor probably assisting the determination, sent him a commission to command in chief along the whole of the Asiatic coast of the empire; and directed the commanders of a fleet, said to have been of four hundred triremes, whose crews would be not less than a hundred thousand men, to coöperate with him.

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 21.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 23.

Meanwhile Alexander, with a conquered continent behind him, having again reached the Ægean sea, the coöperation of his fleet would be important, and it was accordingly ordered to join him. Hastening arrangements then at Ephesus, he concluded them with a magnificent sacrifice to Diana, all his troops present marching in the procession, armed and formed as for battle. On the following day he moved for

Miletus. That city, in the peace long enjoyed, under liberal protection of the Persian government, had so flourished by commerce, that, confident in the continuance of that protection, its increased population had raised a new town, beyond its antient walls, with little care of fortification for it. On Alexander's approach this was evacuated by the Milesians and was presently occupied by his troops. His fleet of a hundred and sixty triremes had already entered the bay. In the island Ladë, which commanded the approach by sea to the city <sup>22</sup>, four thousand men from the army were placed. The very superior fleet of Persia arrived three days after. Its commanders, apparently surprized to find approach to the city precluded, withdrew to the neighbouring roadstead of Mycale, but returned next day and offered battle. This however the Macedonian admiral prudently declined. Concurring accounts show Alexander's understanding, both for extent and quickness, extraordinary, and the amount of his experience, both in military and political business, was such as few besides ever had at his years; yet it may be thought that Arrian has strained compliment a little, imputing rash counsel to the veteran Parmenio, esteemed by Philip the ablest military commander of his age, that he might attribute to the youthful king the sober prudence which corrected it. Parmenio, he says, urged for engaging the Persian fleet: Alexander refused to allow it; and the reasoning ascribed to him seems clearly good. Arrian shows himself continually so scrupulous of asserting, without respectable authority, that it seems due to him to suppose he had respectable authority here; yet in the sequel of the history ground may appear for suspecting that his authority was from those unfriendly to Parmenio.

The siege of Miletus, without delay begun, was prosecuted with the best art of a cultivated age. Battering machines, large and weighty, brought by the fleet, were advanced against the walls. The Persian fleet repeatedly gave opportunity for battle, would the Grecian come out of the harbour, but showed no disposition to attack it there. The troops and people in the town thus seeing all effectual attempt for their relief declined by so great a force, on which they had much depended, began to despair of means to support the contest. Having consulted therefore about a capitulation, they sent to Alexander a proposal of neutrality, offering their port

<sup>22</sup> It has formerly occurred for notice that what was then the bay of Miletus has now been, for some centuries, a marsh, and Ladë a hill in it. Ch. 7. s. 2. of this history.

to be open to the ships, and their town to the troops, of both the belligerent powers. This being refused, with improvident valor, and a fidelity which does honor hardly less to the Persian government which inspired it, than to themselves, much perhaps being due particularly to Memnon, but surely much also to the government which selected and authorized such an agent, they resolved to brave all chances. Their walls however did not long withstand the power of Alexander's machines, directed by the skill of his engineers. A breach was made, by which the Macedonian forces entered. The small body of regular soldiers of the garrison, and the Milesian armed people, quickly overpowered, sought safety by flight. Many got aboard the vessels in the harbour; but so watched by the Macedonian fleet that all were taken. Many, meanwhile, weak to resist, and without opportunity to fly, were killed; quarter, in the sack of a fortified place, being little in the practice of the age. About three hundred of the regular soldiers, throwing themselves into the sea, and using their large shields as rafts, to support them with their armour, passed to a small island, near the town, whose rocky cliffs were as walls, and there prepared to defend themselves. Alexander directed attack upon them; but, being informed they were all Greeks, and giving them credit, says the historian, for their faithful and courageous adherence to the service to which they had pledged themselves, not without example, through a long course of years, warranted at different times by the legislatures of all the principal republics of the nation, he sent to offer them quarter, on condition of renouncing the Persian, and entering into his service. The great Persian fleet was at anchor within their sight, without the least manifestation of a purpose to move. Hopeless therefore of relief they yielded on the terms offered. Nothing then remaining hostile within Miletus or its territory, Alexander admitted all the surviving people to his friendship, and placed the Milesian state, with its old constitution and laws, (so much the expressions of both the historians appear to indicate) upon the same footing of immunity and freedom as all other Grecian states, which had acceded to the general confederacy of the nation under his supremacy<sup>23</sup>.

It

<sup>23</sup> Τοῖς Μιλησίοις Φιλανθρώπως προσήνεχθη. Diod. l. 17. c. 22. Τοὺς Μιλησίου ἀφῆκε, καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἐδῶκε. Arrian l. 1. c.

Diodorus has evidently followed good authorities for much of the history of Alexander. But for his great compilation, when books,



It has occurred formerly to observe, in many examples, how ill the ships of war of the antient construction, tho a construction admirably adapted to the antient mode of naval action, could keep the sea. A harbour ready, and supplies from land, almost daily, were indispensable for them. A fleet thus was liable to annoyance from an army; and as Alexander's fleet could not cope with the very superior force of the Persian, manned with Phenicians and Cypriots, mariners equal to any of the Mediterranean, his next measure was to use his army against it. Stationing a considerable force, foot and horse, in situations to command landing-places and prevent watering, he so distressed that overbearing fleet that it left the road of Mycale, and took its station at the neighboring Greek island of Samos. Battle was again offered to Alexander's fleet, which, however, would not quit its secure port. An attack was then made upon a part of it; but this so failed that five ships were lost, and soon after the great Persian fleet finally quitted the coast.

Alexander's successes, now obtained, were far beyond all previous rational calculation. Yet, tho the rich provinces of Lower Phrygia and Lydia were conquered, and all the commercial republics of the coast, from the Propontis to the border of Caria, brought to coalition with the Grecian confederacy, Alexander found himself wanting means to maintain the very moderate forces of land and sea with which his conquests had been made; so scanty were the resources with which he had engaged in his great undertaking. A council was called to consider the difficulty, and it was put in question whether further service of the fleet might not be dispensed with, and the expense of its maintenance saved. The Persian fleet was clearly too powerful to

books being only in writing, were of course dear, and extensive libraries few, the labor always, the difficulty often, and the impossibility perhaps sometimes, of reaching the authorities to be desired, may account for, and even excuse, many of the obvious defects in his work. He makes the great body of his hundred thousand men, engaged at the Granicus on the Persian side, retreat to Miletus, and there he places Memnon and many satraps, or Persians of great eminence, during the siege. Arrian makes no mention of

Memnon there, or of any Persians of any degree. On the contrary his account clearly implies that Memnon was elsewhere, and that no Persians, or none in any authority, were there. It may suffice to consider the relative situations of the Granicus and Miletus, and the circumstances of Miletus and of the intervening country, to be aware that Arrian's is not more the most authoritative account than the most probable, and indeed that Diodorus's is utterly improbable.

be prudently met by any that Alexander had means to raise. Naval war therefore was not desirable for him. Moreover the enemy themselves had, for the present at least, abandoned it, having quitted the neighbouring seas, and evidently for a cause which would prevent their ready return to any purpose; they had not a port in the Ægean, or near it, where they could find supplies, or perhaps be assured even of necessary shelter. On this consideration the council determined that the fleet, reserving only what might be wanted for the convoy of weighty machines for sieges, should be sent home and laid up.

Alexander's poverty, after all his recent acquisitions, being thus manifest, it may be wondered rather what could have been Philip's plan, when, with his large experience, he at length resolved upon war in Asia, than that he so long bore unmoved the solicitations and remonstrances in which, among his friends in the Grecian republics, Isocrates probably was not singular. Perhaps, after long and careful circumspection, satisfied not only that Isocrates justly reckoned peace between the republics otherwise impossible, but, farther, that quiet for Macedonia itself must be precarious when the republics were in tumult, he chose war in Asia as least among hazards and evils, as well as most promising positive benefits. It may well then be supposed that Philip's mature age would have hazarded less than Alexander's youthful ardor; that he would not have afforded opportunity for the measures advised, tho in vain, by Memnon, for the destruction of his army or the ruin of his enterprize; that on the contrary, he would, like Agesilaus before him, have secured the friendship and coöperation of all the Grecian settlements on the coast, before he would have proceeded to the interior of Phrygia and Lydia.

Nevertheless the success, which attended the boldness of Alexander's measures, may tend both to warrant the advice of Isocrates, and to justify those Macedonians who, in council, may have assented to the plan followed by their youthful king. With the satrapies of Phrygia and Lydia conquered, and all the Grecian settlements of the Asiatic shore of the Ægean, as far as Caria, brought to alliance, much of the summer yet remained. To Caria Memnon had withdrawn, with his new commission, intended to give him authority widely over a country then no longer in the grantor's power. With the loss of provinces to the Persian empire probably  
the

the supplies failed, to which the court had trusted for making Memnon's new authority effectual. Unable however to attempt the recovery of what was lost, the defence of what remained to his sovereign, within the wide district committed to him, became Memnon's care. But even there difficulties had been prepared for him, and advantages for his opponent, by those whose interest as well as duty should have made them his best supporters.

## SECTION IV.

*Constitutions of Asiatic States: Circumstances of Caria: Ada Queen of Caria: Difficulties of Memnon: Siege of Halicarnassus.*

IT is largely indicated, by antient writers, that much of the character of the political constitution, described by Homer, was preserved, not only in the European principalities northward of the Grecian republics, but also extensively in Lesser Asia, and through Syria to the borders of Arabia; even Palestine, with all the peculiarities of the Jewish institutions, not forming an exception. That country, with a system of law more perfect and better defined than any other known of the early ages, appears to have remained almost without a constitution, civil or military; till at length the people, suffering under the misrule of their chief magistrates, intitled judges, concurred in desiring a hereditary monarchy, such as that under which they saw neighbouring nations quieter through civil, and more powerful through military order. This we have observed to have been not an uncommon resource of the Grecian republics, in similar circumstances. With authority then, necessary for the desired purposes, committed to the king, the law, by which his conduct should be regulated, remained as before; and, however the authority may have been abused, the law, we find, more held its force in antient Palestine than in some modern European states. Everywhere private interest must occasionally yield to public good. In the Britannic empire an act of the concurring branches of the legislature is required to warrant any interference with private rights on the public account. In France formerly a simple command of the king sufficed for taking any man's land, at its estimated worth, for public purposes. In the kingdom of Naples, and perhaps some other European states, the

Samuel, b. 1.  
c. 8.



Kings, b. i.  
c. 21.

Ch. 43. s. 1.  
of this hist.

king, paying only the price set by his own officers, might take any man's land for his own use or pleasure. Under the Jewish law private property was so much better assured, that even the tyrant Ahab could not so take Naboth's vineyard; even the daring wickedness of his wife would not so venture upon an open breach of the right of an individual. The authentic history of those persons, indeed, remarkably illustrates the state and condition of both governments and people under that constitution which prevailed so extensively in the early ages; a king, without a legislature, ruling under established law, and arms in the hands of the people forming the sanction of the law. Here then appears the reason of that general satisfaction of the western Asiatics with their governments, remarked by Aristotle, whence civil troubles, so ordinary in Greece, were, among them rare. The establishment of hereditary right prevented that contest for supremacy which was continually lacerating the Greek republics; and arms in the hands of the people, tho not providing such regular security for individuals as a legislature, mediating between king and people, may insure, yet, by giving importance to the people in body, deterred extensive oppression.

Arrian.

Herodotus informs us that the antient Lydian law nearly resembled that ordinary in Greece; thus indicating that private rights were assured by the law in Lydia, under a hereditary monarch, nearly as in Greece under yearly magistrates. But the people of Lydia, an inland country, had not maintained their liberties against the despotism of Persian satraps equally with the Asiatic Greeks, who, with other advantages, had those of maritime situation; and thence Alexander had the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the Lydians by restoring their antient constitution. When the great Cyrus compelled all Lesser Asia to acknowledge his supreme dominion, it seems likely that Caria had a politic prince, who obtained favorable terms. Caria continued, to the time with which we are engaged, to be governed by its hereditary native sovereigns, tho owing homage to the Persian crown. The people were reckoned, by the republican Greeks, among barbarians; yet their character was good among surrounding nations; their government was orderly, and both their language and their religion appear to have been very nearly Grecian. On a fine harbour of their coast arose the Grecian city of Halicarnassus; which, among the Grecian cities of

Lesser

Lesser Asia, yielded in population and wealth, if to Miletus and Ephesus, to them only. It became the capital of the Carian princes, and yet its Grecian quality appears never to have been disputed. On the contrary, men of whom Greece was proud were among its natives; two, of distant ages, being of the first rank among historians, Herodotus and Dionysius. The princely family seems to have been generally popular in its own country, and respected abroad; frequently holding alliance with the leading Grecian republics, and at the same time maintaining its estimation among the vassals of the Persian empire. Marriage between brothers and sisters, esteemed at Athens creditable, was so also in Caria; the princely family commonly married within itself; and an extraordinary order of succession had favor there, recommended, according to Arrian, by the popularity of the renowned Semiramis, of very early times, queen of Assyria; the widowed queen succeeded her husband. Twice already we have had occasion to observe the widows of deceased princes filling the throne of Caria; the heroine Artemisia, who fought under Xerxes, and another Artemisia, who erected, in honor of her deceased husband and brother, Mausolus, that sepulchral monument, which, for its magnificence reckoned among the seven wonders of the world, has furnished a title in all European languages for sepulchral monuments of superior splendor.

Ch. 8. s. 5.  
& ch. 38. s. 5.  
of this hist.

Strab. l. 14.  
p. 656,  
vel 969,  
ed. Casaub.

The second Artemisia was succeeded in the Carian throne by her husband's brother and her own, Hidricus. He had married his and their sister, Ada, who, on his demise, claimed the succession. But an eminent Persian, Orontobates, had married the daughter of Pexodorus, a third brother; and, having perhaps opportunity, at the distant court, to represent both Carian laws, and facts in Caria, otherwise than as they were, he obtained a grant of the principality for his father-in-law and himself. Ada, resisting as far as she was able, maintained herself in one strong place, Alinda: of the rest of the country Pexodorus and Orontobates gained possession.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 69, & 74.  
& l. 17. c. 24.  
Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 24.

Alexander appears to have owed his already great success hardly more to the excellence of the military force, from the private soldier up to the chief generals, prepared by his father, than to the liberal system of policy, equally prepared by his father, and with remarkable stediness, pursued

pursued by himself. The constitution of Lydia, perhaps little touched by the great conqueror, Cyrus, had been overwhelmed by the military despotism afterward committed to, or assumed by, the satraps. Thus, in modern Europe, the constitution of the kingdom of Naples, especially of the island of Sicily, derived from the Norman conquerors, and considerably resembling the antient Norman and the English, was overwhelmed by a military despotism in the hands of the viceroys, whom the courts of Madrid and Vienna, prevailing alternately in their claims to the succession, sent to govern those beautiful, naturally rich, and eminently unfortunate countries; that constitution always holding existence, tho' sickly, weak and inefficacious. The Lydians therefore, rejoicing in the restoration of just vigor to the overborne antient laws of the country, might also not unreasonably hope that, should griefs in future arise, their complaints might more readily and effectually reach a sovereign of Grecian manners, residing at Pella, than one hardly visible but to eunuchs, in some one of his several capitals beyond the great desert.

These advantages of Alexander made difficulties for Memnon. Sardis, apparently, after the loss of the battle of the Granicus, should have been the rallying point for the Persians. But the fall of so many men in the highest commands, especially of Spithridates and Arsites, seems to have paralysed the Persian administration throughout the country; and this, if anything, might excuse the officer who surrendered the citadel of Sardis. Very possibly, without prospect of succour from any quarter, he could not command his own garrison. The support of the Persian cause seems to have devolved upon the foreiner, Memnon; even before the new commission, extending his powers, reached him; and his means appear to have been limited to the mercenary force that he could himself raise and maintain, with only an uncertain interest in some of the Grecian cities. In Ephesus that interest had failed: in Miletus it had been overborne by arms.

But in Halicarnassus it still prevailed. The Carians were, like the modern Swiss, much in the habit of hiring themselves for military service to any power; according to Strabo, the mercenary force entertained among the republics of Greece itself was composed commonly in large proportion, of Carians. If then Memnon could maintain himself in Caria through

Strab.

the



the approaching winter, support from the center of the empire might reach him before spring; and, with Caria left behind hostile, Alexander's progress eastward, should he attempt it, would be highly hazardous.

But with a military command now wide, Memnon's pecuniary means remained evidently narrow. In Caria the civil government rested with Orontobates; the people were attached to Ada. However then Memnon, for his sovereign's interest, might have desired to favor Ada, for his sovereign's interest and his own it was imperious upon him to be well with Orontobates. Circumstances thus invited Alexander to that country; they required speed, and he did not delay. On his way Ada met him: she Diod. l. 17. ceremoniously adopted him as her son, and he accepted the title. Then C. 24. she surrendered to him her strong fortress of Alinda; and through her Strab. l. 14. example and her influence, supported by the fame and the presence of Arrian, l. 1. his army, she procured that his march of near a hundred miles across Caria should be as through a friendly country; the towns on all sides offering submission, or yielding on the first summons.

Memnon, meanwhile, aware of his disadvantages, had drawn together Arrian, l. 1. all his strength within the walls of Halicarnassus. That city Alexander C. 21. prepared immediately to besiege. It was strong by local circumstances; and, to the fortifications carefully raised by the wealthy princes of Caria, Memnon had made such additions as the improved science of his age recommended. Greeks, or regular soldiers trained in the Grecian discipline, were numerous in the garrison; Persians, or Persian subjects, not Greeks, were also numerous; and there were many ships of war in the harbour, whose coöperation might be important. Under all circumstances it seems to have been matter of no ready decision, for the invader, how and where to begin attack upon the place. But, on the northern side of the peninsula, on whose southern shore Halicarnassus stood, was the seaport town of Myndus. A party there, restrained from following openly the general propensity of the Carian people, sent private communication to Alexander, promising to open a gate to him if he would come by night. The possession of Myndus was thought so important toward the acquisition of Halicarnassus, that he went himself, with a strong body: but on his arrival at the appointed gate all was close, without a symptom of any stir in his favor. Having depended upon the concerted admission, he was  
unprovided

unprovided even with scaling-ladders; yet, unwilling to return with nothing done, and hoping still for some coöperation within on his showing himself with a powerful force without, the soldiers of his phalanx were set to undermine a tower of the wall, and they brought it to the ground. But it appeared that secrecy had not been duly observed by the favoring party. Not only its measures were watched and their efficacy obviated, but such communication had been made to Memnon in Halicarnassus, that assistance was sent by sea, which, with the first daylight, was seen arriving. At the same time it was found that the enemy had defences behind the ruined tower, so that its fall did not make a practicable opening. Circumstances thus admonishing, Alexander prudently returned without delay to the greater object, Halicarnassus.

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 22.

That city was surrounded with a ditch, according to Arrian, thirty cubits wide and fifteen deep. Before engines could be brought against the wall, therefore, the ditch must be filled; a work of great labor and danger, under interruption from the enemy's weapons, discharged from above in safety and leisure. It was nevertheless accomplished. Moveable towers, to protect the besiegers, and engines, both for battering the walls and for throwing weapons, were then advanced. The garrison sallied to destroy them, but were repulsed, and the action was made remarkable by the death of a prince of the royal family of Macedonia, Neoptolemus, who fell fighting on the Persian side<sup>24</sup>. Miners being then employed, together with the battering engines, two towers, and the wall between them, were reduced to ruins. The garrison, issuing, set fire to the sheds of the besiegers, and to the brushwood used in the approaches, and they destroyed some of the machines; but they were repulsed before they could complete their purpose. Diodorus mentions two Athenians, Ephialtes and Thrasylbulus, as eminent among the officers of the garrison; and relates of them, probably following some Athenian writer, what adds to the various demonstrations occurring of the principles and temper of the party of Demosthenes. Some bodies of Macedonians killed having fallen into the power of the garrison, Alexander, by a herald, with the usual

<sup>24</sup> This remarkable circumstance is distinctly stated by Arrian. Diodorus speaks of Neoptolemus as holding high rank in the Macedonian army; apparently through mis-

take, to which a writer must be more liable in his large and multifarious collection than in Arrian's simple narrative.

formalities,

formalities, desired them for burial. Ephialtes and Thrasybulus opposed the request: Memnon however granted it. In a following sally the contest was sharp. On the Macedonian side Ptolemy, one of the lords of the body-guard, Clearchus, the commanding general of the bowmen, and some other officers of distinction, were killed. The garrison nevertheless being at length overcome, were pursued so closely that the town might have been taken, if, to obviate the promiscuous slaughter and destruction, not to be prevented in storming a populous city, Alexander had not commanded retreat. Among the Halicarnassian people a party was friendly to him, and it seems to have been the strength of that party which impelled Memnon and Orontobates to their quickly following measure: despairing of means to hold the town, they withdrew their troops by night; and, to prevent the enemy's immediate entrance and communication with the party which favored him, they set fire to their own machines and works of timber at the breach. The flames, probably beyond their intention, communicated to the nearest houses, and extended widely. Alexander, informed by some of the townsmen that the garrison was withdrawn, directed that, in taking possession, injury to the remaining peaceful inhabitants should be avoided. Part of the force retiring from the city strengthened the garrison in the castle: the rest passed to the Greek island of Cos<sup>25</sup>, where an administration friendly to Persia prevailed.

The castle of Halicarnassus, strong by situation, diligently fortified by art, and well provided, might still sustain a long siege. But, as it could not contain a numerous garrison, and little danger would ensue to acquisitions already made from leaving it in the enemy's hands, Alexander proceeded to other objects which more pressingly required attention.

<sup>25</sup> Ἀυτὸς δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἑδαφος κατασκάψας αὐτῆς τε ταύτης, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Καρίας φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπὼν. κ. τ. ε. The writer of the ancient universal history has understood the city destroyed to have been Tralles, in which I think him clearly wrong, tho the passage in Arrian, as applicable to Halicarnassus, is

far from satisfactory. Diodorus however affirms distinctly that Alexander destroyed Halicarnassus, and from him it appears that the neighbouring island, which Arrian has described only as the island, without a name, was that of Cos. Arrian l. 1. c. 24. Diod. l. 17. c. 27.



## CHAPTER XLVII.

ALEXANDER'S Winter Campaign in ASIA, and Measures of the  
 PERSIAN Armament under MEMNON against GREECE.

## SECTION I.

*Financial Difficulties of Alexander: Winter Measures: Lycia subdued.  
 A Plot against Alexander.*

WITH extensive dominion acquired, and great political influence attending it, the expenses incurred, and those which present circumstances and purposes demanded, appear to have exceeded the acquired means. The increase from Phrygia and Lydia probably was considerable; but from the Grecian territories hardly any, and from Caria little. The policy by which Alexander held the voluntary allegiance of the Asiatic Greeks, and obviated the necessity of multiplying garrisons which he could not maintain, made the utmost caution and delicacy in requiring pecuniary aid from them, if not even a total abstinence from the attempt, necessary. But he could not hope to hold his conquests, so rapidly made, without being prepared against powerful efforts of the great empire of Persia to recover them. His army therefore must be not only maintained, but recruited and increased: and means for its maintenance, which Macedonia could not, and the republican Greek states would not furnish, must be sought in the conquered countries. If then the revenue of these was considerable, it seems yet highly probable that the management of it was both unskilful and improvident. The unexpected early departure of the Persian fleet had indeed afforded opportunity, tho' not without hazard, and hardly without inconvenience, for sparing the attendance of the Macedonian. But that powerful fleet, it must be supposed, would return in spring; and what, under the direction of such an officer as Memnon, might insue in the extensive field  
 for

for naval operations, the Asiatic-Grecian towns, the Ægean islands, and the maritime republics of Greece itself, must be matter for most serious consideration.

Altogether it appears likely that, to keep what he had acquired, the best policy for Alexander was to proceed to further conquest. His attention then seems to have been judiciously directed to obviate the inconvenience of his naval inferiority, by using immediately, regardless of season, his superiority by land for depriving the enemy, the most extensively that might be, of means for the shelter and refreshment indispensable for antient navies; while, at the same time, he might extend his dominion over provinces, left without adequate means of resistance, whence revenue might be drawn. If then he might so extend it as to make the river Halys his frontier, which is said to have been the object of Agesilaus, but still more, if he could carry conquest to the chain of mountains of Taurus and Caucasus, which separate the lesser, or that called by the Greeks the Lower, or the Hither, from the Upper, or the Farther Asia, he might make the defence of the wider easier than that of the narrower conquest.

These being important considerations, it quite suited Alexander's temper to resolve that winter should not be for him, as in the ordinary course of Grecian military service, a season of rest. Unsparing of himself, he seems however to have been strongly disposed to be considerate of others. To his army he would allow, as far as the important services in view would permit, the usual winter indulgencies. In selecting then for leave to go home, he preferred the newly married, of all ranks, who had left wives there. Three general officers, coming under the description, Ptolemy, a lord of the body-guard, son of Seleucus, Cœnus son of Polemocrates, and Meleager son of Neoptolemus, commanded the march. This arrangement was very generally satisfactory and gratifying. At the same time future purposes were promoted by giving every one, of those thus indulged, authority to ingage recruits, in any number, to accompany his return to the army in spring.

Alexander then rewarded together the princess Ada's services, and the ready loyalty of the Carian people, by committing to her the princely dignity and authority, and confirming to them their antient political constitution. In that constitution, hardly further made known to us, merit is

implied by intimations remaining of the satisfaction of the people with their government, and of the general quiet of the country, during ages, while the princes were famed for riches and splendor ; creditable all to the benignity of the Persian supremacy, to which all had been subject.

In arranging command for the military measures in view, Alexander took himself that of greater fatigue and privation, for which youthful vigor might be requisite, the expedition for reducing the seaport towns of the mountainous shore, stretching from Caria eastward. To the veteran Parmenio he committed the quieter business, but of extensive and critical trust, to superintend the communication with Macedonia and Greece, and the affairs of all the acquisitions in Asia. Sparing then his new subjects of Lydia, who had so readily transferred their allegiance to him, he required of Parmenio to raise, in the countries yet subject to Persia, contributions in money as well as in provisions for the subsistence of his forces. Cavalry in the country through which he proposed himself to lead, would be difficult to maintain, and, comparatively little useful. Selecting therefore only a small body of the fittest for the difficult service, he committed the rest to Parmenio, together with the battering engines, and whatever could be any way spared that might inconveniently impede progress in a mountainous country.

Marching then with his chosen troops, he found that the fame of his successes and his liberality had very advantageously prepared his way. Within Caria, on the border of Lycia, the strong town of Hyparna was yet held for the Persian king. The townsmen, after the example of the rest of the country and of their princess Ada, seem to have been ready to change their allegiance, but were restrained by a garrison of mercenaries ; a term always implying troops trained in the Grecian discipline ; and, if not all, yet partly Greeks, and under officers mostly Grecian. Alexander offered these leave for free departure, which was accepted, and he became master of the place without a blow. Entering Lycia then, four principal towns of the more mountainous western part, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, and Patara, readily submitted, and thirty smaller towns presently followed the example. The eastern, called Lower Lycia, a more level country, afforded less natural advantages for defence ; yet, midwinter already advancing, the people appear to have reckoned upon time to chuse their measures. Alexander, however, continuing his march, deputies from Phaselis, the principal city of that  
part,



part, met him, with a present of a golden crown, and solicitation for his friendship; and his favorable acceptance of their submission encouraging, similar addresses followed soon from all the country.

The gratification of this flow of prosperity was here checked by intelligence of matter very unpleasant in itself, yet still attended with very fortunate circumstances. Arr. l. 1, c. 26. Parmenio, proceeding according to the concerted plan, by Sardis into Phrygia, found no such opposition as to engage the notice of historians. The satrap Atizyes, neither by an army under his command, nor by any attachment of the Phrygian people to the Persian government, inabled to make any effectual resistance, had nevertheless entertained hopes from other circumstances. The Macedonian prince Amyntas, son of Antiochus, on withdrawing from Ephesus, as formerly related, had proceeded to the Persian court, where he was favorably entertained. Ch. 46, s. 3, of this hist. Asisines, a Persian of high rank, on a mission from the court to the satrap of Phrygia, was arrested by a Macedonian party; and being examined, it was discovered that Amyntas held communication with his kinsman, Alexander son of Aëropus, called the Lyncestian, formerly implicated with him in treasonable practices against the reigning king Alexander, but now serving Ch. 44, s. 1, of this hist. under Parmenio in the important command of the Thessalian horse. Circumstances further indicated that a plot was in agitation for assassinating the king, and, with the Persian monarch's promised assistance, placing the son of Aëropus on the Macedonian throne. Parmenio, with information of what had been discovered, sent Asisines in custody to the Macedonian head-quarters. A council was held for his examination, and his evidence is said by Arrian to have been strong in proof of the Lyncestian's guilt. The unanimous opinion of the council however was declared, that he ought to be immediately removed from his command; and Arrian adds that it was freely observed to the king, by some of the members, that he had been imprudent in intrusting the best and most powerful cavalry of the army to one whose fidelity was so reasonably to be doubted.

Throughout Arrian's account of this alledged treason there is observable a character of caution, and solicitude to avoid assertion beyond warrant, widely different from the commonly bold manner of Diodorus, and Plutarch, in relating similar dark transactions; and perhaps not the less reasonably satisfactory for the superstition, in harmony enough with what is ordinary  
with

with those writers, blended with it. The only stated evidence of the treason, that would be admitted in our courts, was the confession of Asisines, in a private examination. or what those present at that examination asserted him to have made ; but this was corroborated, for antient minds, by recollection of a previous prodigy. Alexander, while engaged in the siege of Halicarnassus, taking his rest during the midday-heat, a swallow fluttered about his head, twittering with peculiar earnestness ; and tho, with his hand, he endeavoured to drive away the disturbing animal, it would not leave him till he was completely awakened. This was thought so far out of the common course of nature that the soothsayer, Aristander of Telmissus was consulted upon it : and he declared it to be a divine admonition, importing that treason against the king was preparing by some person in habits of friendship with him. Suspicion is said to have been then entertained of the son of Aëropus ; but Alexander would give no credit to it on such ground, and the matter passed. It is then not undeserving of observation that a man of Arrian's rank, education, and practice in affairs, civil and military, in the enlightened age of Adrian and the Antonines, speaks of that portent, and the seer's interpretation, as if he concurred with those with whom, he says, it had much weight at the time, and was reckoned to afford important confirmation to the deposition of Asisines.

The Macedonian constitution, we have seen, allowed judgement, in capital cases, at home only to a popular tribunal, and, on military service, to the army at large ; and it seems evident that the testimony against the son of Aëropus was not such that it could be prudent to bring him before such tribunals. But what security the Macedonian law gave against arbitrary imprisonment we have no information. In every regular government, even the most jealous of liberty, it has been found necessary, for public safety, to allow somewhere, and under some restrictions, the power of imprisonment at discretion ; and, if in no government of antiquity, made known to us, this power has been under good regulation, we must not condemn the Macedonian if it did not provide security for the subject equal to what is peculiar to our own. That the appointment of the son of Aëropus to the command of the Thessalian cavalry had excited extensive disgust in the army is positively said by Arrian ; who also shows that he was  
upon

upon no good terms with Parmenio, under whose command he had been placed. It seems likely that he had conducted himself haughtily to the officers generally; among whom a large party evidently was adverse to him. But the body under his particular command was supposed attached to him; and this, according to Arrian, occasioned the course taken with him, which is, in more than one view, remarkable. A confidential officer, Amphoterus, brother of a favorite general, Craterus, was sent in the disguise of an Asiatic dress, bearing no written orders, it being deemed unsafe, says the historian, to send anything in writing on the subject, but; by oral communication only, authorizing Parmenio to arrest the son of Aëropus. This was quietly executed, and so the matter, for the time, rested; and, whether or no the purpose of treason was proved, or any reasonable presumption of it established, it appears evident that the appointment of the accused to the highly confidential command which he had held, had been made in a youthful spirit of generosity, with too little consideration of circumstances; and that his removal from it was, in no small degree, necessary to the satisfaction of many principal officers, and the general quiet of the service.

This anxious business being so far settled, Alexander proceeded in the execution of his plan for depriving the enemy of means for maintaining a fleet in any part of the coast where it could be formidable. In advancing eastward, a chain of mountains was to be passed, the boundary of Lycia; the first important town beyond them was Perga, in Pamphylia. The way over the highlands was very rugged and inconvenient. A better road, but much more circuitous, by the shore, where the mountain meets the sea, was dangerous; and sometimes, when a southerly wind blew, impracticable. The wind at the time was southerly; yet Alexander, after all inquiry made, sending the lighter troops, under guides, over the mountains, would himself lead the heavy-armed the readier tho hazardous way. Against the sea was a lofty cliff called the Ladder, and it happened that, before he arrived there, the wind shifted to the north, so that the waves, being driven from the shore, he passed safely, none wading above the middle. This incident is said by Arrian to have been noticed at the time by Alexander himself, as importing divine favor to his enterprize; an observation, perhaps, more of policy than of presumption. But among  
his

Arr. l. 1,  
c. 27.



Plut. Alex.  
p. 673, 674.

his fervent partizans in Greece, as Plutarch informs us, the story was made quite miraculous ; whence their adversaries, with incitement, had opportunity to turn it to ridicule. The celebrated Menander in one of his comedies introduced the exclamation, ‘ what an Alexandrian story ! If he wants ‘ to pass the sea he has only to command, ‘ Let there be a dry road for me.” The biographer however adds, that a letter of Alexander’s was in his time extant, describing the passage of the Ladder, and felicitating himself on his good fortune there, but not at all imputing it to anything beyond the common course of nature. This information, not contradicting Arrian’s report, is valuable, both as testimony to Alexander’s character, and as showing what circumspection is requisite in estimating both the truth of the wonderful, and the justness of the satirical, among the works of the antients. But whatever Alexander’s faith may have been, or whatever his words, the circumstances of the passage of the Ladder, as they are concurrently related, would be likely to diffuse, or establish, among his troops, the belief or the hope that, wherever he led they would be successful.

## SECTION II.

*Character of the Country and People of the Interior of Lesser Asia. Pamphylia subdued. Progress of Alexander in Phrygia. Circumstances threatening to Alexander. Pisidia subdued.*

THE ridge of Taurus, the longest and loftiest range of mountains of the old world, divides the peninsula of the Lesser Asia into two unequal parts. Arr. l. 5. c. 5. From the promontory of Mycale, against the Ægean sea, it stretches eastward to the border of Syria ; then shooting branches, southward to the Mediterranean, northward to the Euxine, it forms a complete barrier for the peninsula against the Greater Asia. The main body of the mountains proceeds north-eastward, beyond the Caspian, dividing Mesopotamia from Armenia and adjoining countries. From the long but narrow country which it leaves against the Mediterranean, comprizing Lycia, Pamphylia and Cilicia, its lofty and rugged range makes communication with Phrygia, and other parts northward, everywhere difficult.

The character of the people of the western coast of this great peninsula, occupied, in Homer’s account, by communities at least as civilized as any  
then

Europe, and afterward extensively colonized from Greece, has already been much under our observation: among them arose some of the principal fathers of philosophy and the fine arts. The widely different character of some of the people of the interior has occurred also for notice, after the information of Xenophon, who traversed it with the army under the younger Cyrus, between sixty and seventy years before Alexander. This character, it appears, was maintained in the age of the historian Diodorus and the geographer Strabo, three hundred years after Alexander; an age among those most affording opportunity for wide information of the state of nations; when peace was established for the world, in singular extent, by Augustus Cæsar. The same character is imputed to the same people by Arrian, who was born and mostly lived in that great peninsula, about a century and a half later, while the Roman empire still retained its highest power; and according to all accounts of modern travellers, the same character remains in the same fine country under the Turkish empire, little altered to this day. The people who held the extensive plainer regions, the Lydians, Phrygians, and Carians, are described by ancient writers as peaceful and orderly. But those of the highlands, like the Scottish formerly, living in arms, were in a state of ceaseless war; among one another, for wrath; against their fellow-subjects of the plains for plunder; the superintending government sometimes interfering to check, but never so as to suppress, the lawless course.

The Isaurians, between Phrygia and Pamphylia, to the geographer's age, were all robbers; and so expert in arms, and holding such fastnesses, that it was matter of triumph and the assumption of a new title, for a Roman consul, at the time of the greatest power of the Roman commonwealth, to subdue them. The Pisidians, westward of Isauria, were of similar character. These, and apparently all the highlanders, were, like the Scottish highlanders, divided into clans under their several chiefs<sup>2</sup>. Indeed in such a country, so constituted, small proprietors could not exist: all of necessity herded under leaders. The many thus were in a great degree dependent on their chiefs, who were also in no small degree dependent on them. Strabo, living in an age when republican sovereignty had been everywhere abolished, yet the memory of that form of government, so flattering in theory, so universally failing in

<sup>2</sup> Τῶν δ' οὐν ὀρεινῶν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, Πεισιδῶν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατὰ τυραννίδας μεμερισμένοι, καθάπερ οἱ Κίλικες, ληστρικῶς ἥσκησιν. Strab. l. 12. p. 825. ed. Ox.

Strab. l. 12.  
p. 783. ed.  
Ox.

practice, was recent, expresses wonder at the Cappadocians, who declined what the Romans, generosity being the pretence, but policy the real motive, offered them with the name of freedom; meaning a republican constitution, but subject to the controul of the Roman senate and people: they could not, they said, govern themselves; neither their habits nor their circumstances would inable them to maintain civil order through their extensive country, without a chief to superintend all, and repress lawless contest among equals. The geographer describes a remarkable chief who, a little before his own age, ruled Cappadocia. Whether a Greek, or only bearing a Grecian name, by valor and talent, with an unscrupulous policy, Amyntas had accumulated lordships as his private property, to the extent of no inconsiderable kingdom. In Lycaonia he held a wide territory. The country, in Arrian's account, resembled Salisbury plain, and those similar parts of England, little seen elsewhere in Europe, which, in modern phrase, are distinguished by the name of Downs; a term formerly applied to highlands generally, but now limited to lands rising, mostly without abruptness, above the country around; woodless, waterless, or with springs only at extraordinary depth, but affording excellent pasture for sheep. Amyntas, able to protect his property, had three hundred flocks maintained for him on the Lycaonian downs. By services to the celebrated Mark Antony, then commanding the Roman armies in Asia, he acquired such favor as to be raised by him to the kingdom of Cappadocia. But, insatiable in rapacity, he was at length cut off through treachery in his own household. A century and half after, under the emperor Trajan, a chief of robbers, in the country north of Lycaonia, was of such eminence as to ingage the notice of the historian Arrian, with the view to exemplify, for his cotemporaries, the state of the country in Alexander's time: when, throughout Cilicia, civil society was of the antient turbulent character; and even the Pamphylians, tho holding a very productive soil, falling, most advantageously in varied form, southward from the mountains of Taurus to the Mediterranean sea, had a strong propensity to the predatory life, and would not (they are Strabo's words) let their neighbours live in quiet<sup>3</sup>.

For people tolerated in such a course, during many ages, by the weakness or remissness of a government whose supremacy they acknowleged, the boons of independency and immunity, by which Alexander had won the

<sup>3</sup> Οὐδὲ τοὺς ἑμέρους ἰῶσι κατ' ἡσυχίαν ξῆν Strab. l. 12. p. 824 ed. Ox.



civilized and peacefully inclined, would have no allurements, if accompanied with the requisition to live in peace with their neighbours. They reckoned the tribute to the great king, their subjection being otherwise little more than nominal, cheap purchase of license to follow their predatory habits, and preferable to the most perfect immunity and independency, in awe of a neighboring government able and vigilant to repress their excesses.

Through the greater part of Lycia, where Alexander now was, the arts of peace were cultivated, and a better civil order was established; but toward the eastern border, where a bay of the Mediterranean nearly meets the root of Taurus, a predatory clan held the strongly-situated town of Marmara. Alexander's way into Pamphylia, which he proposed to reduce, was along the valley which this town commanded. The body of his army passed unmolested; the baggage and stores, with cattle for the subsistence of all, following, under a guard supposed sufficient, as in a country of friends and allies. But the sight of the cattle, under so slight an escort, was too tempting for the Marmareian youth; whom the elders, more provident of consequences, seem to have been unable to restrain. When the principal military strength was considerably advanced, they issued from their hold, killed some of the escort, who vainly resisted overbearing numbers, and compelled the slaves, who attended the cattle, to obey their orders and become, together with the beasts, their property. Alexander, who before had reckoned the reduction of such a nest of barbarians not a matter for delaying his progress to more important objects, now resolved not to risk the evils which the allowance of impunity for their conduct might produce. Halting his army, he laid siege to their rock, with machines the more alarming as they were new to the Marmareians. The elders desired immediately to capitulate; but the younger, perhaps fearing to suffer as authors of the recent outrage, refused concurrence; and, holding council among themselves, agreed in the atrocious resolution to kill all the women, children, and old men, and then, by night, force their own way across the besiegers' lines to the neighboring mountains. A general feast preceded this purposed impious sacrifice. The best provision of meat and drink was produced for common use; and when all had taken their fill, the signal for what was to follow was given by setting fire to all the houses. Six hundred of the youth however, had the virtue to refuse

concurrence in the decreed massacre of parents, wives, and children ; and the historian has not said how far the bloody purpose was executed. The projected sally, however, was in considerable amount successful ; many of the Marmareian youth reaching the mountain fastnesses <sup>4</sup>.

After this perhaps necessary example, Alexander, proceeding by the shore eastward, was met by deputies from Aspendus, a considerable Grecian colony in Pamphylia, originally from Argos. The business of the mission was to declare the readiness of the Aspendians to accede to the terms proposed for the Grecian cities of the west of Lesser Asia, but to request especially that they might not be subjected to the controul of a garrison. This Alexander readily granted ; but he required that the horses, formerly furnished by the Aspendians as a portion of their tribute to the crown of Persia, should, now and in future, come to him ; and farther, pecuniary need probably pressing, that they should immediately pay a subsidy of fifty talents, about ten thousand pounds sterling. The deputies assented, and took their leave.

Strab. l. 17.  
p. 953. ed.  
Oxon.

Perga, on the river Cestrus, about seven miles from the sea, having, on a mountain summit near it, a temple of Diana, of some celebrity, was the first town in Alexander's way, within Pamphylia. Here measures seem to have been previously arranged to mutual satisfaction, whence nothing occurred for the historian to notice. Sida, the next town, was a colony from Cuma in Æolis ; but the people, having mixed much with those around them, had lost the language of their Grecian forefathers. No resistance from them is mentioned ; but, the place, probably being, for its opportunities, important, a garrison was left there.

Next was Syllium, a fortress strong by nature, and garrisoned for the king of Persia with regular mercenary troops. On his way thither Alexander met intelligence that the Aspendians had denied admission for those whom he

<sup>4</sup>This remarkable business of Marmara, related by Diodorus, is unnoticed by Arrian, whose narrative, always respectable for what it undertakes to warrant, is however far from being so complete as, by mere omission, to invalidate whatever may remain related by others. In many parts indeed it bears the appearance of an unfinished work. Thus, previously to the march for

Marmara, we are led to expect notice of matters at Perga, but they remain untold. The narrative of Diodorus here, for the most part, is remarkably consonant with Arrian's, and what he has added concerning the Marmaræans is consistent with Arrian's as well as all other testimonies to the general character of the Asiatic highlanders.

had dispatched to receive the ratification of the convention made with their deputies, and would neither pay the money, according to agreement, nor deliver the horses, but were preparing for defence. Probably report from their deputies of the smallness of his numbers may have encouraged them to this conduct. Reckoning it to require his first animadversion, he passed Syllium, which was too strong to be taken by a sudden assault, and hastened toward Aspendus.

That city, of some consideration for its wealth and population, and consequent power and influence among the Grecian and perhaps other towns of the coast, was however much more important for its situation on the river Eurymedon, one of the very few of the Mediterranean sea offering a secure and ample harbour for shipping. It will be remembered as the scene of the celebrated double victory of the Athenian Cimon, obtained in one day over the Persian forces of sea and land, during the reign of Xerxes. Liberated then from the sovereignty of the Persian king only to fall under the controul of the Athenian people, and again compelled to be tributary to Persia, when the contentions of the Greek republics among themselves disabled them from vindicating so distant a dominion, Aspendus had flourished under the restored patronage of the Persian government. The original occupancy by colonists from Argos, was of a rock with precipitous sides, one of them washed by the Eurymedon, the summit offering space for a considerable town. A populous suburb had now grown on the lower ground. This, tho fortified enough for defence against neighboring barbarians, being unfit to resist the Grecian art of attack, the Aspendians deserted it on Alexander's approach, and he quartered his army in it. Perhaps his detention by the previous siege of Syllium had been calculated upon by the Aspendians, and his unexpected early arrival had prevented the collection of provisions to enable a place otherwise so strong, to maintain a siege. Probably enough also the ordinary political contest in Grecian towns existed there; so that the party which had prevailed to carry the profligate vote for breaking the treaty made by the authorized delegates, were unable to maintain their superiority when siege was impending from an army bearing the character of irresistible. Capitulation was presently offered on the former terms; but these, tho to prosecute the siege would have been highly inconvenient, Alexander refused. He required now, together with the horses, as before,



before, double the contribution in money immediately ; in future a yearly tribute ; subjection to a governor, or, in Arrian's phrase, a satrap, whom he would appoint ; submission of a dispute existing with some neighbourin people, concerning a territory, to impartial arbitrators ; and hostages to insure the performance of these conditions. All was agreed to. No garrison is mentioned to have been left. Not improbably the party which carried the vote for capitulation, apprehensive of suffering from that which had carried the vote for breaking the former treaty, might desire that powerful men of that party should be taken as hostages, and that a Macedonian governor or satrap, whom they would support, should be appointed to command peace within their walls. Thus the necessity for a garrison, which could ill be spared from the army, might be obviated.

Not far eastward of Aspendus begins that portion of Cilicia distinguished by the name of the Rough ; consisting almost wholly of a mountainous branch from the range of Taurus, extending to the sea. On the coast are some small seaports : the interior, divided by deep narrow valleys, offering everywhere difficulties for an army, had little to invite and much to forbid. It seems probable therefore that Aspendus was the last considerable object in that direction. But it seems further probable that some intelligence had arrived of Memnon's threatening measures, which principally decided Alexander's next proceedings.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 29.  
Arrian, l. 2.  
c. 1.

The king of Persia, dissatisfied with his admiral who commanded at Miletus, had put a fleet of three hundred triremes under Memnon's orders, and had largely supplied him with money. Clearly master of the sea thus, Memnon was inabled also to raise a landforce of the best kind, Greeks, or men trained in the Grecian discipline. In every republic of Greece moreover was a party ready to join him. The ill humor shown by Lacedæmon, on the election of such a youth as Alexander to the chief military command of all the Grecian states, far from abating, had been successfully fomented by its king, Agis, who desired himself to succeed to the antient eminence of his predecessors. The party of Demosthenes, not, certainly, with any purpose of promoting the superiority of Lacedæmon, was however always ready to concur in opposition to the Macedonian interest ; and Agis, without great talents to excite jealousy, was a prince of some popular virtues to recommend him, and promote

promote any cause he engaged in. Under the lead of Agis thus a Lacedæmonian party was gaining strength among the republics of Peloponnesus; and to receive Memnon as an ally, a Greek at the head of a landforce in large proportion really, and perhaps all nominally Grecian, did not carry to Grecian minds the offensive character of assisting a foreign invasion, in the same manner as if the commander had been a Persian, and the army barbarian. To reconcile the Greeks then more extensively to the Persian connection, Memnon held out, as the basis for his conduct, the treaty formerly negotiated by Lacedæmon with Persia, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas; which, however, on one hand, really objectionable, and, on the other, beyond reason and truth reprobated by party-writers, was however in its day, as we have formerly observed, extensively popular. By this treaty it will be remembered, all Grecian cities were to be completely independent; no longer acknowledging, as formerly, the superiority of Lacedæmon, Athens, or any other republic. This, originally aimed against the sovereignty which the Athenian people, through their naval superiority, held over the islands of the Ægean, and many maritime towns of Lesser Asia and Thrace, was for a time, we have seen, effectual for its purpose; while Lacedæmon, disavowing command, retained an influence, nearly equal to sovereignty, over a large part of Greece itself. Now it was aimed against that authority committed to the king of Macedonia, which had formerly been allowed by the Grecian states to Lacedæmon, Athens and Thebes, as imperial republics; and it was an advantage for Memnon that, by the treaty of Antalcidas, the king of Persia had been the admitted patron of the independency of the Greek republics, when the kings of Macedonia had not yet aspired to such eminence.

Ch. 25. s. 7,  
of this hist.

The recall of the Persian fleet to the Ægean, under such a commander as Memnon, with a disposition thus prevailing, in several republics, to give him a friendly reception, placed Alexander in circumstances highly critical. A hostile fleet, commanding the Ægean, with a detached squadron stationed in the Hellespont, might both prevent the passage of recruits from Europe to reinforce his army in Asia, and deny his own return to relieve his allies and subjects, threatened with invasion. Meanwhile Darius was collecting an immense Asiatic army, having also a considerable Grecian force

force in his service, to meet Alexander if he advanced, or follow him if he retreated.

In these circumstances to rejoin without delay the body under Parmenio, and provide, while opportunity was clear, for enabling the absent with leave to return from Europe, with whatsoever recruits they might bring, was of pressing consideration. Gordium, the antient capital of the Hellespontine or Lower Phrygia, Alexander's first conquest from the Persian empire, was the place appointed for the absent with leave and the recruits to proceed to. He resolved without delay to direct his own march thither ; but the way had considerable difficulties. The part of Taurus to be crossed was a wide tract of highlands, the country of the Pisidians ; all freebooters, and yet not so savage as not to have fortified towns. Telmissus, otherwise written Termessus, was one of the principal. Its people, like some of the Scottish highlanders of old, to the profession of robbery added that of prophecy ; for their skill in which they had for centuries maintained a high reputation among nations around. Aristander, Alexander's favorite seer, already noticed as interpreter of the prodigy of the swallow at Halicarnassus, was a Telmissian. For the most convenient road, perhaps almost alone practicable for an army, he must return to Perga, and then proceed by Telmissus. But the Telmissians, jealous of his purpose, and confident in their strength, resolved to deny his army the passage. Their town occupied the summit of a very lofty rock, precipitous on all sides, commanding the rugged way through a narrow glen. When Alexander approached, the heights were occupied by the Telmissians in arms. He halted, and after examining the circumstances, incamped, and kept all quiet within his lines. Thus he gave rest to his troops, while the Telmissians, like many other barbarians, bold, active, and individually skilful, but irregular and impatient, became tired of their situation on the mountains, unsheltered, in a wintry atmosphere, insomuch that, leaving a guard on each hill, the main body of them withdrew into the town. Upon this Alexander had reckoned. Sending then his light-armed up the hills, to positions whence their missile weapons could reach the guarded posts, these were soon abandoned, and his army, hastening through the narrow, incamped on the plainer ground beyond.

But



But the Pisidians were not, any more than the Scottish highlanders of old, under due controul of one regular government. The several clans, all enemies to all mankind besides, unless where particular circumstances led to particular compacts of friendship, were often most hostile to one-another. Possibly it was because the Telmissians had resolved upon hostility to Alexander, that the Selgians, another Pisidian clan, desired his friendship. A deputation came from them soliciting alliance, and offering their services. Such a mission could not but be welcome: the deputies accordingly were gratified with their reception; a treaty was presently concluded; and the Selgians proved always faithful and valuable allies. They would willingly have joined Alexander in arms against Telmissus; but that place was too strong to be taken without a delay which his circumstances would ill allow, and another object required his immediate attention. Salagassus, a large town, the seat of a clan esteemed, tho all the Pisidians were warriors, the best warriors of the nation, was necessarily to be passed; and, being connected with Telmissus, and hostile to Selgium, the Salagassians were of course hostile to Alexander. The Telmissians were diligent in hostility. Acquainted with byways over the highlands, they reached Salagassus before him, and with its people, took an advantageous position for disputing his passage. From ambuscades judiciously placed then they attacked, nearly at the same time, each flank of his advanced guard of bowmen, and presently overpowered it. But the Agrian targeteers following, with better defensive armour and more regular discipline, stood their ground till the phalanx came to their support. The Pisidians, deficient in armour and order and experience, were led by their courage to close, where they should only have annoyed at a distance: many were killed; and, utterly unable to make an impression, the survivors took to flight. In this they mostly found safety; for the heavy-armed were incapable of following them among the highlands, and their knowledge of the rugged and difficult ground made the pursuit of the light-armed hazardous and little efficacious. But as, in the mountain ways, numbers would hinder each other's escape, some fled by the plainer road to the town. These Alexander followed with his cavalry, and, entering with them, became master of it.

Arrian, l. 1.  
c. 2.

His success thus in action against the Salagassians, the most powerful of the Pisidian clans, together with his previous liberality in negotiation with the Selgians, opened such facility that he was induced to proceed to the complete reduction of a nation so capable, as well as disposed, to be injurious to all around them. Possibly intelligence from the Ægean and from Greece, relieving former apprehensions for that quarter, may have assisted toward this determination. The example of the Selgians, however, encouraging, and his terms offered to all being probably liberal, many clans immediately acceded to them; some strong places he besieged, and shortly all yielded.

The fame of the power of his arms, shown in reducing, with his small numbers, this nation of robbers, so long allowed, by the remissness of the mighty government of Persia, to be the annoyance of one of the most productive countries of the world, prepared facility for making his next acquisition, and improved value for it when made. A march of five days brought him to Celænæ, the capital of the Greater Phrygia. The town was little fortified; the inhabitants not soldiers, nor probably solicitous whether they were to pay tribute to a Persian or a Macedonian king; its castle was singularly strong and had a garrison, but only of one thousand Carian, and one hundred Grecian mercenaries. So scanty being the force to which the defence of the capital, and apparently almost the whole of the Greater Phrygia, was committed, discredit seems not imputable to the garrison for what followed. On being summoned they offered to withdraw, if, within a day named, they were not relieved. This was agreed to, and no relief arriving, the place fell of course.

## SECTION III.

*Measures of the Persian Armament under Memnon : Conquest of Chios : Progress in Lesbos : Death of Memnon : Conquest of Lesbos completed by Memnon's Successors. The Persian Land-force recalled from the Grecian Seas : War prosecuted by the Persian Fleet.*

WHILE Alexander was thus proceeding fortunately and rapidly in conquest far from home, his able adversary Memnon had been providing for him difficulties and dangers at his door. Aware that an able and indefatigable enemy, regardless of seasons, could not be effectually opposed but with equal disregard of season and of rest, he would not await the spring to call the fleet from the ports to which, under its former commander, it had withdrawn. The coast of all the continent bordering on the Ægean sea was in the enemy's hands, with a victorious army to maintain the possession ; but the numerous islands were open to a commanding fleet, for attempts of either arms or policy. Memnon sailed to Chios, where matters had been so prepared, by negotiation with those friendly to the Persian connection, that, at the sight only of his fleet, the adverse were appalled, and the whole island yielded without a blow. The Athenian Chares, who had not scrupled, with feigned respect, to wait upon Alexander on his first arrival in Asia, now joined Memnon in promoting, on the Asiatic shores, the cause which Demosthenes was promoting in European Greece. Known through the great commands he had held, and respected by the Persian party as the friend of Demosthenes, he seems to have had interest particularly in Lesbos. Thither Memnon proceeded with his fleet. Three of the four principal towns presently submitted : to Mitylene, alone resisting, he laid siege.

Already thus he had ports for the refuge of his fleet, and that fleet could in a great degree command supplies. He could therefore hold very promising language to the friendly throughout Greece, as well as formidable threats to the adverse. He declared that, after reducing Mitylene, he would proceed to the Hellespont. His fleet would at once give him

Arr. l. 2. c. 1.

Ch. 46. s. 2.  
of this hist.  
Arr. l. 2. c. 2.Arr. l. 2.  
c. 1.



complete command of the strait. Neither reinforcement then should pass from Europe to Alexander in Asia; nor should Alexander return to Europe; but he would himself, with the assistance of his Grecian allies, invade Macedonia, while the king of Persia, the friend of Grecian independency, with overbearing numbers, would annihilate the small force which had hitherto been, so beyond expectation successfully, invading his dominion. In the midst of these great projects, Memnon was seized with sickness in his camp before Mitylene, and he died there.

The chief command then, till the king's pleasure might be declared, devolved upon the satrap Antophradates, jointly with Pharnabazus, son of the satrap of Lower Phrygia, Artabazus, and nephew of Memnon. These officers, prosecuting their predecessor's measures, shortly reduced the Mitylenæans to desire to capitulate, and treaty was not denied them. It was then liberally required on their side, and liberally admitted on the other, that the auxiliaries, sent by Alexander to assist them, should withdraw under safe conduct. On the other hand it was required, that the connection of Mitylene with Persia, according to the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, should be renewed; that the monument inscribed with the treaty concluded with Alexander should be destroyed; that the exiles of the Persian party should be restored.

Thus far the business left by Memnon seems to have been carried on well. But Arrian's account of the sequel, indicates that his successors in command had not inherited his spirit of honor and liberality, or that which had distinguished Pharnabazus, whom we suppose the grandfather, or Artabazus, the yet living father of one of them. To controul the civil government, Diogenes, one of the restored exiles, was appointed to that dignity which the Greek writers designate by the title of tyrant. To insure power with that dignity, they placed a garrison in the city; under the command of a Greek, indeed, but a stranger to Mitylene, Lycomedes of Rhodes. They proceeded to raise a heavy contribution; beginning with arbitrary exactions from the wealthy, and then extending an assessment to all ranks. Those conversant with Grecian history however will be aware that, as the numerous party, which had before held democratical sovereignty, were by the capitulation to retain all civil rights, tho probably under a more tempered constitution, yet the Mitylenæans of the Persian party were likely to be perilously situated

without a continuance of Persian protection ; whence it is not unlikely to have been at their desire, as necessary for their safety, that a supreme magistrate, whom the other party would style tyrant, was appointed, and a body of those regular troops, distinguished by the term mercenaries, was left in garrison. But how far any of the measures were really infractions of the treaty, Arrian's succinct account, apparently not derived from the eminent men his guides for Alexander's actions, nor from any friend to the Persian party among the Greeks, affords no fair ground to judge.

It is however in all accounts evident, that Memnon's death deranged the purposes of Darius and his council. On the advantageous progress of his measures in Europe, the success of those proposed to be pursued in Asia would much depend. A successor qualified by talents and experience and popularity and trustworthiness, for the business of Memnon's commission, would hardly be found. Had one of either nation the two former qualifications, yet no Persian could have his interest with the Greeks, nor was any Greek so connected with Persia. Memnon's great designs therefore perished with him. An order came from the court for Pharnabazus to conduct the landforce of the armament to Lycia. Arrived on the Lycian coast, he was soon joined by Thymondas, son of Memnon's brother, Mentor. That officer came commissioned to conduct the army, mostly, if not wholly Grecian, to the Syrian coast, to meet the king, coming from Upper Asia ; and he brought a commission for Pharnabazus, apparently in conjunction with Autophradates, to command in chief in the same extent as his late uncle, Memnon. Pharnabazus accordingly, delivering the army to Thymondas, hastened to rejoin the fleet.

That fleet still commanded the sea, but the great objects of the armament were ashore. Deprived therefore of a coöperating land-force, nothing great could be undertaken. But the small island of Tenedos, for its neighbourhood to the Asiatic coast and to the Hellespont, was a desirable acquisition. The people were generally disposed to connection with the Grecian confederacy under Alexander ; but, knowing the inability of that confederacy to afford them maritime protection, and utterly unequal to effectual resistance with their own strength, they changed their allegiance, on being allowed the same terms which had been granted to the Mitylenæans.

The

The return of the Persian fleet to the *Ægean*, and the vigorous measures threatened while Memnon lived, had induced Alexander to strain his means for equipping and maintaining a naval force again. His admiral, Hegelochus, was directed to assemble what ships he could in the Hellespont. His viceroy, Antipater, watching, from Macedonia, every movement, had previously collected a squadron, principally from the friendly ports of Eubœa and Peloponnesus, which he had placed under the command of Proteas. Tho no hope could be entertained of raising a fleet competent to meet the Persian in a general action; yet protection might be given to trade, and to threatened parts of the coast, and advantage might be looked for against detached squadrons. When the Persian admirals led the main body of their fleet to Tenedos, they detached ten Phenician ships, under Datames, a Persian, to the Cyclad islands; apparently to raise supplies by prizes and contributions. Datames was in his station at Siphnus, when Proteas attacked him by surprize, at daybreak, with a superior force. Datames escaped, with only two ships; the other eight were taken, with their crews.

Intelligence of the death of Memnon, and of the withdrawing of the Persian land-force from the *Ægean*, relieved Alexander from the apprehension of any very formidable invasion of his kingdom, or of the states of his allies; and the movement of the Grecian forces in the Persian service, from all parts, to join the king of Persia, marked for him the point to which he should principally give his attention. It was now evidently the enemy's purpose to direct his utmost collected strength to the recovery of the dominion lost. Alexander's business therefore would be to provide for the maintenance of his possession of that great peninsula, of which he was already nearly master, and to keep the enemy far from Macedonia and Greece, by the barrier of mountains, on its eastern verge, or to meet him still beyond them. Accordingly allowing himself only ten days at Celœnæ, to regulate the affairs of the extensive country of Upper Phrygia, which had been so abandoned to him, he committed the office and dignity of satrap of that province to Antigonus son of Philip. The situation of general of the auxiliary troops, which Antigonus had held, thus became vacant. Alexander seems always scrupulously to have left the separate command of the troops of each Grecian republic to their several officers, but never yet to have



have trusted a republican general with a more extensive authority. Balacrus son of Amyntas was appointed commander of the auxiliaries in the room of Antigonus.

## SECTION IV.

*Recruits from Europe : Embassy from Athens : Story of the Gordian Knot : Submission of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. Plutarch's Treatise on Alexander's Fortune.*

FROM Celænæ Alexander proceeded to Gordium, the antient capital of the northern, the Lesser or the Hellespontine Phrygia, or perhaps of the whole country of that name. There he had the good fortune to be joined by the troops allowed to go home for the winter, with their recruits. The scantiness of the reinforcement marks the powerful effect of Memnon's measures, and indicates what the check which he was providing for Alexander, might have been had he lived. Apprehension seems to have pervaded, not governments only but individuals generally, in expectation that, with the great force under Memnon, in a situation to intercept Alexander's return, and with the might of Persia, under a king bred a warrior, advancing against him, he must be overwhelmed. The hope of booty, on former occasions so alluring, had lost its power : A hundred and fifty horse joined from Elis, but not a single recruit from any other republic. Macedonia itself sent no more than about a thousand foot and three hundred horse.

No account remains of political transactions among the republics during the crisis ; but, while Alexander was at Gordium, an embassy from Athens joined him, charged with an extraordinary request, which, together, with the answer to it, affords interesting indication. Among the Grecian prisoners made at the battle of the Granicus, and now in confinement in Macedonia, many were Athenian citizens. The declared purpose of the embassy was to obtain the free dismissal of these men, who had been taken in the enemy's service, fighting against that confederacy of the  
Grecian

Grecian republics, of which Athens was a member. Irregular, and even offensive, as this request appears, yet, in the actually critical state of things, it seems to have been thought advisable to avoid an irritating answer. 'But,' says Arrian, 'it was deemed unsafe, war raging, to set all Greeks free from the fear of carrying arms against their country; and therefore it was replied to the deputation, that, "when matters were satisfactorily settled with the common enemy of Athens and all Greece, then would be the fitter time to consider of favor for those who had been fighting against their country in his cause<sup>5</sup>." Evidently this mission must have been a measure of the Persian party in Athens, under Demosthenes, which Æschines shows to have remained always powerful; so that, if not holding a decisive lead in the republic, it could yet, for some questions, overbear the party of Phocion. A proposal for obtaining the release of Athenian citizens, prisoners of war, would, in a general view, be popular; and might be so brought forward by an ingenious orator that, however variously objectionable, it might be thought by Phocion's party, with their usual scrupulousness and moderation, proper to decline strong opposition to it.

Æschin. de  
cor. p. 45<sup>2</sup>.  
55<sup>2</sup>. ed.  
Reiske.

Alexander, while at Gordium, would of course visit the castle, in which was preserved the Gordian knot; then of fame among surrounding people, and, through his notice of it, afterward celebrated over the civilized world. The story, as related with some variations by several antient authors, and with great simplicity by Arrian, is the more a curiosity, as coming from a man of his eminence in his inlightened age.

<sup>5</sup> One cannot but admire the inconsistency of some antient writers, and many modern, who have related this transaction, who have also related the execution of Phocion at Athens, occurring about the same time, and had before them the evidence in the celebrated speeches of the great contending orators of the day, intitled, On the Crown, that all Greece was more free under Philip and Alexander than under the supremacy of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian republics, and yet have not scrupled to assert that Greece, previously a model of free government, was enslaved by Philip and remained so under Alexander. To which of those writers should be imputed only weak credulity or rash assertion, and to which, wilful and insidious falsehood, their readers, attending to existing evidence, will judge. It is however due to the antients to observe that none of them has gone so far in extravagance as to furnish warrant for what several moderns have been bold enough to assert as on their authority; some of our own country; but, in this matter, always outdone by those of the continent.

At

At a remote period, that respectable historian says, a Phrygian yeoman, Arrian. l. 2. c. 3. named Gordius, was holding his own plough on his own land, when an eagle perched on the yoke, and remained while he continued his work. Wondering at a matter so apparently preternatural, he deemed it expedient to consult some person among those who had reputation for expounding indications of the divine will. In the neighboring province of Pisidia the people of Telmissus had wide fame for that skill: it was supposed instinctive and hereditary in men and women of particular families. Going thither, as he approached the first village of the Telmessian territory, he saw a girl drawing water at a spring; and making some inquiry, which led to further conversation, he related the phenomenon. It happened that the girl was of a race of seers: she told him to return immediately home, and sacrifice to Jupiter the king. Satisfied so far, he remained anxious about the manner of performing the ceremony, so that it might be certainly acceptable to the deity; and the result was that he married the girl, and she accompanied him home. Nothing important followed till a son of this match, named Midas, had attained manhood. The Phrygians then, distressed by violent civil dissensions, consulted an oracle for means to allay them. The answer was ‘that a cart would bring them a king to relieve their troubles.’ The assembly was already formed to receive official communication of the divine admonition, when Gordius and Midas arrived in their cart to attend it. Presently the notion arose and spread, that one of those in that cart must be the person intended by the oracle. Gordius was then advanced in years. Midas, who already had been extensively remarked for superior powers of both body and mind, was elected king of Phrygia. Tranquillity ensued among the people; and the cart, predesigned by heaven to bring a king, the author of so much good, was, with its appendages, dedicated to the god, and placed in the citadel, where it was carefully preserved. The yoke was fastened with a thong, formed of the bark of a cornel-tree so artificially that no eye could discover either end; and rumor was become popular of an oracle, which declared that whoever loosened that thong would be lord of Asia; the name Asia being then, in its most common acceptation, limited to the portion afterward distinguished as Lesser Asia. The extensive credit which this rumor had obtained, and the reported failure of the attempts of many great men, gave an importance



to Alexander's visit to the curiosity, on which, as it seems from Arrian's account, he had not previously calculated. While, with many around, he was admiring it, the observation occurred that, his purpose being to be lord of Asia, he should, for the sake of popular opinion, have the credit of loosening the yoke. Accordingly they agreed in asserting, in general terms, that what the oracle required, for a conqueror of Asia, had been accomplished by Alexander. Some writers have reported, apparently for the sake of a pithy saying, that he cut the knot with his sword; but Aristobulus, who, as one of his generals, is likely to have been present, and otherwise would have had means for the best information, related that he wrested the pin from the beam, and so, taking off the yoke, said that was enough for him to be lord of Asia. Nevertheless Arrian adds that, among contradictory accounts, he could not satisfy himself what Alexander really did on the occasion. This however is obvious; that few if any former visitors could well dare to commit violence on the knot; but Alexander was in circumstances to use it as he pleased. What follows then, in the historian's account, may deserve notice, as marking opinions held by those above the vulgar, both in Alexander's time and his own: Thunder and lightening, on the following night, he says, confirmed the assertion that Alexander had effected what the oracle had declared was to be done only by one who should be lord of Asia. Accordingly, on the morrow, he performed a magnificent thanksgiving sacrifice, in acknowledgement of the favor of the gods, thus promised. Such religious ceremony, whatsoever of faith or devotion may have prompted it, evidently was what policy might recommend.

Information had now reached Alexander that the king of Persia had made great preparations for revindicating his lost dominion, and had already crossed the great desert to take himself the command in chief of his numerous forces; thus showing his disposition to energy, and his purpose of maintaining the military reputation acquired in early youth. For Alexander then, whether with a view to farther conquest, or only to keep what he had made, it was most important to hold the great chain of mountains, the natural defence of Lesser Asia, as a barrier, which no enemy should pass. But within that barrier two extensive provinces, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, still acknowledged the Persian

dominion.

dominion. Of the former especially, it behooved him to be master, for it commanded one side of the pass by which, almost alone, a great army could cross the ridge of Taurus, and have free communication between the Lesser and the Greater Asia. The importance of that pass we have formerly observed, in Xenophon's account of the expedition of the younger Cyrus. From Gordium therefore Alexander hastened eastward to Ancyra. There his measures were to be chosen; whether for moving northward, to reduce Paphlagonia; or, with the hazard of leaving an enemy behind him, hastening through Cappadocia to seize the passes; or, with certain inconvenience, and probable danger, to divide his forces for both purposes.

Cappadocia, apparently from its first conquest by the great Cyrus, had been governed by Persian satraps; but Paphlagonia, like Caria, and as we have observed formerly, Cilicia, had been left to their own hereditary princes, as a kind of feudatories of the Persian empire. The prince of Paphlagonia, when Xenophon, with the Cyreian army, was considering of marching across his country, could command the service, not probably for distant enterprize but for home defence, it was reckoned, of a hundred thousand horse. With such powerful means, and a situation little liable to controul from the navy of Persia, and not readily from its armies, the Paphlagonian princes appear to have maintained greater independency than the Carian. We have formerly seen one of them, in alliance with the king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, making war against the king of Persia's satraps; then taking disgust at his new connection; and, on his repentance, immediately readmitted, as an independent prince might be, to his former connection with the Persian crown, in alliance rather than subjection. What were the political circumstances of the country now, and whether fear excited by the renown of Alexander's great and uninterrupted successes, or indignation at the neglect of the Persian government and the conduct of its satraps, together with failure of ready means to have intelligence of the actual measures of the court, or what other view instigated, we are uninformed; but an embassy from Paphlagonia met Alexander at Ancyra, to solicit his friendship. Arrian describes it as an embassy from the Paphlagonian people, offering their allegiance to Alexander; apparently such as formerly to the Persian king; but requesting

Ch. 23. §. 5,  
& ch. 24. §. 5,  
of this hist.

Ch. 24. §. 5.

Arr. l. 2,  
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immunity from the admission of foreign troops into their country. On a basis so relieving to Alexander, in his actual circumstances, a treaty was presently concluded; and the care of the new paramount sovereign's interest in Paphlagonia was committed to Calas, his satrap of the lower Phrygia. The army then traversing Cappadocia, the whole country, as far as Taurus, submitted, and Alexander appointed Sabictas, a Macedonian<sup>6</sup>, to the duties and dignity of satrap there. Thus easily was the dominion of two extensive provinces acquired, and the reduction of all the peninsula of Lesser Asia, within the great mountain-barrier, completed.

The treatise intitled 'On Alexander's Fortune,' attributed to Plutarch, lively and ingenious, tho not without a considerable mixture of absurd argument as well as bold assertion, really a panegyric of the virtues and talents of the hero, denying to Fortune any share with them in his successes, may deserve some notice here.

The moral philosopher begins with reproaching his goddess, Fortune, for delaying Alexander's successes in Asia two years, by raising troubles for him in Europe. Possibly a speculator, less bent upon panegyric, and more upon just investigation, might rather reckon the delay, and the employment, of those two years, highly advantageous to Alexander, and steps to his following achievements, by completing his military and political education; whence he entered upon his Asiatic expedition, not an unexperienced boy, but a youth who had had the advantage of uncommon extent, both of observation and practice, in arduous business, civil and military. Had then that vigor and vigilance of the Persian government, demonstrated, a few years before, in the conquest of Egypt and the defence of Byzantium, continued only so far that its irresistible fleet, instead of being too late at Halicarnassus, had been timely at the Hellespont, how Alexander, with all the advantage, not of his own talents only, but of very superior assistants raised under his father, could ever have reached the Asiatic shore, with an army equal to any important enterprize, would be difficult for the most ingenious panegyrist to show. Favored as he was by fortune, if fortune we should call it, with an uninterrupted passage; favored afterward by the rejection of Memnon's plan of operations, calculated, in Arrian's

<sup>6</sup> Id utique esse Macedonicum evincit vel sola terminatio.—Annot. Jac. Gron. 15, in Arrian, l. 2.



opinion evidently, to have been fatal to his expedition ; still, when battle was resolved on, had Memnon been allowed to direct the order in the usual way of Grecian tactics, placing the Grecian phalanx in the first line, on the river's brink, with complete armour and protended spears, and the Persian cavalry on the higher ground behind, ready to support the infantry, wherever pressed, and cover its retreat, if compelled to give way ; whether Alexander, with, or without the counsel of his able advisers, would even have attempted to force the passage, in Arrian's account may seem to be matter for question. But the passage of the Granicus, with or without contest effected, had Memnon's advice only been so far followed that the satraps, with their overbearing cavalry, had attended Alexander's march, tho destroying nothing, but compelling only the removal of supplies removable, that he might possibly have reached Sardis, perhaps the retreat of the Cyreians may show to have been possible ; but it would have been slowly, with difficulty, and not without loss. Sardis then would not have fallen to him without an effort ; and how he could have managed the siege of such a place, and in what time probably have succeeded, it would require much boldness to say. Ephesus then, tho a friendly party was there, could not have been acquired without a second siege : all southward was hostile ; and, even as circumstances were, the arrival of the overbearing fleet of Persia ended all coöperation of his fleet with his army. The probability then seems that, in the best event, Alexander must have turned northward, to find winter quarters among those Grecian towns which Parmenio's measures had prepared to receive him ; and, instead of all Asia within Taurus conquered in one year, he must have begun his second campaign, if at all capable of offensive operation, with measures against the strongest cities of the Grecian colonies on the western coast. Alexander's fortune, in this his first campaign in Asia, certainly was extraordinary : his readiness, quicksightedness, judgement and indefatigability to use fortunate contingencies, whether conceiving himself, or deciding upon the advice of older men about him, form his just and extraordinary praise.

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

## ALEXANDER'S Second Campaign in ASIA.

## SECTION I.

*March over Taurus into Cilicia: Alexander's illness at Tarsus. Measures for completing the Conquest and holding Possession of Cilicia. Measures of Darius: Composition of his Army: Alliance with Lacedæmon. Hazardous Situation of Alexander. Simultaneous Invasion of Syria by Alexander and of Cilicia by Darius: Alexander's hasty Return into Cilicia.*

ALL Asia within Taurus (so the Greeks described the country included between that range of mountains and the Ægean and Euxine seas) now acknowledging Alexander's sovereignty Cilicia, along the coast of the Mediterranean, yet owed fealty to the Persian empire. Hence, tho  
 OL. 111. 4. the ready accession of Paphlagonia, and, its apparent consequence, the  
 B. C. 333. despair of the king of Persia's officers in Cappadocia to offer any effectual resistance, were advantages beyond hope; yet, before Alexander could reach the Gate, as it was called, of Taurus, against Cilicia, a strong body of the enemy's troops had occupied it. Information of this met him at the place where, says Arrian, the younger Cyrus had incamped, previously to crossing the mountains. Immediately he resolved to lead himself a body to dispossess them. With the light troops of his army, and a small select body of heavy-armed, he marched in the evening, with the view to surprize the Persians at daybreak. But here again his good fortune was conspicuous. He failed, says Arrian, in his purpose of surprize; for the Persian troops, having intelligence of his approach, were so impressed  
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with the idea that his valor and fortune were irresistible, that they withdrew and left him free passage. The historian's following narrative however shows that there might be other cause than meer panic for their retreat. In some parts of Cilicia revolt was ready; and, unless the Persian commander could have time to collect provisions, which might inable him to subsist in his post, should the Cilicians blockade him on one side, and the Greeks attack on the other, his situation would be hopeless. On the following day Alexander's whole army without interruption reached the champain Cilicia. There intelligence met him, that the measures of Arsames, the king of Persia's commander-in-chief in Cilicia, before calculated only for resistance, now on the contrary indicated the purpose of hasty retreat; and that the citizens of Tarsus, the capital, were in consequence vehemently fearful that he would first plunder the place. Alexander, allowing himself no rest, hastened with his cavalry and light infantry to prevent this, and succeeded. The Persian forces withdrew, leaving the city uninjured. But the consequence of the exertion, to Alexander, was a violent fever. His general Aristobulus, in his narrative, ascribed this to simple fatigue; possibly reckoning it unimportant to add, what others have related, perhaps not without some foundation. Arriving, they say, greatly heated, and admiring the clearness of the river Cydnus, which flows through the town, he was informed it was celebrated for its coolness in the summer heats, coming, in rapid course, from snow-topt mountains; and the extreme fervor of a Cilician summer, in the lowlands near the coast, would be the more felt through the quick change, in his hasty march, from the frozen air of the highlands. Thoughtless of consequences, as the fancy of the moment impelled, he stripped; and, plunging in, amused himself some time with swimming. Very soon he was seized with violent illness, insomuch that his life was despaired of by all but his favorite physician, Philip, an Acarnanian. In this crisis a letter came from Parmenio, advising him to beware of Philip, who, it was reported, had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Philip was handing him a draught when the note was brought, which Alexander, after reading, delivered to the physician; and, observing his countenance undisturbed by it, confidently drank the potion. Philip calmly assured him that he was justly without alarm on account of what the note indicated, or on any other account; he would be shortly well: and the physician's  
knowledge



knowledge was proved, as well as his honesty, by the king's rapid recovery.

Cilicia was a country, from various circumstances, of great importance to the contending powers : it was narrow, but, with a great length of seacoast, abounding with harbours ; the soil, in large part, was highly fruitful ; the inland boundary was of mountains hardly practicable for an army ; the situation was critical against Syria by land, and between Greece and Phenicia by sea ; and it afforded the best and almost only passes, easily practicable for an army, between the Greater and the Lesser Asia. For Alexander it was most important to secure the possession of this country, whether his purpose were further conquest, or merely the maintenance of that already made. Cilicia was divided by nature into the Plain or Champain, eastward, and the mountainous, called the Rugged Cilicia, westward. The Plain Cilicia had usually acknowledged the dominion of a prince, as we have formerly seen in the time of the younger Cyrus, bearing the title of king of Cilicia, but owing fealty to the king of Persia, or, in his Grecian title, the Great King. The Rugged Cilicia was divided among clans, under chiefs asserting independency, and warring with all their neighbours ; as in the other mountainous parts of Lesser Asia. Along all the coast, at intervals, Grecian settlements had been established ; a circumstance affording great advantage for Alexander : for among them, unless where, through the divisions of the Greeks among themselves, some strong political interest or prejudice interfered, the people would receive him and his army as fellow-countrymen. But, as in Greece itself, so in all its colonies, opposition of political interest and prejudice was apt to arise and be violent. The Cilician colonies moreover, habituated to the Persian supremacy, had flourished under it. Intelligence therefore of the king of Persia's great preparations, and near approach with a numberless army, to vindicate that supremacy, could not be without effect : for those in maritime situations, and for all who depended on commerce, the clear superiority of the Persian marine offered matter of most serious consideration ; and, moreover, the people of the Rugged Cilicia, like the highlanders of the rest of Asia, would be adverse to any change that might bring restraint upon their inveterate habit of living upon their neighbours' goods.

With these circumstances before him, the first object for Alexander was

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Ch. 23. s. 2.  
of this hist.

to secure the pass into Syria ; whether to prevent the enemy from entering, or to have means for carrying war without. Parmenio therefore was sent thither, with the greater part of the heavy-armed foot. Alexander, as soon as his state of health would permit, chose for himself, as he was wont, the more active service ; proceeding to complete the reduction of the large portion of Cilicia westward of Tarsus ; where, even of the plain country and among the Grecian colonies, much remained to be brought to regular obedience.

For this expedition he took only a small chosen body of the phalanx, but all his light troops. In the first day's march he reached Anchialus, a town said to have been founded by the king of Assyria, Sardanapalus. The fortifications, in their magnitude and extent, still in Arrian's time, bore the character of greatness, which the Assyrians appear singularly to have affected in works of the kind. A monument representing Sardanapalus was found there, warranted by an inscription in Assyrian characters, of course in the old Assyrian language, which the Greeks, whether well or ill, interpreted thus : ' Sardanapalus son of Anacyndaraxes in one day founded Anchialus and Tarsus. Eat, drink, play : all other human joys are not worth a fillip.' Supposing this version nearly exact, for Arrian says it was not quite so, whether the purpose has not been to invite to civil order a people disposed to turbulence, rather than to recommend immoderate luxury, may perhaps reasonably be questioned. What indeed could be the object of a king of Assyria in founding such towns in a country so distant from his capital, and so divided from it by an immense extent of sandy deserts and lofty mountains, and, still more, how the inhabitants could be at once in circumstances to abandon themselves to the intemperate joys which their prince has been supposed to have recommended, is not obvious. But it may deserve observation that, in that line of coast, the southern of Lesser Asia, ruins of cities, evidently of an age after Alexander, yet barely named in history, at this day astonish the adventurous traveller by their magnificence and elegance, amid the desolation, which, under a singularly barbarian government, has for so many centuries been daily spreading in the finest countries of the globe. Whether more from soil and climate, or from opportunities for commerce, extraordinary means must have been found for communities to flourish there ; whence it may seem that the measures of Sardanapalus were directed by juster views than

have been commonly ascribed to him. But that monarch having been the last of a dynasty, ended by a revolution, obloquy on his memory would follow of course from the policy of his successors and their partizans<sup>1</sup>.

Alexander, proceeding from Anchialus still westward, came to Soli, whose leading inhabitants had manifested a disposition to the Persian cause. Requiring of them therefore a contribution of two hundred talents, about forty thousand pounds, he placed a garrison there. Thence, with a force adapted to the service, he went on to the highlands of the Rugged Cilicia; and in seven days, some by force, some by treaty, he brought all to acknowledge his sovereignty. Returning then to Soli, the grateful intelligence met him, that his generals Ptolemy and Asander, whom he had left to oppose the Persian force remaining in Caria, had been completely successful: that Orontobates, the Persian commander-in-chief there, had been defeated in battle, with considerable loss; that the castle of Hali-carnassus presently after surrendered to his forces; and that the towns of Myndus, Caunus, Thera, Callipolis and Triopium, together with the island of Cos, had then desired the conqueror's acceptance of their allegiance.

Alexander seems to have profited from all circumstances, as a diligent, able, and liberal politician. To circulate, in these distant parts, on the verge of the Greater Asia, the news of the successes of his generals on the shores of the Grecian seas, for encouragement to the friendly and intimidation to the adverse, he celebrated, at Soli, what seems to have been a repetition nearly of the Macedonian Olympic festival. Difference appears only in the principal object of religious ceremony. Æsculapius being the favorite deity, worshipped as protector of the place, to him the magnificent sacrifice was dedicated, the whole army joining in the procession. Athletic exercises and theatrical exhibitions, as in the Macedonian Olympic, followed. These ended, his policy was directed to attach the Solian multitude to his interest. Attributing the adverse measures of their government, and the demonstrated attachment to Persia, to the influence of their principal men, he granted them a democratical constitution. Thus apparently he provided that, without a garrison, which he could ill spare from his army, the place should be held in his allegiance. He proceeded then to Magarsus, where he offered a magnificent sacrifice to Minerva, and the

<sup>1</sup> The inconsistency of traditions concerning Sardanapalus is striking in Diodorus's account of him.



historian mentions no other transaction. This, however, was probably not without a political purpose and corresponding effect: a pleasant remembrance of a plentiful and joyous feast would remain among the people. Mallus, a colony from Argos, the next city in his course, required other attention. Civil dissension was violent there. His claim then, for himself and all Macedonians, to be of Argian origin, afforded advantageous opportunity for offering to mediate between the parties. Accordingly he succeeded in composing their differences, and then earned the gratitude of all, by granting to the Mallian state immunity from the tribute assessed on it by the Persian government. Religious ceremony in honor of Amphiloehus, a favorite hero of the Mallians, his army attending, as a flattering compliment, assisted to fix their attachment.

While Alexander thus ably took measures for cementing his acquired sovereignty of Lesser Asia with his old dominion, the king of Persia, Darius, had been also diligent in measures for recovering what he had lost; and his means were powerful. The incouragement for Greeks of eminence, driven from their country, or dissatisfied with it, to seek refuge in the Persian empire, we have formerly had occasion to observe. Several from the republics, and some from Macedonia, were at this time attending the Persian court. The value then of troops trained in the Grecian discipline, and the urgent need of them, if only for opposing the Greeks of the numerous settlements on the extensive seacoast of the Persian empire, had now been so long and so variously experienced, that Grecian mercenaries were become as regular a part of the military establishment of that empire as, in the service of France formerly, the Swiss and Irish regiments, and in that of Holland the Scottish: no satrap of the provinces bordering on the Mediterranean seems to have been latterly without them. When, after Memnon's death, the Grecian troops of his armament were ordered to Asia, other Grecian troops in the Persian service seem to have been called, from all parts, to strengthen the army under the king's immediate command. Our copies of Diodorus make their collected numbers a hundred thousand. Arrian reports them thirty thousand; which seems not beyond probability. He mentions also what indicates further the sense entertained, by the Persian government, of the expediency of improving the composition of their Asiatic force, by arming and training a

Arrian, l. 2.  
c. 8, p. 73.

portion of it, in the Grecian manner, for close fight<sup>2</sup>. A body of sixty thousand was so trained : he calls them Cardacs ; possibly because the Cardacs, or Cardoos, whom Xenophon describes as among the most warlike of the northern people of the Persian empire, were numerous among them. Trained in the Grecian discipline, they had their station in the line with the Greeks in the Persian service. Of the rest of the infantry, some would be middle-armed, but the greater part light-armed, and formidable only in desultory action. But the cavalry, as usual in Persian armies, formed the principal strength of that under Darius. Arrian has not undertaken to state the number ; which however of course would be great, and their kind the best that the empire could furnish. Uncertain of the amount of cavalry, the amount of infantry would be less to be ascertained. In the time of Xerxes, we have seen the method of numbering the infantry of a Persian army, as described by Herodotus, grossly defective. Possibly there may have been improvement since, tho through all ages, changes of custom have been little common in Asia. But when it is considered that the most exact and informed historians, Thucydides and Xenophon, rarely answer for the amount of light-armed, even of the small numbers of a Grecian army, it may be imagined how far credit should be given, even to Persian calculations, if any remained, of Persian multitudes, tho it may reasonably be believed they were very great. Arrian himself therefore must be understood as stating only loose report, when he says that the whole number of fighting men, assembled under Darius, was six hundred thousand.

But if only his Grecian troops were thirty thousand, they were a body such as no Persian king before him had ever commanded. Less than thirteen thousand had formed the main strength of the younger Cyrus's army. Ochus had perhaps a greater number in Egypt. The force however under Darius, tho his army may have been formerly outnumbered, seems to have exceeded, in effectual strength, any of which antient history speaks.

But, according to the general custom of the East, multitudes attended

<sup>2</sup> Ὀπλίται δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οὗτοι. Arrian, l. 2. c. 8. p. 73. This phrase completely indicates that those spoken of were armed and trained for close fight, in the Grecian manner, or nearly so. The name, and some circumstances of character, combine to mark the Cardacs of Arrian for the same people with the Cardoos or Cardooks, described by Xenophon ; who indeed mentions nothing of their having either arms or discipline for close fight, yet possibly they might be chosen as the readiest among the Asiatics to adopt the novelty. Xen. Anab. l. 3, c. 5, & ch. 23, s. 4. of this hist.

the march of Darius who would not add to his army's strength. His wife, his children, his mother, were inmates of his camp; and oriental custom seems to have required license for such indulgence to every officer, and even to every soldier; so that, with the train of the great for ostentation, and of the inferior for gratification, added to the necessary followers of a camp, the unarmed of a Persian army very greatly exceeded in number the fighting men. The inconvenience and even weakness unavoidably resulting are obvious.

Grecian troops to oppose to Grecian troops were however not the only advantage that Darius derived from Greece. He had opportunity to profit also from Grecian counsellors. In former times we have seen the generous policy of the Persian court, not only affording protection to eminent men driven from the Grecian republics, but raising them to high consideration in the Persian empire, and perpetuating the advantage for their families. Nor was the beneficial patronage limited to those eminent enough to be recorded by name in history, as the Spartan king Demaratus, the illustrious Athenians, Themistocles and Conon, the Eubœan Gongylus, and others. From the time of the first Darius, a Greek physician seems to have been of the regular establishment of the Persian court. Since Memnon's death we have observed a son of Mentor, his brother, high in military command. Of other Greeks, received with distinction, those remaining described were Amyntas son of Antiochus, and Alexander son of Aëropus, of the royal family of Macedonia; Aristomedes, a Thessalian of Pheræ; Bianor, an Acarnanian; and, more esteemed, or, through his talents and activity and the estimation of his employers, more prominent than any, an Athenian, Charidemus; whom concurring indications mark for that friend of Demosthenes, who sent from the Macedonian court the early information of Philip's death, of which we have observed the great orator making an extraordinary use. A friend of Demosthenes, according to all accounts, would be likely to be well received at the Persian court; and, talents seconding an advantageous introduction, Charidemus is said to have been admitted, not only to much communication with the Persian ministers, but even to council with the king<sup>3</sup>.

Ch. 7, s. 3.

C. 11, s. 4,

c. 24, s. 1,

c. 28, s. 9.

Ch. 42. s. 7.  
of this hist.

Diod. l. 17.

c. 30.

Plut. v. Alex.

The

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, according to the extant copies of his work, says Charidemus had been in high favor with Philip king of Macedonia, both as a meritorious military officer in his

service, and as a confidential cabinet counsellor, if not even prime minister. The discordancy of this with testimonies of Arrian, Plutarch and Dinarchus, has been justly noticed



The advantage of a party within Greece, recently most threatening to Alexander, had been greatly lessened by Memnon's death<sup>4</sup>. Hopes were checked by the loss of his approved talents, and zeal would be damped by the substitution of a Persian instead of a Grecian commander-in-chief. But, among the various springs of Grecian politics, one formerly of great power, but latterly inert, was gaining new energy. The Lacedæmonian constitution, as we have remarked Aristotle observing, was formed for war, and wholly unqualified for peace. As if then, purposely to provide against what a love of ease might lead to, its kings, at home really subjects, were, in the command of armies abroad, really kings; so that stimulation was especially strong for them to desire perpetual war. Lacedæmon had now a young king of a temper to second and stimulate the characteristical propensity of the constitution, and to be eager for the advantages of a state of war for himself. Many circumstances contributed at this time to favor his purpose. The death of Memnon, greatly darkening the prospect of final success for the anti-Macedonian party throughout Greece, made an opening for Agis, of a kind to allure an ambitious mind. Memnon, while he lived, would, from the great means he commanded, necessarily be looked to as the Grecian head of that party. But a Persian succeeding to the command of the principal force employed in the cause, a king of Lacedæmon might well look to superiority over all others of the Grecian part of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonian people, at the same time, would feel that no ray of the glories of the Granicus was theirs; that victory, and every following success of Alexander, would only inance any prior aversion

Ch. 35, s. 4,  
of this hist.

noticed by Wesseling. But we have seen a Charidemus, and probably the same, about twenty-two years before, eminent in command under Iphicrates, and trusted for important business by him. Whether then where Diodorus may have written  $\text{ΙΦΙΚΡΑΤΕΙ}$ , the transcribers, from some blotted or worn copy, or obsolete form of letters, may have given at a guess,  $\text{ΦΙΛΙΠΠΩ ΤΩ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙ}$ , or whether the historian's simplicity may have been misled by some ingenious writer of the party of Demosthenes into a notion, utterly repugnant to all indications from other authors, and without support from anything

besides related by himself, or what else may be supposed, I must leave to those who may have inclination and leisure for the inquiry. Charidemus was certainly a man so eminent that it were desirable to have fuller and clearer information about him.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus has noticed the relief which Memnon's death afforded to Alexander in strong terms, probably after some writer of Alexander's age:  $\text{Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ—πυιθανόμενος τὸν Μέμνονα—μέλλοιτα στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Μακεδοῖαν—ὅν μετρίως ἡγωνία. Ὡς δ' ἤκόν τινες ἀπαγγέλλουσι τῇ τοῦ Μέμνονος τελευτῇ, ἀπελύθη τῆς πολλῆς ἀγωνίας. Diod. l. 17. c. 31.}$

to accede to the common confederacy of Greece under his presidency. Alexander then being at the farther end of Lesser Asia; Darius moving against him with an army, the Greeks of which alone were said to be nearly equal in number to the whole force under Alexander, and the Persian fleet completely commanding the Grecian sea, such a concurrence of circumstances was powerfully inviting for Lacedæmon to attempt the recovery of her old præminence in Greece. In several of the Peloponnesian republics, a powerful, in some an overbearing party favored the view. Athens was nearly divided; none there indeed were willing to promote the power of Lacedæmon, but the party adverse to the Macedonian supremacy was so strong, or so daring, that an Athenian agent, whether constitutionally appointed, or accredited only by the party, (for we are assured by Demosthenes that he did not scruple himself to give example of irregularity so adverse to all principle of good government,) attended the Persian court, together with a Lacedæmonian minister, in all its motions.

Arr. i. 2.  
c. 15.

Such, as nearly as may be gathered, was the state of things, when Agis, whether more stimulated by selfish ambition, or by that narrow patriotism which we have seen the most ordinary Grecian political virtue, or by any nobler view, active however and daring, went with a single trireme on a mission from his government, (for such an office we have formerly observed even his great predecessor Agesilaus undertaking) to the commanders of the Persian fleet, Pharnabazus and Antophradates. What treaty was concluded, or what arrangements were settled, Arrian, who does not commonly venture to relate after deficient authorities, has not said; but events demonstrated a close insuing connection and coöperation between the Persian commanders and the Lacedæmonian government.

Ch. 27. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Meanwhile Darius, having led his immense army across the extensive plain of Syria, had taken a station near the town of Sochi, near its western extremity, about two days march from that pass of the mountains, bounding Cilicia eastward, which was called the Syrian Gate; the most practicable for an army of any across those lofty and rugged highlands. There it was to be considered whether to await the bold invader, in expectation that he would venture upon the apparently rash enterprize of issuing from his present barrier of mountains, to contend, in a country adapted to the action of cavalry, with an army whose cavalry alone perhaps outnumbered him, or rather to advance and force his barrier, and pursue measures against him within

within it. Darius's Grecian counsellors are said to have advised the former course. They did not doubt, they declared, but Alexander would advance, and hazard war in the plains of Syria; and then, a superior cavalry, with unnumbered troops of missile weapons, might destroy his whole army without ever coming to a pitched battle. But the Persian advisers, it is said, differed nearly as in the consultation previous to the battle of the Granicus, and for similar reasons. Desirable indeed it might have been to follow the course recommended by the Greeks, had circumstances been favorable. But long rest could not suit an army of the numbers and composition of that under Darius. To subsist it would be difficult; to maintain confidence and zeal in long inaction, impossible; nor, it was reckoned, could it become the monarch of the Persian empire, at the head of so great an army, to wait for attack, when an invader, with a force so inferior, was in possession of so many of his provinces. Darius, however, whether conceding to the Greeks, or using his own judgement, waited some time on his ground.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 6.

Alexander was yet at Mallus when information arrived that Darius had crossed Syria and was incamped near Sochi. For him then, hardly less than for his antagonist, the measures most advisable were not of easy decision. In a country fruitful but narrow; inclosed between the sea and ranges of lofty mountains, with few passes readily practicable for an army; the sea completely at the enemy's command; the people, even those of Grecian origin, variously disposed; principally deriving political principle from party-interests, and that party-spirit which would arise out of antient quarrels among themselves; while, with regard to those who were contending for empire, the Greeks as well as others were mostly ready to join the stronger. It is with probability said that information of the near approach of Darius, with overbearing numbers, marking both his disposition and ability to vindicate the dignity and integrity of the Persian empire, made extensive and powerful impression in the provinces which had submitted to Alexander, and especially in Cilicia. Altogether perhaps he could as little rest inactive as the Persian king; insomuch that it might be a question for his council, whether the best measure for defending the great dominion acquired were not to seek the enemy beyond it.

This however Alexander's bold and active temper resolved upon. Sounding the disposition of his army, and finding it to his wish, he proceeded to Issus, passed the strait near Myriandrus, and incamped on the Syrian side.

Historians



Historians say, even Arrian in some degree concurring, that his purpose was to attack the immense army of Darius, wherever he might find it; and probably enough this may have been given out, tho the measures really concerted with the able officers about him may never have come to public knowlege. Such however appears to have been the necessity of his circumstances, that, when the Greek refugees at the Persian court undertook to assert that he would seek Darius, they may probably have gone farther, and said, not without reason, he must do so, or evacuate Cilicia, and perhaps retire to the Greek settlements at the farther end of Lesser Asia.

Diod.  
Plut. Alex.  
Curt.  
Justin.

But Alexander's detention by illness at Tarsus, and then by the expediency of composing civil differences and insuring regular government in a country situated so critically, disappointed Darius's Grecian advisers, who had expected his earlier advance. The Athenian Charidemus, arrogant and presumptuous, of an intriguing disposition, making himself obnoxious to many, perhaps to Greeks not less than to Persians, with integrity at best doubtful, formerly a spy at the Macedonian court, became suspected at the Persian. Occasion thus being taken, more immediately from insolence, it is said, in urging advice to the king himself, he was arrested, and, in the summary manner of oriental judicature, condemned and executed <sup>5</sup>.

Arrian, l. 2.

Darius then resolved no longer to check the impatience of his army; and the insuing measures appear, neither in design nor in execution, those of men incapable of forming and conducting great military movements. The Syrian gate, another Thermopylæ, being in the enemy's possession, it was not proposed there to force a passage. Farther inland was a way, called, from the neighbouring town of Amanus, the Amanic Gate; difficult, but not impracticable, even for carriages, when hands enough, under able direction, might be commanded to improve it. It was found wholly

<sup>5</sup> This seems what may with most certainty be gathered from Diodorus's tale, who has undertaken to relate minutely what passed in a Persian cabinet council, with the king present; the credit due to which the judicious reader will estimate. Perhaps it may rather reasonably be doubted whether either the manner or the cause of Charidemus's death were known to any from whom Diodorus could derive the report.

formation concerning the residence of this eminent person at the Persian court, and his catastrophë, depends upon such writers as Diodorus and Curtius; who, so far from Arrian's scruple to chuse among reports of what the Grecian prince did in public, have not feared to relate, without any reserve, in the manner of romance writers, what the Persian prince did and said in his cabinet council, and even what he thought afterward, in his closet or his bed.

It is indeed to be regretted that all in-

unguarded, so that the Persian advanced body reached Issus unopposed. There some Macedonian sick and wounded had been left, whom, with wanton barbarity they put to death. Arrian has not scrupled to say this was ordered by Darius ; which yet may reasonably be doubted. If Arrian has made himself at all obnoxious to the imputation of partial or hazardous assertion, it is for what relates to the conduct and character of Darius. And here it may be observed, that what orders Alexander gave he might know from the Macedonian generals, his usual guides ; but what were those to be properly attributed to Darius would not be equally open to his knowledge or theirs. Among testimonies, from antient writers, favorable to that prince's character, those to his mildness and generosity are large, and, if any concerning a Persian monarch, they seem intitled to credit. The massacre, from all we know of oriental warfare, appears probable enough ; not however commanded by any, but resulting from the ferocity common among disorderly troops, and especially orientals <sup>6</sup>.

This movement of the Persian army was so utterly beyond the expectation of Alexander and his officers, that not only the Amanic gate had been considered as not requiring attention, but, even at the principal pass, the Syrian gate, no guard had been left. On the night after he reached Myriandrus, an uncommonly violent storm of wind and rain, checked the usual operation of exploring ; and the first information that the Persian army was already within the mountains did not readily obtain credit. As far as remaining accounts afford means for judging, the principal deficiency in Darius's measures was the failure to have a fleet, which he might so readily have commanded, to meet him on the coast. Opportunity thus was left open for Alexander, in his actual situation, to observe the Persian army, and gain intelligence by sea, when by land it was prevented. He was not

Curt. l. 3,  
c. 8, s. 5.

l. 3, c. 8,  
s. 14, 15.

<sup>6</sup> Curtius, giving a very different character of Darius, who, he says, was 'sanctus et mitis' also relates the story with some difference. The unfortunate sick and wounded found at Issus, were, according to him, not immediately put to death, but, 'instinctu purpuratorum, barbara feritateævientium,' their hands were cut off, and, with the stumps seared, they were led round the camp, and then sent to Alexander to report to him what a formidable force they had

seen. Curtius seems to have had large materials before him, and perhaps the best ; and it is therefore to be regretted that he has cared for nothing but to charm his readers with round periods, and theatrical effect of narrative, and to incense them against the "purpurati" of his own age ; which has been the general object of the democratical writers under the Roman empire, in the color they have given to transactions and characters of former ages.

without

without some attending vessels, of a kind adapted for dispatch; one of which, sent across the bay of Issus, returned soon with information, that a camp, of extent to indicate a very large army, might be distinctly seen, without even approaching the shore.

Arrian's candid narrative shows, against his direct expressions, that this raised serious alarm in Alexander's council. It is indeed obvious that, had the enemy, with both the gates occupied, brought his fleet to coöperate with his army, not only the return into Cilicia, but communication with all the recent conquests, and also with the old country, both by land and sea, would have been shut for Alexander; and his army would have remained without an object but escape from the vast extent of the Syrian and Mesopotamian plains; where, harassed by the enemy's cavalry and bowmen, like the Roman army under Crassus, between two and three centuries after, it might have perished ingloriously, without a battle. But, this having been omitted, the measures, which the crisis required, were, with an instant's deliberation, taken. The army was directed immediately to take refreshment of victuals, and then, by short repose, prepare for marching. But a retrograde movement has a tendency to discouragement, which it was important to obviate; and the evidence of energy, even a masterly energy, in the king of Persia's councils, and of surprize upon Alexander and his able advisers, might inhanse the effect. In this crisis Alexander summoned all the commanders of the several bodies of his army. Addressing them he said, ' that  
' the step which Darius had taken was precisely that which they might  
' most desire. The worse advice, and not that of the Grecian officers about  
' him, had certainly prevailed; or rather some divine impulse had led him  
' where neither his powerful cavalry, nor his multitude with missile wea-  
' pons, could act efficaciously, nor even the greatness and splendor of his  
army could be displayed. The deity seemed thus to have demonstrated  
' his purpose that victory should be theirs, and that the Persian empire  
' should pass into their hands<sup>7</sup>. Zeal for his service, and eagerness to

Arrian, 1. 2.  
c. 6 & 7.

<sup>7</sup> Arrian has adopted as his own the sentiments which he puts, on this occasion, into Alexander's mouth, whom the clearest policy would lead to maintain such. But, if Arrian really held them, he must apparently

have been led rather by the final event, than by any consideration of the previous circumstances, as he himself has reported them.



Arrian, l. 2.  
c. 8.

contend for the great rewards proposed, being demonstrated by all, he dispatched a body of horse and bowmen forward, to occupy the pass. Following immediately himself with the whole army, he reached the gate about midnight, and found his advanced body in possession of it. No enemy appearing near he allowed rest for the remainder of the night, and at daybreak pursued his way. Fortunately he had time to clear the narrow, and gain ground on which his phalanx might take its regular order, without meeting anything hostile.

While such cares pressed upon Alexander's youth, with his ambitious projects, enough remains, imperfect as our information of Persian affairs is, to show abounding matters of anxiety for the age of Darius, mature for consideration. From earliest accounts, to the present day, an oriental throne has never been exempt from danger; and what has been transmitted of the circumstances which produced the death of Ochus, and of those following, which led to the elevation of Darius, suffices to indicate that his situation may have been, in distressing amount, precarious. Scarcely otherwise, and not even without something approaching despair, could that have been of which we are amply assured; that when, on resolving upon the forward movement across the mountains, the great officers, and perhaps all others, were allowed to send their families, for safety, to the interior, Darius took his own family, his wife, his daughters, his mother, and his infant son with him, to share the difficulties and dangers of the adventure resolved upon. Whether this was thought necessary toward maintaining confidence among the troops, and engaging them to hold by their king, or the unfortunate monarch doubted where to place his family in safety away from himself, tho both considerations may have weighed, a third seems difficult to imagine. The younger Cyrus, if Xenophon may be trusted for the assertion, professed his confidence, not in the military power only, but also in the fidelity of his Grecian troops rather than of his Asiatics; and the Greeks in foreign service, as far as our accounts go, all indeed from Grecian writers, mostly acted so as to maintain that reputation for trustworthiness on which their trade of war rested. Thus Darius may have reckoned his family safest where his Grecian force was to attend him.

Ch. 23, s. 2,  
of this hist.

## SECTION II.

*Numbers of the contending Armies in Cilicia : Battle of Issus.*

THE report which Arrian has thought worthy of his notice, that Darius's army was six hundred thousand fighting men, may seem to imply that such were the numbers in Cilicia<sup>s</sup>. Plutarch gives six hundred thousand to the army in Syria, not specifying fighting men; and if he meant to include all the followers of a Persian camp, he may not have exceeded probability. Diodorus confidently says the army in Cilicia was five hundred thousand. But Arrian has not declared his belief that such a multitude as six hundred thousand fighting men, and their necessary followers, was led by Darius the hasty march, by a difficult and little used mountain road, from Syria into Cilicia. Perhaps conjecture of the force, really under him there, may best be drawn from that historian's statement of the several numbers of four particular bodies, combining with it his report of the circumstances of the march and of the following battle. The Grecian mercenaries he reckons, as we have seen, thirty thousand; and no account shows it improbable that a Persian king should have had a Grecian force of that, or even a greater amount, in his pay, or that such a force may have attended Darius into Cilicia. The Cardacs he states at sixty thousand. We have formerly had occasion to notice the loose way of reckoning numbers in the Persian service, used by the Persian generals themselves in the time of Xerxes. If Curtius might be trusted for such a fact, the same rude and most inexact method was used by Darius's generals, for ascertaining the force assembled in the Mesopotamian plain. Of the Greeks in the Persian service regular rolls must have been kept, both by themselves and by Persian officers, to ascertain the pay, to be demanded on one hand and issued on the other; and various information concerning them would be circulated in Greece and its colonies, through the occasional communication of individuals in foreign service with their friends at home.

Ch. 7, s. 8.  
of this hist.

<sup>s</sup> Ἐλέγετο γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα ξὺν Δαρείῳ στρατιὰ μάλιστα εἰς ἑξήκοντα μυριάδας μαχίμους εἶναι.

Arrian, l. 2, c. 8.

But

But Grecian reports of the numbers of all other troops in the Persian service must have been liable to great uncertainty. Of horse however less than of foot ; and Arrian states the horse under Darius at thirty thousand. He states then twenty thousand light-armed infantry employed in one place, while a considerable body of the same arms was employed elsewhere. Those actually enumerated make together a hundred and forty thousand men bearing arms ; a very extraordinary force, it will be allowed, to have made the difficult, rapid, and concealed march, in the concurrent accounts of antient writers ascribed to it.

Those writers, stating the numbers of the Persian army, probably after reports which, however exaggerated, had currency, have all omitted notice of the force of that under Alexander, which seemingly must have been more within their opportunity to know ; for, tho nothing exact concerning it may have been made public, yet ground for calculation, of this comparatively small number of their fellowcountrymen, would be more within the means of Grecian writers than of the Persian multitudes. Even among accounts extant, some grounds are apparent, which, tho very defective, may be not wholly undeserving of observation. The force which Alexander led from Europe we have observed to have been stated, by different writers, with a degree of concurrence which vouches for their approach to exactness. The force previously under Parmenio in Asia, is not equally indicated. The numbers killed at the Granicus, and in some other actions, we find also stated, probably under the truth : in several, where some must have fallen, the loss is unnoticed. The dismissal of a few, and their return to Greece, is mentioned ; loss by sickness not so. For acquisition of force, the account of recruits joining at Gordium, and of mercenaries passing from the Persian service into the Macedonian, may be reasonably correct. But not a word is found of any gained from the Asiatic Grecian cities. Alexander's desire to increase his numbers is evinced by Arrian's assurance of his unlimited commissions for raising recruits in Europe. The army with which Agesilaus acquired renown in Asia was mostly of Asian Greeks ; the cavalry wholly so. That Alexander therefore would fail to profit from opportunities open, to him at least equally as to Agesilaus, cannot be likely ; and indeed, in a letter from himself to the Persian king, recorded by Arrian, which will occur for future



notice, the service in his army of those who had been subjects of the Persian empire is mentioned. The certainty being thus established that he had some such force, the probability will be strengthened, by what will appear in the sequel, that whether of civic troops, or mercenaries, or rather both, from the Æolian and Ionian and Carian cities, the accession had been very considerable; so that, notwithstanding some garrisons had been left behind, it is probable that the army, which Alexander led into Syria was more numerous than that with which he had crossed the Hellespont.

Arrian, l. 2.  
c. 11.

It was evidently Darius's object to prevent Alexander's return into Cilicia. Disappointed, by his enemy's rapidity, of opportunity to occupy the Syrian gate, he took ground near it, which was considerably advantageous for his purpose. The river Pinarus, issuing from the mountains between the Syrian gate and the Amanic, first in a westerly course, turns then southward to the Mediterranean sea. The channel near the mountains is between high and precipitous cliffs. Toward the sea the banks are lower, and the ground on each side is sufficiently favorable for the action of cavalry. Here, his force sufficing, Darius occupied the whole right bank, from the mountains to the shore, so that neither flank could be readily turned. To prevent molestation, while making his disposition, he sent his cavalry, in number thirty thousand, with infantry of missile weapons, twenty thousand, across the river. On the margin of the stream he placed his heavy-armed; the Greeks in the center, the Cardacs on each flank; so that the left division of these reached the root of the mountains: the nearest heights were occupied by a body of light-armed. Where the bank of the stream afforded less advantage for defence, he raised earthworks. All this was completed without molestation. He then recalled his advanced forces, and, with his cavalry, occupied the right bank from the right flank of his infantry to the sea. Thus advantageously posted for contest, having the champain Cilicia in his rear, he had the additional most important advantage of commanding all that fruitful country for subsistence. Thus his situation seemed highly promising, while the enemy's was full of difficulty and danger.

Arrian, l. 2.  
c. 10.

It appears indeed, from Arrian's narrative, notwithstanding some adverse declamation,

declamation, that necessity required, and alone could justify the attack which Alexander presently resolved to make, unless he could provoke the enemy to attack him. Measures were taken with his usual quickness ; and, profiting no doubt from his usual able advisers, with great judgement. One advantage the position of the adverse army afforded him : that army held the exterior of the curve formed by the river ; the interior was left for him. Thus, along the shorter course, on his side, from the mountains to the sea, he also could extend his line, so that his flanks, equally with the enemy's, were secure. Having then ascertained his adversary's formation, he placed his Macedonian phalanx overagainst the Greeks in the Persian service : his republican Greeks he divided on each flank, to oppose the Cardacs and the cavalry. The command of his left wing, occupying the ground next the sea, where cavalry might act advantageously on either side of the stream, and where the formidable charge of the numerous Persian cavalry might be expected, he committed to Parmenio. The immediate command of the right wing he took himself, with the apparently desperate purpose of attempting to force the strong position of the enemy's left ; but still not without hope that the enemy might be imprudent enough to quit that position and attack him.

Arrian, l. 2.  
c. 10.

For the chance of this he waited some time, in order of battle, on the bank of the stream. But the Persians, aware of their advantage, and of his necessity, without showing any disposition to advance, continued their works for still strengthening their ground. That ground, however, tho naturally strong, was yet not without also a natural disadvantage. There was a kind of bay in the mountain, at whose foot the stream had its course, so that to defend the left bank, their line was necessarily curved inward, with its rear toward those heights which they had occupied with troops of missile weapons. Nevertheless, with the advantage of the ground and the measures taken, reckoning their left secure, they resolved there to await attack, should the enemy venture to make it, while drawing nearly all their cavalry to their right, and confident in the skill and valor of that force, as well as in the great superiority of its numbers, they would be themselves there the assailants. As at the battle of the Granicus, so still more here, under their sovercin's eye, the first nobility of Persia would be  
eager

eager to distinguish themselves ; not without reasonable hope, and even confidence, that they could overbear the enemy's cavalry, and, then proceeding to the flank and rear of his infantry, which would be opposed in front by the Persian-Greek phalanx, so formidably posted, they might annihilate his army.

Alexander, apparently meaning to draw the pressure of action as much as possible toward the mountains, had taken his Thessalian, as well as Macedonian horse, to his right, giving to his left only the republican Greek. This, however, probably, would be a powerful body, strengthened since his arrival in Asia, from the Asiatic cities. But, the assembling of the Persian horse being observed, and its direction indicating the enemy's purpose to attack with his right, Alexander detached the Thessalian horse and some chosen foot to reinforce Parmenio. No time then was to be lost for his attack resolved upon against their left. Accordingly he detached his middle and light-armed, mostly highlanders, the former, especially, eminent among troops of their kind, to drive the Persians from the heights. This was quickly effected ; and they occupying those very heights, the Persian heavy-armed on the river's brink, were open to their missile weapons in flank and rear. The attention of that formidable body being thus drawn to an enemy whose blows they could not return, Alexander seized the moment for leading his phalanx of republican Greeks across the stream, and up the opposite bank, to attack in front.

Arrian describes this part of the Persian line as composed of those Asiatics, whom he calls Cardacs, to the number of thirty thousand, armed and trained for close action in the manner of the Grecian phalanx. It is however unlikely that, in discipline of the soldiers, and, still more, that in skill of the officers, this body was equal to the Greeks, whether of the Macedonian or the Persian army. Alexander, with his phalanx of republican Greeks, quickly put them to flight.

Arr. l. 2,  
c 10.

The Macedonian phalanx seems to have waited this event, as the prescribed signal for proceeding on the hazardous, and otherwise apparently almost hopeless, enterprize upon the strong position of the Persian Greeks ; a body mostly trained under the deceased Memnon, and commanded by officers appointed or approved by him. These men, says Arrian, solicitous, tho in a forein service, to show themselves worthy of the antient fame of



Arr. l. 2,  
c. 10.

their nation, as the Macedonians were to maintain their new renown, the contest was very severe. The Macedonians, it appears, tho our accounts come from Macedonians, suffered heavily. One general and a hundred and twenty-five officers of inferior rank, were killed. But Alexander's first bold measure proved the key of victory. On the flight of the enemy's left, the Greeks of the confederacy occupying its ground, he was on the flank of the Persian Greeks. The Macedonians, before severely pressed, thus found relief, of which they made such use, that the Persian Greeks were nearly all put to the sword.

Arrian, l. 2,  
c. 8 & 11.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 34.

Arrian. l. 2,  
c. 12.  
Plut. v. Alex.  
p. 669.

Meanwhile Darius, scrupulous to observe the antient customs of his nation, had taken post, conspicuous in his chariot with four horses abreast, in the center of his army, and thus necessarily near his Grecian troops. This impolitic, however well-meant and bold exhibition of himself, marked for the enemy whither their efforts should especially be directed. Attack is said to have been so pressed upon him that his horses, wounded, became ungovernable ; and the heaps of dead bodies and arms in their way so impeded and alarmed them, that he might have been carried into the enemy's ranks, but for the gallant exertion of his brother Oxathres, who, at the head of a body of horse, charged the enemy so vigorously as to give opportunity for the ready and zealous servants of the household to bring up another chariot, into which the king removed<sup>9</sup>. Alexander received a wound, according to one Grecian author, from Darius ; but Plutarch observes that Alexander's letter to Antipater, in his time extant, describing the battle, and mentioning the wound, says not from what hand it came ; and according to Arrian's account of the order and progress of the battle, the Persian Greeks had been thrown into confusion by the complicated attack upon them, before Alexander could approach Darius. The Cardacs of the right wing, new in the discipline of the heavy-armed, when the Greeks, who were to be their example, were overborne, appear to have made no stand. For Darius himself then, his left having fled from the field, his center being completely overborne, retreat was no longer avoidable.

<sup>9</sup> For anecdotes of this kind, accounts of battles by Diodorus and Plutarch may sometimes have some value. Indeed Plutarch's life of Alexander, notwithstanding much mixture of romance with history, for his frequent reference to authorities, deserves attention.

But the cavalry of the Persian right was yet maintaining obstinate contest with the Macedonian left. Had Alexander's success, in his daring, yet well-concerted and well-conducted, enterprize against the Persian left, been less rapid and less complete, there is much appearance, in Arrian's account, that, through the overbearing power of the Persian horse against his left, Parmenio's abilities, and all the valor of the troops he commanded, might have been unavailing: that wing being compelled to retreat, the Persian horse would have gained the rear of his right, and his whole army might have been destroyed. As things were, all the skill of Parmenio, and all the excellence of the Thessalian cavalry, appear to have been necessary to keep the battle balanced. But when the rout of the rest of their army was complete, and the king had retired, then the Persian horse began to retrograde. Arr. l. 2, c. 11.

No accounts remaining from Persian writers, or from any friend of the Persian cause or name, historical justice will require liberal consideration for all indications in favor of the conduct and character of Darius against the imputation of Grecian writers, but especially against imputation of what they were unlikely to know by any certain or authentic information. Arrian, not noticing the action about the king of Persia's chariot, or the bold and successful exertion of Oxathres (probably unnoticed by the Macedonian generals whose narrative he followed, yet indicated by Diodorus to have had credit among the Greeks) has attributed to Darius an early and cowardly flight. But against this aspersion, his own candid narrative affords strong testimony. He relates that Darius retreated, still conspicuous, in his chariot; and, not till the way became impracticable for wheels, took to his horse. This was a matter open to wide observation; and it powerfully shows that his purpose was not concealment, or rapid flight, or anything like desertion of his duty to his army and station. What we have observed farther related, by Diodorus, was of a kind also necessarily open to the observation of many: Darius, in the heat of action, in great personal danger, and in circumstances which might perhaps have justified, in most eyes, his quitting a chariot for a horse, nevertheless would not so condescend, but, when under necessity of abandoning one chariot, mounted another, offering himself still as the conspicuous object of the enemy's efforts. The Persian custom indeed so required, inso-

Arr. l. 2, c. 11.

Diod. l. 17, c. 34.

much that on it his hope of success in no small degree depended. Accordingly his disappearing at length from the field was, in Arrian's account, as a signal for the Persian cavalry of his right, hitherto maintaining an equal, or perhaps advantageous contest, to retreat. It seems however clear, that when the left and center of his army were put to flight, retreat would be absolutely necessary for the cavalry of its right, even if victorious; for otherwise, presently inclosed, by the conquering part of the enemy's line, between the mountains and the sea, and there overborne by the force and discipline of the phalanx, it might have been wholly destroyed. But even the Macedonian generals present, from whom Arrian had his information, may have little known what orders passed from Darius to that cavalry, or, having heard, they may have been careless of reporting. This however seems evident, that, when all the rest of his line was defeated, Darius could look to that cavalry alone for protection of his camp; and, if any credit may be due to the account given by Diodorus of action about his person, so close that his horses were wounded, and of the gallant exertion of his brother Oxathres with a body of cavalry, which extricated him (which is no way adverse to Arrian's detail of the circumstances of the battle) it may seem most probable that it was in an endeavour, with the cavalry, recalled from successful or at worst doubtful action with Alexander's left, to save the camp, that this happened. But all Asiatic history shows that to make an orderly retreat was hardly in idea with Asiatic armies. Even the able Memnon seems to have been unable to maintain any regularity in retiring from the Granicus. Hence the greater credit is due to Darius for the fact, among the best attested of the battle of Issus, that, amid all the confusion and dangers of the flight, he kept his chariot, offering himself conspicuously as the object equally of assault for the enemy, as of encouragement for his own troops: evidence, equal to almost any in antient history to such a matter, against all the malicious or wanton obloquy of some antient, and more modern, writers, that, with his mind firm, he was attentive to the duties and dignity of his station.

All Asiatic history then further shows that, to the great men about him, his principal counsellors and officers, his particular preservation would be of the utmost importance. On his death great commotion throughout the provinces of the empire could not fail: a revolution, ending their eminence, depriving



depriving them of property, and leaving hope of safety for their lives only in flight, would be probable consequences<sup>10</sup>. How far then, in an Asiatic army defeated, he could command the course of others, or even his own, no remaining information will warrant us to say, or hardly even to conjecture. But looking to what remains of Persian history, and considering with it the character, to this day, of eastern governments, it may appear probable, that when his exertions to protect his camp failed, his hope of having a place of refuge for his family, if, by any happy turn, they could ever again join him, depended on his outstripping, in flight, even rumor of his defeat. Mounting therefore his horse, he pressed forward through the highlands, and then hastened toward his capital, to meet there the dangers of his circumstances; which, with every best exertion on his part, so all accounts of the Persian empire show, would from his own subjects be highly threatening.

Arrian affords no reason to suppose that the two kings were ever very near one another in the action. On the contrary, he says Darius was considerably advanced in retreat, probably toward his own camp, before Alexander, attentive to the circumstances of his left wing, with difficulty maintaining itself against the Persian cavalry, ventured to pursue. When that cavalry retreated, then he took the command of his own cavalry for the purpose. The object for the fugitives was, by the Amanic pass, to reënter Syria; the cavalry holding the more level ground, as far as it would serve, the infantry hastening to the shelter of the mountains. Darius's chariot, which he had quitted, slow among the difficulties of a mountain road, was overtaken, and in it were found his shield, bow and cloak. Night was approaching; and no probability appearing that he could himself be overtaken, Alexander gave over pursuit. Returning to the Persian camp, and finding his troops in quiet possession of it, he went to the royal tent; which had been put in complete order for the defeated monarch's lodging. While looking around, he heard the shrieks of women near. On this he sent Leonnatus, one of his principal officers, to inquire the cause; who presently returned with information that the queen of Persia was in a neighbouring tent, with her two daughters, her infant son,

<sup>10</sup> Thus, on a following occasion, Curtius has well observed, 'Anisso rege nec volebant salvi esse, nec poterant.—l. 4, c. 15.

and the king's mother; that intelligence had been officiously communicated to them of the capture of the king's chariot, with his shield, bow, and cloak, whence they had been led to conclude, or to fear, that the king himself was killed; and thence arose the loud lamentation which had been heard. Alexander sent immediately information that, tho indeed those spoils had been taken, yet Darius had outstripped pursuit, and was probably safe; adding assurance that the princesses need apprehend nothing for themselves; their treatment should be what became their royal rank; and that even toward Darius he had no personal enmity; their contest was for empire only.

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 11.

These particulars Arrian has given on the joint authority of Ptolemy and Aristobulus; of whom the former attended Alexander in pursuing Darius. Other writers reported farther, that, on the next day, Alexander visited the princesses, accompanied by his favorite officer Hephæstion. On their entering the apartment together, the king not being pointed out, Sisymbis, the queen mother, in the usual way of adoration to Persian kings, threw herself at Hephæstion's feet. Hephæstion, drawing back, pointed to Alexander, who immediately relieved the aged princess's confusion, by telling her she had made no material mistake, for he to whom she had addressed her devotion was another Alexander. 'This,' says Arrian, 'I relate, neither as ascertained, nor as unfit to be believed; but at any rate I esteem it honorable for Alexander that such speeches, and such manners, have been reckoned warrantably to be attributed to him, as consonant to his character.'

All accounts of the battle of Issus make the slaughter very great, and it is remarkable that in none, of any credit, is there any mention of prisoners<sup>11</sup>. That none were made from the Persian left, first defeated, may be accounted for by the urgency for Alexander immediately to direct his utmost attention to the unbroken part of the Persian line. Combined circumstances make it probable that, to the Persian Greeks, quarter may have been denied. In Alexander's council it may have been reckoned

<sup>11</sup> A writer so careless of authority as Justin, may have reckoned his own computation of forty thousand prisoners a proper appendage to his report of a hundred and ten thousand slain; which, however extravagant, is below Plutarch's, and only ten thousand more than that which Arrian has thought worthy of mention. Prisoners, numerous, no doubt there would be; slaves and others attending the camp; but the concurrent failure of Diodorus, Plutarch, and Arrian, to notice prisoners carrying arms, affords strong presumption that few such were made.

inexpedient

inexpedient to leave opportunity for such applications, in favor of men taken in arms in a foreign service, against the troops of the general confederacy of the Grecian republics, as that which, at Gordium, had reached him from Athens. Of anything done by the Persian infantry on the right of the Greeks in the Persian service, no notice is taken by Arrian; whence it may be inferred that their resistance, through imperfection of discipline, was weak, and their flight decided by the overthrow of the troops next them. The Persian Greeks, as Arrian's account shows, were nearly surrounded; their resistance was considerably destructive to their enemies, especially the Macedonians; but it seems likely that the greater part of themselves fell in the battle. The slain on the Persian side altogether are reckoned by Arrian ten thousand horse and a hundred thousand foot. Such round statements of numbers, in circumstances not to have them ascertained, must be subject to the reader's discretion for reduction within likelihood. The Macedonian generals might probably have known the number of Greeks lost on the Persian side; yet not only the mention of the total number has been avoided, but notice of any eminent person among them has been avoided. The survivors, reckoned by Arrian about eight thousand, seem to have been indebted for means of escape, to the vigorous action of the Persian cavalry against Alexander's left wing<sup>12</sup>, which compelled him so to reinforce it from his right, that the defeated parts of the enemy's line could at first be pursued only with infantry. Thus the surviving Persian Greeks, under the command of Thymondas son of Mentor, with the Macedonian prince Amyntas, and the Thessalian and Acarnanian officers Aristomedes and Bianor, were enabled to maintain some order in retreat over the mountains into Syria<sup>13</sup>.

Five

<sup>12</sup> Ὅι ἱππεῖς τῶν Περσῶν—ἐνρώσως ἐνέβαλλον εἰς τὰς ἴλας τῶν Θετταλῶν, καὶ ταύτῃ συνέσθη ἵππομαχία κρατερὰ.—Arrian, l. 2, c. 11.

<sup>13</sup> For the interesting character of many circumstances of this great battle, and the importance of its consequences, I have been desirous to give the fullest and clearest account of it that I could find warrant for. Arrian, following no doubt faithfully as well as ably the accounts of the generals engaged in it, his usual guides, but, in his usual way,

abridging much, tho generally luminous, is sometimes otherwise; and indeed, in relating a great and extensive battle, without an attending plan, some deficiency of clear delineation can hardly fail. Always respecting the matter, I have, in some parts, deviated from the order of his narrative.

Curtius reports, b. 14, c. 1, that eight thousand Greeks who had been in the Persian service at the battle of Issus returned to Greece, and were engaged by Agis king of Lacedæmon



Five Persian officers of the highest rank are said to have been killed; three of them satraps who had been engaged at the Granicus, and who, tho even Grecian accounts give them the praise of valor for their conduct there, nevertheless, through feeling of the disgrace of defeat, may have been led to be prodigal of their lives on this following occasion. The loss on the Macedonian side was severe. It seems to have been proportionally greatest in Alexander's wing. One general, Ptolemy son of Seleucus, and a hundred and twenty others of some distinction fell<sup>14</sup>. But the victory was most complete. Whatever then might be most grateful to the army, console the friends of the slain, and excite the emulation of the living, was Alexander's care. On the day after the battle, while preparation was making for burying the dead, tho lame with the wound received from a sword in his thigh, he visited and conversed with all the wounded. The funeral obsequies were then performed with the utmost military pomp, and Alexander himself spoke the oration celebrating the merit of the slain. Rewards to the living followed; money to some, offices to others, honors to all. Those noticed are Balacrus son of Nicanor, who was appointed to the satrapy of Cilicia; Menes son of Dionysius, who was made a lord of the body-guard in his room; Polyperchon son of Simmias, who was raised to the command vacant by the death of Ptolemy son of Seleucus; and the people of Soli, on whom the contribution of fifty talents, ten thousand pounds sterling, had been imposed: this requisition was remitted, perhaps for the merit of their troops in the battle; and their hostages were restored, perhaps in consideration of the effect of the victory, whence their defection to the Persians again was no longer to be apprehended.

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 13.

Lacedæmon to act against Macedonia. Agis could little, if at all, entertain mercenary troops from the Lacedæmonian treasury; but the Persian money, of which Frønsheim, not without warrant, speaks, in his supplement to Curtius (l. 6, c. 1, s. 6.) would give him means. Yet probably the number is exaggerated.

<sup>14</sup> Τῶν ὅντιν ἡμελημένων Μακεδόνων.—Arr. l. 2, c. 10.

## SECTION III.

*Consequences of the Battle of Issus, in Greece and in Asia: Submission of Syria: Deputation from Darius to Alexander: Ministers from the adverse Party in Greece to the Persian Court taken.*

PHARNABAZUS and Autophradates were still at Siphnus with the Persian fleet, and the king of Lacedæmon, Agis, was also still there, Arr. l. 2, endeavoring to stimulate them to pursue Memnon's purpose of invading C. 13. Macedonia, and supporting the Persian party among the Grecian republics in taking arms against the Macedonian, when intelligence arrived of the events near Issus. Hopes then instantly fell, and in their stead arose the fear of losing the acquisitions made. The disposition of the Chians being especially apprehended, the Persian commanders went thither, with twelve ships of war and fifteen hundred mercenary soldiers. Ten ships, with a subsidy of thirty talents, about six thousand pounds sterling, they committed to Agis. He sent them to his brother Agesilaus, with orders to proceed immediately to Crete, to prevent adverse movements there. He remained himself among the Cyclad islands with the same object: but Autophradates, whether in pursuance of orders from his defeated king, or only aware of the uncertainty of the allegiance of all the maritime states of the Persian empire, any longer than force might controul them, sailed for the Asiatic coast. The harbour of the destroyed city of Halicarnassus offering convenience for his fleet, which no maritime strength of the enemy could contest, he put in there, and Agis there joined him.

Meanwhile Alexander, relieved from great perils, which had threatened, at the same time, himself and the army with him abroad, and his dominions at home, could now chuse his measures. Perhaps a prince of Philip's mature age and large experience, having made a conquest such as that already achieved by Alexander, calculating then his probably remaining years, and aware that more would be wanting, with the best talents, to mold such extent

of territory and variety of population into one well organized state, and aware also that increase of dominion, beyond a certain extent, does not always bring increase, and still less permanence, of power, might have been disposed to rest on an acquisition possessing such extraordinary advantages for making, with his old dominions, one compact and singularly powerful empire. Not only however such speculation was less inviting for Alexander's years, but opportunities open for securing, by farther successes, the great acquisition made, were such, and the means of safely stopping at a given point, in a career of conquest, so uncertain, that it might be difficult even for prudence to decide that those opportunities should not be used. It would be known, and probably observed in council, that Agesilaus had reckoned more, than had yet been done, necessary to reduce the Persian empire to an extent consistent with the safety of surrounding nations; and had accordingly proposed, not indeed to conquer for himself or for Lacedæmon, if Xenophon may be credited for his friend's moderation, but to sever from Persia all her provinces bordering on the Mediterranean sea, and make the great desert her western boundary. Not only then the fact, that all those provinces were not many years ago in revolt, would incourage, but the friendship of some was known to be ready, and from some even invitation came. If Alexander's ambition thus was roused by his successes, that also of many about him might be so; his army was willing, and he resolved still to prosecute conquest.

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 13.

Returning therefore on his steps into Syria, all was found favorable; the country deserted by the Persian officers, the people ready to obey his commands. Accordingly he appointed Menon son of Cerdimas, with the title of satrap, to the government of that part called by the Greeks Cœlesyria, committing to his orders a competent force of cavalry of his allies, probably the Asiatic Greeks; and he sent a strong body, under Parmenio, to take possession of Damascus, the principal city of all Syria, the depository of the king of Persia's treasure, and the refuge of numbers who had fled before the conqueror. With the rest of his army he proceeded for the Phenician coast.

We have had occasion formerly to observe that Phenicia was divided among republican governments, nearly resembling those of Greece, but perhaps more especially the Grecian states of western Asia; or still rather those



those of Cyprus; having each a chief, who assumed the title of king; popular powers everywhere large; but all under the controul of a Persian satrap. No satrap now however appears to have remained there. The people, or their princes, or both together, for in all were considerable popular powers, had thus been left to chuse their party. Alexander, on his march, was met by Straton, sent by his father, Gerostratus, king or chief of Aradus, whose dominion extended over the northern part of Phenicia, including the large and wealthy seaports of Marathus and Marianmë. Its title came from the small island of Aradus, overagainst Marathus, in which, evidently for security, was the chief's principal residence. Probably negotiation had preceded. The Aradian ships were serving with the Persian fleet; but Gerostratus was ready for a change of sovereignty. What came to general knowledge was, that Gerostratus offered to Alexander that allegiance, for himself and his country, which had before been paid to the king of Persia; in token of which he sent a present of a golden crown, which Straton was allowed to place, in public, on Alexander's head, who then proceeded to Marathus.

Meanwhile Parmenio obtained possession of the city of Damascus, the principal of all Syria, where was found Darius's military chest, with a very large treasure. He had moreover taken four important prisoners; persons commissioned, one from Lacedæmon, one from the anti-Macedonian Athenians, and two from the anti-Macedonian Thebans, to hold communication with the Persian court. These he sent to Alexander.

The unhappy Darius meanwhile had been so far fortunate as to reach his capital in personal safety, and in time to prevent any material commotion. Among the enervated people of the rich provinces of the south, political character is hardly discernible in antient history, farther than that they were, beyond others, contented to live under despotism. The Persian sovereignty was generally unpopular among them, but apparently Darius not personally so. Among the people of the extensive northern provinces, a military people, where he had been known, and had held command, before his accession to the throne, loyalty toward him prevailed. Thus, after all his losses, he was still in possession of great means for maintaining

Arrian, l. 4.  
c. 20.

contest. Arrian relates, as a report generally received, and to which he gave credit, that, soon after the battle of Issus, a confidential eunuch, a principal attendant of the captive queen of Persia, Statira, found means, possibly with leave, to go to her unfortunate husband. On first sight of him, Darius hastily asked if his wife and children were living. The eunuch assuring him that not only all were well, but all treated with respect as royal personages, equally as before their captivity, the monarch's apprehension changed. The queen was generally said to be the most beautiful woman of the Persian empire. How, in the usual concealment of the persons of women of rank, throughout the eastern nations, hardly less in antient than in modern days, this could be known, unless from report of the eunuchs of the palace, Arrian has not said; but his account rather implies that her face had been seen by some of the Grecian officers. Darius's next question however was said to be 'Was his queen's honor tarnished, either through her own weakness, or by any violence?' The eunuch, protesting with solemn oaths, that she was as pure as when she parted from Darius, and adding, that Alexander was the best and most honorable of men, Darius raised his hands toward heaven and exclaimed, 'O great God! who disposest of the affairs of kings among men, preserve to me the empire of the Persians and Medes, as thou gavest it: but, if it be thy will that I am no longer to be king of Asia, let Alexander, in preference to all others, succeed to my power!' The historian then adds his own remark, 'So does honorable conduct win the regard even of enemies.'

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 14.

This, which Arrian has judged not unworthy of a place in his military history of Alexander, is obviously not, like numberless stories of private conversations, related by Diodorus and Plutarch, and Curtius and others, what none who were likely to know would be likely to tell; but, on the contrary, what, no way requiring concealment, the eunuch would rather be forward to relate; so that, not improbably, many Greeks, and, among them, some acquainted with his character, and able to estimate his veracity, might have had it from himself. It seems thus altogether not unlikely that the eunuch's report was among stimulations for Darius to send a deputation to Alexander, which reached him at Marathus. The persons deputed bore a letter from the Persian king, representing that, 'between

‘ Artaxerxes Ochus and Philip there had been friendship and alliance :  
 ‘ that, after the accession of Arses, Philip, without provocation from Persia,  
 ‘ had begun hostilities, which Alexander, passing into Asia, had prosecuted  
 ‘ to the very severe injury of the Persians ; whence Darius was impelled  
 ‘ to place himself at the head of his army, to protect his subjects, and  
 ‘ defend his own inherited rights : that God’s pleasure had disposed of  
 ‘ victory, and it now remained for himself to solicit, as a king from a king,  
 ‘ the release of his wife and family, and to offer to treat of peace and friend-  
 ‘ ship ; for which purpose he proposed that Alexander should send minis-  
 ‘ ters to him with sufficient powers.’

Communications of this kind appear to have been always, in regular  
 course, laid by Alexander before his council. What provoked a reply of a  
 character widely different from that of Alexander’s conduct toward the Per-  
 sian princesses, and even contradicting his reported assurance to them that he  
 had no personal enmity toward Darius, antient history has not said. Ground  
 for conjecture seems only furnished by the fact of the capture of the Grecian  
 deputies, from whom, or from whose writings seized, information of matters  
 before unknown may have been gained. The answer to the Persian, in  
 the form of a letter from the Macedonian monarch, is given by Arrian con-  
 fidently thus :

‘ Your predecessors, unprovoked, invaded Macedonia, and the rest of  
 ‘ Greece<sup>13</sup>, to the great injury of the people. I, elected general of the  
 ‘ Greeks, have invaded Asia to revenge, not that antient aggression only,  
 ‘ but also recent wrongs. You supported the Perinthians, who had injured  
 ‘ my father. Your predecessor Ochus sent forces into that part of Thrace  
 ‘ which is within our dominion. In your own public letters, you boasted  
 ‘ to all the world of being a patron of the conspiracy which produced the  
 ‘ assassination of my father. You yourself, with the eunuch Bagoas, as-  
 ‘ sassinated Arses, and seized the empire, in violation of the law of Persia,  
 ‘ and in wrong of the Persian people. Moreover you sent your rescripts to  
 ‘ the Greeks, inciting them to war against me, and offering them subsidies  
 ‘ to support it : which, the Lacedæmonians alone accepting, all others  
 ‘ rejected. Nevertheless your emissaries did not cease their intrigues for  
 ‘ corrupting and alienating my friends and allies, and disturbing the peace of

<sup>13</sup> Μακεδονίαν και τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα.— Arr. l. 2, c. 14.

‘ Greece,



‘Greece, which, through my endeavours, had been established. On these accounts I have made war against you, who have been so the aggressor. Having then overcome in battle, first your generals and satraps, and then yourself; and having so, through the favor of the gods, possessed myself of the country; all your former subjects and adherents, even those who had borne arms against me, if they have come to me for protection, have been received kindly; and they have served me in arms, not by compulsion but with goodwill. I therefore, as now lord of all Asia, invite you to come to me. If you have any apprehension for your safety, send a confidential person to receive my pledged faith. When with me, ask for your wife and family, and whatever else you may desire, and you shall have all: ask freely; nothing shall be refused. But whenever hereafter you would communicate with me, I must be addressed as king of Asia, lord of all you possess and of all you can desire: otherwise I shall reckon myself affrontingly treated. If you propose yet to dispute the sovereignty with me, be it so, and expect me: I shall seek you wherever you may be to be found.’

It must here deserve consideration that we want the reply of the Persian court to the charge of its having been implicated in the assassination of Philip. Possibly it might deny that its words, in the original language, bore the meaning imputed by Alexander, or were at all so intended. Yet assassination, warranted even by the philosophy of the democratical Greeks, being also familiar in the practice of the despotic courts of the east, and the democracies and the court of Persia having been in league together against Philip, Alexander’s letter cannot but furnish ground for suspicion, at least, against the agents of the Persian court, if the king himself might be clear. The supposition that information, of a kind to irritate Alexander against that court, was given by the captive Grecian deputies, or found in writing among their effects, whether then wholly new, or only confirming what had been discovered among the Persian state writings at Sardis, may appear strengthened by Alexander’s conduct toward those deputies; which seems altogether to show the liberality of which his father had given the great example, and the purpose of following still the noble policy of attaching men by benefits rather than by power. They were evidently obnoxious to the charge of rebellion, as much as any whom the Lacedæmonians

Lacedæmonians punished with death as for high-treason, in favoring the Persians in the invasion of Greece under Xerxes. Two were Thebans, Ismenias and Dionysodorus. Alexander freely released both ; stating for reasons, his respect for the family of the former, which was of the most illustrious of Thebes, and his consideration of the personal dignity of the other, as a victor in the Olympian games. The Athenian, Iphicrates, being son of the renowned general of that name, the protector of his father's infancy, appears to have needed no other recommendation. The Lacedæmonian, Euthycles, was kept some time in arrest, but in no close confinement, and at length was dismissed like the others.

## SECTION IV.

*Parties in Phenicia : Submission of Sidon to Alexander : Deputation from Tyre : Siege of Tyre : Second Deputation from Darius : Tyre taken : Siege of Gaza.*

BETWEEN the small states of Phenicia, as between those of Greece, appear to have been jealousies and antipathies of no small violence. When the Persian empire was extended to the Mediterranean and Ægean, it would soon be found, by the distant court, that naval power was important, and even necessary to it. The Phenicians then, furnishing the principal means for such power, acquired an importance with their sovereigns, whence they appear to have been treated with respect beyond other conquered subjects. But, among the Phenicians, the Tyrians had obtained a preference ; and hence, in Sidon, the elder town, still holding an apparent superiority as capital of Phenicia, a party adverse to the Persian interest would the more readily become the prevailing party. A deputation from that city invited Alexander to take their state under his protection as its sovereign, and no opposition appears to have shown itself.

From Marathus he proceeded southward. The town of Byblus, on his Arr. l. 2, approach, yielded by capitulation ; and, as he still proceeded, a deputation c. 15.

met

met him from Tyre, with the son of the chief, Azelmic, whom Arrian intitles king, at its head, offering him allegiance. Azelmic himself was at the time serving under the Persian admiral, Autophradates, in the command of the Tyrian squadron of the Persian fleet. It appears probable that the purpose of the deputation was but to temporize. The Tyrians, favored by the Persian court beyond others, even of the Phenicians, were unlikely to be willing to transfer their allegiance from the Persian monarch, under whom, in maritime affairs, they were chief, to a Grecian, under whom, the Greeks being a rival maritime people, they could hope to be but secondary. Alexander apparently aware of their disposition, returned his thanks for their friendly professions, and desired they might be informed, that it was his intention to visit their city, for the purpose of sacrificing to Hercules; 'not the Grecian hero, his ancestor,' says Arrian, 'but another Hercules, worshipped by the Tyrians many ages before him, in a temple the oldest known on earth.' The Tyrians replied that, in all besides, they were ready to obey Alexander's commands; but they desired to decline admitting equally Persians and Macedonians within their walls.

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 16, 17.

This answer Alexander submitted to a numerous council of war, such as was customary, it appears, in the Macedonian kingdom, as well as in the Grecian republics: together with the generals it consisted of all the taxiarchs and ilarchs (colonels, if modern phrase should be used, of infantry and cavalry) of the republican Greek and other auxiliary troops, as well as of the Macedonian. To this assembly Alexander addressing himself, said, 'To me it appears that our proposed expedition against Egypt cannot be safely undertaken while the Persians remain masters of the sea; nor can it be prudent to proceed into the interior of the empire against Darius, while the disposition of Tyre remains doubtful, and Cyprus and Egypt acknowledge his authority. I attribute the more weight to this consideration, on account of the actual state of Greece; where, according to recent intelligence, Lacedæmon has taken part openly with our enemies, and Athens holds to engagements with us, more through the fears of the adverse than the power of the friendly there. But, with Tyre, all Phenicia being in our power, the Phenician seamen, now forming the largest and best part of the Persian navy, having no longer a

' motive



‘ motive to fight for others, would probably be induced to join us. Cyprus  
 ‘ would be likely to follow the example ; or, no hostile naval force prevent-  
 ‘ ing, would be readily subdued. The invasion of Egypt then would be  
 ‘ easy ; and, the enemy being deprived of all maritime territory, and so  
 ‘ without means to maintain a fleet, nothing would remain to be feared  
 ‘ for Greece and our homes, should we proceed to Babylon, or whither-  
 ‘ soever else.’ The resolution followed, that, if the Tyrians persevered  
 in refusing a complete connection of interest, siege should be laid to Tyre.

That city covered an island, less than half a mile from the main-land of Diod. l. 17.  
 Phenicia. A view to security only could have led the Tyrians originally C. 40.  
 to the choice of a situation so abounding with inconvenience ; as, many Strab. l. 16.  
 centuries after, it led the Venetians and the Amalfians to analogous situa- Ch. 28, s. 9,  
 tions. But the site of Tyre was preferable to that of Venice, as, instead of this list.  
 of a marsh, among shoals, denying the approach of large ships, it was a  
 rock, with deep water around, yet with a shore affording means for com-  
 modious harbours ; and still more, perhaps, it was preferable to that of  
 Amalfi, whose disadvantages have been formerly noticed. Wealthy by  
 their commerce, which for its own sake the Persian government favored,  
 the Tyrians, to the natural strength of their situation, had added fortifica-  
 tions of uncommon magnitude. Probably the connection they always  
 maintained with their colony of Carthage, the most powerful maritime  
 state of the age, had assisted to give them importance with the Persian  
 government ; and it now promoted encouragement to maintain the con-  
 nection with the Persian government, which the prevailing party among  
 them preferred. Reckoning their city impregnable without a superior  
 fleet, and confident that Alexander had not means to raise a fleet equal to  
 theirs, they resolved to defy assault.

Alexander and his army, habituated to overcome difficulties, engaged Arr. l. 2.  
 eagerly in this new undertaking. But it was not obvious, without naval C. 17, 18.  
 force, how even to approach the town. A great work however was under- Diod. l. 17,  
 taken, carrying out a mole from the mainland. The channel being shallow C. 40.  
 near the shore, the business at first was comparatively easy ; but, as the  
 work advanced the water deepened, and the workmen were not only more  
 exposed to annoyance from the enemy's vessels, but also came within  
 reach of shots from bows and engines on the city-walls, which were, on

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 21.

that side, of uncommon height. Wooden towers were built to protect them, covered with hides for security against fire. But the advantage which the Tyrians possessed in having means to act by water, of which their opponent was destitute, enabled them, by a bold and well-planned effort, to burn his towers, and extensively destroy his preparations.

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 19, 20.

Alexander was now aware that, without a fleet, his measures against Tyre must fail; and such a failure might produce even fatal consequences. He therefore resolved to have a fleet. Accordingly sending orders where he might command, and ministers wherever negotiation might be expected to avail<sup>14</sup>, he went himself to Sidon, to inquire what naval force might be raised there. Thence he proceeded to Antilibanus, a mountainous tract, abounding with timber, whose people had not been disposed to acknowledge his authority. Partly by arms, partly by negotiation, he brought all to submission. Meanwhile his usual good fortune, promoted by the fame of the battle of Issus and its consequences, attended his negotiations beyond sea. Enylus prince of Byblus, learning that his state had yielded to Alexander, entered into the views of Gerostratus prince of Aradus. Together they deserted the Persian fleet under Autophradates, led their squadrons home, and professed themselves at Alexander's orders. The number of Phenician ships of war thus acquired, was eighty. About the same time naval assistance arrived at Sidon from the allies; ten ships from Rhodes, three from the Cilician towns of Soli and Mallus, and ten from Lycia; and not long after, the Cyprian princes, if not all Greeks, yet mostly, and the rest Phenicians, being assured that not only all Lesser Asia, but also all Phenicia, except Tyre, had yielded to Alexander, followed the example of the Sidonian and Byblian in deserting Autophradates, and came with a hundred and twenty ships to offer their services. The Greeks apologized for their ingagement under the Persians. Alexander gratified them with the declaration that he considered them as having acted under unavoidable compulsion, and he showed favor to all. Nearly about the same time an accession arrived to his landforce of four thousand mercenaries from Peloponnesus. These, prepared by the voyage for service

<sup>14</sup> This seems clearly implied in Arrian's narrative, tho his explanation has here, as in some other places, a deficiency that seems to show the work never received the author's finishing hand.

ashipboard,

ashipboard, were put into his triremes, to act as marines. Thus he at once strengthened the crews, and provided security against treacherous purposes, should any such be entertained among his new subjects. Sailing then from Sidon to offer battle to the Tyrians, he took himself the command of the right wing of his fleet.

The Tyrians, before completely commanding the sea, were surprized at the approach of a fleet so beyond their expectation greater than they had force prudently to meet. They directed their views therefore to the security of their ports, on different sides of their town, together with the defence of their walls. They had had in contemplation to send most of their women and children, with the men beyond military age, to Carthage; but, confident in their strength, they had delayed the measure: a small part only was gone, and they could not now spare ships or seamen to transport the rest. But with their republican government, under a chief intitled king, they were not without party distractions. Perhaps the spirit of hostility toward the forein enemy, in the prevailing party, had been stimulated by opposition among fellowcitizens, when, having taken a vessel coming from Sidon, they led those found aboard to a part of their wall in Arr. l. 2, sight of the besieging army, and there, with ostentatious malignity, putting c. 24. them to death, threw the bodies over into the sea.

When they thus demonstrated such a determined spirit of virulence, the force prepared against them was already such, that final success, in resistance, was no longer within reasonable hope, unless they might obtain relief from either Persia, or Carthage: the enemy, commanding the sea, could starve them into submission. But this might be a tedious process, and Alexander's purposes required quicker decision. He wanted to proceed against Egypt, before the Persian government could so recover, from the shock of the battle of Issus, as to send support to that important dependence of the empire. He therefore collected hands from all the neighboring country to put forward his mole, by which he had proposed to make his attack. But the strength of the place in that part was such, and the besieged conducted their defence so ably and vigorously, that he soon saw it necessary to alter his plan. Wholly unpractised in maritime affairs, he had however practised men about him, and he possessed sagacity to appreciate their advice. Accordingly he resolved to carry on the siege by his fleet. The southern wall appearing most



assailable by shipping, the engines were directed thither, and a breach was made. In a hasty attempt to storm however he was repulsed. But, waiting then for a day of perfect calm, so that his numerous fleet might, with oars, be conducted at the same time to every part of the wall that a vessel could approach, the attention of the Tyrians being thus divided, a large part was overthrown. The ships carrying the battering engines were then withdrawn, others with pontoons were in all haste advanced, and himself took the lead of the main body for storming. The resistance of the Tyrians was vigorous. Admetus, the officer who commanded the forlorn hope, after he had mounted the breach, was killed upon the ruined wall. But Alexander, with his select body, being at hand, the nearest towers were presently carried, and possession was obtained of that part of the fortification. To penetrate immediately into the town was yet difficult; but by the summit of the wall itself he forced his way to the palace, and thence the descent into the body of the place was easier.

Meanwhile the southern port, defended by gates or chains, being attacked by the Phenician fleet, and the northern, protected only by triremes moored with their beaks outward, by the Cyprian, both were forced. The usual horrors of the storming of a populous city could not then be intirely prevented. About eight thousand Tyrians, according to Arrian, were killed.

B. C. 332.  
Ol. 112. 1.  
Arr. l. 2.  
c. 24.

The king, Azelmic, with many of the principal men, and some Carthaginian deputies, who happened to be present, took refuge in the temple of Hercules. Opportunity being thus afforded for Alexander to interfere for their protection, not only their lives were spared, but they were generously presented with liberty. All others taken, strangers as well as Tyrians, to the number of about thirty thousand, were, according to the practice of the age, sold to slavery for the benefit of the conquering army<sup>15</sup>.

Meanwhile Darius, with means yet great, but not to be readily collected, evidently found himself distressed by the rapidity, as well as vigor, with which his opponent pressed forward in conquest. The siege of Tyre was yet but in progress, when a second deputation from him reached

<sup>15</sup> Arrian's detail of this remarkable siege will deserve the attention of those curious after the military of the antients. Diodorus, in relating the military operations of Alexander, has mostly followed the same good authorities as Arrian, and has drawn some

matters not unworthy of notice from those whom Arrian has neglected. The frequent ineptitude, which he has introduced among them, may indeed sometimes provoke a smile from the judicious reader.

Alexander, bringing the offer of ten thousand talents, about two millions sterling, for the ransom of his family, and proposing a treaty of peace and alliance, with the further offer of his daughter in marriage, and all the country between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean sea, for her dower. The proposal was laid before Alexander's council, and tradition of words passing on the occasion has become celebrated: 'If I were Alexander,' it is reported Parmenio said, 'I would accept the terms;' 'and I,' replied Alexander, 'were I Parmenio'. The answer returned to the proposal imported, 'that he neither wanted money from Darius, nor would accept a portion of the empire of which he reckoned the whole his own; and if he chose to marry Darius's daughter, his prisoner, he should not ask Darius's leave.' Something of pithiness, in the answer to Parmenio, has obtained admiration from some, in antient and in modern times. But with this there is a petulance, so little becoming from a youth, however lofty in station, to so highly respectable an elder, and so contrary to the good manners which all accounts show to have prevailed in Philip's court, while, in the answer, to the unfortunate head of the Persian empire, there is a harshness so nearly approaching brutality, the very reverse of that politeness and generosity to which Alexander had been bred, and which we have observed him frequently demonstrating, that, as Arrian merely states report without an author, allowance for doubt of its exact conformity to truth may be claimed; and perhaps it may not unreasonably be suspected that the story has received its actual coloring from the worse taste of the democracies of Alexander's age, or of the vicious court, afterward, of the Roman empire. Nevertheless that Parmenio, and with him, all the more sober-minded and reflecting men of the council, would reckon it, not for themselves only, but even more for their country, desirable to rest on the great acquisition of empire proposed to be assured to their prince by the terms offered, can hardly be doubted. What however came with certainty to public knowlege was, that the deputation from the king of Persia produced no accommodation.

During the siege of Tyre, the disposition of that populous neighboring country, called by Arrian the Palestine Syria, including Judæa and Samaria, could not be indifferent to Alexander. According to that historian, the whole had acceded to his interest before Tyre was taken; Gaza only, a strong fortress on the coast, with a garrison under a Persian governor, resisting.

resisting. The circumstances of the submission of the Jews, and the terms they obtained, would be interesting to us. But it appears they afforded nothing to attract the notice of Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian, Justin, any heathen writer of Alexander's history whose work is extant; tho of the defence of Gaza, under the Persian governor Batis, a eunuch, their account is large, and Arrian's especially particular<sup>16</sup>.

Apparently Gaza, an insulated fortress, in a country not friendly to Persia, could have given Alexander little trouble had he left it behind him, as he had left the citadel of Halicarnassus, and some fastnesses in Lycia. But his extraordinary achievements appear to have operated upon

<sup>16</sup> The story found in our copies of Josephus, and of the book of Maccabees, has been the subject of much discussion among very learned modern critics. According to those books the Samaritans at once acceded to Alexander's demands: the Jews, pleading their oath of allegiance to the Persian king, refused. Alexander in person led his whole army to compel them to submission. The high priest, Jaddua, divinely instructed, went out to meet him, arrayed in the robes of his office, attended by the priests in the attire of their order, and followed by the whole people in white garments. Alexander also had been favored with a divine admonition; in consequence of which, on the approach of the suppliant throng, he fell prostrate before the high-priest, as a person divinely commissioned; and the result was, that he not only showed high favor to the Jews, but carried it to such extravagance, as to show extraordinary illiberality and ingratitude to their religious adversaries, the Samaritans.

The objections to this story, ably discussed by Moyle, are well tho briefly stated in a note of the eighth volume of the antient Universal History. The recent attempt of the very learned Dr. Hales of Dublin, in his Chronology, to rebear those objections, marks a mind highly desirous that the story should have credit, and will, I think, hardly convince any other. Arrian's account of Alexander's transactions with Palestine, those at Gaza excepted, is dispatched in these few words, ἦν ἀπὸ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῆς Παλαιστίνης

καλούμενης Συρίας προσεχωρηκότα ἤδη — Arr. l. 2, c. 25. Indeed it cannot but appear utterly unlikely that if Alexander really led his whole army, or but a part, to Jerusalem, the military writers his companions, and all other Greeks, his cotemporaries, should fail to notice such a march; and, if any of them recorded it, that five such writers after them as Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Justin, and Arrian, the four former eminently fond of the marvellous, the last remarkable for solicitude to be exact, all having not only those military writers, but many other histories of Alexander before them, should concur in a total omission of matter so remarkable as that related in the books aforementioned.

One suggestion it may perhaps be allowed to add. All accounts of Alexander's transactions, and especially Arrian's, show it likely that, if he did not go himself to Jerusalem, he would send, to receive the submission of the Jewish people, an eminent officer, instructed to treat them with liberality. The high-priest would be a person to communicate with. In meeting the general he would hardly make the mistake attributed to the mother of Darius, when Alexander visited her after the battle of Issus, and persevere in it. Yet possibly the story, circulated perhaps with some extravagance at first, might, in course of years, and in repeated telling, receive such gradual improvement as to come out, at last, among the Jews, that which has been transmitted.

his



his mind as stimulation to contend with difficulties, and rather to seek them; and the idea would be ready that it was due to his acquired fame, and requisite for his view of farther conquest, not to allow an insulated fortress to defy him with impunity. Gaza was situated about two miles from the sea, on a lofty mound, in a territory of deep sand, denying every material for forming approaches. The people of the adjacent country were assembled to assist in the works: timber and even earth, were to be brought from a distance. With immense labor, a mound was formed, equal in height to that on which the town stood, so that battering engines could be applied. The expense of the siege of Gaza, in lives, money, and time, less than of the siege of Tyre, was however, in proportion to the importance of the object, greater. Alexander, himself, impatient, leading an assault, received the severest wound he had yet experienced: he was for some time disabled by it. His example, nevertheless, and his suffering, exciting emulation among his troops, and all his principal officers putting themselves forward for hazardous enterprize, the place at length was stormed; tho such was the desperate valor of the garrison that, according to Arrian, every man of it died fighting. The women and children were sold for the benefit of the conquerors; the place was given to a colony of the neighboring people.

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 26.

## SECTION V.

*Expedition to Egypt. Olympian Festival at Memphis. Foundation of Alexandria. Journey to the Temple of Jupiter Ammon.*

THE acquisition of the rich country of Egypt was Alexander's next object, and circumstances favored the enterprize. Sabaces<sup>17</sup>, satrap of the country, had attended Darius at the battle of Issus, and fell there. Amid the wreck of high hopes, for those in the Persian service, resulting from the event of that battle, the emigrant Macedonian prince Amyntas appears to have seen, in the calamity to the empire wherein he had found

Arr. l. 2,  
c. 11.

Diod. l. 17,  
c. 48.

<sup>17</sup> In our copies of Diodorus the name is Tasiaces.—Diod. l. 17, c. 34.

refuge,

B. C. 332.  
Ol. 112, 1.  
Diod. l. 17,  
c. 48.

refuge, hope of new fortune for himself. Knowing that Egypt had been drained of troops to swell the army under Darius, and that the Persian government was very unpopular there, he formed a project for making himself master of the country. With specious display of prospect in adventure, rather than with wealth he could possess, he engaged four thousand of the Grecian mercenaries, in the Persian service, who had escaped from the field of Issus, to act under his orders. At Tripolis, on the Syrian coast, he found vessels, which, in the paralysis of government among the western Persian provinces, with the force under him, he could command. With these he proceeded to Cyprus, where he engaged additional adventurers, and then led all to Egypt. On his arrival he proclaimed the death of the late satrap Sabaces, and asserted that he came himself commissioned by the king to succeed to the government. Mazaces, who seems to have been left with the chief command, when Sabaces went to attend Darius in Syria, was without means for effectual resistance, unless he could persuade the Egyptians themselves to take arms under him. Amyntas penetrated as far as Memphis, the capital, one of the most populous towns of antiquity, whence has grown Cairo, one of the most populous of modern ages. The Memphians, little attached to the Persians, were yet not disposed to submit to the Macedonian adventurer. Amyntas, without pecuniary resources, could only subsist his troops by plunder of foes, if he could find and overcome them, of friends, if he could not. The Memphians shutting their gates against him, he plundered the country around. Issuing for its protection, he defeated them. But, when the nearer fields yielded no more, whether it became necessary, in extending excursion, to divide his strength, or, as is probable, he failed of authority to maintain due order, the Memphians, observing opportunity, attacked his dispersed force, and, with the greater part of his troops, Amyntas himself fell.

These events were recent when Alexander arrived with his army before Pelusium, the key of Egypt by land as well as its principal seaport, and his fleet anchored in the harbour. The impression, both on Persian officers and Egyptian people, was very different from that made by the pretended satrap, when the conqueror of Lesser Asia and Syria, the hero of the Granicus and Issus, whom the previously supposed impregnable fortresses of Tyre and Gaza could not withstand, showed himself at the head of his combined

combined land and sea forces. The Egyptian people seem to have been ready to receive and even welcome the invader: Mazaces, yielding to necessity, surrendered whatever depended on him; and that formerly powerful and still wealthy kingdom, which had so long defied the force of the Persian empire, became an addition to Alexander's dominion without a blow. Thus Persia was completely excluded from the Mediterranean and Ægean seas, and Macedonia, head of the Grecian confederacy, commanding the coast from Sicily and Italy to the Libyan desert, was become, perhaps without excepting even Carthage, the first maritime power in the world.

Hitherto we have seen Alexander, as a soldier, displaying, with the most ardent courage, uncommon prudence (uncommon certainly for his years, even if only decided by the ablest advice) and, as a politician, highly liberal, tho' with ambition always apparently the main mover. In Egypt first we find another, and a noble feature of his great character displayed. He would know the country that he had so acquired, and the people so become his peaceful subjects, and establish suitable regulations. No other purpose is indicated in his march up the country, on the right side of the Nile, as far as Heliopolis, crossing the river there, and returning on the other side to Memphis. In that great capital, then, to produce harmony between his new subjects and his old, by bringing them acquainted with one another, among ceremonies of religion and amusement, he repeated the celebration of a festival, in the manner of the Macedonian Olympic. The Persians, from their first conquest of the country under Cambyzes son of the great Cyrus, had made themselves generally odious by offensive demonstrations of contempt and scorn for all that, in religious belief and religious ceremony, the Egyptians held most sacred. Indeed to men bred, like the Persians, to exalted notions of the Deity, in a religion approaching primeval purity, it might be difficult to behold, without some indignation and abhorrence, and at the same time perhaps with a disposition to ridicule, the preposterous ceremonies which were public, whatever might be the more secret belief of the learned, among the Egyptians; and possibly they might not unreasonably object to them, not only that they were derogatory to the dignity of the great Author of nature whom they adored, but also adverse to the effect which religious faith should have on human

Ch. 6. s. 2.  
of this hist.



morals. On the contrary, with the polytheistical principles of Greece, liberality was not requisite to produce respect for the religious belief and religious ceremonies of all nations ; superstitious hope and fear would suffice. Jupiter being supposed powerful in the air, Neptune on the sea, Pluto under the earth, Juno at Argos, Minerva at Athens, Diana at Ephesus, it would be but in course to believe, or at least to apprehend, that Apis might hold the greatest divine sway in Egypt.

From the numerous, and continually recurring instances, reported by antient writers, of Alexander's attention to what in his age had popular consideration as religious duties, some moderns have imputed to him a religious, and some a superstitious turn of mind. Positive information however failing, it were perhaps not only otherwise fairest, but also most consonant to all the best testimonies extant, to suppose that his religious belief was nearly that of Socrates, Xenophon, Plato, and more especially Plato's pupil, his preceptor, Aristotle. Holding then, with Aristotle, that one Almighty Power made and preserves the universe, it might not be inconsistent to hold, with Socrates, that in the want of certain instruction from the Deity himself, it was safest and most becoming, with regard to matters of ceremony, for all men to follow the customs of their forefathers ; the belief being very general that the Deity communicated with their earliest forefathers. He might not improbably, and perhaps not improperly, go farther, and hold, with Xenophon, that it became statesmen and military commanders to use even popular superstition for honorable and salutary purposes. Clearly his purposes appear to have been honorable and salutary in showing, contrary to the Persian practice, tho honorable motives might also influence the Persians, high respect for the venerated god of the Egyptians. He himself assisted in the ceremony of sacrifice performed to Apis. With this measure of conciliation for his new subjects, he combined measures of gratification for the Greeks. Accustomed even to seek new deities, to suppose something of divine essence in every part of inanimate nature, and taught, by inquirers concerning the antiquities of their country, to look to forein parts for the origin of their religion, and for the birthplace of some of the most eminent of their reputed gods and goddesses, the addition of Apis to their catalogue would not be likely to excite extensive, if indeed any offence. But not to leave the effect negative,

Alexander

Aristot. de  
mundo, c. 6.  
Ch. 2. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Xenoph.  
mem. Socr.  
l. 1. c. 1. s. 3.

Ch. 23. s. 5.  
of this hist.

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 1.

Alexander sent to Greece for the persons most eminent as public performers in all the amusements of the theater; and the labors and dangers of past campaigns were forgotten, or, in recollection, even enjoyed, among the gratifications at great expense provided.

Of the revenue, that essential engine, political and military, which Alexander had now acquired by his extensive conquest, comprizing some of the richest countries of the world, accounts are among those failing. That however the poverty, under pressure of which he originally engaged in his great enterprize, little relieved by the successes of the first summer, was now done away, so that, from a needy he was become a wealthy prince, appears beyond doubt. Liberal and magnificent even to appearance of prodigality in expense, he was however attentive to the sources by which liberality and magnificence could be supported. Having surveyed much of a country very extraordinarily productive, watered by one of the largest rivers of the world, discharging itself, by seven mouths, into the Mediterranean sea, whence the greatest facilities for commerce might be expected, he learnt that nature had denied it a convenient haven. That of Pelusium, at the most eastern mouth of the Nile, was very defective, and offered little opportunity for improvement. Canopus, on the eastern side of the most westerly mouth, had a landing-place for vessels, but still more inconvenient. Alexander nevertheless would examine it. Canopus itself was found unsatisfactory; but on the western side, between the river and the lake Mareotis, was found a situation which, under the able advice within his means to command, he judged to have those circumstances of nature which art might improve, so as to make it singularly promising for the site of a great commercial city. It was among the advantages of his extraordinary fortune to find, in every line, men of his nation qualified to second his great ideas, and among his extraordinary talents to be generally unerring in selecting them. As an architect, Dinocrates had already acquired superior reputation, especially in building the new temple of Diana at Ephesus. He added greatly to that reputation by the design and execution of the buildings of the new city, near the western mouth of the Nile, which, from its magnificent founder, had the name of Alexandria. For wholesomeness everything was adapted

Ch. 6. s. 2.  
of this list.

to the climate; for commerce everything to the greatest convenience; for magnificence and beauty, the streets excelled in length and width, the temples of the Grecian and Egyptian gods, and the markets and other public buildings, in extent and elegance; and for security, the sea on one side, the lake Mareotis on another, and strong and lofty walls all around, that city was eminent. Many circumstances seem to have concurred to offer facility for making this new city a Grecian colony. The Egyptians, as we have formerly seen, under their native kings before the Persian conquest, had been familiarized with the establishment of Greeks among them, for both commercial and military purposes. Many men of Alexander's army, disabled for active service, but still valuable for garrison duty, and without prospect at home, would be likely to rejoice at the advantages offered for citizens of the rising town; and the rewards here given for passed services would encourage the young and able to enlist for new adventure. Thus would be provided, at the same time, security for conquest made, and means for farther conquest.

Arr. l. 3. c. 2. Alexander was yet busy with this great work, in which utility of design so vied with magnificence of execution, when his admiral, Hegelochus, arrived from the Ægean sea, reporting very important advantages which had resulted from the near dissolution of the Persian naval power, through the defection of the Phenicians and Cyprians. In the island of Tenedos, the party adverse to the Persian supremacy had revolted, and renewed their connection with the Grecian confederacy under the supremacy of the king of Macedonia. In the more powerful island of Chios, not only those whom Autophradates and Pharnabazus had raised to sovereign authority there had been overborne, but Pharnabazus himself was made prisoner. In Lesbos the counter-revolution was equally rapid. The services of the Athenian Chares to the Persian cause had been rewarded with the government of Mitylenë, but he was unable now to hold it: Mitylenë and all Lesbos renewed the former connection with the Macedonian confederacy. The friends of that confederacy in Cos sent a deputation to the Macedonian admiral, representing that they were ready to rise. Hegelochus sent them sixty triremes under Amphoterus; and, following soon with the rest of the fleet, he found his officer's success already complete. Aristonicus, under Persian patronage,  
tyrant



tyrant of Methymne in Lesbos, had used the means in his hands for depredation upon the commerce of the Ægean, and took himself the command of a squadron of five small vessels adapted to the purpose<sup>18</sup>. Putting into the port of Chios, uninformed of the recent revolution there, he was made prisoner, with all his crews. These, to a man, perhaps hardly warrantably, were put to death as pirates. Aristonicus, Apollonides, Phisinus and Megareus, who had been chiefs of the Persian party in Chios, were brought, in the squadron attending Hegelochus, to receive from Alexander himself their doom. Pharnabazus, probably less obnoxious, and therefore less strictly guarded, had escaped, and it may rather seem with permission<sup>19</sup>. Of the other prisoners, those who had held the dignity of tyrant were sent home to be judged by their people; except Apollonides, who, whether as a measure of more mercy, or some political consideration required it (possibly as a leader in piracy he might be popular among the seamen of the Ægean) was placed in close confinement at Elephantine in Egypt. Thus was completed the reduction of the islands of the Ægean under Alexander's empire, which now extended from the Adriatic sea to the great Asiatic desert on one side and the African on the other.

An expedition of no small difficulty and danger, tho no opposition in arms was apprehended, then invited Alexander's fancy; an expedition, to ready view, more of curiosity than of ambition, or of any obvious utility; tho it is possible that views both of ambition and of extensive utility to mankind may have had a share in the purpose.

Far within the vast desert of sand, bounding, westward, the narrow length of habitable Egypt, are some small tracts of well watered and highly fruitful soil, scattered, as islands in an ocean. Extreme distress only, in the urgency for men to avoid fellow-men, can be imagined to have impelled any to the adventure by which treasures so hidden were first discovered. Security, however, being attained, population would grow; and with it wants, beyond what the scanty extent of useful soil could supply. Thus,

<sup>18</sup> — ἡμιολίαις ληστρικαῖς — Arr. l. 2. c. 2.

<sup>19</sup> He went to Cos. A powerful Persian party was among the population of that island: but, according to the historian's previous information, it had already been overborne by the party of the Grecian confe-

deracy. No violence being mentioned as attending the revolution, it is possible that, even after it, Pharnabazus may have been safe among his friends of the Persian party there.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 4.

in course of time, the quiet possessors of the little territories were impelled to the hazardous undertaking of retracing the steps of their forefathers over the wilderness of sand, the protector of their quiet, to communicate with the warring world. A natural production highly valuable in neighboring countries, a salt for culinary purposes, of uncommon purity, in quantity far beyond the need of the small population, was found, in one of these sequestered spots, which became known by the name of the Land of Ammon. This commodity, carried to Egypt, obtained extensive demand, with an importance heightened through its request among the priesthood, for sacrifices. It appears likely that early settlers in the land of Ammon, perhaps the first, possessed what is called, in holy writ, ‘All the learning of the Egyptians.’ They possessed however what enabled them to establish, in more perfection than was then common, the law and order necessary to the well-being of societies. In the earliest period in which history notices them, they had acquired extensively the reputation of superior sanctity for their abode, and of such favor from the deity, as enabled them to reveal to others his purposes. Already in the age of Herodotus the oracle of Jupiter Ammon had been of fame from time beyond his means to trace; tho he mentions tradition, but evidently fabulous, of its having originated in the same manner, and at the same time, with that of Dodona, esteemed the oldest of Greece. Report went, which, tho slighted by Strabo as also clearly fabulous, yet Arrian found so prevailing as to be induced to notice it, that the antient heroes, Perseus and Hercules, reckoned among Alexander’s progenitors, had consulted the oracle of Ammon. Such a notion, however unfounded, having had, as seems probable, some popularity in Alexander’s age, might stimulate the desire, not unnatural in a youthful breast, to emulate the course of those renowned ancestors. That Cræsus king of Lydia consulted the oracle of Ammon, as Herodotus relates, is perfectly within probability; and altogether Alexander’s desire of communicating with a seat of prophecy of such antient and extensive fame, would not, in its day, be generally considered as unbecoming a prince of great designs. The story cherished by the profligate temper of after-times, that the god Jupiter Ammon had an intrigue with the queen Olympias, Alexander’s mother, was moreover, according to Arrian, already in public rumor.

But

Herod. l. 1.  
c. 46.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 2.

But to gain assurance of success to his views for the future, or, as Arrian says, a pretence to assert that he had such assurance, is likely to have been a principal motive.

Independently however of greater purposes, a curiosity to see the place, and a disposition to make light of difficulties and dangers incident to the journey, were of the character of his youthful age and adventurous temper. Nevertheless he did not neglect what prudence might require, for security to himself and companions, in the adventure. He took with him an escort, described as a small army; and he chose the road, not the shortest, but the least difficult for the accommodation of numbers. About two hundred miles he proceeded along the shore of the Mediterranean sea to Parætonium. The whole tract was desert, yet at intervals furnishing water in wells. Turning then inland for the rest of the way, water must be carried. An evil, not uncommon, but which apparently, at that season, it was hoped to escape, put the whole escort in extreme peril. A strong southerly wind, raising the sand, so obliterated all signs of way that the guides were utterly at a loss. A prodigy, according to both the great men of Alexander's army who wrote his history, relieved him and his followers from threatened destruction. Ptolemy related that two dragons (large serpents were so called by the Greeks) appeared at the head of the army, uttering sounds that seemed like speech. Alexander commanded to follow them, and they led directly to the seat of the oracle. Aristobulus differed only in calling the conducting animals ravens; and for this he seems to have had credit from most following writers.

It cannot but excite surprize, that two such men as Ptolemy and Aristobulus should have gravely given to the world either story as fact within their knowlege. Those stories indeed have come to us only in a very succinct abstract, from their unfortunately lost works, by Arrian; which, high as that writer's authority is, will hardly warrant a decisive judgement on the subject. That subject, however, has engaged the attention of eminent modern inquirers. The very learned Bryant, looking to the familiarity of figurative speech among the eastern people generally, and the particularities which we learn of the antient Egyptians, has supposed that the appellation of Ravens, borne as a distinguishing title by some of the Egyptian priests,  
gave



gave occasion for the more popular story, that of Aristobulus, to which alone he has adverted. Priests, and attendants of the temples, would, in all probability, be among the guides. But the serpent, as well as the raven, was among sacred symbols of the Egyptians. If then some of the priests were, either in Egyptian or Grecian speech, distinguished by the title of dragons, while others were called ravens, the difference between the two eminent writers would be utterly unimportant, and both accounts would be divested of all improbability. Whether then it were so, or whether it may have been the deliberate purpose of those eminent writers to take a simple fact as ground for fable, suited to excite public respect for their prince, among a credulous and wonder-loving people, must be left to the reader's judgement. Indeed in Arrian's narrative we are not yet at an end of the miraculous. In prosecuting the march, under guidance of the divinely-inspired animals, the water, carried for the army, failed. Distress was already great, and apprehension unbounded, when a heavy rain afforded the necessary supply; and whether this was in or out of the ordinary course of the season, it passed for another prodigy, indicating the favor of the deity to the prince who voluntarily incurred such hardship and danger with a religious purpose<sup>20</sup>.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 3.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 49.

The island of valuable soil in the ocean of sand, to which Alexander had been directing his course, is said to have been little more than five miles  
across

<sup>20</sup> The learned annotator on Strabo, in the Oxford edition, has proposed another explanation of Aristobulus's story, affording however no relief for Ptolemy's. ' Quid autem mirum (he says) si milites, in desertis, aquarum, expertibus, vagantes, ab avium volatu, fontes sylvasque petentes, se non procul ab Ammonis templo abesse judicarint.'—p. 1153. The value of this imagination will best be estimated by those who have visited the sandy deserts of the hot climates, or are familiar with the best accounts of them. In favor of Bryant's interpretation, what Herodotus relates of the founders of the oracle of Dodona may deserve to be remembered: from some peculiarities of their speech, he says, on their first arrival

from beyond sea, the people of the country, called them pigeons; whence tradition passed to posterity that birds, with power of human speech, established the oracle. But the raven, it is well known, is a bird of extraordinary intelligence, disposed to become very familiar with men, and, when habituated to their society, unwilling to leave it. Many will yet remember the Cheshire raven, that marched on wing, let the expression be excused, from that distant county through London with its regiment of Militia, in the year 1781, to the camp on Coxheath, near Maidston, in Kent, and, in an unfortunate excursion thence, was shot by a neighbouring farmer. I know not whether it may be extravagant to suppose that, as pigeons are trained to be messengers,

across, each way. Its beauty and fruitfulness, and altogether the pleasantness for which it was celebrated, would be the more striking from the contrast with all around and near it. The air is said to have been deliciously cool, at least for those parched with the burning atmosphere of the desert. Springs of the finest water were plentiful; and the abundance of trees, mostly bearing refreshing fruits, afforded a shade, in such a climate, among the greatest of luxuries.

Arriving at this favored abode, Alexander was received with the respect which the fame of his actions and power would prepare, and with the goodwill which his disposition to respect the oracle would conciliate. Proceeding with the prescribed ceremony to consult the god, the answer, as Arrian's account indicates, was given to him alone. What it was, the historian has not undertaken to say, farther than that Alexander declared it satisfactory. The conclusion seems reasonable that neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus had reported it, and that Arrian gave no credit to the accounts of others.

The extraordinary natural circumstances of the little territory then engaged Alexander's attention; and he expressed himself altogether much gratified with his expedition. Having satisfied his curiosity he returned, according to Aristobulus, the way he came; but according to Ptolemy, by the shorter way directly to Memphis. Perhaps it may here be allowed to suggest that this second difference of those writers, who both had superior means of information, may have been less real in their own than it appears in the later historian's account. It seems likely the body of the army would return the way it came, as the only way reasonable for an army to attempt, and that Aristobulus, attending it to Alexandria, reported its march; but that the king, with such a body of horse only that sufficient water might be provided for it, took the far shorter course to Memphis, where, as the sequel shows, business required him; and Ptolemy accompanying him, related that to which he was a party.

messengers, ravens might be trained to be guides. Such a supposition need not lessen the value either of Bryant's interpretation, or of what it has been ventured to offer concerning Ptolemy's account. If, among the priests, guides of the army, the superior were intitled dragon-priests, and those who had the care of birds, trained to lead the way, were of infe-

rior rank, which, all things considered, seems no very extravagant supposition, one of the eminent writers may have considered those who held command to have been the guides, while the other may have spoken only of the subordinate, who were the efficient indicators.

At Memphis embassies from many Grecian republics were waiting Alexander's arrival, or came soon after. All, according to Arrian's expression, obtained all they desired; which may imply that they obtained whatever could be reasonably granted; and, if all were not completely satisfied, yet such was Alexander's conciliating manner, that, tho his liberality could not meet all their wishes, they still went away gratified. A magnificent sacrifice to Jupiter followed; and the amusements of the Macedonian Olympian festival, gymnical games and theatrical exhibitions, with music, were repeated for the gratification of the army and people.

Arr. I. 3.  
C. 5.

To regulate the government then of a country so valuable, yet, for centuries, so habituated to disturbance, as Egypt, became an important consideration. Arrian's account of the arrangement is very concise, yet variously interesting. As before through concerns of religion, so now in settling the civil administration, Alexander showed the liberal purpose of conciliating the people. He would have the ancient law of the country maintained, and he proposed to appoint two Egyptians, Doloaspis and Petisis, to be civil governors. The latter however declining the highly honorable yet arduous office, the whole authority was committed to Doloaspis.

The military command in chief obviously could be with prudence intrusted only to Macedonians, of high rank, and of character to deserve high confidence. Balacrus son of Amyntas, a lord of the body-guard, and Peucestas son of Marcatatus were appointed to it. The two important military stations, till the new city of Alexandria might vie with them, were Memphis, the capital, and Pelusium, called the key of Egypt; being the principal seaport, situated where the fruitful soil meets both the eastern desert and the Mediterranean sea. To the military command of these, under the superintendence of the joint commanders in chief, he appointed also Macedonians, committing the former to Pantaleon of Pydna, the other to Polemon son of Megacles, of Pella. Hitherto we find Arrian distinguishing Macedonians in the common way of Grecian family description, by the addition of the father's name only. For republican Greeks the mention of their republic is his common and obviously necessary distinction; and this affords indication of the extent in which he used the services of the republicans, and the rank to which he admitted them. Androcles of Amathus in Cyprus is named as commanding a ship of war at the siege of Tyre. The Cyprian-Greek cities, with the title of allies,



furnishing a large squadron to the fleet, this would be in course. But no account remains of naval assistance from the Italian-Greek states; yet an Italian-Greek officer, Pasocrates of Thurium, also commanded a ship of war in Alexander's fleet at Tyre. The description now of the Macedonian Pantaleon by his town only, may seem to indicate that he was raised to the dignity of a royal companion, and then to the important military government of the capital of Egypt, from a rank inferior to that in which the two commanders in chief were born, who are distinguished only, as supposed enough so distinguished, by the addition of their father's names; Balacrus, as son of Amyntas, it will be observed, being clearly marked for a different person from Balacrus, appointed by Alexander satrap of Cilicia who is described as son of Nicanor. It may then deserve remembrance that Pydna is recorded to have been twice in revolt, under the influence of a democratical party, against the Macedonian kingdom; tho the inference will be doubtful whether disaffection there was, in Alexander's opinion, done away, or whether Pantaleon had been eminently of the loyal, in opposition to the democratical party.

It is however evident that Alexander, with the successes which gave him increased power, and with it increased security, extended his liberality to the republican Greeks. Hitherto, tho the civic troops of the several republics, and also the several bodies of mercenaries, were severally under their own officers, yet Macedonian officers commanded all. But now a very extensive command over the Grecian troops<sup>21</sup> in Egypt was given to Lycidas, an Ætolian. That high trust however was not committed to him in total independence of other officers, yet still republican Greeks, Ephippus, a Chalcedonian, and Æschylus, called by Curtius a Rhodian; tho what was the controlling authority, with the title of overseers<sup>22</sup>, committed to them, is not said. But as ages ago there were Greek colonies established about the mouths of the Nile, the Egyptian Greeks might be numerous. Altogether it may seem likely that, Lycidas holding the military command, the authority

<sup>21</sup> Τῶν ξένων. We find the mercenaries often clearly intended by that title. The forces of the Greek republics, serving with Alexander, are commonly distinguished in Arrian's narrative by the title of *ἐυμαχοί*. And

yet it may seem that each term has been sometimes intended to include both. Possibly careful observation might relieve the doubt.

<sup>22</sup> *ἐπίσκοποι*.

of Ephippus and Æschylus was civil. Eugnostus son of Xenophantus was appointed to an office, very uncertainly farther described than by the title secretary<sup>23</sup>, but which is marked as important, not only as Arrian esteemed the appointment matter for notice, but also as Eugnostus was of the rank of royal companion. The district, called by the Greeks Heroopolis, on the eastern side of the Delta, reckoned rather of Arabia than Egypt, was committed to Cleomenes, who seems to have been a Greek, of the antient colony of Naucratis. A province immediately westward was also made a separate government under Apollonius son of Charinus. These appear to have been important toward commanding the communication between Egypt and Asia, and between Memphis and Pelusium. Orders were publicly issued for all these officers, in their several capacities, to respect the antient laws of the several cities and districts. Thus the overseers and secretary would form a board of general administration for the Greeks; every colony holding, for its own affairs, its old republican government; while the Egyptian governor would hold the king's, according to the antient constitution of the country.

<sup>23</sup> Γραμματεὺς τῶν ξίτων.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

## ALEXANDER'S Third Campaign in ASIA.

## SECTION I.

*Recruits for Alexander's Army. March from Egypt to Tyre. Question of a Third Embassy from Darius to Alexander. Embassies from Greece.*

WHILE Alexander wintered in Egypt a small reinforcement for his army arrived; four hundred Grecian infantry, and five hundred Thracian horse. Arrian, l. 2. c. 6. Recruits from Europe seem thus always to have been reported by the historian generals from whom Arrian drew his account, but those, indubitably numerous, from the extensive Grecian establishments in Asia and Egypt are omitted: possibly, and even probably, because the historian generals avoided notice of them. In spring Alexander moved for Phenicia.

Diodorus introduces here the embassy from Darius, reported by Arrian and Curtius to have reached Alexander at Tyre, before he moved for Egypt. Diodorus undertakes for chronology, yet often marks it but uncertainly, and sometimes relates facts clearly out of season. Arrian, far less generally attentive to mark times and seasons than might be desired, nevertheless so holds his narrative in direct course, that strong proof only can warrant a modern writer to controvert his course; and, much as the florid, licentious, and sometimes petulant style of Curtius differs from the dignified simplicity, in which Arrian, at a late age, has emulated the earliest and best Greek writers, yet his account of the embassies from Darius clearly shows that he has drawn from the same authorities as Arrian. Nevertheless it may seem not preposterous to suppose that Diodorus may have had some foundation for the report of an embassy meeting Alexander on his return from Egypt, of which  
the



the other writers omitted notice. The purpose of such a mission might be to refute whatever may have appeared erroneous in Alexander's angry answers to former communications ; to apologize for whatever might have given offence ; yet to state that Darius was now prepared with powerful means to resist and even revenge any further attempt against his remaining still very large dominion ; and, moreover that, tho powerful by the force actually under his orders, defended by barriers not easily to be passed, and, as Alexander knew, having zealous allies, ready for opportunities, in Greece itself, yet, that for the sake of peace, and to recover his wife and children, Alexander's prisoners, he was willing to abandon all claim on the extent of rich country already conquered from him, and to pay even a greater ransom than before was offered.

But still farther considerations might have encouraged to renew the attempt to negotiate with an enemy not known of immoderate views. With Alexander's European empire his conquests in Asia, thus once, at least, according to all accounts, offered to be confirmed to him by treaty, comprized almost all the best provinces of the modern Turkish empire, and, through the circumstances of antient navigation, gave him the command of all the neighboring seas ; for Carthage, mistress of the western part of the Mediterranean, could no longer, since the loss of the Phenician ports, contend with him in the eastern. This dominion, with just improvement, might perhaps have been rendered richer, and more effectually powerful, than the most extensive ever yet known on earth. Nor were a disposition to promote the welfare of mankind, or great and just views for it, wanting in Alexander : they had already been largely shown, especially in his recent measures in Egypt. But Providence had other purposes. Magnanimous, liberal and judicious as his conduct generally had been, yet the greatness of his successes was already more than even his strong mind, chastened by his excellent education, could, at his yet early years, hardly yet twenty-five, completely bear. With his acquisitions, and his dangerous adventures, his passion, both for acquisition and for dangerous adventure, rose.

Negotiation therefore, if again attempted, again failing, Alexander proceeded to Tyre, the place appointed for the meeting of army, fleet, and embassies. There the Athenian sacred ship *Paralus* arrived, bringing *Diophantus* and *Achilles*, ministers from the Athenian people, accompanied by  
ministers

ministers from several other republics. All came commissioned to represent that, in the absence of the captain-general of the nation, the repose of Greece was threatened by the ambition of Agis king of Lacedæmon; and that already it had been declared to some Peloponnesian states, that, unless they would renounce the general confederacy under the king of Macedonia, and ingage in a league adverse to it, they would be treated as enemies. Against this therefore support was solicited and claimed.

Such a representation might have induced a leader of more sober prudence, and less eager in pursuit of a favorite purpose, to forego or suspend the proposed expedition beyond the great desert. But it was accompanied with information of a recent event at Athens affording encouragement. Alexander's arrogant refusal of treaty would stimulate Darius's diligence in measures for resistance, and, among others, in the endeavor to procure a diversion in his favor by exciting war in Greece. A more particular account were highly desirable; but what remains from Æschines, uncontradicted by his opponent, is still a very curious document, marking the character of the Athenian democracy of the day. Orators it appears were found who did not scruple to propose to the Athenian people their acceptance of three hundred talents, about sixty thousand pounds sterling, as a present from the king of Persia. This sum may appear small as a bribe to the whole population of one of the most powerful states of Greece, the formerly imperial Athens. But, before the introduction of paper-credit, bribing more largely was less readily to be managed; and it is to be recollected that in no remaining account the Athenian citizens, qualified to vote in the general assembly, have been reckoned more than twenty one thousand; so that sixty thousand pounds might have paid a clear majority, even had all attended, five pounds each. Accordingly Æchines evidently has thought the sum not unfit to be mentioned to the assembled Athenians as calculated to be equal to its object. But the influence of the Macedonian party prevailed, and the disgraceful proposal was rejected.

Æschin. d.  
cor. p. 633.  
ed. Riske.

Ch. i. s. 4.  
of this hist.

This decision of the Athenian many, under the lead, it seems probable, of Phocion, was, in the moment, of great importance. Alexander, powerful now at sea, beyond competition, confident in the ability of his vicerent, Antipater, in Macedonia, and assured of the adherence of Athens to ingagements with him, satisfied himself with ordering a hundred ships  
of

of the navies of Phœnicia and Cyprus to join his Grecian fleet, under the command of his admiral Amphoterus, in the Ægean. Thus also, it appears, he satisfied all the embassies. Arrian and Curtius concur in saying that, as the former embassies, so these obtained all they were commissioned to desire; the wise policy of their constituents, the Macedonian party in the several republics, not pressing for anything beyond what the liberality of their elected chief might properly grant<sup>1</sup>. In favor of the Athenians, Alexander added, apparently unasked, what he had before refused. The Macedonian party, in Athens, it is likely, would be less anxious than the Persian, to obtain the release of the Athenian citizens, made prisoners at the battle of the Granicus; and, even if desiring, they would be more scrupulous of urging it. Now freely given, it may perhaps, notwithstanding the common illiberality of party spirit, have won for Alexander the gratitude of some generous minds in Athens.

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 6

About the same time his magnanimously liberal and forgiving temper was manifested in another, and perhaps yet stronger instance, apparently clear of all instigation of policy. Harpalus son of Machatas, one of his early friends, having incurred the king his father's displeasure, had withdrawn from Macedonia. After Philip's death he returned on Alexander's invitation, and passed with him into Asia. Among those with whom he was most intimate was Tauriscus, a young man whose talents might recommend him, but of conduct highly exceptionable. A little before the battle of Issus, for some misbehaviour, it became necessary or expedient for him to abscond; and Harpalus was induced to go with him. Tauriscus managed to gain reception into the service of Alexander king of Epirus, the king of Macedonia's cousin, and brother-in-law, then making war in Italy; but he soon died there. Harpalus had taken his residence at Megara; a circumstance among many proving that the Grecian republics were free; that no arbitrary authority of the king of Macedonia, the elected stateholder and military leader of the nation, interfered to the injury of the just civil authority of the several states. The king of Macedonia, apparently satisfied that Harpalus had been misled by Tauriscus, from whom now there was no longer either

<sup>1</sup> Ἐτυχον ὧν ἕνεκα ἐσάλησαν.—Arr. l. 3. c. 5. Omnes, æqua desiderare visi, impetraverunt.—Curt. l. 4. c. 8.



ill advice or ill example to apprehend, sent him assurance which induced him to repair to Tyre. Simply to forgive, however, was not the measure of Alexander's kindness. Harpalus being of a constitution ill adapted to the fatigues of military service, a civil situation, was provided for him. Cœranus of Berroœa and Philoxenus had been joint treasurers, attending the king's person with the military chest. Here again, it may deserve notice a Macedonian in high office is distinguished by his town. Cœranus was now appointed receiver-general of Phenicia, Philoxenus of Asia within Taurus, and the office of Treasurer attending the king's person was intrusted to Harpalus alone.

Hardly however all, whom Alexander's now powerful favor, with whatever acuteness of discrimination, raised to great situations, would have minds to bear their fortune. Arimmas, whom he had appointed to the satrapy of Syria, important not only for the extent and wealth of the country, but also for its situation on the border against the still powerful enemy, had so shown either a dangerous ambition, or an offensive vanity, that it was thought proper to remove him, and Asclepiodorus, son of Eunicus, was appointed in his room. Arr. l. 3.  
c. 6. The satrapy of Lydia, which, on the first conquest of that country, had been committed to Asander son of Philotas, in whatever way now becoming vacant, was given to Menander, one of the order of companions, actually commander in chief of the auxiliary Greeks<sup>2</sup>. To the high command which, by this promotion he quitted, Clearchus was appointed. The general in chief of the bowmen, Antiochus, died. Ombrion, a Cretan, was appointed in his room. The historian's notice of these and other promotions in the army, and in the financial department for the conquered countries, little interesting in the detail for the modern reader, is yet altogether valuable, as it marks the care with which the particulars of Alexander's administration were recorded by cotemporaries, and the interest with which they were observed by following writers.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἐνυμμάχους τοὺς πεζοὺς*—Arrian, l. 3, c. 5, p. 110.

## SECTION II.

*March from Tyre across Syria: Passage of the Euphrates: March across Mesopotamia: Passage of the Tigris. Station of Darius's Army at Gaugamela near Arbela. Forces of the Armies.*

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 7.

B. C. 331.  
Ol. 112, 1.

Arrangements being completed both for the security of the friendly among the Grecian republics, and for the administration of the extensive countries conquered, Alexander ventured upon the movement with his army, in various views highly hazardous, to which his passion for conquest in the region celebrated for earliest empire, and the most extensive and wealthy known in the world, led him. He arrived at Thapsacus, where the younger Cyrus had crossed the Euphrates, in the Attic month Hecatomæon, in the archonship of Aristophanes at Athens, so Arrian marks the date, being about the end of May or beginning of June of the three hundred and thirty-first year before the Christian era. The bridges he found broken, and a body of about four thousand Persian horse, and two thousand Grecian foot, on the opposite bank, commanded by an eminent Persian, Mazæus<sup>3</sup>. This body however presently withdrew. The bridges were then in all quiet repaired, and that great barrier the Euphrates, was, with no opposition, crossed<sup>4</sup>. It had been Alexander's declared purpose to proceed directly to Babylon, the rich head of the empire, looked to as the inexhaustible fountain of rewards for the labors and dangers in which his army was engaged, and supposed the object, beyond all others, for the enemy to defend.

<sup>3</sup> That this is the description of the body under Mazæus, intended by Arrian, I have been led to believe by a judicious note of Gronovius on the passage.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus here has either followed an ignorant guide, or, undertaking to abridge greatly what he ill understood, has given a grossly defective account; as the reader,

observing it only with the most ordinary map before him, will at once see. Tho a little before he mentions both the Euphrates and the Tigris, he here forgets the former. A story follows about Alexander oversleeping, ineptly introduced, yet possibly not unfounded on fact.

The difficulties of the shortest road from Thapsacus to Babylon, even when no enemy gave interruption, are marked, as we have formerly seen, in Xenophon's account of the expedition of the younger Cyrus. That account and others would be before Alexander and his council. A way considerably more circuitous, eastward across the north of Mesopotamia, and then southward on the eastern side, was therefore resolved upon. There water and forage would less fail, and the heat of the air was commonly less injuriously violent.

In this course Alexander had not proceeded far, when his advanced guard made some prisoners, from a body of the enemy employed to observe his motions. From these information was gained, that Darius, abandoning Mesopotamia, had taken a strong position on the eastern side of the Tigris; and it was added, that his army there was considerably superior to that with which he had suffered defeat in Cilicia. A council of war was called; and, in result of its deliberation, the resolution prevailed, most consonant to Alexander's repeated declaration, and, tho seemingly the boldest, perhaps really the safest, postponing the march to Babylon, to proceed immediately against Darius.

Before Darius ascended the throne, his course of life gave him advantages for the arduous contest he had to maintain, which a prince, bred wholly in a Persian court, could not have possessed. Practised in the command of armies, tho wide of opportunity for experience of the Grecian discipline, nevertheless, in his preparation for the battle of Issus, he had shown that he was aware of the value of the Grecian discipline. Hence we may the rather admit the probable account of Diodorus, where Arrian fails us, that his defeat there was a lesson which he did not neglect. Assembling an army in Mesopotamia, while Alexander was in Egypt, he assiduously attended himself to bring  
Died. l. 17.  
c. 53.
his numerous forces, of various nations, and languages, and customs, and weapons, and art of war, to act in some reasonable concert. But he had more confidence in the attachment, as well as in the military character, of his northern subjects. Among them, in youth, he had acquired military fame, and among them, when the throne was hardly in his view, he had held a satrapy. There then, should Alexander, unallured by the rich meed, left apparently unguarded in the south, seek him, he might reasonably hope, with his cavalry, excellent in kind



and very superior in number, in an open country, to be superior altogether ; yet, in case of an unfortunate event, the mountains were at hand for refuge, with a brave and, it might be hoped, a loyal people their inhabitants. But, should his enemy take the more obviously inviting and less immediately dangerous course southward, he might follow through the immense plains with his cavalry at secure distance, watch opportunities, annoy without exposing himself to danger of defeat, and in the end, as happened to the Roman army under Crassus, in the third century after, destroy him without a battle.

Nevertheless why no disturbance was given to Alexander's army in crossing the Euphrates, none in the extent of the Mesopotamian plain between that great river and the Tigris, and, when that second great obstacle was reached, at the place indicated as the station of the Persian king's army, why no obstruction was provided there, information fails. This however may be observed, that the Parthians, when they destroyed Crassus, had been for more than two centuries, in constant contact, and frequent wars, with the armies of the Greek princes of Syria ; an advantage for the contest to come, of which the northern subjects of Darius wholly failed. The Tigris at that place and in that season not denying a ford, and no enemy interrupting, yet the rapidity of the stream, with its depth, made the passage troublesome and hazardous. The Assyrian bank nevertheless, under the able management of Alexander's army, was gained without loss of lives. Rest then was allowed for some days, to prepare for new fatigue ; delay being also apparently necessary toward obtaining information where the hostile army was. In the interval happened an eclipse of the moon, nearly total. The solicitude which this phenomenon never failed to excite among the Greeks, as a mysterious indication of the purposes of the gods toward men, required attention. Sacrifices therefore were offered to the moon, the sun, and the earth, as deities through whose agency eclipses happen ; and the judicious seer, Aristander of Telmissus, declared that the phenomenon foretold a battle, to be fought within the running month, and that it concurred with the indications of the victims in assuring that Alexander's army would be victorious.

The soldiers mind being thus not only set at ease, but filled with hope, Alexander resumed his march. Darius's purpose, when he had ascertained his enemy's determination to avoid the allurements of Babylon, Susa, and the

the riches of the southern provinces, appears to have been to weary him by a circuitous march, avoiding a battle. And Alexander was thus effectually put to difficulty: very doubtfully informed where Darius was, he directed his way down the course of the Tigris, with that river on his right, and the Sogdian mountains on his left.

Having proceeded thus three days, in uncertainty, on the fourth he had information from his advanced party, that they had seen a body of the enemy's horse. Assurance presently following that it was only a detachment of not more than a thousand, he himself, with two bodies of his best mounted cavalry, the royal horse, and the companions, proceeded against them. The Persians, whose orders probably were to observe, and not to fight, presently retreated; but, Alexander pursuing, (his opportunities having been great, through his command of Palestine and Egypt, to procure horses of the race always esteemed the finest in the world) a few overtaken were killed, and also a few were made prisoners. From these intelligence was gained that Darius, with his whole force, occupied a strong camp, at the distance of but a few miles.

Upon this Alexander halted. Choosing then an advantageous spot, he c 9. surrounded it with a rampart and ditch, as a depository for his baggage and sick, and of retreat for his forces in any adverse circumstances. In this work, and in preparation for battle by rest and otherwise, he employed four days.

We want assurance of the numbers, now on either side preparing to contend for the empire of the civilized world. An official return of the Persian force is said by Arrian, on the authority of Aristobulus, to have come into Alexander's hands; stating the nations or provinces which furnished the men, and in some instances distinguishing horse from foot; but that it gave numbers does not appear. On what authority therefore Arrian has undertaken to state the totals of the several arms, we want to know; and what error in transcription of his work may have made the infantry, far beyond all other accounts, a million, must be left for conjecture. The horse are said to have been forty thousand, sithebearing chariots two hundred, elephants only fifteen; numbers all clearly within probability. The Grecian infantry that retreated from the Euphrates under Mazæus are mentioned to have been two thousand. What more may have been still in the Persian king's service is no where distinctly said. But if the infantry altogether

altogether were a hundred thousand, the proportion would be nearer to what experience on former occasions would lead the Persian king or his generals to desire to assemble, even nearer to what we find previously ordinary in Persian armies, and perhaps nearer to what Arrian himself meant to report<sup>5</sup>. But whatever myriads of Asiatics, with missile weapons, may be supposed to have attended, it is evident, from the historian's account of the following battle, that the king and his principal officers reckoned the horse, the chariots, the elephants, and among the infantry, almost only the small body of Greeks, as the strength of their army<sup>6</sup>.

It is observable then that Arrian, with the caution so usual with him, which stamps authority on his more positive assertions, has avoided to undertake for exactness in giving the numbers even of the king of Macedonia's army, which he says consisted of about forty thousand foot, and seven thousand horse. Possibly the Macedonian generals, from whom he drew his narrative, lessened the Macedonian force while they magnified the Persian; but we are not furnished with ground for any precise conjecture on the subject. If to the accounts of his losses, since he entered Asia, we add those of recruits joining him from Greece, they will hardly make his European force so great. But, for raising men among the Grecian settlements in Asia and Egypt, his opportunities, as before observed, were large; and his own letter, formerly noticed, to Darius from Tyre, may seem to advert to the service in his army of others, beside Greeks, who were become his subjects. Indeed we have seen it of old usual to admit such among Grecian mercenaries, whence they obtained military estimation as Greeks. That the force of every description, attending him, was in the highest state of Grecian discipline, is little to be doubted. It would then be improved for contest with Asiatic armies by practice against Asiatic armies, and perhaps strengthened by whatever useful in Asiatic practice, whether of the cavalry, or of the light-armed service, could be gained through the conquests made.

<sup>5</sup> If the historian wrote the words at length, δέκα μυριάδας, ten myriads, or a hundred thousand, and the transcriber, ἑκατον μυριάδας, a hundred myriads, or a million, the addition and alteration would be less than is often found to have been made in Grecian manuscripts. If, on the other hand, numeral letters were used, a blot near the

top of I, meaning ten, might lead the transcriber, to suppose it P, meaning a hundred.

<sup>6</sup> Thus, according to Curtius (who among his theatrical matter has some good historical observations) at the battle of Issus, *Darius equestri prælio decernere optabat*. l. 3. c. 11.



Had the composition and temper and discipline of Darius's army been such that he could have completely chosen his measures, the sequel seems enough to show, not only that he had done judiciously in hitherto avoiding a battle, but that, persevering in that course, he would probably have ruined Alexander. But for such perseverance difficulties would remain, such as those which disturbed his purpose of waiting for Alexander in Syria, before the battle of Issus. Finding it therefore necessary at length to hazard a battle, which he had hitherto, probably with just judgement, avoided, he deposited his heavy baggage and his military chest in the fortified city of Arbela; and he chose the station where to wait the enemy about six miles off, at Gaugamela, on the river Bumadus, which runs into the Tigris. The country around, open, with gentle undulations of surface, was advantageous for the action of his cavalry, on which he principally depended. But he hoped also for great effect from his sithe-bearing chariots; and, to give this kind of artillery its best opportunity, numerous hands were employed to remove, to a great extent, any of those smaller inequalities of surface which might impede it. Thus prepared, waiting for the enemy, he avoided all attempt to disturb his measures on the ground which he had taken, only about seven miles off.

## SECTION III.

*Battle of Gaugamela, commonly called of Arbela.*

ALEXANDER, on the fifth night after reaching his station, called to arms ART. 1 3  
 about the second watch, near midnight, and marched immediately, with the C. 9.  
 purpose of attacking the enemy at daybreak. Nearly midway some hills of moderate height had prevented the view of either camp from the other. On his arrival there, unmolested, having a full view of the Persian station, he saw marks of recent handy-work, to a great extent. The military historian does not account for the failure of previous observation, but proceeds to say that, unaware of the enemy's object for sithed chariots, what are called, in modern military phrase, wolf-holes, concealed excavations, prepared with pointed stakes, to disturb the approach of any troops, but especially of cavalry, were apprehended. On this the army was halted, and a council of war was called.

Such

Such then was the improvident ardor among Alexander's young officers, that a majority, in contempt of the enemy, recommended attack without delay; but, Parmenio advising previous investigation, Alexander's intuitive mind repressed his own ardor, which was inferior to none, and, the ground being very advantageous, he incamped on it in order of battle.

Xen. Cyr.  
Anab. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 21.  
Ch. 23. s. 4.  
of this hist.  
Arr. l. 3.  
c. 11.

It was not in the practice of the Persians, as of the Greeks, to fortify their camps<sup>6</sup>, and their management of their cavalry, as we have seen formerly in Xenophon's account, assisted to make nightly assault formidable. Among their labors, now, to prepare for action without their camp, little had been done to provide security within. Such therefore was the apprehension excited by the view of Alexander's army, occupying the heights only three miles off, that the troops were formed in order of battle in the evening, and kept under arms all night. A written statement of that order, according to Aristobulus, came after the battle, into Alexander's hands. The extreme of the left was held by the Bactrian, Daan, and Arachosian horse. The forces of Persia proper followed, foot and horse intermingled. The Susian and Cardusian troops then completed that wing. The center, immediately commanded by Darius, composed of Indians, emigrant Carians, perhaps having the Grecian discipline, Mardians, who were bowmen, Uxians, Babylonians and Arabians, was formed in very deep order. Directly about the king's person were two bodies of royal guards; one styled the king's kinsmen, the other the Melophor Persians<sup>7</sup>; and on the flanks of these the Greek mercenaries. The elephants, and fifty sithed chariots, were in front of the center; a hundred chariots, supported by the Scythian horse, were in front of the left, and fifty chariots, with Armenian and Cappadocian horse, in front of the right.

Alexander, with numbers insufficient for meeting the whole Persian line, and therefore liable to have his flanks turned, and perhaps his rear, resolved upon the mode of action of which, as far as history shows, Epameinondas seems to have given, in the battle of Leuctra, the first example

<sup>7</sup> Οὗτοι στρατόπεδον ἀντιοῖς περιέβλητο ἀκρεβέες.  
—Arrian, l. 3, c. 11.

<sup>8</sup> The body of Persians called by the Greeks Μηλοφόροι, applebearers, or orange-bearers, are said to have been spearmen, at

the hand-end of whose spears, or lances, apparently for balance, was a gilt ball; for which Wesseling's note 64 to the 59th chapter of Diodorus's 17th book, and the authorities there indicated, may be consulted.

for antient and for modern times; directing a superior force against a particular point of the hostile army, and avoiding, as far as might be, to meet the rest. With this view he advanced in two equal lines, so arranged that, should the enemy, far outnumbering him in cavalry, gain his flank or rear, the whole might readily form a hollow square. In this order, first so in direction toward the Persian center as to be outflanked each way, he took, as he proceeded, an oblique direction toward the right. The Persians, observing this, inclined to the left, to obviate his apparent purpose of gaining their flank. Alexander however had almost reached the extreme of the ground which they had levelled for the operation of their chariots, when his cavalry and Darius's Scythian horse were nearly meeting. The apprehension of the Persian generals then was that, by further progress in that course, he would render their chariots useless, and therefore the Scythian, with a part of the Bactrian horse, were ordered immediately to charge. Alexander hastened forward the Grecian mercenary cavalry under Menidas, to meet them, and thus the action began. The Greeks were nearly yielding before superior numbers, when Alexander ordered Aretas, with the Pæonian cavalry, and that of the Greek confederacy<sup>8</sup>, to their support; and then the enemy were compelled to give way. But the rest of the Bactrians advancing on the other side, and the Scythians, both men and horses, being superiorly provided with defensive armour, Alexander's troops were again pressed, and the action was for some time doubtful. The superior discipline however of the Greeks, charging in regular order those who held no line, gave them at length a clear superiority, and the enemy fled.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 13.

During this contest the Persians, the bearing chariots were advanced against that part of the Grecian line where Alexander himself had his station. It had been foreseen that the shock of that kind of artillery upon the phalanx might be formidable. To weaken the effect therefore a body of light-armed was advanced, who, with a shower of missile weapons, wounding drivers and horses in their approach, disturbed the order necessary to their efficacy; while active men, unincumbered with the panoply, easily avoiding the line of the chariots, hung upon their flanks, and some even approached so as to seize the reins and

<sup>8</sup> Τοὺς ξείρους.



turn their course. Thus the proposed simultaneous charge of the whole body of the chariots was so obviated, that, for those which could hold the proposed course, it was not difficult to open and let them, with little injury, through to the rear. All, so passing, were taken.

This point gained appears to have afforded important relief to Alexander's army, among pressures from superior numbers, directed with considerable judgement, and supported with valor. The Persian main body followed the charge of the sithebearing chariots, expecting to meet in front the phalanx in disorder, while a powerful body of horse was endeavoring to gain its right flank. The defeat however of the Bactrians and Scythians inabled Alexander to send Aretas, with the cavalry under him, against that body. The contest here again was severe. At length however the Persians were driven against their own infantry, so as to disturb that part of the line where Darius had his station. Alexander observed, and proceeded instantly to profit from this. Moving his phalanx to the left, he directed its attack in column against the disordered Persian ranks, which he charged at the same time with the horse immediately about him; and presently piercing and dividing the Persian line, he threw all into confusion. Flight became extensive; to restore order in that part was no longer possible; Darius, tho, according to those whom both Diodorus and Curtius followed, not till after personal exertions in the thickest of the action, nor till after his charioteer was killed<sup>2</sup>, of necessity joined in retreat.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 60.  
Q. Curt. l. 4:  
c. 15.

Alexander then, whether led more by his constant passion for the glory of personal valor, or instigated by the circumstances of the moment, and eagerness of desire to make the Persian king his prisoner, appears to have overlooked the first duty of a commander-in-chief for the purpose of executing that of an inferior officer. Instead of directing his attention to his left wing, which he had weakened to make his successful impression on the right, he pressed pursuit of the defeated part of the Persian line, with the cavalry about him, and directed the whole phalanx of his right to follow. Meanwhile, how far under direction from Darius himself, who

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus says by a javelin from the hand of Alexander himself. Had this been in any degree ascertained, it would hardly have been of much use to Aretas. Curtius gives it to an unknown hand. Both say it was supposed by those around that Darius himself was killed, and thence the flight of the Persians that followed.

according

according to both Diodorus and Curtius, excelled in military skill as well as in valor, must remain uncertain, the enemy's right wing, commanded immediately by Mazæus, had profited from Alexander's fault. Parmenio, with two lines in phalanx, was unable to withstand the great body of horse, charging, as seems to have been the Persian way, in column. They did not indeed rout, but they broke through both his lines. Not stopping then to complete their success, as if it was already certain, in their habitual passion for plunder, they proceeded to the camp, which was within view. It was so out of contemplation, says Arrian, that any cavalry could break through two lines in phalanx, that the orderly retreat of that body, in case of failure of victory, was depended upon for the security of the camp. The small guard therefore being surprized, was presently overpowered; Persian prisoners, probably not numerous, being released, joined their victorious cavalry in slaughter and plunder. Meanwhile another body of the enemy's horse gaining Parmenio's left, prevented his detaching any assistance to the camp: so that, threatened on all sides, he with difficulty maintained his ground.

Ch. 24. §. 3.  
of this hist.

Information of these circumstances, sent after Alexander, who was far advanced in pursuit of Darius, first reached Simmias, commander of a large body of the phalanx following him. That officer judged it so important, that, without waiting for orders, he halted his division, while the messenger hastened after the king. Alexander, tho with extreme regret, did not hesitate about the measure which prudence imperiously required. Returning, with the utmost speed, to relieve the laboring part of his army, on arriving he charged the Persian cavalry, which was hanging on Parmenio's left. A contest singularly vehement ensued. Sixty of the body, called the companions, immediately attending Alexander, were killed: Hephæstion, Cœnus, Menidas, generals of high rank, were wounded. Grecian discipline however at length prevailed against the valor of numbers less ably combined, and the Persians, once compelled to give way, took to precipitate flight. Meanwhile Parmenio, relieved from the pressure on his flank, could use his Thessalian cavalry against the enemy in front, and at the same time detach a part of his second line, which presently overpowered the Persians, tumultuously plundering the

camp. Alexander, after having defeated the enemy's cavalry, came to his support; but, through the exertions especially of the Thessalian horse, who earned the highest credit, the victory was already complete.

The indefatigable prince then, directing Parmenio to proceed to take possession of the Persian camp, resumed himself the pursuit of his royal foe. Reaching the river Lycus, itself no small obstacle, supervening night made farther effort hopeless, even had those under him been equal to farther effort. The horses he rode had been relieved by relays; many of the horses of those attending him, it is said, had already died of fatigue. Thus necessitated he returned to his camp. On arriving he directed that his army should have repose; but he allowed himself little. Moving again at midnight, with a chosen body of cavalry, he reached Arbela so unexpectedly that he became master of the town, apparently without resistance, and found in it, yet unmoved, all the valuables deposited there; among which a chariot, shield, and bow of the Persian king, the second of each sort the fruits of his victories, were especially noticed.

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 15.

Such, according to Arrian's probable and mostly perspicuous account, drawn, as he professes, from the narratives of general officers present, was the battle, fought near Gaugamela, but commonly called of Arbela, which decided the fate of the Persian empire. In reporting numbers slain, that historian however, is, against his custom, extravagant; he says only one hundred men were killed on the Grecian side, and on the Persian three hundred thousand; adding, that the prisoners were still much more numerous. Here however, as on former occasions, it is necessary to recollect how liable numbers are to be altered in transcription; and error may the rather be suspected as, of the other antient writers of Alexander's history, tho generally given to extravagance, none has approached that found in our copies of Arrian's work. But supposing those copies should be trusted for accuracy in numerical notation, yet his care continually demonstrated to follow the best authorities, being considered, his report can only be valuable as an eminent example of the antiquity of the trick of governments to give their warrant to false accounts, exaggerating an enemy's loss in battle and lessening their own; least practicable in ours, where a vigilant party is always ready to detect  
and



and expose any attempt at such fraud, and rather to mislead public belief in the contrary direction. Nevertheless that the destruction on the Persian side was great, is clearly probable. But that the loss of the victors also was severe may, against Arrian's enumeration, be gathered from his narrative. In an action fully acknowledged to have been strongly contested, and even long of doubtful issue, it could not be otherwise; and the admission that the cavalry of the royal companions alone lost five hundred horses, tho some are said to have died of fatigue in the pursuit, would suffice for assurance that the slain altogether were numerous.

Arrian we may believe followed his usual guides, the Macedonian generals, in his account of the conduct of the Persian king; but what their knowledge of it was may be questionable; and policy might lead them to adopt the most unfavorable among various, and apparently all uncertain reports. He says that Darius, immediately on Alexander's charging the part of his line where he had his station, so yielded to fear as to be among the first to set the example of flight. It is creditable for the Grecian character that other Grecian accounts remain transmitted. Diodorus, not usually an inventor, attributes to Darius the first praise of that courage and conduct on the Persian side, which, even in Arrian's report, long balanced the battle. Curtius, nearly concurring, farther gives him credit for generous and magnanimous conduct, even in his flight; of which one circumstance, necessarily of some publicity, may, even on his authority, deserve notice. Having put the river Lycus between himself and the pursuing enemy, it was proposed, by some about him, immediately to destroy the bridge by which he had passed. But he forbade; observing that thousands of his subjects, who had been engaged in the chance of war with him, might want that bridge; and he would not, for his individual safety, deprive them of a chance for safety<sup>10</sup>. All accounts indicate that, before Alexander arrived, the bridge was rendered impassable.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 58, 60, &  
61.

Q Curt.  
l. 4. c. 16.

We

<sup>10</sup> Curtius's narrative so frequently corresponds with Arrian's, and especially his account of the more important circumstances of this great battle, that it cannot be doubted but Arrian's authorities were before him. That he has used them in so different a way is to be regretted; upon a foundation so valuable raising a superstructure not without value, but so disguised with flowery ornament, romantic tales, and scenic dialogue,

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 61.

We have had more than one occasion to observe that an Asiatic army defeated, commonly dispersed, so that, for a time, it nearly ceased to exist as an army. Of Darius's forces the Greeks alone, unless also the cavalry immediately attending him, seem to have preserved order in retreat. Reports were various of the course which he immediately took in his flight, and perhaps none exactly true; for it seems likely that, at first, some concealment was advisable, and even necessary. His plans however were not so defective but that misfortune was in some degree provided for. Estimating, according to appearance, justly, the deficiency of his means to defend the rich and open southern provinces, with a population of little loyalty, he directed his course toward Media; and, when it was ascertained that the enemy had taken the contrary course, so that communication northward was clearly free, he collected some of his dispersed cavalry. Before long then he was joined by relics of his Grecian infantry, to the number of about two thousand, with Paron of Phocis and Glaucon of Ætolia, their commanders. The severity exercised toward those Greeks, who at the Granicus and at Issus had fought against the army of the Grecian confederacy, would be admonition for these to remain true to their engagement for the Persian service.

dialogue, that it is rarely possible to estimate his testimony for any fact without some corroborating evidence. Hence whether his lively description of the miseries of the defeated, in their flight from the field of Gaugamela, tho probable enough, be derived from any just authority, or is only a fanciful emulation of Thucydides's fine picture of the flight of the Athenian army under Nicias and Demosthenes from Syracuse, may be questioned. Like the poet, he undertakes to know everything. Not contented with giving, like Livy and so many other antient writers, the speeches of generals to their

armies before battle, he answers for their words, their looks, and their passions, what they knew and what they felt in the midst of the hottest action. Through this licence indeed he offers some scenes admirably suited to either the stage or the easel. Thus his work seems to have been adapted to the taste of a refined and luxurious age, when the despotism of the Roman empire denied to the public all interference in public concerns, so that minds, even the most capable of public business, and the most disposed to it, must find content, as they best might, in idle amusement.

## SECTION IV.

*Alexander's March to Babylon, Susa, and Pasargadae or Persepolis.*

WE have seen the generally generous policy of the Persians, toward conquered people, failing in Egypt, through an overweening contempt of those superstitions which held the strongest sway in Egyptian minds. Their honest pride of their purer religion, becoming evil by excess, had also revolted the Babylonians. The destruction of the temples of Babylonian worship, among which that of Belus, or Baal, was supereminent, is attributed to Xerxes. How far anything, either in Babylonian or Egyptian superstition, adverse to the Persian government, might justify restraint, or urge to severities, remaining history will not enable us to judge. The Babylonians however were prepared, nearly as the Egyptians, to rejoice in passing under a new dominion. This was not likely to be a secret to either of the contending princes; and while it assisted to determine the retreat of Darius northward, would strengthen the otherwise powerful inducement for Alexander to go southward. Accordingly abandoning for the present, what had been the first object of his keen mind, the pursuit of the defeated monarch, he hastened, in the opposite direction, to take possession of the rich prize waiting for his grasp.

Ch. 45. s. 4.  
of this hist.

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 16.

Arrian, ibid.  
Diod. l. 17  
c. 64.  
Q. Curt.

Nothing opposed his march to Babylon. Mazæus, with all he could keep together of the large division of the Persian army which he had commanded at the recent battle, had retreated thither, and appears to have held the principal authority there. A garrison in the citadel was commanded by Bagophanes. Alexander expected resistance; but, as he approached, he was met by the whole population of the immense city unarmed, the nobles and priests leading a solemn procession, bearing presents, and declaring the surrender of the town, citadel, and treasury to his pleasure. Mazæus, it appears, promoted the measure; and Bagophanes, hopeless of support from his king, hastened, after the example, to earn the conqueror's favor. Alexander, courteous to all, took Mazæus into his confidence, and directed his policy to gain, among the Babylonians, that attachment which the

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 16.  
Q. Curt.  
l. 5. c. 1.



the conduct of the Persian government had repelled. Communicating with the Chaldæan chiefs of the Babylonian religion, he ordered the temples, which had lain in ruin from the time of Xerxes, to be restored under their direction, and he presided at a sacrifice to Belus, performed as they prescribed.

Ch. 24, s. 5.  
of this hist.

We are unfurnished with ground for estimating how far the conduct of Mazæus was reproachable. His omission to obstruct the enemy's passage of the Euphrates may very possibly have been within orders. His conduct in the battle of Arbela has eulogy in all antient accounts. We must look to the texture of the Persian empire, and to preceding circumstances, and to some following, for direction of judgement. Even in the earlier reign, with less irregular succession, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, we have seen the generous and upright satrap Pharnabazus openly avowing, that he reckoned himself bound in allegiance to the sovereign of the empire only as long as he enjoyed his confidence and favor. Intelligence had now reached Alexander of circumstances in Armenia. Before the battle of Issus all Asia, westward of that country, had yielded to him. The event of that battle could not but affect the minds both of rulers and subjects there. Those dissatisfied, reasonably or otherwise, with the actual state of things, would look toward a revolution. The event of the battle of Arbela would augment and extend that disposition. Hence, apparently, it was that Alexander sent, from Babylon, a satrap into Armenia; and, for the execution of that high and important office, he chose one who, whether a Persian or of whatever country under Persian dominion, had been a subject in high office under the Persian crown, Mithrines, to whom he had owed the ready surrender of the citadel of Sardis; and it does not appear that any Greek was sent to check or share his authority. Mazæus had so recommended himself that the important dignity of satrap of Babylon was committed to him, but with civil authority only. The military command of the district was given to Apollodorus of Amphipolis, and the presidency of the revenue to Asclepiodorus son of Philon.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 16.

Curt. l. 5.  
c. 2.

It may deserve notice, then, on the authority of Curtius, tho unmentioned by Arrian, whose guides, the Macedonian generals, were likely to avoid notice of it, that Apollodorus was directed to raise recruits for the army in Babylon and its territory. The wealth of that city and the extent

of rich territory acquired with it, enabled Alexander, apparently with the revenue ordinarily paid to the former sovereign, to reward those who had shared with him the labors and dangers of his expedition. He made a donation, according to Curtius, to each Macedonian horseman of about twenty-four pounds sterling, to every other horseman about twenty, and every foot soldier near ten. Q. Curt.  
l. 5. c. 1.

A disposition, among the southern provinces, to disaffection toward the government of Darius, or rather toward the Persian dynasty altogether, marked in the occurrences at Babylon, seems yet more strongly marked in what followed at Susa. That city had been the principal seat of the Persian government; chosen for the convenience of its situation between Babylon, Ecbatana and Persepolis, the antient capitals of the Assyrian, Median and Persian kingdoms. It was the common winter residence of the court, which, on account of the heat there in summer, which Strabo mentions as extraordinary, generally moved for that season to Ecbatana. Strab. l. 15.  
p. 1037. ed.  
Ox. Communication from Susa had been such as to induce Alexander to send thither one of his generals, Philoxenus, without a military force, merely as a negotiator. After no long stay in Babylon, proceeding himself with his army toward Susa, he was met by the son of the satrap, accompanied by a messenger from Philoxenus, with dispatches assuring him that the surrender of the city was ready on his arrival, and with it that of the general treasury of the empire, containing valuables to the amount of fifty thousand talents, about ten millions sterling. This came into Alexander's possession; and it was farther a gratifying circumstance of triumph, that in Susa was found the spoil that Xerxes had carried from various Grecian cities, to exhibit to his eastern subjects as testimonies of his conquests in the west. Among them the brazen statues of those celebrated tyrannicides, venerated by the Athenians as martyrs in the cause of liberty, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, were especially noticed. Alexander consulted his popularity and fame among the Greeks generally, as well as especially among the Athenians, at the same time confuting the slander of the demagogues who had been in the habit of qualifying his father and himself as tyrants, by sending these to Athens, as presents to the Athenian people. Placed by order of the sovereign assembly in the square called Cerameicus, they remained there, as Arrian assures us, in his time, near five hundred years after.

At Susa Alexander displayed his generosity also in another way; for the concurrence of Diodorus with the Latin historian here apparently may be trusted for what Arrian, intent principally on military movements, tho no way contradicting, has omitted. The illustrious prisoners, the wife and family of Darius, who, in the long journey from Cilicia, had been always treated with the kindest respect, were now settled in the royal palace of Susa; probably the most grateful resting-place for them; and it would also probably be to their gratification that here, as at Babylon, the civil administration was committed to one of Alexander's new subjects, Abulites, a Persian. The military authority was reserved still to Greeks, and mostly Macedonians. Archelaus son of Theodorus was appointed commander-in-chief within the province of Susiana. The government of the citadel of Susa was committed to Mazarus, one of the band of companions. Menes was sent to take the extensive and critically situated viceroyship of Syria and Phenicia; whether superseding Asclepiodorus, who had superseded Arimmas when Alexander was leaving Tyre to march against Darius, or including his province within a wider command. Menes carried with him three thousand talents, about six hundred thousand pounds; part to supply Antipater, for the war threatened in Greece by Agis king of Lacedæmon, and the rest to raise recruits for the army in Asia.

Alexander appears to have denied to the purer religion of Persia the respect with which he had studiously treated the Chaldean superstition, as well as the still grosser Egyptian. Yet we are not uninformed of what may have led to this. The Persians, with a misbecoming pride in their purer faith, for the principles of which perhaps Herodotus, confirmed as we find him by following writers, may be trusted, were disposed to be intolerant of all others; and not only had been severe against the Egyptian and Chaldean, but, till they had learnt to fear the Greeks, had even persecuted the Grecian. At Susa, instead of ceremonies in honor of the national religion, as at Memphis and Babylon, the historian reports only a magnificent sacrifice, according to the Grecian ritual, accompanied with Grecian gymnastic games.

A reinforcement from Greece and the Grecian cities of Asia, which, tho Arrian has not specified the numbers (the Macedonian generals, his authorities, having apparently avoided to report such matters,) may perhaps

reasonably



reasonably be believed, on the testimonies of Diodorus and Curtius, to have been the largest yet at any one time received. Those historians concur in reporting six thousand foot and five hundred horse from Macedonia, three thousand five hundred foot and six hundred horse from Thrace, and mercenary infantry from Peloponnesus four thousand; differing only concerning cavalry from Peloponnesus, which the former makes near a thousand, the other under four hundred. Thus however the foot would be thirteen thousand five hundred, and the horse, at the lowest account, near fifteen hundred. With this reinforcement, according to the same writers, came fifty youths, of the first families of Macedonia, sent by their parents, with recommendation from Antipater, to be admitted among the king's page-guards. Amyntas son of Andromenes is named as the officer commanding this large reinforcement, led to such a distance.

Master now of the greatest and far the richest part of the Persian empire, the bounds of Alexander's dominion were not very different from those of modern Turkey. But proper Persia, the native land of the great Cyrus, the rich kingdom of Media, and extensive provinces inhabited by a warlike race, northward of Media, yet acknowledged the sovereignty of the unfortunate Darius. The way to Persia was difficult, over rugged mountains, held by the Uxians; a people who, not only for ages had maintained themselves in independency of the great empire surrounding them, but, denying the payment of tribute, made that great empire in some degree tributary to them. In the capital of Persia, as in a place of the best security in those times known, a very great treasure had been deposited. Thus, for postponing the immediate pursuit of Darius, two important objects were offered; to deprive the enemy of the means which the treasury of Persia proper would afford for continuing the war, and to bring to just subjection a people who had been so permitted to disgrace an empire which he proposed to make his own. When the Persian government wanted passage for troops between Susiana and Persia proper, it had grown into custom to pay them for permission. Observing what is transmitted of the circumstances of Asia, and of the character of its various population, it cannot be doubted, but that, with this indignity, the Persian government had been accustomed to bear another, that of frequent depredations on its faithful subjects, unrevenged, or deficiently punished:

for a people situated like the Uxians could, only by frequent predatory warfare, have the practice necessary toward their skill and renown in war. The Uxians, informed of Alexander's approach, with the purpose of marching across their country, sent a deputation, informing him of former custom, and demanding the payment usually received from the Persian court; intimating that, without it, any attempt to pass would be resisted. Alexander, without negotiation or threat, dismissed the mission with answer, 'that the Uxians might occupy with their forces the straits in their mountains, and there receive the demanded tribute.'

In passing the river and crossing the plain he found no opposition. Arrived at the mountains, he took upon himself the command of one select body, and committed that of another to his favorite general Craterus. With Susian guides, by a very rough and difficult road, in one day, he traversed the wild highlands, so as to reach some cultivated dales at night. The inhabitants, unprepared, were in numbers killed in their beds. Whether this was a just or a necessary severity, Arrian, like other ancient writers, not always solicitous about such matters, has not at all shown. The booty, principally cattle (for these highlanders had not the use of money) was considerable; and probably an important acquisition for the supply of the army. Meanwhile Craterus, by another road, had reached the heights commanding the strait. So beyond expectation bold and rapid had been these measures that no guard was there. The Uxian chiefs supposing they might safely await the return of their deputation, had delayed for it the call upon their people to leave their homes; and Alexander joined Craterus at the narrow, before their forces arrived. Hastening at length, they got into a situation where they could neither fight nor withdraw. On the plain ground they could not contend with the Grecian heavy-armed; and the eminences, on which they had depended both for advantage in action and security in retreat, were in the enemy's possession. In the flight, which they presently attempted, many were killed: resistance they made hardly any. It may seem reasonable to hope it was for some offence, unnoticed by Arrian, that their extermination was threatened. Ptolemy, he says, related that the intercession of Sisygambis, mother of Darius, probably for some merit with her, of which also the historian has omitted notice, procured them allowance to retain their lands among their strong holds,

holds, paying a yearly tribute of one hundred horses, five hundred head of neat cattle, and thirty thousand sheep. In the deficiency of our information it may seem that the pride of extraordinary success, combined with the general carelessness of the Greeks for humanity toward barbarians, had now begun to overbear that generosity inherited from his magnanimous father, and cultivated by his great preceptor, which, in the earlier part of Alexander's brilliant course, appear on no occasion to have failed him<sup>11</sup>.

But, in the way to Persia, there remained yet another highland pass, called by Diodorus the Susiad rocks, threatening greater difficulties. It was occupied by a powerful body, Arrian says forty thousand foot, with seven hundred horse, under the satrap Ariobarzanes, who had added to the natural strength of the ground by fortifications. Diodorus, perhaps from authorities more deserving of credit here than the generals engaged, whom Arrian followed, states the force under Ariobarzanes at only twenty-five thousand foot and three hundred horse. Alexander, committing the main body of his army to his veteran general, Parmenio, again undertook himself the fatigues and dangers of a partizan. His chosen division consisted of all the Macedonian heavy-armed, the horse of the band of companions, and that of the fore-runners, (probably lighter horse) with the Agrians, his favorite middle-armed, and all the bowmen. A formed carriage-road led from the Uxian narrow to that called the Persian gate. By this road he directed Parmenio to march, taking with him all the heavy baggage of the army. With his own select body he hastened by a shorter highland way; and, reaching Ariobarzanes's lines before Parmenio, he rested for the night. Next morning he proceeded to storm them. But they were so resolutely defended, and the satrap had so occupied the commanding heights, not only with bowmen and darters, but also with machines for the discharge of missile weapons, that, with the loss of many men, he was obliged at length to retire. Doubtful then about

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 18.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 68.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch, but in a most unsatisfactory manner, gives a degree of corroboration to the accounts of Alexander's cruelty here. With no narrative of circumstances, he refers to an extant letter of Alexander's, mentioning that he had ordered the execution of numerous prisoners, 'because he thought it for his interest.' But the biographer, in his frequently careless way, so confounds the passage of the Uxian highlands with the capture of Persepolis, and the conquest of all Persia, that there is no knowing what prisoners he meant to say were so executed.



measures, he learnt by inquiry among his prisoners (according to Curtius from a son of a Greek by a Persian wife, speaking familiarly both languages) that there was a mountain path by which it might be possible to reach the pass, in the rear of the Persian army; but it was rugged and narrow <sup>12</sup>. Again then taking upon himself the command of greatest fatigue and danger, and marching by night with a chosen body, he left Craterus to command the camp; ordering him to watch for signals of the trumpets, which should indicate that he was arrived in the enemy's rear, and then immediately to assail the lines. In his way over the mountains, he detached Amyntas, Philotas, and Cœnus, toward the Persian plain, with orders to secure the passage of the river Araxes, which crossed the great road to the Persian capital, by throwing a bridge over it <sup>13</sup>, while he, with a second selection of his before chosen troops, hastened, according to Arrian mostly running along the rugged way, to the enemy's station <sup>14</sup>. Arriving before day at their first outpost, he put all to the sword. A second was also surprized so far that few escaped. A third, taking alarm, fled to the nearest heights, and no intelligence of Alexander's approach was carried to the Persian camp. About daybreak he arrived at it. The trumpets then sounded the appointed signal, and Craterus, duly prepared, presently attacked the lines. Such was the surprize that resistance was little attempted. Some fled from Alexander toward Craterus, and others from Craterus toward Alexander. Repulsed each way, those who avoided the sword sought the lines again, but were intercepted by Ptolemy; to whom Alexander, foreseeing the event, had assigned a station for the purpose, so that a large proportion of the army was destroyed. Ariobarzanes himself escaped with a few horse, with whom, however (for what Curtius directly says, even Arrian's account implies) he cut his way through the enemy.

It was apprehended that, as soon as the defeat of Ariobarzanes

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus, 17, 68, says a Lycian, prisoner of war, long employed as a herdman among the mountains. Plutarch says the son of a Lycian by a Persian woman, and thence familiar with both the Greek and Persian languages.—Plut. Alex. p. 686.

<sup>13</sup> Arrian has not named the river or the city.

<sup>14</sup> Ἀελὶς τε (ὁ Ἀλεξανδρος) παρουχῶσει νύκτωρ, καὶ διελθὼν κ. τ. ε. the stopping of Gronovius's edition, and the Latin translation of Vulcanius, which Gronovius adopts the abusing it, are both bad here.

became

became known, the Persian king's officers in Persia proper, conscious of inability to withstand, yet not disposed, like those of Babylonia and Susiana, to court the conqueror, would, before they fled, plunder the royal treasury. According to Curtius, Alexander received intimation of their purpose from Tiridates, a principal officer of the treasury; whose earnestness to provide for Alexander's early arrival is mentioned by Arrian. The solicitude of the army, on such an occasion, would not fail. By rapid march then he reached Pasargadæ, or Persagadæ (the capital of Persia proper, better known by the name, which seems to have been a Greek translation, Persepolis) where was the treasury of the great Cyrus, in time to prevent any meditated spoliation.

We have observed, in the transactions at Susa, some indication of a disposition in Alexander hostile toward the proper Persians more than toward any other subjects of the Persian empire. During his stay at Persepolis an instance of it occurred, highly uncreditable, even in the succinct report of Arrian, and affording ground for exaggerated stories adapted to romance and the theater, which has been eagerly seized by other writers, especially the ingenious Curtius. Our fellowcountryman Dryden, in his exquisite ode on the subject, perhaps relates the matter as fairly as any other writer, except Plutarch, his principal guide, who here has been intent on just inquiry; always highly valuable where he has been so. The circumstances, he says, were very variously given in accounts extant in his time. What he thought most trustworthy was this: The mischief originated at a banquet, where, in the manner afterward of the great of Rome, in the age of Horace, Mæcenas, and Augustus, courtezans were of the company. The celebrated Thaïs, an Athenian born, heated with liquor, and prompted by recollection of what she had heard of the destruction of Athens formerly by the Persians, proposed to make a bonfire of the palace of the Persian kings. Some of the gravest, Plutarch says, of the Macedonians, uneasy at the growing partiality, observed in their young king, for every-thing oriental, and earnest to turn his affections homeward, if not contributing to excite the extravagance, however encouraged it when proposed. Alexander, not till the general disposition of the company became manifested, led the way, and the palace was presently in flames. As the ruin spread, with more sober reflection

flection he repented, and ordered measures for stopping its progress. The extension of the evil to the city, which it threatened, was thus prevented; but much of the palace was destroyed <sup>15</sup>.

Plut. Alex.  
p. 686. F.

According to Plutarch, Alexander staid four winter months at what he calls the capital of the Persians, whether Pasargadæ or Persepolis; and, from Arrian's account, this seems probable <sup>16</sup>. The interior of the vast continent of Asia, north of proper Persia, rising in some parts in mountain ridges, in others in extensive plains, far higher than the country nearer the ocean, is subject to a severity of cold in winter, unknown under the same latitude, and even in much higher latitudes, in land nearer the level of the ocean. Informed, no doubt, of these circumstances, Alexander prepared, against the earliest of the proper season, to pursue his purpose of completing the conquest of the Persian empire.

<sup>15</sup> The Persian name of the antient capital of Persia was variously written by the Greeks and Romans, probably as it was taken by different ears from different mouths, Pasargadæ, Pasagardæ and Persagadæ. According to Arrian it was the palace of Pasargadæ that, as related in the text, Alexander burnt. According to both Diodorus and Strabo it was the palace of Persepolis. Plutarch gives authority for neither name, but describes the place only as 'τὰ Πέρσων βασιλεία,' and Arrian also sometimes calls it simply Πέρσων πόλις. Curtius confounds the names, l. 5. c. 4. and at length, l. 10. c. 1. s. 22. speaks of the Persagadæ as a Persian people. It is enough evident that the Greek and Roman writers, even Strabo and Arrian, knew little of Persia proper. Any satisfactory authority for the notion, so extensively received among the moderns, that the old capital was far from Persepolis, the new capital; according to D'Anville a hundred miles south, according to the authors of the antient Uni-

versal History, north or north-west; or when a new capital was founded; or why, in all antient accounts, the new capital had only a Greek and the antient only a Persian name; or, if they were different towns, what proves them to have been more distant than London and Westminster, I have been unable to discover. Supposing them one, or contiguous towns, or nearly so, antient authors may be reasonably reconciled to themselves and to one another. Supposing them two and distant, reconciliation is impossible. The question however is merely geographical; for the history unimportant.

<sup>16</sup> What can have given occasion for the strange stories of Persian cruelties and Alexander's retaliation, in which Diodorus and Curtius nearly agree, and of the military expeditions in Persia, of all which Arrian has not a word, and which are virtually contradicted, in one part by Plutarch's account, and in another by Arrian's, I must leave to the opinion of the curious reader.



## CHAPTER L.

ALEXANDER'S Fourth Campain in ASIA : Affairs in GREECE :  
Trials for High Treason, marking the Character of the  
MACEDONIAN Constitution.

## SECTION I.

*Measures of Darius. Affairs in Greece: Confederacy under the lead of  
Lacedæmon against that under the king of Macedonia; and War  
insuing.*

THE unfortunate Darius, from the field of Arbela, after collecting what he could of his fugitive troops, had proceeded to Ecbatana, the capital of Media. That antient kingdom, with the adjoining provinces, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana and others, would alone form a dominion still worthy of the imperial title, and their people were the most warlike of the whole empire, and the most loyal. There he hoped to raise an army with which he might still vindicate for himself that large and valuable relic of his former, perhaps over-extensive, dominion. Nor was he without reasonable subsidiary hopes. The fame of Alexander's extraordinary fortune, and the evidence of his passion for still pushing conquest, had excited alarm among the warlike nations of the north; often at war with Persia, but now rather disposed to look toward the stranger as the more dangerous enemy; so that, negotiation having been put forward, Darius was led to expect important assistance. He looked moreover to the probability that, in the rich and populous countries compelled to receive a foreign ruler supported by a foreign army, or even in the conqueror's old dominion and the numerous states of various interests around it, whence he was now so distant, or in his army itself, the instrument of his conquests, something might arise powerful

to check his progress, and perhaps afford means not only to preserve the actual relic of the empire, but to recover much, if not all of what had been so rapidly lost.

But especially the state of things in Greece, and the old connection of the Persian court, still maintained with a powerful party in that country, tho communication was become difficult and precarious, would afford reasonable incouragement for these speculations. A regular embassy from Lacedæmon, a minister more doubtfully authorized from Athens, and one even from the distant state of Carthage, had followed the Persian monarch's motions; not perhaps, after the battle of Arbela, with choice of another course in their power, yet in regular prosecution of their commissions; and they attended him still at Ecbatana.

The springs of that policy among the Grecian republics, which produced war against Alexander in Greece itself, while he was prosecuting the war of the Grecian confederacy against Persia, nowhere declared by antient writers, but seeming rather studiously involved in mist by some of them, may nevertheless, by a careful examination of information remaining, in a great degree be traced. We have observed it remarked by Plato, of the singular constitution of Lacedæmon, that it was more that of an army than of a peaceful society; or, in his expression, of a camp than of a city. It denied friendly communication, on equal footing, with any other government: Lacedæmon must command, or keep at an unsocial distance. Accordingly, in the very terms in which accession to the general confederacy of Greece, under the lead of Macedonia, was refused by the Lacedæmonian Government, the purpose of command was avowed. It had been the habit and privilege, it was declared, of Lacedæmon, to follow the lead of none, but on the contrary to hold the lead of Greece.

Ch. 44. c. 1.  
of this list.

Philip's sagacity no doubt had observed the unbending and domineering temper of the Lacedæmonian constitution; and he seems, as much as might be, avoiding to offend, to have avoided communication with it. Men versed in his able councils would be among the advisers of Alexander's youth, when, on occasion of the haughty and almost hostile refusal of Lacedæmon to acknowledge the validity of a decree of a general council of the Greek republics, acknowledgement of whose constitutional authority was implied by its act in sending deputies to that council, he showed

his moderation. Philip, we have observed, had always professed himself of no party among the contests of the republics; nor is the assurance of Isocrates, that he adhered in practice to that profession, contradicted by any authentic information. Among the Athenians it was avowed as a rule, to compel all states over which, with the name of allies, they acquired command, to change their form of government, if differing from their own. The Lacedæmonians equally, after the Peloponnesian war, overthrew constitutions everywhere. Decarchies superseded the old government in most states; governors or superintendants, with the peculiar title of *harmost*, exercised despotic authority wherever they were sent. Nothing of this arbitrary policy of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians is imputed to the Macedonian supremacy. On the contrary, the endeavours of Demosthenes to overbear the confederacy of republics under the lead of Macedonia, by a union of the democratical interest under the lead of Athens and Thebes, failed through the attachment principally of the democratical states, those of Peloponnesus especially, to the king of Macedonia's patronage. Alexander so far deviated from his father's policy as, in Asia, generally to favor democracy in preference to that form of republic, the government of a few, which Lacedæmon had always favored; and in Greece he courted especially the Athenians. Apparently the hostile conduct of Lacedæmon urged him to this policy. Could Lacedæmon have coalesced with the other Grecian states, it seems possible that the vision of Isocrates might have been realized: the Grecian republics, each governing itself, as the Swiss formerly, by its own constitution, and all meeting in general assembly, a resource wanting to the Swiss, to direct common concerns and prevent war of one republic with another, might long have maintained domestic peace and national dignity.

Nothing in antient history remains more fully ascertained than that, under the Macedonian supremacy, the Grecian republics enjoyed, not only more liberty and independency than under the Athenian or Lacedæmonian supremacy, but, as far as appears, all that could be consistent with the connection of all as one people. Nor did it rest there: Demosthenes, in the Athenian assembly, reviled the Macedonian monarchs, the allies of his commonwealth, the heads of the Grecian confederacy, in a manner that, in modern times, would be reckoned highly indecent toward

*Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 545.  
ed. Reiske.*



Æsch de  
cor. p. 55<sup>o</sup>.

an enemy ; and he avowed and even boasted of treasonable practices against the general confederacy, of which his commonwealth was a member : ‘ I,’ he said, ‘ excited Lacedæmon against Alexander : I procured the revolt ‘ against him in Thessaly and Perrhæbia.’ In fact the government of Athens, described, as we have formerly seen, by Xenophon and Isocrates as in their time verging toward anarchy, is largely shown, in the extant works of following orators, and especially, in the celebrated contest between Æschines and Demosthenes, to have been still advancing in corruption and degradation. During the whole time that Alexander was in Asia, the struggle of parties was violent ; one, under Demosthenes, with the support of Persia, contended ably and indefatigably for the mastery of Athens and of Greece ; the other, after Isocrates, looking to Phocion as their leader, desired peace under the established supremacy of Macedonia, and above all things dreaded the ascendancy of Demosthenes and his associates.

Of the domestic politics of Lacedæmon, as occasion has heretofore repeatedly occurred to observe, information rarely comes to us but through transactions with other states. Agis, the reigning king of the Procleid family, whom we have seen already active in enmity to Macedonia, appears to have been a man of character to suit the purposes of Demosthenes ; of high spirit, without great talents or extensive views ; perhaps of sincere patriotism ; and if it was meer Lacedæmonian, not Grecian patriotism, the narrowness should be attributed less to his nature than to his education under the Lacedæmonian institutions. Possibly he was not much grieved, nor perhaps Demosthenes, at the death of Memnon. Had Memnon lived, either could have been but second of the Greeks of the party ; which could no way maintain itself but through the patronage of Persia. By Memnon’s death indeed great advantages were lost, and a contest of far less hope for the party altogether remained. But in that contest Demosthenes reckoned, by his talents and his extensive political communication, to hold the first importance among the Greeks, while Agis reckoned himself effectually first, by his regal dignity and the old eminence of the Lacedæmonian state ; both trusting that they should still not fail of support from Persia. Till the battle of Issus the hopes of both might reasonably run high ; and evidently they were not abandoned on the adverse event of that battle. Yet declamation of cotemporary writers

of

of the party so gained favor with men of letters under the tyranny of the Roman empire, and the spirit has been so cherished by the learned under the arbitrary governments of modern times, admirers of the politics of Demosthenes, as to have spread extensively the belief that Greece was enslaved by the kings of Macedonia. Nevertheless looking to facts acknowledged by all, we find the little, half-ruined state of Lacedæmon never ceasing to avow a political opposition, at length growing into open hostility, to the confederacy of republics, constitutionally established under the lead of Macedonia; as constitutionally, it appears, as ever before under the lead of Lacedæmon, Athens or Thebes. In Athens itself an opposition to the Macedonian interest was always openly maintained. Negotiation was carried on by Lacedæmon among the other republics with avowed hostile purpose, and adverse intrigue from Athens appears to have been no secret. Against this open political hostility no interference of force, has been even pretended to have been used; and, in all appearance, hardly such opposition of influence as honest prudence might require. Negligence, inertness, shortsightedness, may seem, with more reason, to be imputed; yet they never have been imputed to Antipater, to whom the government of Macedonia, and the protection of the Macedonian party in Greece were committed. It may seem an overweening magnanimity that allowed the workings of the Persian party among the republics to go so far: a determination to prove that the reigning king of Macedonia was worthy, equally with his predecessor, to be the chief of a free people, desiring authority founded on the attachment of a free people and not on violence. But perhaps for a Macedonian politician, of however acute intellect, bred under a monarchy, in the simple state of the Macedonian, the ways of republican intrigue were hardly to be conceived. While then the Macedonian supremacy, if not remissly, was liberally exercised, the party interests in every Grecian state, the inveterate hatred everywhere of fellowcitizens to fellowcitizens, and the generally active and restless temper of the Grecian people, afforded ground for that league against the confederacy of the Greek nation acknowledging the lead of Macedonia, which Demosthenes and Agis succeeded in forming.

It is beyond question that Persian gold, imputed by all writers, greatly  
promoted

promoted the Persian interest. It appears to have been after the disastrous battle of Arbela, when the Persian monarch's hope even of personal safety, depended on opportunity to raise new enemies to Alexander, that he found means to make remittances to Greece. Æschines, uncontradicted by Demosthenes, stated before the assembled Athenian people, as a matter publicly known and not to be gainsaid, that a present to them of three hundred talents, about sixty thousand pounds, was offered in the name of the king of Persia. To the modern eye not only the transaction altogether may seem strange, but, on first view, the sum, as a bribe to a whole people, beside being little for the wealth of the Persian empire, may appear beneath its object. It must however be recollected that, when paper-credit was unknown, and especially if Lesser Asia and Syria were no longer portions of the Persian empire, the remittance of even the sum stated might not be easy; and farther, that the Athenian citizens, competent to vote in the general assembly, have, in no account been reckoned at many more than thirty thousand, and that rarely ten thousand met.

Demosth. de  
legat. p. 403.  
Ch. 38. s. 3.  
n. 13. of this  
hist.

Demosthenes himself then having stated, before the Athenian people, half-a-crown to have been a bribe for the secretary of the general assembly, it will appear that sixty thousand pounds might be a powerful present to be divided even among thirty thousand citizens; how much more may have been given to the leading orators remaining unknown. The prevalence of Phocion's party however, at the time, sufficed to procure a refusal of the disgraceful offer.

But in Peloponnesus the Persian party, under the lead of the king of Lacedæmon, for whom there was no difficulty in taking subsidies from the Persian court, obtained superiority. Argos and Messenia, inveterately hostile to Lacedæmon, were indeed neither by bribes nor threats to be gained. But all Eleia, all Arcadia, except Megalopolis, and all Achaia, one small town only refusing, renounced the confederacy under the lead of Macedonia, and joined Lacedæmon in war, equally against Macedonia and all Greek republics who might adhere to the confederacy. Beyond the peninsula the opposite politics generally prevailed; tho, in Athens, Phocion's party could do no more than maintain nominal adherence to ingagement, and a real neutrality; the weight of the party of Demosthenes sufficing to prevent any exertion against the Lacedæmonian league.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 62.

That



That league however was not of such extent that it could be hoped, with the civic troops only of the several states, to support war against the general confederacy, under the lead of Macedonia ; and those states were not of wealth to maintain any considerable number of those, called mercenaries, ready to ingage with any party. Nevertheless mercenary troops were ingaged for that league, if the cotemporary orator Deinarchus should be trusted, to the number of ten thousand ; Persia, as *Æschines*, still contradicted by *Demosthenes*, affirms, supplying the means ; and another source is hardly to be imagined. With such preparation and such support Agis ventured to commence offensive war. A small force of the opposing Peloponnesian states was overborne and destroyed or dispersed ; siege was laid to the only adverse Arcadian city, *Megalopolis*, and its fall was expected daily.

*Æsch. d. Cor. p. 552. ed. Reiske. p. 554. Deinarch. in Demosth.*

*B. C. 330. Ol. 112, 3.*

Alexander was then in pursuit of Darius. Accounts of him received in Greece of course would vary : some reported him in the extreme north of Asia ; others in India. Meanwhile revolt in Thessaly and Perrhæbia, excited by the able intrigues of *Demosthenes*, and according to *Diodorus*, also in Thrace, distressed *Antipater*, while it was a most imperious duty upon him, as vicegerent of the head of the Grecian confederacy, to protect the members of that confederacy, apparently the most numerous part of the nation, against the domestic enemy, supported by the great foreign enemy who threatened them.

*Æsch. d. Cor. p. 558. Diod. l. 27. c. 63.*

Accounts remaining, both of the circumstances of the Macedonian kingdom at the time, and of following events, are very defective. But it appears indicated that no Macedonian force, that could be spared for war southward, would enable *Antipater* to meet Agis ; and it was long before he could excite the republican Greeks, adverse to the Lacedæmonian and Persian interest, however dreading its prevalence, to assemble in arms in sufficient numbers. His success however in quelling the disturbances in Thessaly and Thrace, encouraging the zeal of that portion of the Greek nation which dreaded republican empire, whether democratical under *Demosthenes*, or oligarchal under Agis, enabled him at length to raise superior numbers. *Megalopolis* had resisted beyond expectation. *Antipater*, entering Peloponnesus to relieve it, was met by Agis. A sanguinary battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians are said to have fought with all the obstinacy which their

*Diod. l. 17. c. 63. Ol. 112, 3.*

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 63.

their antient institutions required, and which their antient fame was adapted to inspire. But they were overborne: Agis, fighting at their head, with the spirit of a hero, rather, apparently, than with the skill of a general, received a wound which disabled him, so that it was necessary to carry him out of the field. His troops, unable to resist superior numbers, directed by superior skill, took to flight. Diodorus relates that, pressed by the pursuing enemy, he peremptorily commanded his attendants to save themselves, and leave him with his arms; and that, disabled as he was, refusing quarter, and threatening all who approached him, he fought till he was killed<sup>1</sup>.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 73.

The conduct of the victor then was what became the delegate of the elected superintendant and protector of the liberties of Greece. The Lacedæmonian government, feeling its inability to maintain the war in which it was engaged, and, perhaps no longer holding the same disposition toward it, the principal instigator being no more, sent a deputation to Antipater to treat of peace. Antipater, as deputy of the captain-general and stateholder of the Greek nation, took nothing farther upon himself than to summon a congress of the several republics to Corinth, to which he referred the Lacedæmonian ministers. There matters were much debated, and various opinions declared<sup>2</sup>. The decision at last, in the historian's succinct account, appears not what best might become the wisdom and dignity of a nation accustomed to appreciate its ascertained privileges, or what ought to be such. For the Grecian republics, neither under the rule of Lacedæmon, or of Athens, or under the more liberal superintendancy of Thebes, while Epameinondas lived, were in the habit of such appreciation. And looking to precedents, with any liberal views, the congress could not but be greatly at a loss. When Lacedæmon led, the massacre of the Platæans; where Athens commanded, that of the Melians and Scioneans; where Thebes had power, the severities against Plataea, Thespiæ, and especially Orchomenus, all would revolt liberal minds. Even

<sup>1</sup> Curtius tells the same story, in his romantic way, describing all as he might see it quietly acted before him on the stage. Nevertheless, in the scantiness of accounts of this important movement in Greece, the loss of that early part of Curtius's work which related leading circumstances, may be regretted.

<sup>2</sup> — Ἀντίπατρον. Εκείνου δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἀποσάλαντος, οἱ μὲν σύνοδοι συνήχθησαν εἰς Κόρινθον· καὶ πολλῶν ῥηθέντων λόγων πρὸς ἑκάτερον μέρος, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς κ. τ. ε.  
——Diod. l. 17. c. 73.

the recent decision of the nation, in assembly, against the Thebans, would justly appear a precedent not to be followed. Failing thus of fit example, and unable to agree upon a measure to afford precedent for future times, the resource was to decree that the Lacedæmonian state, submitting itself to the mercy of their great and magnanimous captain-general, should send fifty principal Spartans into Macedonia, as hostages to insure obedience to his decision. We owe to Curtius the additional probable information that the assembly set a fine of a hundred and twenty talents, about twenty-four thousand pounds, upon the Eleians and Achæans, to compensate to the Megalopolitans the damages done in the hostile operations against them. Curt. l. 6.  
c. 1.

It seems likely the Lacedæmonians rejoiced in a sentence which, in so great a degree, secured them against the usual virulence of party animosity among the Greeks, and the result of which they had reason to hope would be liberal and mild. It does not appear that anything more was required than to acknowledge error in hostile opposition to the general council of the nation, and to send, thus late, the Lacedæmonian contingent of troops for maintaining the Grecian empire, already acquired, in Asia <sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup>Diodorus's succinct account of this interesting business in Greece is clear and altogether apparently fair, allowing for inexactness in round statements of military numbers, and for the partiality which disposed him to adopt the cry of the Persian party among the Greek republics *συμφορῶσαι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας*.—Diod. l. 17. c. 62. For the transactions in Thrace, there is deficiency, and perhaps error in transcribing. A rebel Macedonian is mentioned as commanding a Persian party in Thrace, by the name of Memnon, without distinguishing him from the great Memnon, commander-in-chief of the Persian fleets and armies, who according to Arrian's perspicuous narrative, and as Diodorus also has previously indicated, proposed indeed to go to Thrace, but never reached it. What however may more be regretted is the want of more complete information of the circumstances whence the Argians, Messenians and Megalopolitans in Peloponnesus, and so many republics without the peninsula, were zealous in preference of their political situation, as members of the Macedonian confederacy, to that to which Agis and Demosthenes invited them.



## SECTION II.

*Alexander's March into Media: Flight of Darius from Ecbatana: Reinforcement to Alexander's Army. Pursuit of Darius: His Death: Honors to his Memory.*

ALEXANDER, eagerly bent upon completing the conquest of the Persian empire, appears to have used the earliest season that the climate would allow for prosecuting his march northward. In the way to Media or near it, was a country called Parætacene, held by a people who refused submission to him; apparently less through attachment to the Persian king, than with the purpose of maintaining that degree of independency, which we have observed so many provinces within the bounds of the empire asserting, and in apprehension of being brought, by the new conqueror, within stricter rule. Alexander quickly subdued them; and, their territory being extensive and important enough to form a separate satrapy, he added to the former instances of his liberality toward his new subjects, by committing the dignity and authority to Oxathres, whose father, Abulites, a Persian, held under him the more important satrapy of Susiana.

Arr. 1. 3.  
c. 16.

Information now arrived that Darius was so advanced in preparation as to propose to hazard another battle. With all Alexander's ardor and vigor and celerity, prudential considerations, however sometimes he might seem to overstep them, seem never to have escaped him. Celerity in movement he reckoned still important, but such only that he might lead with him his whole force, leaving only the heavy baggage to follow. On the twelfth day thus entering Media, he obtained intelligence that Darius, disappointed of expected succours from the Cadusians and Scythians, had not a force with which he could hope to keep the field. Alexander, still pressing forward, was within three days march of Ecbatana, when he was met by Bisthanes, an illegitimate son of the late king Ochus<sup>4</sup>, with information that Darius had, five days before, quitted that city, with an

<sup>4</sup> From all accounts of the family and succession apparently Bisthanes must have been of birth not to succeed regularly to the throne.

escort

escort of only three thousand horse and six thousand foot, but carrying with him about seven thousand talents, near a million and half sterling, in money.

Among the Scythians and Cadusians, the Grecian name would be more familiar, and events in Greece more readily known, than among the more southerly of the eastern provinces of the Persian empire. With the western Scythians, we have formerly seen; commerce with the Greeks was constant; and that communication among the Scythians themselves, through their extensive country from east to west, was ordinary, will occur for observation in the sequel. Thus it seems likely that Darius's negotiation with them may have been assisted by those circumstances in Europe which have already occurred for notice; the powerful opposition raised against the Macedonian interest under the lead of Agis king of Lacedæmon, threatening Macedonia itself, and the probable advantage of such a diversion for the affairs of Darius in Asia. It seems then farther likely that intelligence of the defeat and death of Agis had reached both Darius and the Scythians, and very possibly the Scythians first; whence might come the alteration in their disposition to support a tottering throne, and, in result, his flight from Ecbatana.

This circumstance becoming known, all the great and wealthy kingdom of Media seems to have yielded to the conqueror. The treasury was emptied, but a great revenue would be still accruing. For immediate needs much of the wealth of Persia, found at Pasargadæ, had been brought in the military chest, and from the southern treasuries more might come at command. Alexander's power thus was large both to reward past, and to ingage men for new services. Arrian, reporting his generosity in discharging, is evidently deficient in notice of the numbers added to the army; probably because the generals his guides neglected, or perhaps designedly avoided, to report them. According to Curtius, five thousand foot and a thousand horse, under Plato, an Athenian, joined the army in Media; perhaps all Greeks, but however under Grecian officers, and trained in the Grecian discipline. Plutarch speaks of much larger numbers raised among those whom the Greeks called barbarians. Thus Alexander might be enabled, without inconvenience, to dispense that favor of discharge to those of his old soldiers desirous of it, which Arrian men-

Ch. 38. s. 3.  
of this hist.

Q. Curt. l. 5.  
c. 7.

tions. At Ecbatana he declared all the civic troops of his Grecian allies released from obligation for farther service, and made a donation among them of two thousand talents, about four hundred thousand pounds, in reward of the past. They were then informed, that all the convenience of an orderly march should be provided for those who might desire to return home, but that the choice to reëngage was open to all who might prefer following his farther fortune. These were numerous. Of the others, the cavalry, mostly Thessalian, were allowed, or perhaps required, to sell their horses. A body of cavalry was therefore directed, under the command of Epocillus son of Polyeides, to escort all to the Phenician coast; where, in pursuance of orders to the governor-general, Menes, vessels were prepared to carry them to Eubœa. The remainder of the wealth brought from Persia was placed in the treasury of Ecbatana, to the presidency of which Harpalus was appointed, with a guard of six thousand Macedonian foot, and a small select body of horse. Parmenio was then directed to lead the mercenary troops, and the Thracians, with a large proportion of the cavalry, through Cadusia into Hyrcania.

For his own office Alexander resumed the task of pursuing the illustrious fugitive, Darius. For this he reckoned no longer any great numbers requisite, but those, of every weapon, who could best make rapid progress and bear fatigue. Of heavy infantry he took only those Macedonians who had not been previously selected for the treasury-guard of Ecbatana; of middle-armed only the Agrians; all the bowmen, unless a few had been assigned to the bodies under Parmenio and Cleitus; of cavalry the royal companions, and the forerunners<sup>s</sup>, superior bodies, and the mercenary horse; perhaps preferred to the allied, as these, mounting themselves, would be liable to be unequally mounted, whereas the mercenaries, for their inlisting bounty and pay, would be required all to be well mounted, and to be ready, at least equally with any others, for any service. The haste of the march was such that many of the infantry, unable to keep pace with the rest, were left behind, and some of the horses died of fatigue; yet so was Alexander bent upon his object that, indefatigable himself, he would not remit anything of the speed of the ablest. Thus pressing forward eleven days, he arrived at Rhagæ, within one day's forced march of the

<sup>s</sup> Προδρομοί.



pass through the mountains of Caucasus, called the Caspian gate. There he received information that Darius, despairing of ability to defend the pass against him, had abandoned it, and, with a wide continent before him, had resumed flight.

Satisfied now that farther immediate haste would be vain, Alexander halted at Rhagæ five days, to collect and refresh his scattered and wearied troops. Meanwhile he found gratifying consequences resulting from his recent exertion. Of the little army which Darius had led to the Caspian gate, the greater part, on his taking again to flight, deserted, and not a few came and surrendered themselves to the conqueror. Intermitting however the prosecution of his purpose no longer than circumstances made indispensable, Alexander moved from Rhagæ on the sixth day, incamped, for that night, at the Caspian gate, and next day entered Parthia. The country was, in that part, cultivated; beyond, as he was informed, waste. A halt therefore was necessary, while Cœnus was dispatched with a strong body of horse and a few infantry to collect provision. During this pause Bagistanes, a man of high rank among the Babylonians, and Antibelus, one of the sons of Mazæus, Alexander's satrap of Babylon, arrived at the camp. Hitherto they had faithfully followed the fortune of Darius. But, in circumstances which had occurred, their services about his person having been forcibly ended, the course they took was perhaps the most promising for his personal safety. Surrendering themselves to Alexander, they informed him that Bessus, satrap of Bactria, with Brazas, satrap of Arachosia, and Nabarzanes, commander of the small force of cavalry which remained as the royal body-guard, had conspired against the unhappy prince, who was actually their prisoner. Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 21.

This intelligence inflamed Alexander's ardent and feeling mind. Without waiting the return of Cœnus, he ordered the companion and forerunner-horse for immediate duty, and selected, among the infantry<sup>6</sup>, the ablest for rapid progress. Committing the rest of the army then to Craterus, with orders to follow leisurely, and commanding his chosen body to take only their arms and two days provision, he marched throughout the night, and till noon of the following day. Allowing then short repose, he proceeded again throughout the next night, and about daybreak

<sup>6</sup> Gronovius's note on this passage of Arrian perhaps may deserve the critic's notice.

reached

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 8.

Arrian, l. 5.  
c. 9.

reached the ground where Bagistanes had left the satraps incamped; but they were gone. Nevertheless important information was obtained. The rebel chiefs had gained the Bactrian and all the cavalry of the small royal army, except that under the satrap Artabazus and his sons. With these the Grecian mercenaries, said by Arrian to have been now collected to the number of four thousand, persevered in fidelity to the deposed monarch; and, tho unable to prevent the revolution, had together seceded from the revolted forces, and were marching for the mountains. Artabazus was the father-in-law of Mentor and Memnon; under the Persian empire, while it existed, satrap of Lower Phrygia, and the firmest still, as he had been among the oldest, of Darius's friends. The unfortunate sovereign was confined in a covered chariot; and it was said to be the purpose of the rebels, if they found themselves pressed by pursuit, to deliver him to Alexander, and make for themselves the best terms they could; but, should leisure be afforded them, to use their utmost endeavors for collecting forces, and make common cause for vindicating the possession of their satrapies. The command-in-chief, for the present, was allowed to Bessus; both because of his former situation, as the immediate minister of Darius, and also because the circumstances occurred within his satrapy.

This was new and vehement stimulation for Alexander. Tired as his troops were, he would proceed immediately. Again marching throughout the night, and till noon of next day, he arrived at a village which the satraps, with their royal prisoner, had left but the preceding evening. Learning then that it was their practice to march by night and rest by day, it followed that, to overtake them, he must use the day. Inquiring farther concerning their road and the surrounding country, he gained information of a shorter way, but across a desert and waterless heath. Encouraged thus to hope that exertion might yet avail for his earnest purpose, but reckoning it important to have some infantry with his cavalry, he ordered five hundred of the latter to give their horses to as many of his phalanx, and to follow themselves afoot. Committing the rest of the infantry then to Nicanor and Attalus, with orders to proceed by easy marches along the great road, he took himself the cavalry, with his five hundred dragoons, by the shorter way. Having, in the course of the night, advanced

between twenty and thirty miles, when day broke he saw the enemy hastening before him in disorderly march. As he gained upon them in pursuit, a few, assuming some order, attempted resistance; but presently some were killed, and the rest dispersed. Alexander then continuing to press forward, Bessus and his associates despaired of being able, safely for themselves, to bear off their prisoner king. Apparently they had reckoned upon advantage to their purposes from holding him alive in their power, and apprehended an adverse use of his name and influence, should he fall living into Alexander's hands. Satibarzanes and Barzaentes, therefore, who had charge of his person, proceeded with their swords to destroy him, and then, with Bessus, rode off. The wounds given in their haste and confusion were not immediately mortal, but, before Alexander could arrive, the unfortunate sovereign of the Persian empire had expired. Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 21.

Darius, at the time of his death, in the fifth or sixth year of his reign, seems to have been about the fiftieth of his age. Hitherto, in the historian's account of Alexander's conduct, there appears something of personal enmity to the unfortunate sovereign of Persia. But if he was ever actuated by any such sentiment, its operation, as all collateral circumstances show, was restrained by a temper of large generosity, and on his rival's death, not the least of a revengeful disposition was manifested. He directed the dead body to be treated not only with decency, but with all honor. Being carried into Persia, it was deposited in the usual place of sepulture of the royal family, with all the pomp and ceremony formerly used at the burial of the Persian kings.



## SECTION III.

*Alexander's Measures for completing the reduction of the northern Provinces. Surrender of several Satraps; of the Grecian Troops in the Persian service; of Ministers from Grecian republics to the Persian Court. League of Satraps against Alexander, and Acknowledgement of Bessus as Successor to the Persian Monarchy. Treachery of Satibarzanes.*

ARRANGEMENTS for the newly conquered provinces now required Alexander's attention, and in these he pursued his early principle of making his new subjects his friends, intrusting command to those among them whom he might suppose most worthy of it. Ammynapes, a Parthian, had been in power in Egypt, and had concurred with Mazaces in surrendering that rich country to Alexander. His service on that occasion was now rewarded with the appointment to the satrapy of Parthia and Hyrcania, which seems to have been one of the greatest governments of the empire, and, for situation and circumstances, of the highest trust. The precaution however, which we have seen used elsewhere, was not omitted, but, perhaps rather extended here; a Grecian colleague was given him, Tlepolemus, son of Pythophanes, one of the band of royal companions<sup>3</sup>.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 23.

For securing the dominion of these northern parts of his now vast empire, two important objects yet remained; to reduce Bessus, who,

<sup>3</sup> To investigate accurately the geography of these countries, so little known to the world of letters either in antient, or even in these modern times, is a labor which I have been unable to undertake. Diodorus, attentive often to matters less within Arrian's purpose, relates that Alexander, in his way now through a most plentiful country, came to a great city, which he calls Hecatontapylus, a Greek, it will be observed, and not a Parthian name, meaning Hundredgates: Thence

Diod. 17. 75.

entering Hyrcania, he subdued all to the Caspian, which Diodorus concurs with Arrian in considering the same as the Hyrcanian sea; tho modern travellers have ascertained that there are two seas, or immense lakes, which the antients appear not to have known to have been separated by a wide tract of country. The historian then mentions a district in Hyrcania, called the Happy, singularly fruitful, with vines and fig-trees especially productive.

assuming

assuming the name or title of Artaxerxes, aspired to succeed to the sovereignty of the Persian monarchs, and also to bring to his obedience those of the late king's adherents who, tho seceding from the traitor, had not yet surrendered, and especially the Greeks. These had betaken themselves to the lofty wooded mountains of Hyrcania, whose inhabitants, the Pagrans, affecting independency of the Persian dominion, appear to have admitted them as associates. Alexander then being joined by the bodies which, through the rapidity of his movement he had left behind, took again, according to his custom, the service of fatigue and danger. Sending Craterus in command of an expedition against the Tapoors<sup>8</sup>, and committing to Erigyus the conducting of the cavalry and greater part of the phalanx by a circuitous but better road, he himself led a chosen body of heavy-armed, with some bowmen, a most difficult march over the mountains. He seems however to have found little other opposition than the country itself offered. A great plain beyond, extended to the sea which Arrian calls the Caspian. Here he halted four days ; and, before the body under Erygius arrived, Phradaphernes, satrap of Hyrcania and Parthia, with Nabarzanes, and some others who had been in high situations under Darius, came and surrendered themselves. Proceeding then toward Zadracarta, the capital of Hyrcania, he was joined by Erigyus, with the baggage of the whole army, and by Craterus, who had brought to obedience the people through whose country he had passed. The Grecian mercenaries had been supposed there, but no intelligence of them was obtained. Soon after however the satrap Artabazus arrived, with three of his sons, Copen, Aribarzanes, and Arsames, and also Autophradates, satrap of Tapuria, all surrendering themselves; and they brought with them, desiring to present, for his favor, some Greeks of the Persian service, deputed to solicit his forgiveness for the whole body. All the Persians were honorably received. Autophradates was restored to his satrapy. Artabazus, a man now of great age, of the first nobility of Persia, known to Alexander not only as satrap of the province of Bithynia, and by his various Grecian connections, but also as having been at one time a refugee at Philip's court, was, together with his sons, complimented on their fidelity to their late sovereign, and all were immediately placed in situations of honor about

<sup>8</sup> Ταπούρους.

Alexander's person. But he peremptorily refused to treat with the Greeks; they must surrender themselves unconditionally, or provide their own safety. Their deputies, then, hopeless of better for themselves and their constituents, ingaged for the required submission to Alexander's generosity; requesting only that an officer of rank might return with them, to command the march, and provide for security in it. This was granted; and it seems to have been a kindness that would be gratifying and encouraging to them that, in the commission for the purpose, with his own officer, Andronicus son of Agerrus, the satrap Artabazus, their friend and late patron was joined, who, through his family-connections and habits, was almost half a Greek.

ARR. I. 3.  
C. 24.

In his progress into Hyrcania Alexander had left behind him a hord of freebooters, the Mardians, holding a highland territory, so rough and so poor that the combined consideration of the difficulty of subduing them, and the worthlessness of the conquest, had hitherto preserved them from invasion; and they the more trusted they should continue to enjoy the immunity, as Alexander had already passed without noticing them<sup>9</sup>. But for Alexander, it appears, difficulties were pleasant. He would hunt a wild hord of warriors among hardly accessible mountains, as other princes the wolf or the roe. He had now formed a body of horse-dartmen, apparently after the Persian model, probably all Asiatics, trained from infancy to the exercise; skill in which is not to be acquired but while the limbs have the suppleness of the growing frame. Part of the country, it appears, was fit for the action of cavalry. With this new body of horse-dartmen therefore he took also half the horse of the order of companions: some chosen heavy-armed, all the bowmen, and all his favorite middle-armed, the Agrians, completed his army. With a force so various, so practised, and so commanded, the Mardians certainly were unaccustomed to contend. Wherever they attempted resistance they were slaughtered; and flight, even to their highest and roughest mountains, gave them but a precarious security. Shortly they sent deputies offering submission to regular authority, and their country was added to that of the Tapoors, under the administration of Autophradates.

<sup>9</sup> *Μάχιμοι ἐπὶ τῇ πενία ἦσαν.* Arrian I. 3. c. 24. This phrase, combined with all we learn of the Asiatic mountaineers, enough marks their character of freebooters.

Returning



Returning to his camp in the lowlands <sup>10</sup> Alexander found the Grecian mercenaries arrived, under the conduct of Artabazus and Andronicus, and with them some eminent prisoners of a remarkable description. They were ministers from several states to the Persian court, who had followed the unfortunate Darius while he lived. In preference to Bessus then, and his associates, they had held with Artabazus and the Greeks; and now, hopeless of other means of safety, they threw themselves on Alexander's mercy. An embassy from Lacedæmon, consisted of four, Callistratidas, Pausippus, Monimus and Anomantus: Dropides <sup>11</sup> was commissioned from Athens: from Carthage came Heracleides, whose name would mark him for a Greek; possibly of a Sicilian town of the Carthaginian dominion; and from Sinopë, on the Euxine shore, some deputies unnamed. The Sinopians he immediately dismissed, considering them, tho of Grecian origin and language, yet not of the Grecian confederacy, but proper subjects of Persia, and therefore warranted to communicate by their deputies with the Persian king. The others he ordered into custody; the Lacedæmonians being agents of a state engaged in rebellion against the common confederacy of the Greeks, and the Athenian not only so, but a rebel to the actual government of his own city, which adhered to the general confederacy. Whether the original appointment of Dropides had been regular, from the Athenian people under the lead of Demosthenes, or his mission was one of those irregular measures of an adverse party, of which Demosthenes himself furnishes an instance in describing his own conduct, does not appear. Taking then the various cases of the Grecian mercenaries into consideration Alexander freely dismissed all who had entered into the Persian service before the confederacy was formed, to the presidency over which he had been elected to succeed his father. On the rest he imposed no greater severity than requiring them to enter into the service of that confederacy, with the same pay as in their former service; and Arrian gives his judgement on this, that it was clearly a wise liberality.

While Alexander was delayed by the difficulties of the mountainous country to be traversed, and of the season, which seems to have been winter, in a climate where, for the latitude, the winters are of extraordinary severity,

<sup>10</sup> Τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν Δαπυρί ὡρμήθη εἰς τῶν Μάρδων τὴν γῆν.

<sup>11</sup> *Dropides*, Arrian, *Diopetides*, Diod.

some principal Persian nobles had assembled about the regicide Bessus. A just patriotism might animate some; and the hainousness of the crime of regicide would be diminished for Persian minds by its familiarity, not in Persian history only, but in the history of eastern courts altogether. Looking around then for means to maintain themselves, they had negotiated with neighboring nations, claiming assistance as in a common cause, against the invader from another quarter of the world. Alexander's successes and avowed ambition might indeed well excite jealousy, however his pretensions, even if extending to universal empire, were no more than the Persian kings appear to have asserted, after the Assyrian princes, who possibly claimed from the first patriarchs. Accordingly the combined chiefs were not unsuccessful in their negotiation: and, especially as the powerful nations of Scythia gave them hope of large support. To preside over their measures, and give weight to their negotiations, in conformity to oriental notions, one supreme head was become indispensable, and the imperial dignity was allowed to Bessus. He assumed then the upright tiara and the Persian robe, the customary marks of royalty, and with them the name of Artaxerxes, and the title of king of Asia.

Alexander meanwhile, with his usual scorn of rest, bent upon revenging the murder of Darius, and, for his own future quiet, preventing the murderer from injoying the proposed fruit of his crime, crossed Parthia to the adjoining territory of Arcia. At Susia, a principal town, Satibarzanes satrap of the province, surrendered himself, and, in reward for his ready submission, was restored to the satrapy. So disposed then was Alexander to trust those of the Persian nobility whom he received into favor, that he left in Arcia a body of only forty horse-archers, under the command of Anaxippus, one of his band of companions; not to hold the people in subjection, but to insure them against injury from his own troops in passing through their country. Intelligence arrived of the lofty pretensions of Bessus, and of the expectation of a Scythian army to support them. Preparation for such events had not been neglected. A considerable body of cavalry joined from Media; and, with his collected army, Alexander was proceeding to invade Bactria, when information of the first treachery, at least the first of any importance, experienced among his new subjects, reached him. Satibarzanes, whom he had so readily received into favor, and trusted with  
high

high authority, was of a timeserving character. No sooner did his magnanimous new patron's departure from his province leave him scope, than he began practising with the people to revolt with him, in favor of the regicide Bessus, and he quickly succeeded to a great extent. Overpowering then Anaxippus and his small band, he put all to death, and collected his utmost force at Artacoana, the capital of the country. There, should Alexander return against him, he hoped to maintain himself till he might have relief from his newly chosen sovereign, or, should the enemy persevere in his course, to carry assistance to that new sovereign.

Alexander was instantly decided by the urgency for repressing and punishing such treason as that of Satibarzanes. Committing the command of the main body of his army to Craterus, he took himself the lead of a select division, the best capable of rapid movement. By a forced march, in two days, he reached Artacoana; so before expectation, that, in the universal surprize and alarm insuing, the greater part of those whom the satrap had assembled in arms deserted him, and he himself, utterly at a loss for measures, fled, with a few horse. Rarely as Alexander had yet been harsh, even against rebels, it was judged necessary to take measures of some severity here. Not the chiefs only, as many as could be taken, suffered, but, cavalry sent in pursuit of the people (who, at the satrap's call, had left their villages in arms) killed many, and made many prisoners, who were sold for slaves. Alexander's magnanimity however would still trust his new subjects, insomuch that he committed the satrapy of Areia to Arsaces, a Persian.

Returning to the body of his army, he proceeded into the province of Zaranga, held by Barsaentes, one of the accomplices of Bessus in regicide. This satrap, who seems to have been yet but preparing means for supporting his associate's assumption of the royal title, fled on Alexander's approach. Whether only for better safety to his person, or hoping to find support for his cause, he went into the neighbouring northern part of India. But he had so far miscalculated his interest there, that he was arrested and sent prisoner to Alexander; who reckoning him a proper subject for public justice, caused him, with what formalities we do not learn, to be executed for his atrocious crime against his proper sovereign.

SECTION.



## SECTION IV.

*Trials of Philotas and others for High Treason.*

Arr. l. 3,  
c. 26.

ALL thus succeeding for Alexander in his exertions for completing the conquest of the Persian empire, a matter broke out, of a character most severely to interrupt his immediate satisfaction, and to imbitter his following days. In this distant corner of that empire, bordering on nations hardly heard of among the Greeks, with his mind bent upon the prosecution of war against the traitor and regicide Bessus, his declared rival in claim of the Persian empire, he was informed that Philotas, who had been among his most intimate and favored friends from childhood, son of Parmenio, his father's and his own most confidential general, was engaged in traitorous measures against him. Concerning this variously interesting matter, and its tragical results, our information is very disappointingly scanty. Here, if anywhere in antient history, an account, circumstantial as well as trustworthy, of a political plot, where the criminal suffered the penalty of the law, might be expected. Not that we can wonder if the historian generals, Aristobulus and Ptolemy, connected as they were with the parties, and probably interested in the event, were, as Arrian shows they were, in their published histories, cautiously concise upon it. Yet, from other sources, it might be supposed, posterity would derive trustworthy information of matters of such public importance, through trials so public as those which ensued. It is however evident that Arrian could find no other guides in whom to have any confidence; and apparently we may trust Plutarch for the failure of any others deserving it, since, disposed as he generally was to inlarge on such matters, tho, in his too usual way he has undertaken to relate words spoken, the least likely to come to public knowlege, yet he assists not with a syllable Arrian's brief account of the very interesting public circumstances.

Aristobulus and Ptolemy, as Arrian assures us, concurred in relating  
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that disloyalty was not now for the first time imputed to Philotas. He had been accused of treasonable practices so long before as when Alexander was in Egypt. Then, however, the accusation seems to have rested on meer suspicion ; that any proof was ready is not said. Accordingly Alexander's generous temper, on consideration of his intimacy from infancy with Philotas, his respect for Parmenio, and the ground, in his mind, for believing both above suspicion, would not allow any formal inquiry : the matter dropped, and Philotas continued to be trusted with high command, and to receive favors, perhaps extravagant.

We have had occasion formerly to observe faction, for ages, violent among the Macedonians. In character however it differed from that among the Grecian republics. The contending parties, as in our own country formerly, supported different families, competitors for the throne ; the constitution, being also like ours of old, but more than ours, irregular and undefined, yet having, in some degree like ours, excellent principles of freedom. Among those, formerly of adverse parties, admitted to favor and confidence by the generosity of Alexander, we have seen some making an ill return ; of whom his kinsman Alexander of Lyncestis, accused by Parmenio, is said to have attended the army's movements as a prisoner now for three years. In the Macedonian court, as in all courts, rivalry, dissension, contest, tho of less violence than in republics, yet were weeds of growth not to be prevented. Even generosity would produce trouble, as in the case of Alexander of Lyncestis, and whether he was guilty or no ; one party imputing crime to the Lyncestian, another envy, and false or exaggerated accusation to Parmenio.

Diod. l. 17.

It is remarkable, considering Parmenio's fame as a general, and his eminence under Philip and under Alexander, that, concerning either his political, or his private character, so little remains. The liberal and perhaps reasonable inference would be, that in politics he was honest and moderate, and in private life unexceptionable. But where party was rife, to be wholly clear of party connections, and of their influence on conduct, would hardly be possible. The violence and indiscretion, of either an adverse or a friendly party, might make that necessary which was not within his inclination.

To mark the private character of Philotas we are not equally without anecdote. In what rank Parmenio was born is not said, but probably  
among

among the higher. An over early promotion to the highest among subjects appears to have been the misfortune of Philotas. In Alexander's first campaign against the northern Europeans, he held the command of all the Upper Macedonian horse; apparently the principal force of cavalry in the Macedonian service. From the first arrival of the army in Asia we find him, in military rank, and in importance of commands, inferior hardly to any but his father. Thus situated, with considerable talents, he had made his military merit conspicuous. But his vanity and ostentation Plut.v. Alex. are said to have been yet more conspicuous; and his profusion was such that tho, as Alexander's generosity expanded with his acquisitions, loaded with riches, he was sometimes without means for his immediate needs. Through his generosity, his vanity, and his high pretensions, he had numerous adherents, but also numerous enemies. Among instances of his arrogance he is reported to have said, talking of his father's deeds and his own, 'What would Philip have been without Parmenio, or Alexander 'without Philotas?' Parmenio, himself, it is related, apprehensive of the consequences of his indiscretion, tho partial to his merit, reproved him on some occasion, saying, 'My son, be less eminent'<sup>13</sup>:'

The weight of Parmenio's family, in political as well as in military affairs, must have been great; himself the second man in the army and the kingdom; his eldest son inferior only to himself; and two other sons, Nicanor and Hector, holding high military rank. When Alexander advanced northward, Parmenio had been left with the chief command in Media; a trust of the more importance, as Alexander had allowed himself little time for arranging the affairs of that extensive and rich kingdom, to which he must in prudence look for means of retreat, should any adversity make retreat necessary. Parmenio, thus in the most critical detached command, was in the situation in which we have commonly before seen him. But it is observable, in Arrian's narrative, that, since the battle of Arbela, Philotas is less mentioned, and Craterus was become the general, in whom Alexander showed most confidence. Probably the concurrence of Diodorus and Plutarch may be trusted for the enmity they assert to have existed between Craterus and Philotas. But family calamity, which Parmenio had been suffering, may have somewhat lessened that family weight which arises from combined influence. One of his sons, Hector, had

<sup>13</sup> *Χείρων μὲν γίγναι*.—Plut. v. Alex. p. 692. B.



recently fallen in battle. Another, Nicanor, had since died of sickness. Alexander's disposition to a generous sympathy however did not fail on that occasion. In his eagerness for the prosecution of war against Bessus, denying rest to himself, he had given leave for Philotas to remain in Parthia, where his brother died, to do, in funeral obsequies, all honor to his memory.

Philotas had rejoined the army, when he was suddenly arrested on accusation of high treason. Caution was evidently deemed requisite in measures, even the most rigidly legal, against the heir of a family so eminent, and, among a large party in the army, so popular. The proceedings against him appear to have been strictly according to the Macedonian law. But that law, tho proposed to give the utmost security to innocence against official power, being the law of an unlettered people, was favorable to hasty decision. Communication with Parmenio was avoided, while Philotas, with others, accused as accomplices, were brought to trial. The manner of the trial appears to have been nearly the same as in the Grecian kingdoms of Homer's age, and hardly differing, in essential matters, from what, derived from the times of regal government in Attica, had ever since prevailed in the Athenian republic. All the Macedonians of the army were assembled as the jury. The king himself, as in our law, was the prosecutor; and, as appears to have remained regular under the Macedonian constitution, tho ours, consulting better both the dignity of the crown and the safety of the subject, has for centuries disallowed it, Alexander himself arraigned the accused, who himself pleaded his own defence. Witnesses were then heard: the multitudinous court pronounced sentence of death; and those who gave the verdict were the executioners, proceeding, it appears, immediately, to pierce the condemned with their javelins. In this hasty consummation only is marked a difference from Athenian practice; a difference not creditable to the Macedonian law, but on the contrary, a striking relic of barbarism; yet, in character, so far consonant with the rest of the proceeding as to mark itself a feature of a free constitution<sup>14</sup>.

Among

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus says that Philotas was put to torture, and, in his sufferings, confessed the crime imputed to him. Curtius, whether inventing himself, or profiting from the ingenuity of some one of the many Greek writers of Alexander's history, whose works, in

Among those, brought to trial with Philotas, were Amyntas, Attalus, and Simmias, sons of Andromenes, who all held high rank in the army. Polemon, their brother, immediately on receiving information of the arrest of Philotas, whose intimate friend he was, had fled. This circumstance made very unfavorable impression upon the minds of the numerous jury; yet the three tried so defended themselves that they were acquitted. Amyntas then requested that he might be permitted to seek his fugitive brother, confident, he said, of his innocence, and of his own power to persuade him to return and stand his trial. The assembly assented; Amyntas went, and on the same day returned with Polemon. Thus, says the historian, even the suspicion, that might have adhered to all, was done away; and Alexander, whose great mind evidently was always averse to suspicion, continued to Amyntas the high command he held <sup>14</sup>.

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in his time extant, are now lost, has worked up the trial of Philotas, with attending circumstances, into nearly a complete tragedy. Plutarch also gives, in his way, some scenic representation, hardly of probability enough for tragic poetry, and utterly unfit to be asserted as history.

It is too well known that torture for the purpose of extracting confession from accused persons has been extensively used, to the disgrace of almost every known sort of government; and probably enough the Macedonian may have warranted torture. But Arrian's account strongly implies that there was no opportunity for applying torture to Philotas. Indeed it seems to afford conviction that the whole story of the confession has been exaggerated by the ingenuity or the interestedness of some, and perhaps altered by the carelessness of others, of the writers whom Diodorus, Curtius and Plutarch followed. Whatever confession Philotas made, Ptolemy and Aristobulus no doubt would have known, and are not likely to have been backward to report; for they were evidently not of Parmenio's party. Nevertheless they concurred in relating that Philotas denied the imputation of having in-

formation of a plot against Alexander which he never revealed; and Arrian, who shows himself to have been anxious to discover and to relate all that could be ascertained concerning this interesting transaction, appears to have given no credit to any account of any confession made by him. Concerning three most important points it is satisfactory to find all extant accounts agreeing; first, that the trial was public, by the assembled Macedonians of the army; secondly, that the condemnation was pronounced by a majority; and, thirdly, that this majority themselves carried their own sentence into execution.

<sup>14</sup> Arrian, more concise concerning the trial of Philotas, in speaking afterward of that of Amyntas, which appears to have followed immediately, confirms the description of the criminal court, given by Curtius, as consisting, according to the antient Macedonian law, of all the Macedonians of the army. Ἄλλ' Ἀμύντας γε ξὺν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, ὑπομείνας τὴν δίκην, καὶ ἀπολογησάμενος ἐν ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΕΙ καρτερῶς, ἀφίσταται τῆς αἰτίας. Καὶ εὐθὺς ὡς ἀπίφυνγεν, ἐν τῇ Ἐκκλησίᾳ ἠξίωσεν ἀφιθῆναι οἱ ἐλθεῖν παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν, — καὶ οἱ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΕΣ ξυγχωρῶσιν. — Arrian, l. 3. c. 27. Diodorus, a century and half before

Arrian,

In the usual failure of Arrian, for such matters, we have only, from Diodorus, a very succinct account of legal proceedings against Parmenio. That eminent man, he says, absent, was arraigned before the same numerous tribunal which condemned Philotas. His friends in the army were allowed to plead in his defence, and there was much contest in speeches. A majority at length pronounced condemnation<sup>15</sup>. This was a mode of proceeding authorized by the law and practice of Athens, and probably of most, if not all, Grecian republics. It may, therefore, on the authority of Diodorus, not unreasonably be believed of the Macedonian kingdom; a branch from the great root whence the Grecian republics sprang. Indeed it is not wide, in principle, from our own law of parliamentary impeachment; for the portion of the Macedonian people forming the army, when regularly called together by the king, as a popular assembly, appears to have been, by the Macedonian constitution, a sovereign assembly. That, in Alexander's army, a powerful party desired the ruin of both Parmenio and Philotas is implied in all accounts. Proof of guilt, against even the son, Arrian seems rather to have doubted; and against the father he appears to have known of nothing beyond suspicion. What authority Curtius may have had for his different conclusion we fail to learn. Those writers however concur in indicating that measures of severity against a man in Parmenio's situation were not to be taken without hazard, requiring much caution in proceeding. Indeed the circumstances, formerly noticed, of the arrest of Alexander of Lyncestis, on Parmenio's accusation, mark the necessity of deference to general opinion, in a Macedonian army, on such an occasion. Arrian, in his usually simple manner, reporting facts without comment, says, that Polydamas, of the order of Royal Companions, was sent into Media, with instructions for the generals Cleander, Sitalces, and Menides, who, apparently, had been commanding under Parmenio. They were authorized now to command in chief; and, in pursuance of instructions to them, Parmenio suffered death<sup>16</sup>.

Curt. l. 6.  
c. 11.

Arr. at aut.  
Curt. l. 7.  
c. 1.  
Ch. 47. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 26.

From

Arrian, expressed himself to the same purpose, Τὴν κρίσιν τοῖς ΜΑΚΕΔΟΣΙ (ὁ Αλέξανδρος) ἐπέτεψε. l. 17. c. 79. More, to the same purpose, occurs in the next following note.

<sup>15</sup> Πολλῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων λόγων, οἱ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΕΣ κατέγνωσαν τοῦ Φιλώτου, καὶ τῶν καλαϊσιανθέντων,

θάνατον, ἐν οἷς ὑπῆρχε Παρμενίων. Diod. l. 17. c. 80.

<sup>16</sup> Diodorus, in his account of Parmenio's condemnation and death, with his usual honesty, shows vacillation between different reports before him, from different parties; of the



Ch. 47. s. 1.  
of this hist.

From Arrian, we have no farther account of the Lyncestian Alexander, son of Aëropus, than that, on accusation preferred by Parmenio, as formerly related, when the king Alexander was in Lycia, he was removed from a situation of high military command, and imprisoned. But Diodorus and Curtius concur in reporting that, having remained a prisoner three years, he was now brought to trial before the same numerous tribunal which condemned Philotas ; and, receiving sentence of death, was executed. That any community in crime was imputed to them, does not appear ; and if credit, which there seems no reason for denying, should be given to the concurring accounts of those writers, the probability may seem to follow, that the son of Aëropus was a sacrifice required by the partizans of Parmenio and Philotas.

Arrian's eminent situation, under the despotism of Roman emperors, might occasion for him no small amount of necessity for forbearance on civil and political subjects, even in treating of centuries long past ; and thence it may be that we have so little light from him on such subjects ; a deficiency in his history greatly to be regretted. There is indeed no appearance that he has suppressed any fact reported by those whom he has professed principally to trust ; but it is to be observed that they also were in situations to make it not only imprudent, but highly improper to publish all that might come to their knowledge. In the deficiency therefore of their accounts, what has been transmitted by antient writers, less informed than Aristobulus and Ptolemy, and less judicious than Arrian, yet having before them what does not remain to us, may deserve some attention here. Diodorus reports measures taken, as necessary to stem the ebullition of discontent arising from the execution of Parmenio. Those of the army, who by their conduct in the judiciary assembly, or otherwise, had manifested a disposition adverse to the king's counsels, were noted : to discover the less openly indicated purposes and sentiments of others, letters directed for Macedonia were opened. Thus, he says, the communication of the

the merits of which he felt himself unable to judge, and yet was unwilling to acknowledge so much. After having related that Parmenio was condemned by a vote of the majority of the army (which, as a very public matter, was probably not denied by writers of any party), he says, that Alexander, sending men upon swift camels, to arrive before report of the execution of Philotas could

reach Parmenio, Παρμενίωνα ἰδοιοφόνησε, l. 17. c. 80. This expression enough marks itself as derived from an adverse party, and yet perhaps not very falsely describes the manner of the business, which, however uncreditable for a regular government, may have had large warrant from such law as precedent may have established among the Macedonians.

spirit

spirit of dissatisfaction from the army to the people at home was checked. And to prevent the spreading of dissatisfaction in the army itself, through daily conversation, the discontented were drafted from their several divisions, and formed into one separate body, with an appropriate title; a title not to be with certainty translated, but seeming to refer to their failure in constitutional deference to the decision of the assembly of the army, constitutionally held to deliberate on matters of vital importance to the state<sup>17</sup>. Of these matters no mention is made by Arrian; and that the Macedonian generals, his favourite authorities, would avoid them, is likely. But he relates measures of a character to corroborate what the elder historian has reported. The command of that superior and numerous body of horse, called the King's Companions, was thought, he says, too great a trust to be any longer committed to one officer. Being therefore divided, one division was given to Hephæstion son of Amyntor, the other to Cleitus son of Dropidas: both those officers were among Alexander's most confidential favorites. Not long after, suspicion being entertained of Demetrius, one of the lords of the body-guard, that he had participated in the councils of Philotas, or perhaps was among those discontented at his fate, he was removed from that confidential situation; and Ptolemy, the historian, afterward king of Egypt, gained promotion, being appointed in his room. It is thus made evident that Ptolemy was not of the party of Parmenio and Philotas. Doubtful then as history has left their guilt, doubtful also as remains that of the Lyncestian prince, whose accuser Parmenio was, it seems altogether likely that Alexander, in very difficult and hazardous circumstances, took nearly that course, which, as far as human prudence could decide, those circumstances imperiously required, and the Macedonian law warranted.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Ἀτάκτον τάγμα.—Diod. l. 17. c. 80. This title, according to Diodorus, was given, or warranted, by Alexander himself. The authors of the antient Universal history have translated it the *turbulent battalion*. It is rendered in Rhodoman's Latin translation, adopted by Wesseling, *cohors extraordinaria*, and explained, conjecturally, in Wesseling's note, *Fortasse quod scorsum cohortem hanc a ceteris tendere rex jussit*. The title *turbulent*, apparently, would have been ill fixed by authority, as its ten-

dency would be rather to stimulate the turbulence which it was the purpose of the measure to stifle. Possibly the word may have had reference to the military situation in which the drafts were placed; as the Latin translator and the learned annotator have imagined; or, possibly it may rather have been applied, as supposed in the text, to their conduct in their civil capacity, as members of the general assembly of the army, failing in constitutional deference to the decision of the majority.

## CHAPTER LI.

ALEXANDER'S Fifth Campaign in ASIA, which completed the  
Conquest of the PERSIAN Empire.

## SECTION I.

*Natural and Political Circumstances of the Northern Provinces of the Persian Empire. Rebellion of Satibarzanes. Paropamisian Alexandria founded Asiatic Recruits to Alexander's Army<sup>1</sup>.*

AMONG events so originating from party interests, and so necessarily distressing to numerous individuals, irritation to the public mind could not fail, nor would immediately cease. Parties would remain adverse to each other, and some among them perhaps adverse to the king himself. To leave the army then in leisure to brood upon the past could not be prudent, even had it been Alexander's disposition, or had there not remained an enemy, holding means with inclination to disturb his yet unsettled empire.

The views of Bessus and his associates were greatly favored by the circumstances natural and political, of that considerable portion of the Persian empire, in which they had held the chief, and, some of them, perhaps, hereditary commands. The mountain-range which, under various ancient names, Taurus, Caucasus, Emodus, Imaus, and others, extends, from the west, as Arrian has observed, through Asia, as far as Asia was in his time known, is supposed, from modern observation, to complete its course unbroken, through China, to the Pacific Ocean. Comparatively narrow within Lesser Asia, it

Strab. l. 15.  
p. 689, ed.  
Casaub et  
al. Arr. l. 5.  
c. 5.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, little attentive to chronology, noticing neither the Olympiads nor the years of Rome, yet relating events generally in the course in which they occurred, and sometimes mentioning seasons, has pretty satisfactorily distinguished the five first years of Alexander's reign. The two next are less marked by him, and those following less still. For Diodorus, the beginning of the Olympian year at Midsummer, dividing thus the principal season of military operations has been a stumbling-block; and his purpose of a concise abridgement of universal history would ill allow him to give every event exactly to its day. In failure of other assistance, nevertheless, we are often reduced to draw from him as we best may, and rejoice in what he affords.

spreads



spreads in Armenia; which in Strabo's description consists of many mountains, and many highland plains. Contracted then, on the north of Media, it spreads again in advancing toward India; in some parts so unbroken in its height as to seem a great island, or even a continent, set upon a continent. From the narrower part, where it approaches the Caspian sea, a large branch stretches southward, almost to the Indian ocean, forming the eastern boundary of ancient Media and Persia. Eastward then of this extensive highland country is a sandy desert, not equalling those of Africa, but far greater than that often called the Great Desert, which divides Mesopotamia from Syria. Extending fifteen degrees of longitude and ten of latitude, it reaches eastward to India, southward to the ocean. Report went that it had been the grave of every army attempting to cross it; among which one of the great Cyrus, and, tho not impossible, yet rather more against probability, one of his predecessor in the Assyrian empire, the great queen Semiramis, are mentioned. Communication thus, from the body of the empire, and its three capitals, with the northern provinces was limited and hazardous.

Those northern provinces were of great extent, and variously important. Bactria or Bactriana, the satrapy of Bessus, while a subject, was a large country, populous and eminently fruitful. Strabo says it gave abundantly all the most valuable productions of the earth, except olives, and whatever else could ill bear severe winter cold. Its limits, as those of all these provinces, except where a great river marked them, appear to have been but uncertainly known to the most inquisitive and best informed ancient writers; and the names of many, taken by Grecian ears from Asiatic mouths, or by Grecian pens from Asiatic alphabets, are found so variously written as to leave it often uncertain whether, by names of different orthography, the same country or another has been intended. Sogdia, or Sogdiana, north of Bactria, bordered on Scythia. Westward, the principal names are Parthia, Daïa, and Hyrcania. Southward was Paropamisus, for its extent eminent among those found in various parts of the world of the character which the concisely expressive language of Greece described by the one word *oropetion*<sup>2</sup>, which may be translated a highland plain. Southward of this, in a line from west to east, were Zaranga, apparently

<sup>2</sup> Ὀροπέδια. Strab. l. 11. p. 520.

the same which is found otherwise written Drangia and Drangiana, and perhaps Dragogia, unless Dragogia were a name for the country of the Ariasps, beyond which, eastward, Arachosia extended to India. All these countries partook of the character of Strabo's oropedion, highland-plain, tho less lofty than Paropamisus, and all bordered southward on the Great Desert. Westward then of Paropamisus was the large and highly fruitful province of Aria, Areia, or Ariana, bordering, north-eastward on Bactria, and, in the opposite direction, reaching the Caspian Gate; the Thermopylæ of these parts, being the principal pass for communication with Media and the body of the empire. By position therefore, as well as by produce and population, Areia was of great importance. In all these countries moreover, the people, widely different in character from those of the south, were universally bred to the use of arms. Nevertheless in the lowlands they were civilized, and their country highly cultivated. Areia, still more than Bactria, was celebrated for fruitfulness, and especially for the abundance and excellence of its wines. The people of the adjoining province of Zaranga, or Drangia, tho a highland country, are marked as a civilized race, by Strabo's information that they lived in the Persian manner, except, as he says, that they had little wine, the climate, apparently, denying the production.

We have observed, in the account of Alexander's course through the Lesser, or as the Greeks called it, the Hither or the Lower Asia, the turbulent and predatory character of the people of the extensive highlands of that country; not widely different, it must be confessed, from what, in many lively pictures, from the candid pen of Xenophon, we have seen extensively that of the Greeks themselves. It may be advantageous to add here Strabo's account of the mountaineers of the Greater, the Farther, or the Upper Asia.

Westward of the Caspian Gate, toward the borders of Armenia, the Mards and other highlanders, brought by Alexander to submission in his course through that country, have been already noticed. Southward, along the borders of Media and Persia, the mountains dividing those rich regions from the Great Desert, were held by various hords, of which some also have already occurred for notice. Their territories differing in fruitfulness of soil and temperature of air, their wants, and so their mode of life and of

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policy,

policy in some degree differed ; but they were all more or less freebooters. The Cossays, on the east of Media, were all bred from infancy to the use of the bow ; and for the supply of their wants and luxuries, beyond what their soil spontaneously afforded, and what they might get by hunting, they depended almost wholly upon robbery. The Parætacs were not without agriculture, but still they were robbers. Elymæa, southward, had, among its mountains, some fine vales well cultivated : it was altogether the most varied and most fruitful of the highland countries. The military hords, holding these countries, had each its chief ; for military hords must acknowlege a chief. However then occasionally, or, perhaps some of them, hereditarily, at variance with oneanother, they would also occasionally unite, when defence required, or when opportunity for profit invited. The Ely- Strab. l. 15.  
P. 732.  
mæans, having the best country, and most practising husbandry, had probably also the best policy. Their chief is said, at one time, whether before or after Alexander appears uncertain, to have been accompanied by thirteen Strab. l. 11.  
P. 524.  
thousand men from other hords, in addition to his own, in a march into Susiana and Babylonia. All these people had been brought to acknowlege submission to Alexander ; but a submission no longer to be depended on than while the strong hand of power was impending over them.

Those highland-plain provinces, which extended eastward from Areia to India, with Paropamisus on the north, and the great desert on the south, were held by people who, as more following agriculture, were more disposed to live in peace with their neighbours. To have secure command of this country, while he proceeded northward against Bessus, was the more important for Alexander. Rugged highlands formed a line of separation for all this northern part of the empire from the still larger and richer portion which more patiently acknowleged his sovereignty. But it appears that he had a farther object. The Indian prince who, of his own free motion, as we have seen, sent in bonds to Alexander the fugitive Ch. 50. s. 3.  
of this hist.  
satrap of Zaranga, Barsaentes, the associate of Bessus, thus marked himself for no friend to Bessus. Probably, their territories joining, they had been at variance ; and the Indian, dreading the advancement of the satrap of Bactria to the sovereignty of the Persian empire, was anxious to cultivate the friendship of the great conqueror, his enemy.

Such seem to have been the considerations which induced Alexander, as



soon as the revolt of Areia, excited by the faithless satrap Satibarzanes, was quelled, instead of returning directly northward, by the western side of Paropamisus, into Bactria, to proceed first eastward, to the provinces southward of that singular country. Zaranga or Drangia was first in his way, where the catastrophë of Philotas and Parmenio and the Lyncestian Alexander had occurred. But before matters were so settled that military

B. C. 330. operations might be resumed, autumn was already advanced, and the  
Ol. 112, 4. country, tho according to the latest geographical inquiries, included within the thirty-fourth degree of northern latitude, and thus south of all Europe, became early covered with snow.

In the mild climate of our ilands very few persons, comparatively, are aware of the degree of winter cold on the continent southward, even in the countries nearest us, Germany, and a large part of France itself; tho to those who have visited America or China, vicissitudes of temperature in the air, of a violence hardly known anywhere in Europe, will be familiar. But even within Europe, the account of a country, not ordinarily visited either for business or curiosity, by a very intelligent modern author, who had held high office there, may deserve notice. 'In 'Walachia' which is in the latitude nearly of Lombardy and the south of France, 'the winter,' says that respectable writer, 'is long, and 'commonly very severe. In the year one thousand seven hundred and 'seventy-nine, tho little snow fell, the quicksilver in Reaumur's thermometer stood at twenty degrees below frost<sup>3</sup>. Spring begins in April: 'in July and August the heat is excessive. Excellent wines are produced in great abundance: but, as soon as the vintage is over the vines 'are bent to the ground, and covered with soil, not to be exposed to the 'air again till spring<sup>4</sup>.' Xenophon's description of a climate some degrees

Obs. int. la  
Valachia e  
Moldav.

Ch. 23. s. 4.  
of this hist.

<sup>3</sup> Twenty degrees of Reaumur's thermometer are equal to about forty-seven of Fahrenheit's; an amount of cold never experienced in any part of Britain.

<sup>4</sup> *Observazioni storiche, naturali, e politiche, intorno la Valachia e Moldavia*, printed at Naples in 1788. The author, Raicewick, by birth and family a Transylvanian, was counsellor of legation from the court of

Vienna to that of Naples, where he did me the favor to present me with his book. He had been previously secretary to the Austrian embassy at Constantinople, and afterward principal secretary to Ypselanti prince of Walachia. With a singular talent for acquiring languages, he chose the Italian for his book, and has had the approbation of Italian critics for his style.

southward

southward of Walachia, yet more severe, so as to forbid the cultivation of the vine, of which he had experience in returning from Mesopotamia with the Cyreian Greeks, will be remembered<sup>5</sup>.

Alexander had already had experience enough of the climate of Caucasus and the highlands branching from the great range, to be not unaware of what was to be expected among them. Eager nevertheless in his purpose, in advanced autumn he moved from Zaranga eastward. In the adjoining country he met with a political phenomenon of a very gratifying kind, of which probably he was not without previous intimation. The small nation of the Ariasps, or Agriaspas, differed so in character from the predatory hords of the Asiatic highlands in general, that they were renowned for honesty and good faith.

Arrian says, meaning it evidently as high eulogy, that they were equal to the best of the Greeks. According to tradition, the great Cyrus, when he marched through their country to make war on the Scythians, was so satisfied with their conduct, that he gave them the title of Welldöers; which had prevailed so as nearly to have superseded their antient name<sup>6</sup>.

Arrian, l. 3, c. 27.  
Strab. l. 15.  
l. 15. p. 724.  
ed. Casaub.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 81.

How a small hord so situated should have acquired this superior character, and how, under a government so failing to afford due protection to its best subjects, as we have seen the Persian, they should have maintained it and preserved themselves, is matter of just curiosity, for which however, among

<sup>5</sup> Δράγγας τε καὶ Δραγωγούς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ παρασησάμενος : παρεσήσατο καὶ τοὺς Ἀραχάσιους — Ἐπῆλθε δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἰνδῶν, τοὺς προσχώρους Ἀραχάσιους. Εὐμπαθία δὲ τὰντα ἔθνη διὰ χιόνος τε πολλῆς, καὶ ζῆν ἀπορία τῶν ἐπιτιθείων, καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ταλαιπωρία, ἐπῆλθε. Arr. l. 3. c. 28.

The learned translator of Arrian, Rooke, would give no credit to this passage of his author: 'The country,' he says, in a note on it, 'lies between the thirty-fourth and fortieth degrees of latitude, and of consequence could not be much colder than Greece or Italy.' Common as such error is, it seems strange that a man of learning and inquiry should so boldly maintain it. Not only any one acquainted with Virginia could inform him better, but, in Johnson's dictionary, he might have found admonition,

that he should have inquired further before he so positively asserted. Under the article *Temperature*, the great lexicographer quotes the following passage from Brown's travels. 'There may be as much difference, as to the *Temperature* of the air, and as to heat and cold, in one mile as in ten degrees of latitude; and he that would cool himself in summer had better go up to the top of the next hill, than remove into a far more northern country.' Brown's Travels quoted under the article *Temperature*.

Rooke's numerous notes indeed, unless for his laborious collation of Curtius with Arrian, are rarely of any value.

<sup>6</sup> Of the Persian word we are not informed, the Greek writers all using the translation into their own language, *Εὐεργεσία*.

Arr. ut ant.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 81.

antient writers, gratification fails. Alexander, the historian proceeds to say, halted in their country to celebrate a sacrifice to Apollo; and their rulers, encouraged by his expressed satisfaction with them, requested a small addition to their territory, which he granted. An additional proof of his favor and confidence he seems to have given them, in committing the government of their country to a Persian, who, according to Curtius, had been secretary to the late king, Darius, not leaving any military force under a Grecian commander to insure their fidelity to engagements.

Diod. ut ant.  
Curt. l. 7.  
c. 3.

The Ariasps of this country, as the learned examiner of the historians of Alexander has observed, have been confounded by some antient writers with the Arimasps of European Scythia, eminent in fable as dwarf human monsters, with an eye only in the forehead, who waged continual war with brute monsters, of mixt form, beast and bird, called griffins or gryphons. Hence the existence of the Welldoers has been called in question<sup>7</sup>. Wherever fable is found blended with history, under respectable assurance of its antiquity, some foundation in truth may not unreasonably be suspected. Extensive tracts of mountain, and their inhabitants, generally, the world over, are little known beyond their immediate neighbourhood. Of those in Europe, the Alps, whose vallies alone afford thorofare to Italy, have become most familiar. There the disease of the swoln throat prevails, and with it often mental weakness. Those of its people not so affected are generally of good persons, and strong in body and mind; and even those laboring under infirmity of either have been remarked for

<sup>7</sup> If the learned examiner of the historians of Alexander has given way sometimes to hasty fancy, the liberal reader, considering the merits of the work, and the author's early age when published, will make allowance for it. 'Les historiens d'Alexandre saisirent avec 'empressement,' he says, le rapport qu'il 'pouvoit y avoir entre les Agriaspes ou 'Ariaspes, selon Ptolomée (l. 6. c. 19.) et 'les Arimaspes, peuple de la Scythie Euro- 'péene, celebre tant par les fables qu'en 'avoit débitées Aristéas de Proconnesse ' (Herod. l. 4. c. 11. et seq.) que par le 'secours qu'ils donnerent aux Argonautes, 'et qui leur meriterent le nom d'Evergetes. ' (Steph. Byzant.) les ecrivains—imagi-

'nerent, &c.' Exam. Crit. des Hist. d'Alex. p. 214. Strabo, as well as Diodorus, agrees with Arrian in sober account of the Welldoers of this neighbourhood of India. The concurrence of Diodorus and Curtius concerning the appointment of a satrap to their country, tho differing as to his name, yet agreeing so far that each gives him a Persian name, is itself considerable testimony. Altogether then, whatever of fable may have been mixed with accounts of the Ariasps by writers whose object has been amusement for the fancy, their more sober history is so far warranted that it cannot but appear rather rash for a modern to treat it with contempt.

that



that eccentric wit, which in those ages when letters were neglected and even despised by the higher ranks, was so in request, as an amusement of courts and great houses, that none would be without its fool. Hence, throughout the south of Germany, the proper name *Tirolese* has become the common word for that kind of witling; as at Paris, *Swiss* for a porter, and *Savoyard* for a chimneysweeper. But within Europe there is another country, less known, where the malady is more severe. ‘The people of *Argis*, among the mountains of *Walachia*,’ in the account of the respectable writer recently noticed, ‘seem hardly of human race: less than four feet high, such is the fleshy protuberance under their chins, that the large misshapen head seems fixed on the chest, without the intervention of a neck; and understanding fails.’ Nevertheless *Walachia* is a valuable country, and the people, not thus unfortunately affected, a respectable race. Whatever then may be thought of the European dwarfs, the *Arimasps*, objects of fable, and whether there may or may not have been any analogy between them and the *Walachians* of *Argis*, or between either them, or the *Walachians*, with the *Ariasps* between *Media* and *India*, it cannot but be gratifying to the investigator of eventful history to find, among other testimonies, that of so able and careful an inquirer as *Arrian*, to the character of the Asiatic *Welldoers*.

Observ. int.  
la *Valach.*  
e *Mold.*

In the northern parts of the Persian empire, tho hardly reaching the middle of the great Asiatic continent, the character of the people, and of their government, appears to have differed from those of the south as much as the climate. In the south, the mass of the population consisted of husbandmen and artizans, utterly unused to arms, depending upon the ruling powers to insure orderly conduct among themselves, and to protect them against foreign enemies. Here government was despotic, and subjects were careless whom they served. But, in the north, verging on foreign nations, whose trade was plunder and war their delight, circumstances, compelling every man to be a soldier, compelled also the rulers to respect the subjects. Where every man bears arms there must be respect for the multitude; there must, whatever form the government may have, be a considerable amount of freedom; and the conduct which rulers find necessary, will attach the people to them. Alexander found early proof of this. *Satibarzanes*, his late satrap of *Areia*, faithless in promise, but bold and persevering in enterprise,

prize, on being surprized by his rapidity, so as to be obliged presently after engaging the Areian people in revolt, to abandon them, had fled to Bessus. While then Alexander was busied with his various measures for securing his command of the countries southward of Bactria, Satibarzanes, obtaining a body of two thousand horse from his new sovereign, returned into Areia<sup>8</sup>; and, such was the respect for him among the people, or such their aversion to a foreign dominion, that he engaged them a second time in revolt.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 28.

Alexander did not judge it necessary now again to interrupt the prosecution of his concerted measures, by returning himself to oppose this new insurrection. With two Macedonians, Erygius and Caranus, he appointed two eminent Persians, Artabazus, so often before mentioned, and Phrataphernes, his satrap of Parthia, to conduct the war in Areia. Satibarzanes meanwhile had collected such a force as to venture to meet them in battle, and maintain sharp contest. With that impatience, distinguishing Asiatic from European minds, he seems to have resolved to conquer or die. Instead then of attending, with the just coolness of a general, to the conduct of those under him, who were yet maintaining an action of doubtful issue, he sought personal conflict with the opposing commander: attacking Erygius, he was killed by his hand. The Areians then universally fled, and no farther resistance appears to have been made throughout their country.

Arr. ut ant.

Meanwhile Alexander proceeded eastward, through Arachosia to the confines of India, the whole way, according to the concurring accounts of historians, over snow. No opposition is mentioned, even in the Persian provinces. In India, as already observed, it seems probable that his object was rather negotiation than war, and he appears to have succeeded. But he had now had sufficient evidence that, for these northern countries, quiet could not be provided with the same ease, or by the same methods, as for the southern. The singular region called Paropamisus, divided Arachosia from Bactria. Probably his information was good on which he grounded his resolution to proceed thither for winter quarters. On the higher grounds projected from the mountains into the lofty plain, he found a spot advantageous for the site of a fortress to command an extent of fruitful country. There he employed his troops during winter in

<sup>8</sup> This is the orthography in our copies of Arrian: in those of Strabo it is Aria, but more commonly Ariana.

building

building a town, to which, as to his Egyptian city, he gave the name of Alexandria<sup>9</sup>.

We have seen, in Xenophon's account of the retreat of the Cyreians, how unavailing ordinary Grecian discipline was to prevent the association of women and the growth of families, in a Grecian army, passing any time in an enemy's country, even in distressing circumstances. Hence, tho the Macedonian discipline is likely to have been, for other matters, more perfect, yet, much as Alexander evidently had need to court his army, what indulgence for the society of women, in passing through such an extent of country as conquerors, would be expedient and even necessary, may, in some degree, be estimated. We have seen also the violence of opposition to Xenophon's purpose of colonization with the Cyreian army. But his plan was proposed after a single year's absence from Greece, and not till all the greatest difficulties of the return, long nearly hopeless, were overcome, and home was already almost within sight. Very different were the circumstances now, when, after an absence of three years, the army was on the border of India, and a winter campaign in a most severe climate, against enemies of high and even singular warlike fame, was in view. Probably numbers would take, if not with a view to perfect satisfaction, yet as a very desirable immediate indulgence, the permission to rest, with their families, in the new settlement. It seems indeed likely that a large proportion had been Persian subjects; for the civil government of the colony was committed to a Persian, Proëxes, with the title of satrap; the military command however being reserved to Neiloxenus, of the band of companions.

Ch. 23. s. 5.  
of this hist.

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 28.

<sup>9</sup> Arrian says that here, Caucasus produces nothing but fir-trees and masterwort, *τεγμίνθους* and *σίλφιον*, yet that the country is populous, feeding numerous flocks and herds. *Σίλφιον*, under its Latin name, *Laserpitium*, is described by Ainsworth, 'an herb, the gum whereof is called *laser*; some call it masterwort; some take it to be benzoin: the worst kind of it is called *assa foetida*.' Of this plant, Arrian proceeds to say, sheep are so fond that the Cyrenæans, in whose country it abounds, and who prize the benzoin greatly, protect it from them with laborious care. Elsewhere he mentions the name

Caucasus as improperly, tho frequently by the Greeks, extended to this part of the great Asiatic highland chain. He uses it nevertheless here, but seemingly limiting it to the mountains, *τὰ ὄρη*, and not including under it the plainer highland country, which would probably give other produce than *τεγμίνθους* and *σίλφιον*.

Strabo reckons Paropamisus within his Ariana, and thence calls this the Arian Alexandria, but, among later writers, the title of the Paropamisan seems to have more prevailed.

But



Vincent on  
Nearchus,  
v. 1. n. 7.

But such was the wisdom or felicity with which the situation was chosen and the arrangements made, that the settlement prospered, as a Grecian colony, long after support from a Grecian empire failed, and flourishes yet, it has been supposed, under the corrupted name of Candahar.

Arrian's omission of notice of Asiatic recruits to Alexander's army, even Greeks of Asia, has been formerly observed, and the probable cause suggested, that the Macedonian generals, whose reports he principally trusted, were not solicitous to mention them. What is related on this subject by other writers will therefore deserve consideration. Plutarch says that, observing the hardiness of body and firmness of mind of the people of these climates, Alexander inrolled no less than thirty thousand boys, to be trained in the Macedonian discipline. Probably he has described them properly, calling them boys; for men would be averse to a change of habits to which they had been educated; whereas boys would soon become proud of arms and discipline, which gave them military importance above the men of their nation, and equality with the conquerors of Asia. Associating with Greeks, they would, more readily than men, learn the Grecian language, and, in other matters of habit, would become effectually Greeks.

## SECTION II.

*Measures of Bessus. Discontent in Alexander's Army: Pursuit of Bessus: Critical Circumstances of Alexander: Surrender of Bessus.*

Arrian, l. 3,  
c. 28.

BESSUS meanwhile had been busy in measures for obstructing Alexander's farther progress. Of the northern satraps about him, of no small power, some were also of no mean abilities; insomuch that hope might be entertained, not only to defend the dominion they yet held, but to proceed to the recovery of some of the southern provinces, which, it might be supposed, only in want of due support from a superintending government, had submitted to a foreign invader. They removed or destroyed all subsistence for an army, throughout the plain at the foot of Caucasus toward Bactria, and soon the season, coming to their assistance, had covered the country with snow.

But, for Alexander, difficulties were inviting, and rest annoying. Anxious

to

to reach Bactria while Bessus might be yet incompletely prepared, he resolved upon moving while spring, in that severe climate, yet lingered. Probably his inquiries had been extensive, his information good, and his purpose founded on a just view of things; for the result warrants the supposition. But he had difficulties to encounter beyond what the enemy opposed. To Babylon, and perhaps as far as the treasury of Pasargadæ, he was followed by most willing soldiers; eager for great rewards in promise. Even when, after indulgence of some months in rest and plenty there, the march was turned northward, in pursuit of the fugitive monarch, the expediency of thus providing permanence for advantages gained would be so obvious to those of more thought, and impatience of rest, ordinary with those habituated to action, would so stimulate the more thoughtless, that zeal for the prosecution of the monarch's purpose might still be ready. But when Darius was no more, and with him the Persian dynasty so far extinct, that a pretender able to contend with Alexander, for the richer part of the empire, was supposed no longer to be apprehended, yet war was to be prosecuted in a most severe climate, against hardy nations, whose conquest would bring no obvious reward, a great change would be likely to insue in the soldier's mind. Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch nearly concur in supplying what Arrian has left unnoticed; probably because the Macedonian generals, his guides, would avoid report of the first ebullitions of discontent in the army; and yet there occurs, in his narrative, what gives probability to their accounts.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 64.  
Curt. l. 6.  
c. 2.  
Plut. v. Alex.  
p. 691.

It appears likely that, as Curtius relates, the adverse humor originated, or first became extensive and dangerous, during the intermission of military enterprize, while the new city, the Paropamisan Alexandria, was building. The notion was propagated that, Darius being dead, Alexander clearly lord of the Persian empire, and a new settlement prepared for those whom age or wounds disabled for the long march home, and for numerous others for whom, on account of families grown in camp about them, or failure of means at home, such a settlement would be acceptable, all desirous of returning would of course have free leave to return. In this temper of the army, notice of the purpose of marching still northward, and with snow yet upon the ground, was received with such demonstration of discontent, and such disposition to disobedience and tumult, that Alexander deemed it expedient to call the soldiers together as a popular

assembly. In an able speech then, mixing the pathetic with the animating, he so wrought on their minds, as to restore zeal for the prosecution of a hitherto glorious, and largely rewarding, but yet unfinished war, and to produce a declaration that they would follow wherever he would lead. Diodorus adds that this zeal was politicly rewarded with large donations immediately made; and it seems indicated, by what Arrian adds, that it was promoted by promises of dismissal for any who might desire it, when the expedition, which circumstances immediately required, should be ended.

Arr. 1. 3.  
c. 29.

The threatening discontent of the army being thus appeased, Alexander hastened to use the favorable temper which he had excited. Proceeding with the utmost speed that the season and the state of the country would allow, he advanced into Bactria. Whether Bessus and his associates disagreed, or why else they were yet so unprepared to defend that extensive and populous region, which, under their legitimate sovereign they had commanded as his satraps, we are uninformed, on Alexander's approach they withdrew. Probably his army was formidable, not by discipline only, but in number also. They however resolved to retire behind the great river Oxus, which separated Bactria from Sogdiana, the satrapy of Spitamenes. But when arrived there, the Bactrians of their army, to the number of seven thousand horse, refusing to go farther, dispersed to their several homes; whence it may seem that Bessus, even in his own province, was little esteemed. The Sogdians followed Spitamenes, and the Daïans accompanied them; for the way was homeward for both. But the sequel shows Spitamenes to have been able, and considerably popular. When all had crossed, they burnt the boats which had given them passage; thus demonstrating hopelessness of support from Bactria, and abandonment of the Bactrians to the mercy of the conqueror. Alexander allowed his army, in the town of Drapsaca, some time for rest and refreshment, which were probably needed. He then proceeded against Bactra and Aorni, the two principal cities of the province; and, these making little resistance, the whole quickly submitted. In the citadel of Aorni he placed a garrison under one of his band of companions, Archelaus son of Androcles, and he committed the very important satrapy of Bactria, a large, fruitful and populous province, to his Persian friend, of tried fidelity in engagements alternately on each side, the almost half Grecian Artabazus,

It



It may have been policy, but it seems also to have been in some degree a passion of Alexander, to pursue Darius living, and not less so to revenge him dead. Coming to the river Oxus, the difficulty of crossing seemed insurmountable. The breadth was great; the depth various; the rapidity of the stream, and the shifting of the gravel in its bed, made fording, in the most favorable season, dangerous. But now, with advancing spring, the snow melting on the mountains, fording was utterly denied; and to make bridges, or repair the destruction of boats by the enemy, the country, to a great extent, afforded no material. The hazardous resource therefore was, what we have before observed in use for passing quieter streams, to use skins, the soldiers beds or nightly covering, duly stuffed, as rafts. Arr. l. 3.  
c. 29.

With his mind eagerly bent upon one object, Alexander's circumstances were, at this time, variously critical. His new subjects, to whom he had dispensed favors, and committed great and confidential offices, showing, in some instances, a most honorable fidelity, still in others, continued to prove that trusting them was hazardous. Intelligence came that Arsames, raised, on the second expulsion of the faithless Satibarzanes, to the important satrapy of Areia, was misconducting himself; insomuch that Stasanor, of the band of companions, was sent to arrest him. Whether some revival of discontent in the army, and unwillingness to pursue a flying enemy farther among boundless snows and deserts, were demonstrated; or it was simply in pursuance of promises given, when the former fermentation was stilled, some of the most valuable troops of the army, in circumstances so pressing, were dismissed. All those Thessalians, who had voluntarily renewed their services, together with all Macedonians who could claim privilege for age, wounds, or any disability, were, in this critical state of the expedition, allowed to return to Europe.

The remaining forces crossed the Oxus on the stuffed skins. If loss was suffered Arrian has not mentioned it; but he says the business, probably executed with diligent care, employed five days. The army then proceeded in pursuit of Bessus. The effect of the bold measure was evidently great: it appears to have brought to decision the policy of that pretender's associates. A deputation from Spitamenes and Dataphernes met Alexander, commissioned to inform him that Bessus was effectually their prisoner;

not indeed under close restraint, but in their power; and they would surrender him to any officer whom he would send with a detachment, which need not be large. Alexander chose for the important mission Ptolemy son of Lagus. To his orders a force was committed, not inconsiderable for number, but superior for selection. The heavy-armed consisted of the taxis<sup>10</sup> which having been that of Philotas, went still by his name, and one chiliarchy of hypaspists. Of this body we have no farther information than that, with its peculiar title, of very uncertain meaning, it had eminently Alexander's confidence, and especially his preference among the heavy-armed, for rapid movements. Of light infantry, all the Agrians were assigned, and half the bowmen of the army: of cavalry three troops of royal companions, and all the horse-darters. With this force Ptolemy was directed to use the utmost speed, while Alexander followed with the rest of the army, at an easier pace than before. Such then was the vigor of the body selected, that, on the fourth evening, having completed the space, the historian says, of ten ordinary marches, Ptolemy reached the ground which Bessus had quitted only the day before. Gathering reason then for doubting, either the sincerity of Spitamenes and Dataphernes in their offer, or their perseverance in its purpose, he took the lead with his cavalry only, directing the infantry to follow, in order for action. On approaching a fortified town, he learnt that Bessus was there with a small force; deserted by Spitamenes, who would no longer support him, yet would not himself be the person to deliver him to his enemies. Ptolemy sent a summons into the town, offering immunity to the garrison and people, upon condition of surrendering Bessus. This found ready acceptance, and Ptolemy, with his prisoner, hastened his return.

Approaching Alexander, he sent to ask his commands for the manner in which the captive chief, the pretender to the throne of Asia, should be brought into his presence. The answer directed that he should be placed naked, with a halter about his neck, on the right of the road by which the army was marching. Alexander, in his chariot, stopping when he came near, asked Bessus ' Why he had so treated Darius, not only his king but

<sup>10</sup> Whether the taxis, in Alexander's army, appears uncertain. The chiliarchy would more nearly answered to our brigade, or to be something between eight and twelve hundred men. a division consisting of two or more brigades,

‘ his friend and benefactor, dragging him about a prisoner, and afterward ‘ putting him to death?’ Bessus answered, that ‘ the measures were not ‘ of his single authority, but concurred in by those then attending Darius, ‘ with the view to obtain safety for themselves from Alexander’s mercy.’ Alexander then directed that he should be scourged, and that the herald should proclaim his crimes of treachery and murder in the same terms in which he had himself reproached him, as the reason for the ignominious severity. This, Arrian says, was Ptolemy’s own account. But Aristobulus related that Bessus was sent by Spitamenes and Dataphernes under a guard, apparently meaning a guard of their own people, who delivered him naked, and bound with a halter; seeming thus to differ from Ptolemy, yet not clearly contradicting him. This notice, by Arrian, of difference between those eminent writers, whatever farther may be thought of it, will be so far satisfactory to the modern inquirer, as it shows his care to investigate and declare authorities, and to mark whatever might be doubtful. The miserable Bessus was sent to Bactra, the capital of the province of which he had been satrap, there to await his farther doom.

Arrian, l. 3.  
c. 29, 30.

### SECTION III.

*Stubborn Resistance of the Northern Asiatics. Negotiation with Scythian Kingdoms. A Grecian Colony established among the Scythians not Subjects of the Kingdoms. War with the Scythians, not Subjects of the Kingdoms.*

IN passing the mountains of Caucasus, and in the hasty marches over the snow-clad plains beyond them, a great number of horses had perished. Fortunately Sogdiana and adjoining provinces could furnish supply of a valuable kind, both for cavalry and baggage. But time would be necessary for collecting these, and preparing them for service to follow, while the army rested in the city called by the Greeks Maracanda, the modern Samarkand, capital of Sogdiana.

The object of the next march, toward the Caspian sea, is no farther stated, than



than as it appears the people were not disposed to the submission required ; perhaps necessary toward the quiet of the more civilized country which acknowledged the conqueror's sovereignty. Nevertheless no opposition seems to have been yet met, when, while the army incamped near a great river, variously called Tanais, Orxantes, and Silys, a body of foragers was destroyed ; and the natives, to the number of thirty thousand, assembling on the summit of a hill on all sides precipitous, defied assault<sup>11</sup>. Alexander, indignant at his loss and their presumption, took himself the lead of his lightest troops to storm the post. Such however was the difficulty of the ground and the energy of its defenders, that his men suffered in several unsuccessful assaults, and he himself received a bowshot in the leg. The wound was so far severe as the arrow-head could not be extracted without cutting ; but efforts were not relaxed for it. Resistance being at length overborne, only about eight thousand of the enemy were reckoned to have escaped death from the sword, or the precipices by which they attempted flight.

Curt. l. 7.  
c. 6.

Concerning Alexander's wound, warranted by Arrian, a circumstance, related only by Curtius, but in its nature open to extensive knowledge, may deserve notice. A wound in the leg, it is well known, for cure, requires rest of the limb. But Alexander's mind could not rest without personal observation of things going forward. He would be carried in a litter, by mens hands, wherever he supposed his attention wanted. The honor then of being his bearers was contested with eagerness among his troops. The cavalry, as his usual companions in action, claimed the duty of attending his necessities when unfortunately disabled for action. The infantry contended against this, that, as theirs was the office to carry their wounded fellow-soldiers, cavalry as well as infantry, it could not be just to deny them the honor of carrying their king, when needing such assistance. Alexander settled the dispute by deciding that cavalry and infantry should carry him alternately.

<sup>11</sup> The river, according to Arrian, was ordinarily called the Tanais ; not that Tanais, he says, which, falling into the lake Maotis, was reckoned by Herodotus the boundary of Europe and Asia ; for, rising among the heights of Caucasus, it runs into the Caspian,

or, as he names it here, the Hyrcanian sea. According to Aristobulus, he adds, the people of the country called the river the Orxantes : Pliny (l. 6. c. 16,) gives it the very different name of the Silys.

Not many days after, while he was allowing that rest to his army which he wanted for himself, but nevertheless was employing his mind diligently in ordering regulations for all the country around, he was surprized with embassies coming to wait upon him from the kings of the Scythians. Arrian mentions, of that powerful and extraordinary people, two great kingdoms, one in Asia, the other in Europe; and, beside these, many wild hords, who, with opportunity for wandering over immense plains of soil little productive, in a most severe climate, avoiding all certain settlement, avoided all regular government. They appear to have resembled much the borderers of England and Scotland in former days, and those of Spain and France; differing chiefly as they lived in a severer climate, and had an extent, very many times greater, of land uninviting for cultivation, to wander over. The embassies, now arriving, came together from the two great princes of the more settled and civilized Scythians, the Asiatic and the European. To the European the Greeks had been for ages known. Athens, we have seen, had commercial settlements on their shores, which were a principal source of its slave-market, and Macedonia had had wars with them, and probably treaties. To the Asiatic-Scythians communication with the Persian empire was familiar, in war and in negotiation. Both the princes appear to have supposed it of consequence for them to acquire some insight into Alexander's purposes; and it was perhaps yet more important for him to have some knowlege of theirs. Receiving both the embassies therefore in a gratifying manner, he avoided immediately entering into any specific treaty with either, by sending, as a compliment, his ambassadors to their princes.

Ch. 38. s. 3.  
of this hist.

Within the great river, the boundary of the late Persian empire against the Asiatic-Scythian kingdom, a Scythian hord, conquered, it appears, by the great Cyrus, had been allowed to retain its establishments, and to live in freedom, as subjects of the Persian crown. But to provide for peace and good order, that prince had fortified a principal town, which had from him its name, in the Grecian translation, Cyropolis. War with any of the Scythians appears not at all to have been Alexander's purpose; nothing among them inviting it. But stability for his acquired empire, always prominent among his objects, and, with it, improvement of the condition of its people,

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 1.

people, required consideration. To provide security therefore for his northern border, and at the same time inforce peaceful demeanor among subjects disposed to turbulence, he pursued his own former plan, in imitating that of his great predecessor in conquest. On the river, whether to be called Tanaïs, Orxantes, or Silys, a situation offered itself, recommended, not only by its opportunities for both protecting Sogdiana, and carrying war, should it become advisable, into Scythia, but also by various circumstances of promise for the growth of a great and wealthy city. A remarkable instance of Alexander's deference, whether more for the political principles gathered from his habits with the free constitution of Macedonia and his education under Aristotle, or for the free people forming the principal strength of his army, followed. He summoned all the Sogdians, who held authority in their country, to a meeting for deliberation on measures for common good<sup>12</sup>. His purpose evidently was to conciliate his new subjects of the north, as he had conciliated those of Egypt and the south of Asia: but Arrian, who, himself an Asiatic, would know the general temper of Asiatics, indicates that it had a contrary effect; expressing himself doubtful whether it did not excite more jealousy than the proposed new town, and afford more opportunity of advantage for the partizans of Bessus. The Sogdians generally, and many of the Bactrians, and all the Scythians within the Orxantes, engaged together in revolt. The Scythians were the first to act. Falling suddenly on those of the Macedonian army quartered in their country, they put all to death; and then Scythians, Sogdians, and Bactrians, withdrew to their strong places.

Such proceedings would of course call forth Alexander's energy. His first measures were directed against the Scythians. Cyropolis had walls of masonry, and a citadel: six other towns had fortifications, but only of earth. Among these towns their forces were distributed in proportion to the estimated importance of each; by far the greatest in Cyropolis. Alexander committed to Craterus an army sufficient to invest that city, while he took himself, in his usual way, the conduct of the more active and dangerous service. When a contravallation around Cyropolis was so far completed that no succour

<sup>12</sup> Ἐς ἑνα ξύλλογον ἐπήγγειλε συιελθεῖν τοὺς ἐπάρχους τῆς χώρας ἐκείνης.—Arr. l. 4. c. 1.

could



could easily issue to any of the inferior towns, he attacked them one by one, and presently stormed three<sup>13</sup>. All the men were put to death; the women and children were saved for slaves, as part of the booty to reward his army. Measures were taken for preventing information of the fate of these towns from reaching those unattacked; yet such alarm arose, either from intelligence or suspicion, that two were abandoned. Alexander, apprehending this, had so stationed his cavalry that few of the fugitives escaped.

His whole force was then assembled against Cyropolis. Assault according to antient art, with battering machines, was preparing, when the channel of a torrent stream running through the town, rough and narrow, yet not impracticable for armed infantry, was observed to be neglected by the garrison, intent upon the expected attack on their walls. Thus an enterprize was offered, inviting for Alexander himself. With a few chosen troops he entered without resistance; and, hastening to the nearest gate, opened it, and admitted a large body prepared for the event. Nevertheless the garrison, amounting, according to Arrian, to eighteen thousand men, surprized, but not dismayed, resisted vigorously. Alexander received blows on the head and neck with stones. Craterus and other principal officers, were wounded with arrows. The Scythians however, unable to make head at the same time against the enemies within their walls and entering over them, were overpowered. Eight thousand are said to have been slain; but about ten thousand made their retreat good into the citadel. There, however (probably through incomplete execution of the great founder's purpose) was no provision of water; so that, on the second day, they found it necessary to surrender. The seventh town was yet held by its garrison, but yielded immediately on Alexander's approach; according to Ptolemy, by capitulation; but Aristobulus reported that it was taken by assault, and all the men within put to the sword. Arrian however seems to have thought Ptolemy's account the rather to be trusted, as it proceeded to state, what must have been within that officer's means of knowing, that the prisoners were distributed among the several divisions of the army, to remain in custody; apparently, to be

<sup>13</sup> Arrian says two of those towns were stormed in one day, and the third on the day following; whence it may seem that the word *πόλις* has not been intended to be taken in the elder Greek sense of the word, a city.

finally led away to slavery ; for the historian says it was resolved to leave none behind who had partaken in the revolt.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 3.

Alexander's rapidity in his measures for reducing this small branch of the extensive nation of Scythians, subjects, apparently, since its reduction by Cyrus, of the Persian empire, appears to have been of great importance. Those holding the country on the farther side of the river, so variously named Orxantes, Silys, and Tanaïs, on intelligence received of insurrection of those of their nation within the old Persian boundary, had assembled in arms and already had reached the neighbourhood. With information of this threatened hostility from that formidable nation, so eager in pursuit of gain by victory, with so little to lose by defeat, and possessing such ready means to avoid and still annoy a foe whom they could not resist, intelligence arrived that Spitamenes had revolted, and was actually besieging Paracadi, where Alexander had left a garrison. As, however, the force under Spitamenes was of the freebooting kind, neither regular, nor very numerous, it was thought sufficient to dispatch against him fifteen hundred of the mercenary Grecian foot, with eight hundred horse of the same description, and sixty of that superior and confidential body, the royal companion cavalry. These appear to have had their several proper commanders, Andromachus, Menedemus and Caranus. Whether then through growing favor to Asiatics, or on the supposition that negotiation might succeed with little support from arms, the chief authority was committed to Pharnuches, a Lycian, familiar with the Scythian language, as well as with the Greek, of approved talent for civil business, but without the qualifications of a military commander. Meanwhile the establishment of the proposed colony engaged Alexander's own attention ; and in twenty days, employing all the force with him, he raised works sufficient for its defence against the surrounding people ; formidable in the field, but of no skill in the assault of fortifications. He then offered choice for any of the Greek mercenaries, and those Macedonians who, from age or infirmity, were become less fit for active service, to establish themselves in the place, with permission to associate any natives of the country who might be willing. Matters of business being settled, he, according to his custom, engaged and amused the public mind with religious ceremonies and games, horse-races and gymnic exercises, being exhibited among sacrifices to the gods.

The

### SECT. III. AFFAIRS WITH THE SCYTHIANS.

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The Scythians of the farther side of the river meanwhile remained incamped near its bank, watching what was going forward. The stream, tho not fordable, was not there so wide but that words might be heard across; and the Scythian soldiers amused themselves with taunting speeches to the Macedonians, telling them ‘their king, as great a conqueror as he was, dared not invade their country, or he would soon be ‘taught the difference between Scythians and the southern Asiatics.’ Words not producing provocation enough, they proceeded to acts, and shot arrows, Arrian does not say over, but into the river. The usual disposition to petulance, among youths with arms in their hands, under a loose discipline, may have produced so much. But the amount of force assembled appeared to indicate, that the Scythian chiefs entertained a hostile jealousy, if not hostile purposes. Alexander therefore resolved to cross the river and at once chastize rather than complain of insolence. Skins were prepared in the usual way to serve as rafts, and the usual sacrifices for ingaging the favor and consulting the will of the gods were performed; Alexander’s favorite seer, Aristander of Telmissus, presiding. It appears likely that the principal officers of his army, in concert with the seer, who seems to have been an able man, apprehended the consequences of their prince’s impatience of insult and eagerness for adventure, with the immense wild plains of Tartary before him. The symptoms of the victims however were declared quite unfavorable. Alexander, uneasy under the disappointment, nevertheless acquiesced, so far as to defer his purpose. But, the Scythians continuing their provoking conduct, he ordered another sacrifice. Still the symptoms were declared utterly unfavorable, and clearly portending danger. Alexander’s temper could then hold no longer: ‘It were better,’ he said, ‘to risk the extreme of ‘danger than, after conquering almost all Asia, to become a laughing-stock for the Scythians, as the elder Darius had been.’ Aristander answered that, ‘however the king might desire another interpretation, he ‘himself could only declare what was indicated by the divinity.’

Nevertheless Alexander persevered. The artillery, for throwing darts and stones, was moved to the river side, to protect the passage; some of the enemy were wounded; and one, struck with a dart, through both his shield and breast-plate, fell from his horse dead. In evident consternation at this



event, all withdrew from the bank, and the Macedonian army passed, Alexander leading. The Scythians seem to have been all cavalry carrying missile weapons. Alexander, knowing that their discipline would not enable them to withstand a regular charge from even an inferior force, hastened against them a division of the allied, and four squadrons of the spearbearing horse. The Scythians, approaching enough to give effect to their missile weapons, avoided a charge by rapidly wheeling: then, taking a circuit, they returned, and again discharged their darts and arrows. Alexander, we have seen, to answer the exigencies of service against Asiatic cavalry, had formed a small body, trained, after the Asiatic manner, to use missile weapons on horseback. This he now dispatched to support his suffering troops; but he seems to have depended more upon his numerous bowmen, slingers and darters, accustomed, on foot, to act in concert with cavalry. Hastening these forward, he followed himself at the head of all the remainder of his horse. The Scythians finding that they could no longer attack with missile weapons but at the peril of wounds given at equal or greater distance, which disturbed their wheeling, and overtook them in retreat, fled precipitately. Being pursued by the fresh cavalry, about a thousand were killed, and a hundred and fifty taken.

In advanced summer now, as not uncommon in climates where winter is very severe, the heat was violent. Alexander, with his usual eagerness, intent upon revenging the disgrace and loss of the first onset, urged in person the pursuit of the fugitives, till at length, in common with others, he was oppressed with thirst. The country offered water, but of an unwholesome quality, of which he was unaware. Drinking therefore plentifully, he was quickly seized with a disorder of the bowels, such that he was carried back to the camp with his life supposed in danger. The evil however passed, and the advantage resulted, that the credit of the science of prophecy, and the reputation of the seer Aristander, its professor, often found of great convenience, were completely saved; for the danger to the king, supposed to have been portended, was not from the enemy, but from the draught of water.

Not long after, deputies reached Alexander from the king of the Scythians; so Arrian qualifies him, not distinguishing of what portion of the extensive Scythian nation he was sovereign. They came directed to apologize for the

insults offered to his troops by some outlaws, they said, living by robbery, without warrant of any authority which the body of the Scythian people acknowledged; adding assurance that the king himself was ready to obey his commands. It seems probable that the Macedonian generals, Arrian's authorities, to magnify their prince, derogated somewhat from the dignity which the king of the Scythians would maintain on the occasion; for that historian proceeds to avow, what indeed the sequel of his narrative evinces, that it would ill have suited Alexander, at that time, to engage in war with the king of the Scythians. Accordingly the embassy was very civilly received; and, if the offer to obey commands was a Scythian compliment, really expressed, it appears to have been judiciously taken as such: for the apology was accepted, and no commands are mentioned to have been returned.

This accommodation fortunately was completed before intelligence arrived of the greatest disaster which had yet befallen the Macedonian arms. Spitamenes, dispirited by a successful sally of the garrison of Maracanda, and informed that the force under Pharnuches was approaching, raised the siege and retired toward the extensive Scythian downs. Pursued by Pharnuches, he avoided action till he was joined by six hundred Scythian horse; for the herdmen, who occupied the Scythian downs, or, as the Greek word has been commonly expressed, desert, appear to have been all horsemen. The Grecian cavalry being then worn with marching, and weak through deficiency of forage, he could avoid their charges while he gave unceasing annoyance to the infantry, with the missile weapons which the Asiatics used so dexterously on horseback. Defence now became the object of Alexander's officers; and they retired to a wood verging on a considerable river, the Polytimetus. But, among them, there was neither just command nor proper concert. Caranus, apparently a Macedonian, without communicating either with the Lycian commander-in-chief, or with the commanders of the mercenary Greeks, probably men of the republics, led his small body of horse across the river. The infantry, seeing themselves thus deserted by that small but superior body of cavalry, without command, hastened after him. Spitamenes, and the Scythians, observing the disorderly movement, proceeded to use advantage offered. The Greeks, some already across, others yet in the river, were so pressed with  
darts

Arr. I. 4.  
c. 5.

darts and arrows that they attempted to regain the wood ; but being intercepted, they stopped on a small island. Missile weapons however could reach them there. Many were thus killed, and many others wounded. The survivors, feeling themselves helpless, surrendered at discretion, and all were put to death.

This appears to have been Ptolemy's account. Aristobulus, attributed the misfortune to the deficient arrangement of command, on which, it may be supposed, Ptolemy, a favorite of Alexander, would avoid comment. When difficulty arose, Pharnuches, according to Aristobulus, avowing himself incompetent, as little versed in military affairs, and rather appointed for a civil business, desired to commit the military command to the proper military officers. But these hesitated to take upon themselves, in circumstances highly threatening, a responsibility not regularly theirs ; and, before anything was settled, the enemy was upon them. Of the whole force, about forty horse only and three hundred foot, according to Aristobulus, escaped.

Intelligence of this event vehemently affected Alexander. With the utmost of his usual zeal and activity, he took himself the command of a chosen body, and, understanding that Spitamenes was approaching Maracanda, to renew the siege, he hastened thither. By extraordinary exertion, at the dawn of the fourth day, he reached the city. Spitamenes, informed of his approach, had withdrawn toward the Scythian downs. Alexander, urging pursuit to the utmost ability of his troops, was however unable to overtake him. His next care therefore was to find the field of battle in which the force under Pharnuches had suffered, and to perform those rites of burial for the bodies, the importance of which, in the opinion of the Greeks, we have observed so often strongly marked. After this he gave a loose to revenge, wasting all the cultivated country on the banks of the river Polytimetus, whose inhabitants, he was informed, had joined those of the downs in the destruction of his troops.



## SECTION IV.

*Recruits to Alexander's Army. Cruel Treatment of Bessus. Difficulties for Alexander arising from his Successes. Embassies from Scythian and other Northern Princes.*

WINTER then approaching, which, in that country sets in early, and is often early severe, he moved for quarters to the city of Zariaspa, said by Strabo to be the same with that commonly called by Arrian, and other Grecian writers, Bactra. There he was presently joined by his satrap of Parthia, Phrataphernes, and his general Stasanor, whom he had sent together to quell the second rebellion of the Areians. They appear to have been completely successful, bringing in custody Arsames, whom Bessus had commissioned as his satrap of Parthia, and other chiefs, his associates. About the same time powerful reinforcements arrived, to supply the losses sustained in long and difficult marches and numerous actions, since the last from the western countries joined at Susa. They consisted of three thousand foot, and five hundred horse, from Syria, commanded by Asclepiodorus; equal numbers of each from Lycia, probably collected among the Greek cities of Asia, by Asander and Nearchus; seven thousand five hundred foot, and five hundred horse, sent by Antipater from Greece, where the levy probably would be easier for the recently finished war with Lacedæmon. Beside these Ptolemy, distinguished among the several of that name as general of the Thracians, brought three thousand foot and one thousand horse; probably Greeks and others, raised in the provinces south of Lesser Asia. If, in the failure of Arrian to mention the numbers, Curtius may be trusted for them, likely to be not exact, yet not imaginary, but given from some authority, the whole would be sixteen thousand five hundred foot and two thousand five hundred horse.

The assemblage thus at head quarters would be numerous, of persons of all ranks of both nations, when Bessus was brought, apparently after the Macedonian manner, before all in congress. The treatment of him, however, was rather after the Asiatic manner, arbitrary and cruel. No mention

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Arrian, l. 4.  
c. 7.  
Strab. l. 11.  
p. 514, 516.

Arr. ibid.  
Q. Curt.  
l. 7, c. 10.

is made of any form of trial. He was reproached before the numerous meeting, with his perfidy to Darius: then his nose and ears were cut off; and in that mangled state he was sent to Ecbatana, to be treated according to the law or the pleasure of those Medes and Persians there<sup>14</sup>, who, apparently having been, or being supposed to have been, faithful to Darius living, had after his death been admitted to some favor by Alexander.

On this proceeding Arrian has declared his own sentiment: ‘Such extravagant punishment,’ he says, ‘I cannot commend. Mutilation of the body in that manner is of the spirit of barbarians; and I am inclined to think that Alexander was led to it by a growing disposition to emulate the Median and Persian pomp of power, and ostentation of superiority over vassal princes.’ The historian, no doubt, will have credit here with the modern reader; and, considering his situation in the Roman empire, he will also have excuse for overlooking the monstrous cruelties of the renowned Roman republicans to conquered princes, of which the fate of the king of Numidia, Jugurtha, is a prominent example, while he refers to the practice, in no accounts more atrocious, of the Medes and Persians. But those crimes which we denominate High Treason, and especially the extreme of them, Regicide, tending to the most violent disturbance of the quiet of nations, require, in mercy to millions, severity to one or a few. Hence the mode and measure of punishment for those crimes, even in modern ages, in some countries by the law itself (which nevertheless, as in our own, practice has mitigated) in others by arbitrary decision for the occasion, as in two memorable instances in France, have been carried to a severity at which the philosophic mind is apt to revolt. Yet what should be the mode and measure, appears to be among questions proposed by Providence for trial of mankind, not to be by human wisdom exactly decided. For the punishment said to have been ordered by Alexander himself, the historian’s censure will hardly be controverted; but, for leaving the regicide to Persian law or practice, if approbation be denied, excuse however apparently may with reason be demanded.

<sup>14</sup> ἐν τῇ Μήδων καὶ Περσῶν συλλόγῳ ἀποθανού-  
μενον.—Arr. l. 4. c. 7. p. 159. Gronovius  
understands σύλλογος here to mean the same  
as ξένουδος. It seems to me uncertain and not  
very important; Arrian himself probably hav-

ing known little of the Median and Persian  
constitution and law, and therefore not mean-  
ing to define any particular kind of as-  
sembly.

Arrian has taken this occasion for noticing some other matters of Alexander's conduct, in his arduous situation, on which opinions antient and modern, have been divided. 'Nor can I,' he says, 'anyhow approve his assuming the Median dress instead of the Macedonian; he of the race of Hercules; and changing, for the Persian turban, the covering which he, the conqueror of the Persians, had been accustomed to wear.' Against Arrian, an eminent modern, Montesquieu, has warmly eulogized, not indeed the cruelty to Bessus, but the adoption of Persian customs, which Arrian has blamed. To judge between them it must be considered that Alexander's circumstances were such as never before occurred, from the beginning of the world, as far as history shows, nor since. When the disposition of that extraordinary conqueror to become Persian, in dress and manners, was first manifested, Arrian has not said. According to Diodorus, and Curtius, and Plutarch, it began almost immediately on the acquisition of Babylon, and was not a little encouraged and emulated by some of the younger officers in high situations about him, and especially by Philotas. Since the age of twenty Alexander had seen little of Macedonia, and from twenty-two when he passed into Asia, to now, toward twenty-seven, had never been near it. His immense acquisitions of dominion would be, and clearly ought to be, important in his consideration; and the consideration was of a magnitude and difficulty such as never occurred to any other man. That his prudence in the business was consummate, as the sage Montesquieu's concise eulogy may imply, will hardly be generally admitted; yet that large allowance should be made for failure of perfection, in the very difficult decision, candor must allow.

Arrian, l. 4.  
c. 27.

Esp. des loix,  
l. 1, c. 13.

For the manner in which Bessus was put to death at Ecbatana accounts vary. That it was cruel, it is to be feared may be believed; and if more light is not to be obtained on the particulars, it will be little regretted by the generous reader.

During Alexander's winter residence in Zariaspa, his ambassadors to the Scythian courts returned, accompanied by an embassy from the king of the European-Scythians. During their mission the reigning king of European-Scythia had died in the course of nature, and the ambassadors, now arriving, came commissioned by his brother, who had succeeded to the

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 15.



throne. They brought, from that prince, presents, such as among the Scythians were esteemed most valuable, with a declaration, that he was ready to obey Alexander's commands; offering him, for cementing alliance, his daughter in marriage, or, should that be disdained, the daughters of his nobles, or, in Arrian's phrase, his satraps, for Alexander's confidential ministers and officers; and adding, that if Alexander's will might be so signified, he would come himself to take his commands. Perhaps here, as perhaps also on other occasions, in translating a foreign language into Greek, the compliment may have been somewhat exaggerated.

Nearly about the same time Pharasmanes, styled king of the Chorasmies, came in person, with an escort of fifteen hundred horse, to wait upon Alexander. His country, he said, bordered upon that of the Colchians and of the Amazonian women<sup>15</sup> (information marking how little it was before known to the Greeks) and, if Alexander desired to subdue the Colchians and Amazons, and other people near the Euxine sea, he would himself guide his army through the country, and undertake for abundant supplies. Alexander received all graciously. The offer of marriages he declined; but he concluded with Pharasmanes a treaty of friendship and alliance. At the same time he declared that 'his views would not allow him immediately to march himself westward: that he proposed first to bring India under his dominion; and, being so master of all Asia, (such is Arrian's phrase) he would then return to Greece, and thence direct his measures for the reduction of the people around the Euxine sea.' For that season he desired Pharasmanes to reserve himself under the engagements made. 'In the mean time,' he said, 'his Persian friend Artabazus, who was well acquainted with that part of the world, should accompany Pharasmanes in his return westward, and all the satraps in that line of country should be required to afford him friendly accommodation.'

The epithet *Just*, by which Homer, in earliest, and Arrian, in late times, have described the Scythians, and the philosophical character attributed to them by authors of ages between them, may seem to be rendered doubtful by the indications of barbarism, also occurring in the imperfect

<sup>15</sup> *Ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς Ἀμαζόνων.* Arr. l. 4. c. 15.

historical memorials of them which have reached us. Not simply however the epithet, but Arrian's narrative, who must have had knowledge of their descendants in his own age, seems to afford some warrant for the favoring reports. The passage of Alexander's ministers through the country of the Asiatic, to the residence of the king of the European Scythians, and their return, indicates order among the people; and the apology of the Asiatic prince, for the unprovoked aggression on Alexander's troops, appears to mark government more regular, and people more civilized, than the Scythian generally have been described. But the same writer's account of the Nomad-Scythians, and especially the character asserted to have been given of them by the sovereign of a large portion of the nation, assist to show the ground of the differences observable in different accounts of that widely-spread people. For the Amazons, here first mentioned in Arrian's narrative, remark may best be reserved for an occasion on which we find him entering into some discussion of the reports transmitted by other writers concerning them.

## SECTION V.

*Different Character of Northern and Southern People of the Persian Empire. New Rebellion of the Sogdians under Spitamenes. Death of Spitamenes, and final Reduction of the Sogdians.*

THE contrast between the stubborn people of the north and the submissive millions of the southern provinces of the Persian empire, who, while their monarch was yet living and preparing to repair his losses, yielded to the conqueror without a struggle, and remained apparently satisfied with the new dominion, continues yet to become more strongly marked. The Sogdians again rose in rebellion. Refusing obedience to the satrap appointed by Alexander, a great proportion of them withdrew to strong holds<sup>16</sup>. In these few words of Arrian, is indicated the foundation of the striking difference of character. In the south, an immense

<sup>16</sup> —εις τὰ ἐρύματα. Arr. l. 4. c. 15.

population, in large proportion artizans and manufacturers, all wholly unpractised in arms, were in the habit of depending, for security of person and property, both against fellowsubjects and foreign enemies, upon others, to whom, under direction of their king and his officers, the profession of arms was peculiar. In the north, on the contrary, a scantier population, husbandmen, herdmen, and hunters, were in the habit of reckoning arms among necessities, and of depending, for safety, private and public, much on themselves. Such men necessarily would be respected by those in authority over them, and thence would hold a considerable amount of freedom: not insured, as far as appears, by any regular constitution of government, but by the power which arms in their hands, and the need of their chiefs for their service, gave. Practice in arms, we have observed, under hereditary chiefs, had preserved the freedom of the Macedonian people under their monarchical constitution. A state of things, not the same, yet considerably similar, appears to have maintained the independent spirit, and an effectual freedom, among the northern subjects of the Persian empire. If the Macedonian government was more irregular and undefined than that eulogized by Tacitus, which our Teutonic forefathers established for the basis of the English constitution, that of the Asiatics appears to have been still more irregular and undefined. Yet, from the freedom they enjoyed through the means which arms in their hands gave, seems to have flowed the attachment to their monarch, and aversion to a foreign dominion, beyond what was found among the people of the south.

Arr. I. 3.  
c. 16.

The Sogdian war thus required the employment of the whole army, with which, after subduing the Persian empire, Alexander had proposed the immediate prosecution of conquest beyond its bounds. For the example of the Sogdians immediately stimulated neighbouring people, actuated by similar principles. A portion of the Bactrians presently joined in revolt, and the disposition was supposed extensive through that country. A large force therefore was left under Polysperchon, Attalus, Gorgias, and Meleager; principally as a body of observation, for the rising yet was small. Alexander led the rest of his army against the Sogdians. Arriving in their country, he divided his force into five parts. Under the command severally of Hephæstion, Ptolemy son of Lagus, Perdikkas, and Cœnus, but associating in authority with them his venerable Persian friend

Artabazus,



Artabazus, he placed four divisions, for reducing the towns and fastnesses held by the insurgents. With the remaining division he went himself toward Maracanda, the capital of the province, where he had a garrison.

The people of these countries were more skilful in desultory war in the field, than in the defence of walls or strong positions, against the Grecian art of attack. The four generals soon reduced all the places of refuge within Sogdia ; but, of the people, many had fled, with or after Spitamenes, to the Scythian wilderness. This is not, like the southern deserts, an ocean of driving sand ; but rather, in some parts, resembling Bagshot heath, in others the Cheviot highlands or Salisbury plain ; affording firm footing for cattle, and not wholly denying pasture. Alexander therefore detached Cœnus and Artabazus against the Scythians, while, to insure the future obedience of the Sogdians, Hephæstion was employed in establishing colonies of his veteran soldiers and others, in the principal towns of the country.

The apparent inconsistency in the conduct of Spitamenes, who had so essentially served Alexander by delivering Bessus to him, and then became presently and perseveringly hostile, is not accounted for ; but that he was an active, bold, and able enemy is evident. The Sogdians, who fled from Alexander's arms, found, among the Massagete-Scythians, a kind reception, which, apparently, Spitamenes had prepared for them. The Massagetes were a plundering hord, generally ready for adventure. Spitamenes persuaded six hundred horsemen of them to join his Sogdians for an inroad into Bactria. There he surprized a Macedonian garrison, made the governor prisoner, put to death all of inferior rank who could not escape by flight, because numerous prisoners were inconvenient, and then proceeded toward Zariaspa, the capital. The garrison there, as Arrian's account implies, was only about eighty mercenary horse, with a few of the body of royal Macedonian youths, and some of the royal companions, left for recovery of health ; most however so far convalescent as to be able to mount their horses and use arms. This slender force then being found alert, the irregular enemy would not venture attack upon the town, but directed their measures to plundering the surrounding country. Frequently in accounts of military operations by military men, such as Arrian (those of others would prove nothing) we find deficient arrangement of gradation in command in Grecian armies ; and sometimes  
such

such a sort of republican equality that there was no proper commander. So we have seen it in the recent disaster to Alexander's troops in Scythia ; and so, in Arrian's account, it appears to have been here. The only persons, in Zariaspa, of consequence enough to be named by the historian, were Peithon, son of Sosicles, intitled chief of the king's household, and Aristonicus, a singer <sup>17</sup>. The enemy was seen dispersed for collection of booty. On consultation all agreed to go out and attack them. The bold measure succeeded so far that, killing many, they put the rest to flight, collected the booty, perhaps mostly cattle, and returned with it toward Zariaspa. But the Scythians, the able Spitamenes being with them, soon recovering from the dismay of surprize, observed their enemy's march, which says Arrian, was disorderly, as being under no regular command ; and, on account of their convoy, it was necessarily slow. Getting before them, unperceived, they placed themselves in ambush, at which they were expert, it being their common mode of attack. With superior numbers then, falling on the Macedonians by surprize, they killed sixty of the mercenary horse, and seven of the royal companions : Peithon wounded, was carried off a prisoner ; Aristonicus, acting, says Arrian, beyond what might be expected of one of his profession, as a brave soldier, or, in the Greek phrase, a good man, died fighting <sup>18</sup>. The result, tho not stated by the historian, of course would be, that the booty before taken was recovered by the victors, and that they might, without immediate danger, extend their maroding.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 17.

As soon as intelligence of this reached Cœnus<sup>19</sup>, he proceeded against the Massagetes. Informed of his approach, they hastened toward the desert ; but, their booty apparently making their march slow, he overtook them. Meanwhile they had been joined by about a thousand Massagete cavalry. With this reinforcement standing an action, they maintained it stoutly ; but superior discipline prevailed. About a hundred and fifty Scythians were killed : the vigor of their horses and acquaintance with

<sup>17</sup> Κιθαρωδός, a singer to the harp or lyre. This seems to mark nearly the character of the minstrel of early modern ages.

<sup>18</sup> Ὁν κατὰ κιθαρωδὸν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος.  
Arr. l. 4. c. 16.

<sup>19</sup> Polysperchon, Attalus, Gorgias, and Meleager, were commanders for defence of

Bactria ; Cœnus and Artabazus were sent against the Scythians. Considering what follows, in Arrian c. 17, it seems nearly clear that for *Craterus* here should be read *Cœnus* ; yet Craterus is mentioned again, c. 18, as if associated in command with Cœnus.

the country inabled the rest to save themselves by flight; but their booty would be finally lost.

Winter now approaching, the known severity of the climate, and the daring and persevering activity of an enemy singularly formed to disturb neighboring countries in all seasons, tho without strength to protect their own, admonished to the measures which followed. The large experience, the powerful influence, and the tried fidelity and honor of the veteran satrap Artabazus, gave him a value which Alexander appears to have estimated justly, and cherished accordingly. But the fatigue of the government of a frontier province, like Bactria, with a turbulent population, exposed to the intrigues and possibly the attacks of such enemies as Spitamenes and the Scythians, being too much for his years, he desired to resign it, and Alexander appointed a Macedonian, Amyntas son of Nicolaus, in his room. His own winter residence he took at Nautaca in Sogdiana, the most northern province of his acquired empire.

B. C. 329,  
328.  
Ol. 113, 1.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 18.

Meanwhile Spitamenes was in uneasy circumstances. There was no longer safety for him in Bactria or Sogdiana, but with an armed force; and he could no longer keep an armed force together than while he could provide for it the allurements of plunder. A bold attempt was therefore necessary, and without delay. Within the Sogdian territory, but upon the verge of the Massagete-Scythian downs, was a town, of name variously written by the Greeks, Gabæ or Bagæ, strongly situated on the Oxus, where it divides Sogdiana from Bactria. There he induced the Scythians to join him, to the number of three thousand horsemen; which, says Arrian, was not difficult, because that people having neither towns, nor any settled habitation, feared little for anything they had to lose, and were urged by want to use arms, always in their hands, for gain.

Arr. ut sup.  
Strab. *ibid.*  
1. 517.

Alexander had committed the military command, within the two frontier provinces of Sogdiana and Bactria, to his approved, and now oldest general, Cœnus. That officer, informed of the measures of Spitamenes, marched to meet him. A sharp conflict ensuing, the Macedonians remained conquerors, with the loss, it is reported, of only twenty-five horsemen, and twelve foot-soldiers. Above eight hundred of the enemy, all cavalry, were said to be killed. In the flight of the survivors, Spitamenes was deserted by



by most of his Bactrian and Sogdian followers. Not disposed to the life of the wandering Scythians, or to change their fruitful lands for new settlements in the Scythian wilderness, they sent offers of submission to the conqueror, which Cœnus accepted. The Scythians then, disappointed of the plunder which they hoped to have carried off for their winter subsistence, deserted by their allies, threatened with invasion of their country by a prince who could command the service of numbers, used, as they were, to the rigor of climate, and thus, for themselves and their horses, which they valued almost equally with themselves, apprehensive of starving, cut off the head of Spitamenes, and sent it, as a propitiatory present, to Alexander.

Thus was ended the little yet troublesome war with the wild borderers, which had so long engaged the rapid conqueror of the Persian empire.

## SECTION V.

*Circumstances of Scythia. Country between Media and Scythia. Siege of the Hill-Fort of Oxyartes. Marriage of Alexander with Roxana daughter of Oxyartes. Conquest of the Persian Empire completed.*

THE smallness of the numbers attributed to the enemy, in all the many engagements, mostly allowed to have been sharply contested, is no inconsiderable warranty of the fairness of the reports which have reached us of these transactions. The Scythians, ancestors of those whom we now call Tartars, holding the same extensive country, are universally so described that the modern Tartars seem to have inherited their character and manners, transmitted through so many generations, unchanged. What we might principally desire to know of them, beyond what has been transmitted, is the state of the two great kingdoms of Asiatic-Scythia, and European-Scythia, indicated, as they are, to have been held by people more settled and more civilized than those who wandered over, rather than possessed, what the Greeks called the Desert. All accounts mark

the Scythians of those two kingdoms for a free people ; and it may seem to have been a superior civilization, under a free yet regular government, which produced that superiority of character, whence some writers have represented the Scythians altogether as a nation of philosophers ; while others, led by the more striking peculiarities of character and manners of the Scythians of the Desert, have considered those peculiarities as forming the general character of the nation. It seems however evident that, tho, in very antient times, Scythia may have sent out the hords of whose destructive emigrations uncertain rumor only reached the age of letters, yet no Scythian kingdom ever was able to contend for superiority with the Persian empire. The establishment, in their country, of the great Cyrus's colony, which the Greeks, apparently translating the Persian name, called Cyropolis, proves the successful exertion of his superior power ; and the subsistence of that colony, and of the Persian dominion over it, till it yielded to Alexander, satisfactorily shows the continued existence of very superior means in that empire, among all its troubles, and with all the occasional misrule and weakness of its government in later times. Thus then we find four distinctions of Scythians clearly marked ; the European kingdom, the Asiatic kingdom, the wanderers of the Desert, and the people of the Persian province. That the freebooting Scythians were always alarming, often highly annoying to the Persian borders, appears not doubtful. That they were difficult to be dealt with, and hardly to be bound by treaties, may also be believed. To them honesty was unprofitable ; war the source of wealth and injoyment. But the Scythian kingdoms had within their bounds some of the most fruitful portions of the earth. To them therefore peace was valuable, and a reputation for good faith an important possession. Accordingly it appears that they maintained peace and good faith with Alexander.

In the course of the winter, Cœnus, who had commanded against the Sogdians and their Scythian allies, and Stasanor, who had commanded in Areia, and Phrataphernes, satrap of Parthia, returned to head-quarters at Nautaca, reporting the complete execution of the businesses severally committed to them. We have seen it Alexander's policy in his outset, apparently on just consideration, to intrust the highest commands under him, military or civil, only to Macedonians, bred under his father. But early in his career of conquest in Asia, earnest to conciliate the conquered

APP. I. 4.  
c. 18.

people, he had committed to the great among them high and even critical authority. To hold the attachment of the republican Greeks was also evidently much in his consideration. At the same time then that he was liberal in favor to the Persians, he brought republican Greeks also forward, and put them more upon a footing with the Macedonian great. That some of all descriptions would disappoint his hopes might be expected. Phradates, a Persian, his satrap of Mardia and Topira, repeatedly sent for, had failed to come. Nevertheless Alexander employed a Persian, Phrathaphernes, with whose conduct in Parthia he had found reason to be satisfied, to bring him to obedience. Exodates, to whom he had committed the great and important satrapy of Media, had exhibited symptoms of disaffection. Another Persian, Atropates, was sent to supersede him. Diodorus and Curtius have reported some instances of mutiny among the republican Greek mercenaries, and the desertion of a considerable body, with their officers, when, after having shared largely of the riches of the southern provinces, severe service in the northern was before them. Not improbably Ptolemy and Aristobulus would avoid mention of such a circumstance, and therefore Arrian might avoid it. But as among the Macedonians themselves loyalty was not so universal, or so certain, but that some of those most highly intrusted had been condemned for high treason, it was perhaps altogether the safest, as well as the most liberal policy, to divide high favor and high confidence among men of the several nations of the empire. Accordingly Eumenes, a Greek of Cardia in Thrace, whose superior talents and satisfactory conduct had earned him Alexander's favor in the confidential office of his principal secretary, was raised to high military rank, and intrusted occasionally with great commands. Stasanor who had executed satisfactorily the business in Areia, was a Greek of Soli in Cyprus. He was now appointed to command in Drangia. The government of Babylonia, becoming vacant by the death of Mazæus, formerly in high situation under Darius, was given to Stamenes, apparently a Macedonian. Sopolis, Epocillus, and Menædas, also probably Macedonians, were dispatched home, to conduct thence recruits for the army.

Strab. et  
 App. ver. in  
 loc.

The countries between Tartary and the great eastern desert abounded in military posts of uncommon strength, such as in India our armies have frequently had to contend for; small rocky hills, precipitous on all sides.

≈

Habitual



Habitual confidence in these fortresses, some of which, never known to have yielded to an enemy, were deemed impregnable, encouraged some principal men of those parts, how otherwise incited does not appear, to join in revolt against the conqueror. Oxyartes, an eminent Bactrian chief, had submitted to Alexander. Nevertheless, with many Bactrians, having engaged numerous Sogdians in his party, he took possession of a hill-fort in the highlands of Sogdiana, introduced large store of provisions, and placed his family there as in a situation of certain security, while himself, without, took measures for extending insurrection. About the same time, Choriencs, an associated chief, took possession of a post of congenial character in the adjoining province of Parætacene, while two others, Catanes and Austanes, excited the Parætacs to a general rising.

The view of extraordinary difficulties appears always to have stimulated the ardent mind of Alexander: easy enterprizes had little gratification for him: to overcome what to others had been insuperable was his delight. The siege of the fort of Oxyartes, in all seasons an arduous undertaking, was now the more so, as, in its lofty country, winter still lingered when spring had invited to move from Nautaca: on approaching the fort, it was found still surrounded by deep snow. According to the liberal practice of modern Europe, little known among the republican Greeks, Alexander, before attacking, summoned it; offering protection for those within, if they would surrender and go to their several homes. Such liberality seems to have been as little common among the Asiatics as among the republican Greeks, and therefore perhaps was mistrusted. A scoffing answer was returned, signifying that Alexander should seek some winged soldiers; for the garrison feared no others. Perhaps this imprudent joke suggested the course that Alexander took. His means to reward were great, and, for obtaining a favorite purpose, his liberality little bounded. He caused proclamation to be made, that he who, first of a storming party, reached the top of the rock should receive twelve talents, near two thousand five hundred pounds, and who last, three hundred darics, about two hundred pounds. Zeal was thus enough excited, and volunteers abounded. But Alexander would not leave the business to blind zeal. Among the multitude offering, diligent inquiry was made for those most practised in climbing mountains, and in mounting the walls

of places besieged, of whom three hundred were chosen. One side of the rock was so lofty and precipitous that, ascent being supposed impossible, no watch was kept by the garrison. There the chosen three hundred, supplied with iron pins and short ropes, going to work early in the night, drove their pins; here into frozen snow, there into crevices of the rocks, and, with their ropes assisting one another, mounted. About thirty, losing hold and footing, fell, and perhaps perished: the rest reached the summit before daybreak. Alexander, assured by signal of their success, with his army prepared for assault against the less precipitous part of the hill, again summoned the Indians to surrender; informing them that his winged soldiers had already possession of the summit of their rock. In extreme surprize and consternation, on having ascertained that it was so, without waiting, and probably not having means immediately, to know the number of those who had so unaccountably mounted, the garrison surrendered at discretion; and the family of Oxyartes became Alexander's prisoners.

It seems probable that when the family of Darius were taken, none of his daughters was of marriageable age. His wife, as formerly mentioned, had reputation among the Greeks as the most beautiful woman of the empire; and Alexander, with a sense of honor that has justly earned him universal eulogy, had treated her, while she lived, as a sacred charge. But Oxyartes had a daughter marriageable; said, by those of Alexander's officers who were supposed to have seen both, to have been, after Darius's queen, the most beautiful of women. With her, as with the rest of her family, Alexander did not scruple to make honorable acquaintance; and intercourse produced a passion, which he proposed honorably to gratify by marrying her. Inducement, beyond personal beauty, not stated by the historian, seems yet, in the progress of his narrative, in some degree implied; and, tho' the resolution were hasty, yet its connection with political purposes, previously entertained, appears probable. Communicating on it with his friends, Craterus, to whom latterly he had most intrusted high and difficult military commands, dissuaded it strongly. On the contrary, Hephæstion, in whom he most confided as a personal friend, encouraged it. To the Europeans generally, unless to some who had taken or desired to take Asiatic wives, it was offensive; but to Alexander's new and now far most numerous subjects, it was highly grateful. The lady's

lady's father was still in arms against him, yet the wedding was quickly solemnized.

Circumstances followed which would assist, in argument, the favorers of the connexion, tho among the Greeks it could not be esteemed otherwise than irregular. Probably Alexander had good information of the character of Oxyartes, who, it appears, had confidence in that of Alexander. Presently he offered submission, which was accepted, and he was received with honor and kindness. It remained then to reduce the revolters in Parætacene; the most southerly of those provinces which had demonstrated a rebellious disposition; bordering on the richer countries of quieter population, to which the soldier chiefly looked for the reward of his dangers and sufferings among the rough people, in the rough climate where the army now was. That war therefore would be, in the mind of all, an important business. The mountaineer Parætacs are described by Strabo as a nation of robbers, living chiefly by plunder, and confiding in their fastnesses for security against punishment for their aggressions. The lowlanders, or rather inhabitants of the more level highlands, were more numerous, and had more property to defend; but were nevertheless addicted to predatory excursions, and thence practised in arms. These had joined in the revolt, or perhaps were principal in it; confiding for defence against the conqueror of the Persian empire, principally in the extraordinary circumstances of a hill-fort within their plains. The height of the insulated eminence, if the number in our copies of Arrian may be taken for correct, is more than a mile; the measure probably being intended not of the perpendicular, but of the slope, or, perhaps of the ordinary way of ascent: the circuit was about two miles; clift on all sides. One path only led to the summit, formed by art, narrow, and for a single person difficult, even tho none opposed. To check military approaches a deep ditch had been formed around the foot of the hill.

For the engineer's art, however, to meet these difficulties the neighboring mountains bore an inexhaustible supply of fir-trees. In filling and conveying these the whole army, beyond camp-guards, was employed by reliefs. Galleries, framed in the day, were erected in the night, and covered with earth, for security against fire; and shortly the edifice attained such a height that missile weapons from it might reach the besieged, from assailants hid by their defences. Then the garrison, who at first had scoffed at the work, became



became so seriously alarmed, that their chief, Chorieneſ, ſent a requeſt to Alexander, that Oxyartes might be permitted to come to confer with him. This was granted. Oxyartes declared to Chorieneſ his opinion that no place was impregnable to Alexander and his army, and no advantage not to be expected from his frienſhip and generoſity. Upon this the Parætac chief, without more negotiation, taking ſome of his family and principal aſſociates with him, went and ſurrendered himſelf to Alexander, who did not diſappoint Oxyartes's promiſe. Chorieneſ, remaining with ſome of his company, ſent ſome back into the fort, with orders for its ſurrender, which were obeyed. Alexander, curious to ſee the place, went himſelf, with an eſcort of five hundred hypaſtiſts, to take poſſeſſion. Reſtoring then the fort to Chorieneſ, he appointed him alſo to the command of all the neighboring country which he had before commanded.

This war againſt the revolted highlanders, with the ſieges of the two extraordinary fortreſſes, and the intervening nuptials, for which ſome leiſure would be taken, appear to have conſumed the ſummer, ſo that before Chorieneſ ſurrendered, much ſnow had fallen, and the beſieging army was ſuffering from both cold and ſcarcity. Chorieneſ, in juſt return for Alexander's generoſity, gave a plentiful ſupply from the ſtore in his fort, and engaged to furniſh ſalted meat and other eatables for two months, if wanted, avowing, or perhaps boaſting, that ſo not a tenth of what had been prepared for the ſiege would be conſumed.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 22.

Cataneſ and Auſtaneſ, yet maintained, in Parætacene, what they would call the cauſe of their country, but the Macedonians, rebellion. Alexander ſent a body againſt them under Crateruſ. Their force evidently was not large; for, ſtanding a battle, acknowledged to have been warmly conteſted, their loſs in killed is ſtated at no more than a hundred and twenty horſe and fifteen hundred foot. Nevertheleſs Cataneſ being among the ſlain, and Auſtaneſ among the priſoners, the rebellion was completely quelled, and thus ended reſiſtance to Alexander's command of all that had been the Perſian, now the Macedonian or Grecian empire.

To eſtabliſh order in the northern provinces, and to prepare for the farther conqueſts which he meditated, Alexander then returned into Bactriana, and took his head-quarters in Bactra, otherwiſe called Zariaſpa, the capital.

CHAPTER

## CHAPTER LII.

Controversy on the Kingly Office and Dignity: Trials for High Treason. War prosecuted by ALEXANDER beyond the Bounds of the PERSIAN Empire.

## SECTION I.

*Republican Greek Philosophers following Alexander's Court: Controversy on the Kingly Office and Dignity.*

WHEN it is considered that with such scanty power in the outset, Alexander's conquests now exceeded, both in extent and rapidity of achievement, all that history reports before him, and all that, in more than two thousand years, has occurred in the world since, it may rather appear matter for admiration that, at his early age, now but about his twenty-sixth year, he preserved so long so much moderation and prudence, than if, at length, moderation and prudence failed. But, far as those conquests had led him from Greece, among people of very different manners, policy, and prejudices, very many times outnumbering the conquering nation, it seems obvious that a reasonable policy might urge him to assume to be, in all points, as great as those before him on the Persian throne, or rather greater; and this, not on his own account only, but, for the sake of establishing, for the comparatively few thousands of Greeks about him, a permanent command over the almost numberless millions become, with them, his subjects, but their inferiors. At the same time the constitutional freedom, the habits of simplicity, the accustomed familiarity  
with

Aristot.  
Polit. l. 4.  
c. 6 & 7.  
Ch. 40. s. 2.  
of this hist.  
Demosth. de  
legat. p. 424,  
425.

with their kings, and the constitutional controll over them, which all accounts mark to have been established among the Macedonians, would make the pursuit of this policy difficult. Nor would the difficulty be lessened by the conflicting politics of the Grecian republicans. These were numerous about him; and, in stationary quarters, not only military men but others, and especially men eminent in science and literature. Alexander's policy, in his first invasion of Asia, led him, as we have seen, to profess himself the patron of democracy; less probably fearing inconvenience to result from such a policy, not so much because his master Aristotle held democracy to be the kind of government most congenial with tyranny, but as he would know that, of all the republics of Greece, some of the Peloponnesian democracies had been most attached to his father, and even extravagant in court and adulation to him.

The choice of line then for him to pursue, when become master of the Persian empire, was of difficulty, such that perhaps the ablest of modern politicians would be at a loss to say, either what was the course most for his own interest, or what for that of the Grecian confederacy of which he was the elected head; and, perhaps yet more, what for a just performance of the weighty and quite new duty incumbent on him, the protection of uncounted millions become his subjects by his conquests. On ascending the splendid throne, in which he superseded the long list of the Persian, Median, and Assyrian dynasties, tracing their pretensions from the first conqueror known in history, to adopt in some degree oriental habits, and assume oriental state, was a policy which a view to interest, and to the welfare of all about him, probably would concur with inclination to press upon him. In making the hazardous change, however, he did not proceed hastily. Arrian does not, like some other antient writers, more careless of just authority, assert that Alexander himself was the first to promote the requisition, either of that form of salutation, in approaching him, too nearly in the manner of adoration to the Deity, which had been, from time immemorial, rigorously required of all in approaching the Persian kings, nor that he himself first broached the absurd notion that he was the son, not of Philip, but of Jupiter Ammon. Among the Greeks, whom the fame of his conquests, of his liberality, and of his patronage of arts and literature,



litterature, had drawn to his distant court, and who had followed its wanderings, opposition of sentiment, much arising from opposition of interest, had produced division into parties; and some recommended and applauded, perhaps too much without reserve, the adoption of oriental manners and customs, while others too rigorously insisted upon the strict maintenance of Grecian habits and practices, in circumstances in which they would never have arisen, and for which they were so utterly unadapted that perhaps they could no way be established. But in his earnest purpose of conciliating his new subjects, Alexander had clearly made a progress of no small importance to all those, of his old subjects, who looked to profit from the establishment of his new empire. Among these, however, Macedonians, his subjects by inheritance, and Greeks of the republics, his subjects by their own election, between whom he seems to have made the least distinction that might be, by the perhaps reasonable attachments of some, and the unreasonable prejudices and extravagant desires of others, that purpose was thwarted.

We have, from Arrian, report of discussion on this important and curious matter, said to have occurred in Alexander's presence, and given as the best selection that historian could make, among varying and contradictory reports in his time extant, derived from persons present. The care which Arrian continually manifests to use his best judgement in comparing accounts, and the evidence his work altogether affords of his desire to maintain a just impartiality, are here eminent. The illustration therefore of the manners of Alexander's court, which his report affords, especially marking freedom of communication and conversation in the king's presence and with himself, make it highly interesting; and the more from the consideration that the author held high office in the Roman empire, in an age when science and philosophy most flourished, and when, nevertheless, for a previous century and half, divine honors had been attributed to the sovereigns;<sup>1</sup> nor were discontinued till the adoption of Christianity, for the religion of the state, extinguished the impious absurdity.

<sup>1</sup> Virgil's flattery in this fulsome and impious way, is, I think, the earliest that has reached us. Horace has preserved so much

more of a better school as to reflect credit on his patron Mæcænas, and on Augustus himself.

Arrian. *ibid.*  
Plut. v. *Alex.*  
p. 694. e.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 10.

Arr. *ibid.*

Anaxarchus and Callisthenes, both subjects of the Macedonian monarchy, the former as a citizen of Abdera, the latter of Olynthus<sup>2</sup>, were the most eminent among the philosophers of Alexander's train, leaders of the two adverse political sects. Anaxarchus is represented as a courtier, a flatterer of the great, qualified to become the favorite of an Asiatic despot; Callisthenes, who had studied under Aristotle, as a rough republican, extravagantly disposed to flatter himself. Of his insolent vanity Arrian mentions a remarkable instance, which, tho of uncertain authority, yet as having been popular, marks the popular opinion of the philosopher's character. He claimed for himself to be greater than Alexander, and for his literary works to be more glorious than all Alexander's deeds of conquest and political regulation: for, he said, he did not follow that prince to be indebted to him for glory, but to make him glorious among men; and if Alexander's connection with the godhead had credit, it did not come from what others falsely reported of his birth, but from what he, the philosopher, by his writings, persuaded men to believe. To illustrate this eminent man's politics also, Arrian furnishes an anecdote. Philotas, it was said<sup>3</sup>, once in conversation with him, asked 'whom he reckoned to be held most in honor by the Athenians?' 'Harmodius' he answered, 'and Aristogeiton; because they killed one of the two tyrants, and procured the overthrow of the tyranny.' Philotas then asking, 'where a man who killed a tyrant might find surest refuge among the Greeks?' Callisthenes answered, 'if nowhere else, he would be safe among the Athenians.' Alexander having the magnanimity (for if imprudent, it was yet a magnanimous imprudence) to admit a man of formidable talent, so avowing the king-killing principle of Demosthenes, to his counsels and his table, he may surely at least be excused the admission also, to his society, of the courtly philosopher Anaxarchus, as well as of the poet Agis, said to have been not less a complete courtier, tho a citizen of the democratical republic of Argos.

Concerning then the requisition of the ceremony called adoration, which consisted in bowing to the ground, on approaching the royal presence,

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, unscrupulous in assertion, says, the Macedonian law. Observation upon this on another occasion, that Callisthenes, as an Olynthian was not intitled to the benefit of

<sup>3</sup> Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰδε ἀνέγραψαι.

Arrian says that, among various reports transmitted, what he preferred was this. Alexander invited to an entertainment the principal Persians and Medes, together with the principal officers of his army, and the principal philosophers and eminent men attending him from various Grecian republics. Wine circulating, the philosopher Anaxarchus began a preconcerted discourse, stating that 'Alexander might be more reasonably treated with 'divine honors than either Bacchus or Hercules; not only on account of 'the superiority of his deeds, and the greater extent of his conquests, 'but, also, because Bacchus was a Theban, unconnected with Macedonia; 'Hercules, an ancestor indeed of Alexander, yet not a Macedonian but 'an Argive; and surely it would be more consistent for the Macedonians 'so to honor their own king. That after death such honor would be paid 'him there could be no doubt. How much better then to give him 'importance by it, in the eyes of his new subjects, while living, than wait 'for his death, when that advantage would, for him, be gone by !'

For Grecian minds, however enlightened by philosophy, the extravagance of such a proposal obviously would be lessened by familiarity with Grecian religion and that called mythology; which taught that many of the Grecian gods had been fathers of men, and warranted the claim for very many Greeks, and eminently for Alexander, to be of a race descended from a deity. Accordingly other philosophers of Anaxarchus's party supported his proposal, some with speeches, all with applauses. But the matter was not a question simply either of compliment, or of religious concern. It might not unreasonably be apprehended that the change from Grecian to Persian habits, but especially if honors were added to the living prince as to a Grecian deity, would produce, or even seem to warrant, a claim to that unlimited authority over all subjects, which those of the Persian empire had been habituated, from time immemorial, to admit in their sovereigns. The Macedonian officers therefore were very generally dissatisfied, yet held silence. The philosopher Callisthenes undertook reply; and the speech will deserve attention; whether pure from his day, or mixed and tempered with sentiments of Arrian's own age, a century and half within the Christian era; when, on one hand, the attribution of divine honors to the most worthless and vicious of men had been carried to the most absurd and abominable extravagance, and, on the other, even philosophers had con-

c. 11.



descended to gather from Christianity purer notions of the Godhead. ‘Of  
 ‘ honors’, said Callisthenes, ‘ which men may pay to a man, I think none  
 ‘ too great for Alexander. But human and divine honors are many  
 ‘ ways distinguished. To the gods we consecrate temples, we sacrifice, we  
 ‘ pour libations. Hymns are sung to the gods: praises are given to men;  
 ‘ but not with the ceremony of prostration. We salute men with a kiss:  
 ‘ but to reach the gods, living beyond us, we worship them with prostration.  
 ‘ Dances are practised in honor of the gods, and pæans are sung to them.  
 ‘ Different honors are paid to different gods, and to heroes again honors dif-  
 ‘ ferent from godlike honors. It cannot be proper to confound all these;  
 ‘ honoring men extravagantly, and derogating from the dignity of the gods,  
 ‘ by giving to men equal honors. It would, beyond others, become you,  
 ‘ Anaxarchus, who for your learning and wisdom are admitted to continual  
 ‘ communication with Alexander, to recommend to him these considerations,  
 ‘ and divert him from contrary purposes. Recollect that you are not advising  
 ‘ Cambyses or Xerxes, but the son of Philip, of the posterity of Hercules  
 ‘ and Æacus. His forefathers passed from Argos into Macedonia, holding  
 ‘ the sovereignty of the Macedonian nation, not by violence, but under  
 ‘ law. Hercules himself, while living, was not worshipped as a divinity;  
 ‘ nor even after death, till the god at Delphi had clearly declared that it  
 ‘ should be so.’

Arr. l. 3.  
 c. 24.

Curtius, as superior in dramatic arrangement, as inferior in all the most essential qualities of a historian, makes Alexander withdraw during the discussion, to reënter with effect when it was concluded. Arrian’s account, after some writer, apparently, earnest to put forward the causes of philosophy and democracy, makes him present during the whole; thus exhibiting more eminently the commanding boldness of the democratical philosopher. But thus he marks also the character of the Macedonian constitution, which inabled a subject to use such freedom with the sovereign. After the preceding argument, directed to the meeting at large, Arrian represents Callisthenes addressing the king himself thus: ‘ And if, because we are only  
 ‘ a few thousands in a wide continent of millions of barbarians, it may be  
 ‘ in any degree necessary to adopt barbarian sentiments, nevertheless I  
 ‘ conjure you, Alexander, to be mindful of the Greek nation; for whose  
 ‘ sake wholly the expedition was professed to be undertaken, with the  
 ‘ purpose

‘ purpose of subjecting, not Greece to Asia, but Asia to Greece. Consider, then; when you return to Greece, will you require of the Greeks, bred, beyond all people, to reckon upon a liberal equality between man and man, this servile ceremony? Or will you make a degrading difference for the Macedonians, and put upon them alone this dishonor? Is it not fitter that the distinction should be otherwise made? That the Greeks, including the Macedonians, should pay you human honors, according to Grecian customs, derived from remotest antiquity, and that to the barbarians should be left the practices transmitted from their forefathers? Humiliation seems to await the proud. Xerxes was put to shame by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians; Artaxerxes by Clearchus and Xenophon; and recently Darius has been levelled with the dust by Alexander, not then worshipped as a god.’

Arrian, still avoiding, with his usual just caution, to answer for words, tho reported to have been delivered in his own language, in a numerous company, on a subject of great interest, proceeds to demonstrate his opinion of the freedom used, not less by republican Greeks than by the Macedonian great, in communication with Macedonian monarchs, even with Alexander, in the zenith of his triumphs. These and similar arguments, he says, were very grating to Alexander; who, nevertheless, would not directly express dissatisfaction. That Callisthenes’s freedom had been gratifying to the Macedonians present, was obvious. Intimation nevertheless being given that the ceremony of prostration would please the king, and was expected by him, all the Persians rose, and, in order, made the obeisance, as to their former monarchs. One of them appearing to humiliate himself more than the rest, Leonnatus, an eminent Macedonian, previously, and afterward, much favored by Alexander, indecorously enough laughed at him. At this Alexander did not scruple to express displeasure. But, however swoln with pride, or bent upon a favorite purpose, possessing, with a generous forgiving temper, much of his father’s talent to ingage the willing obedience of men, he would use no compulsion, and yet, for the moment, succeeded. It was customary, among the Greeks, to drink in circle from the same cup. Alexander directed a golden flagon to be filled with wine; and, drinking from it himself, sent it to one of several who had previously expressed his approbation of the purpose of adopting the ceremony.

This

Arr. l. 4,  
c. 12.

This person, not named by the historian, rose and drank, gave the flagon to the cup-bearer, prostrated himself, and, on rising again, proceeded, after the Grecian custom, to salute the king with a kiss. Others, also prepared, followed the example; and thus all those averse to the ceremony were led to comply, except Callisthenes. He drank, and proceeded, but without prostration, to offer the kiss. Alexander, talking at the time with Hephæstion, did not observe the omission; but Demetrius<sup>4</sup> son of Pythonax informing him, he refused the Grecian salutation from Callisthenes. The philosopher withdrawing, then said aloud, 'I put up with the loss of a kiss.' If Alexander resented this insolence, it seems that he had the temper not at the time to show it.

## SECTION II.

*Death of Cleitus.*

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 8.

Among the Macedonians, by antient custom, a particular day of the year was sacred to Bacchus. In the winter-quarters at Bactra Alexander took the fancy, instead of Bacchus, to perform the sacrifice and hold the feast in honor of Castor and Pollux. It might seem that he meant thus to declare his esteem of the warlike character, of which those heroes were esteemed patrons, and his disregard of the luxury which, perhaps not in the origin of the worship, was supposed the care of the fabulous conqueror of all the countries from Greece to farthest India, but in process of corruption became so. Among Alexander's virtues a general temperance is, on the best authorities, attributed to him<sup>5</sup>. In eating, Plutarch says, he remained always moderate; faring, according to his own assertion, reported by Arrian, like those under him, and even less luxuriously than some, studious of delicacies. But in drinking, latterly, he sometimes deviated from his early sobriety; giving, according to Arrian's phrase, into the barbarian habit of excess<sup>6</sup>.

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 9 & 28.  
Plut. symp.  
l. 1. p. 623.

<sup>4</sup> Surnamed Pheidon. Plut. v. Alex. 696, A. This story is related nearly alike by Arrian and Plutarch. The latter informs us that its authenticity rested on the report of Chares, of Mitylene, whose authority, it appears, Arrian respected.

<sup>5</sup> Ἡδονῶν δὲ τῶν μὲν τοῦ σώματος ἐγκρατέστατος.  
Arr. l. 7. c. 28.

<sup>6</sup> Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν πότων ἥδη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εἰς τὸ βαρὺ σικώτερον νεωτέρως. Arr. l. 4. c. 8.

Yet,



Yet, according to Plutarch, his pleasure was in conversation more than in wine, so that often when he sat long he drank little. At the feast of the twin gods, however, the cup circulated over freely. The company in general was heated, when question arose about the history of Castor and Pollux, how it was that they were reputed sons, not of Tyndarus, their mother's husband, but of Jupiter. Hence the discourse turned on their actions; and at length some, disposed to flatter the king, and urged by the fumes in their head, insisted that, in greatness of achievement, those of Bacchus were not comparable to those of Alexander.

*Incert. auct.  
ap. Arr. l. 4.  
c. 8.*

Cleitus, brought up with Alexander from childhood, and now among his most favored generals and most confidential friends, nevertheless was among those who saw with uneasiness his growing vanity, his growing partiality for oriental manners and sentiments, and his disposition to abandon the character of a Greek as contradistinguished from a barbarian. Himself heated with wine, he reproved warmly the flattery of the king to the dishonor of divinities. This urged the others to greater extravagance. 'All that was reported of Hercules himself,' they said, 'was little, compared with what had been done by Alexander. But human envy denied to the merit of the living its due honor.' Cleitus retorted; and at length, with the altercation, so lost his temper and judgement, that, turning from those with whom he had been arguing, he addressed the king himself in very offensive terms. Alexander, heated like the rest with wine, and irritated by the conversation he had witnessed, became so provoked that he rose, and was advancing with marks of vehement anger toward Cleitus. Some of the more sober and prudent managed to stop him, while others forced Cleitus out of the room, and led him to a guard, where Ptolemy commanded. Being however not strictly watched, he slipped away, returned to the company, and immediately addressed Alexander with evident purpose of provocation. The king, unfortunately not in a condition to command himself, snatching a weapon from one of the attending guards, killed Cleitus on the spot.

*Aristob. ap.  
Arr. l. 4.  
c. 8.*

Alexander's almost immediate repentance for this atrocious deed, has been allowed by all writers, however differing about particulars, to have been signal. For three days he kept his chamber in the deepest grief, and would neither eat nor drink. His friends, highly uneasy, at length, with

*Arrian, l. 4.  
c. 9.*

with difficulty, persuaded him to take refreshment, and resume his former habits of business and daily meals. Some priests of Bacchus are said to have assisted; representing that the anger of the god, for the neglect of customary honor, produced the catastrophe. To this representation Alexander so far yielded that he performed a sacrifice to Bacchus; glad, says Arrian, to have the fatal event attributed rather to the god's anger with him, than to his own disposition. The philosopher Anaxarchus took occasion to use an analogous argument. 'It was a saying transmitted,' he said, 'from wise men of old, that justice sat on the right hand of Jupiter, and whatever Jupiter decreed was just.' He is reported to have proceeded to urge the inference, afterward actually adopted by the Roman emperors, that 'whatever the king does is just.' Possibly this may have been added by some ingenious Greek among the enemies of Anaxarchus; for it seems uncalled for by the occasion, and, on the contrary, rather weakening the arguments drawn from the supposed pleasure of one deity, and anger of another.

Plut. v. Alex.  
p. 694.

Plutarch's account of the death of Cleitus, differing in some particulars, is so far of the same tenor with Arrian's, that it may be considered as confirming rather than contradicting it. But Plutarch has added what assists to mark the character of Alexander's court, and the state of parties there at the time. Envy was not between Greeks and Persians only. The respect with which Alexander treated the republican Greeks generally, and the honors with which he distinguished some, inflamed the vanity which was not an uncommon Grecian failing; and the men of letters, almost all men of the republics, began to assume, occasionally, an offensive superiority over the Macedonians, less generally educated to letters. 'Do not the Greeks appear among the Macedonians like demigods among wild beasts?' is a speech reported, no doubt on the authority of republican writers, to have come from Alexander himself. Callisthenes was admired for a singularly ready eloquence. On any proposed subject he could speak immediately an interesting treatise, and defend either side of any question with ingenious arguments. Yet so far he kept this talent in reserve that he rarely entered into general conversation; oftener indicating silently a sullen disapprobation of the sentiments of others, than declaring any of his own. In a numerous company once, the merits of the Macedonians  
being

being proposed to him by Alexander for a topic, he spoke so as to gratify all; and the Macedonians most highly. Alexander then, in a phrase of the poet Euripides, said 'On an advantageous subject words will be ready;' 'but now, Callisthenes, show your powers in representing the faults of the Macedonians, so that, hearing, they may mend them.' Callisthenes, immediately taking the other side of the question, abused the Macedonians grossly, vilified the king's father, imputing his successes, not to his talents, but solely to the divisions among the republican Greeks; and concluded with a verse, probably from some tragedy then familiar, 'The wicked wretch through discord honor won.' The Macedonians present showed themselves highly offended. Alexander himself simply observed, that 'Callisthenes had been less showing his powers of eloquence than his ill-will toward the Macedonians.' To this anecdote Plutarch has given value by naming his authority for it; Hermippus, a cotemporary of Alexander, he says, related that Stroïbus, reader to Callisthenes, reported it to Aristotle. Another anecdote, also furnished by Plutarch, marks the freedom which Callisthenes would take and Alexander would bear. On some occasion the philosopher, finding or fancying himself less well received than formerly, turned away, repeating in Alexander's hearing, twice or thrice, this verse of Homer: 'Patroclus died; a better man than thou:' which, adds the biographer, is enough to justify Aristotle's observation, that Callisthenes was great and powerful in eloquence, but wanted just judgement<sup>7</sup>.

## SECTION III.

*Conspiracy of the Band of Pages.*

AFTER the death of Cleitus, in the winter-quarters still of Bactra, a conspiracy against Alexander's life, of a very extraordinary kind, was discovered. The body-guard of boys approaching manhood<sup>8</sup>, sons of the first men of the state, has been formerly described. They were the king's companions, it will be remembered, in hunting, and by turns they mounted

<sup>7</sup> Νῦν δὲ οὕχ ἔρχεται.<sup>8</sup> Ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακίσαντο.—ARR.



Arrian l. 4.  
c. 13.  
Curt. l. 8.  
c. 6.  
Plut. v. Alex.

guard nightly in the antechamber of his bedroom. Arrian mentions, but as report, for which he would not answer, tho he seems to have thought it probably true, that Alexander being on a hunting party from Bactra, and going to strike a boar, Hermolaus, one of the youths of the body-guard, insolently or indiscreetly struck the animal before him. The youth's father, Sopolis, was of high military rank, then employed on the recruiting service in Macedonia. Nevertheless, for such a breach of order and discipline, perhaps more than for personal disrespect, Alexander ordered Hermolaus to be chastised with stripes, in presence of the other youths, and deprived of his horse.

The king's anger was passing, but the youth's indignation was not so. He was readmitted, it is evident, to the former honors of his situation, or his chosen opportunity for revenge would not have occurred. He is said to have been a diligent and favorite scholar of Callisthenes; who, according to report, as we have seen, which appears intitled to credit, was a preacher of the doctrine of the lawfulness and merit of tyrannicide. It seems indeed difficult to conceive that, without some such stimulation, what followed could have happened. Hermolaus, the more his own master as his father was absent, engaged four other youths, sons of eminent Macedonians, together with the son of Carsis, who, tho a Thracian, appears to have ranked among those of the Macedonian court most honored, in the horrid plot to murder their king in his sleep. For executing this the night was chosen when Antipater, one of the conspirators, whether alone, or in command of others, was to hold the watch in the antechamber. The father of Antipater, Asclepiodorus, was actually satrap of Syria, perhaps the most important command within the new empire. Alexander, however generally a model of temperance, yet of a constitution to bear long tension of the faculties, and to be uneasy in rest, would, in the leisure of winter-quarters, even after the catastrophe of Cleitus, and perhaps as medicine for his severe feelings resulting from it, indulge sometimes immoderately in protracting the pleasures of the table. The character of the company he most encouraged favors the apology for him, that liberal and instructive conversation was altogether his object; yet it appears on all hands acknowledged that he would sometimes drink to excess. Arrian, on the authority of Aristobulus, has thought  
what

what follows worthy of a place in his narrative. A Syrian woman, pretending to inspiration, had followed Alexander from her own country, and was admitted occasionally to his presence: first as an object of ridicule for himself and companions; but, her forebodings being often justified by the event, at length she gained great estimation, insomuch that access to him was denied her neither day nor night, and she frequently watched him sleeping. This woman, meeting him, on the night proposed for his assassination, as he was retiring from his company, conjured him to return. At her pressing instance he did so, and, continuing his carousal till daylight, escaped the danger prepared for him. From a man of the rank and means of information of Aristobulus, if only as marking the manners and opinions of Alexander's court, this could not but require the modern historian's notice.

Next day one of the conspirators revealed the secret to a young friend. He told another, who hastened to declare it to Ptolemy son of Lagus, and the five youths were presently arrested. Being put to torture, according to the Macedonian law, they revealed the whole plan of their conspiracy; and declared Callisthenes to have been their instigator. They were then brought to trial before the Macedonians of the army. According to some writers, unnamed by Arrian, Hermolaus boldly confessed and gloried in the plot, telling his judges that it could not become freemen to bear the indignities put upon them by Alexander. Proceeding then to particulars, he noticed the unjust condemnation of Philotas; the still more illegal execution of Parmenio; the murder of Cleitus in a fit of drunkenness; the assumption of the Median dress; the requisition of the ceremony of adoration; not however saying it was insisted on, but only not abandoned; the drinking by night, and sleeping by day, of the man who, beyond all others, ought to watch for the good of all.

Ptol. et  
Aristob.  
ap. Arr.

If credit should be given to this account, it however proves that freedom of speech was largely allowed to the accused. But indeed so far all accounts concur, that the trial was according to all the forms of law, required by the free tho rude constitution of the nation; that the assembled Macedonians condemned Hermolaus, and the youths ingaged with him, to death; and that they proceeded to execute the sentence,

according to the national custom, known as also that of the Jews, by overwhelming them with stones.

The philosopher Callisthenes, accused of instigating the plot, was apprehended. Aristobulus related that he was carried about a prisoner, with the army, and died of disease in the course of nature. On the contrary Ptolemy asserted that he was put to torture, and then hanged<sup>9</sup>. 'So widely,' observes Arrian, 'have those who ought to have been most worthy of confidence, and who, as present with Alexander, must have had all opportunity for knowing such facts, differed about them.' This, it must be confessed is an extraordinary difference; hardly to be accounted for unless upon the supposition that, among the distractions which followed Alexander's death, with opportunity for either, in the situation where he then might be, to obtain credit for a matter happening in a very distant country, some private interest instigated one, and we are without means to decide which, of those eminent writers. Thus much however appears from all accounts of Callisthenes, that he was a turbulent and mischievous preacher of democracy, long favored by Alexander's liberality beyond prudence. His imprisonment and death, as, from the utter uncertainty of the circumstances, they were a most convenient, so they became a favorite subject for following democratical writers; who appear to have made large use of the opportunity afforded by the impossibility of absolutely proving falsehood, to assert, very variously, anything to their purpose.

<sup>9</sup> κρεμάσθαι. There has been controversy a capital punishment, decision of which I among the critics of the continent about will not undertake. the exact import of this word, as describing



## CHAPTER LIII.

War prosecuted by ALEXANDER beyond the Bounds of the  
PERSIAN Empire.

## SECTION I.

*Force of Alexander's Army. Natural and political Circumstances of India westward of the Ganges. March into India, and Conquests there : Grecian Colony established in India : Indian Cattle sent to Greece.*

ALEXANDER, having set out for the conquest of Asia, as we have seen, with a land-force of less than forty thousand men, and with a revenue too scanty to maintain the fleet wanted for coöperation with it, now, with the income of the Persian empire, commanded a corresponding army. With guards and garrisons in all the provinces, and administration so arranged that disturbance of the new order of things arose nowhere, or nowhere so as to engage the notice of historians, those provinces injoying a freedom from commotion and from the private wars of satraps, unknown perhaps since the defeat of Xerxes in Greece, unless in the latter years of Ochus, Alexander's moving army, under his immediate command, according to Curtius, who alone of extant writers has given the number, was a hundred and twenty thousand men. Exactness in the round sum will not be supposed ; yet the amount is no way beyond probability, nor does anything from Arrian imply contradiction of it. Doubtless, in a new empire, to maintain a large disposable force would be necessary, and in so wealthy an empire means abounded. To maintain satisfaction with quiet in a conquering army would be the difficulty ; for Alexander the greater from the very rapidity, extent, and value of his conquests, in which the soldier was accustomed to have all fall before him, and to find large reward, if not with little labor and danger, yet in little time.

time. But his latter campaigns, tho everywhere still victorious, could not have been gratifying, like the earlier, to either soldier or officer. Instead of a great battle splendidly successful, or an obstinate siege once or twice in a season, followed by the ready submission of the richest countries and largest cities in the world, there had been continual hard fighting, in a climate of the severest alternacy of heat and cold; and tho the success so hardly obtained was most important for the quiet and stability of the empire, yet, in comparison with what had preceded, little ensued of either glory for the chief, or profit for the soldier.

But the passion for adventure and impatience of rest, common in youth, had been, in Alexander's ardent temper, stimulated by extraordinary success and fixed by habit in exertion; holding all his faculties now for years almost unremittingly on the utmost stretch. With this, to a mind highly susceptible of fine feeling, reflection on things recently past could not but be greatly uneasy. If Parmenio and Philotas were guilty, that those whom he had so esteemed and honored and trusted should so prove, must have been of bitter consideration. If they were innocent, or if their guilt, as in all accounts it seems to have been, was at least in the imputed amount, doubtful, reflection on the catastrophè would be still more biting. His poignant grief for the death of Cleitus, tho after three days most acute suffering, smothered so far as no longer to interrupt his public functions, could not so end. Pondering on all these matters would contribute to chasten his generous yet over ardent temper, and prepare it to bear the disappointment which, apparently he found it expedient to bear, of failure in the purpose in which at first he seems to have been keenly earnest, to establish the ceremony called adoration, in approaching his person, together with the opinion, or the acknowledgement, that his dignity, if not his nature also, was suprahuman. The idea of a man partaking of divine nature and dignity was familiar among the most cultivated of antient nations; and the estimation of such superiority to the bulk of mankind would be not simply gratifying to human vanity, but probably important, and perhaps indispensable, toward obtaining that respect among subject nations for the conqueror of the Persian empire, with which the conquered dynasty had for ages been treated; and desirable, not for the prince only, but for all who were to share with him in profit from the conquest.

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conquest. That a powerful party therefore would favor the extravagant idea is not wonderful, and under this view much consideration certainly is due to Alexander himself.

These circumstances of sorrow and disappointment appear to have been among stimulations for Alexander to seek new conquests. But there were still others. It was evidently in his nature to desire to show the Macedonians that, with the wish he had manifested for extravagant honor as a divinity, it was not his purpose to seclude himself, like some of the Persian monarchs, among the pleasures of his palace, avoiding in future the labors and dangers and privations of the common soldier. But he had still farther and greater views.

For some time now we have been engaged with transactions in countries imperfectly known from either antient accounts or modern, yet known to have remained always very deficiently civilized. The sea, in the infancy of art and science the divider of nations, beneficial to mankind by affording security for the weak against oppression from the strong, became in their advancement otherwise beneficial, giving means for advantageous communication between the most distant. Thus while a large portion of the Persian empire, nearly central in the greatest continent of our globe, has remained, still for us, in much obscurity, countries of vast extent beyond that empire, against the ocean, have become in large proportion even familiarly known. Interest and curiosity together inciting, the talents of seamen, soldiers, merchants, geographers, philosophers, have been largely and laboriously exerted, and the results of their inquiries have been ably given to the world. Formerly, if, anywhere among the learned, suspicion was entertained of romance in even the gravest accounts of Alexander's transactions in that distant part of the world whither we are now to follow him, such suspicion could not, on sure ground, be controverted. But the new and certain light, in modern times obtained, affording much confirmation of the best antient accounts, often deriving assistance from them, and rarely finding them in error, tends to establish widely the faith of antient history. Not simply as it establishes the credit of Alexander's historians, especially Arrian, for matters in countries at length laid open to European curiosity, but farther as it reflects credit  
on



on the most authentic, and assists estimation of the more questionable, accounts of things and transactions in countries less admitting observation and inquiry.

It is now ascertained that the northern part of western India, to a great extent watered by the numerous streams issuing from the boundary mountains of Scythia, which, at intervals uniting, form the great river Indus, is among the most productive in the world, and thence, in antient as in modern times, extraordinarily populous and wealthy. Of wars between the Indian princes and the Persian empire accounts remain; but scanty and uncertain, nor is any great result from them indicated. Probably the limits of the Persian empire, on this side, were not very steddily maintained, and perhaps never very exactly decided. But with Alexander's views it would be an important political object to establish a certain boundary, and to provide for its being respected. Doubtless he would have intelligence of the wealth of India; nor would information fail him of the worthlessness of a great extent of country between India and Persia proper, barren nearly as the desert he had traversed in Africa, but affording refuge for wild hords in its neighbourhood, whence they avoided submission to any government. Arrangement of some sort for this eastern boundary of his new empire was obviously, in various views, wanting; and Alexander's views, always great, were often directed to extensive benefit for mankind. Whether the learned Vincent had ground for the supposition that, when he founded his city of Alexandria in Egypt, he had already conceived the idea, not only of carrying conquest to the Indus, but also of establishing a commercial communication between the Indian shores and that city, it seems not doubtful that when, having completed the conquest of the Persian empire, he resolved still to prosecute conquest eastward, such contemplation was in his mind.

In Arrian's account of India, not only natural but political circumstances also are described, in large part, as they exist at this day. The country was divided into numerous principalities, to several of whose chiefs he gives a title<sup>1</sup> indicating allegiance to some paramount sovereign; yet shows that they possessed power to make war and peace for themselves.

<sup>1</sup> Ὑπαρχος, seeming to mark nearly the modern, perhaps also antient, RAJAH.

Contests between these chiefs abounded; and probably among them, on this eastern verge of the Persian empire, as among the Grecian republics on the western, it had been the policy of some to obtain support from that empire; whence, on the conqueror's arrival with his victorious army in their neighborhood, a disposition to court him was ready.

Such was the climate of Bactria that it appears to have been necessary for Alexander to wait in the winter quarters there till spring was considerably advanced, before the roads were sufficiently open for conveniently marching in any direction. Even then the extent of the Indian mountains eastward was forbidding, in no season affording an easily practicable road. Alexander therefore, leaving ten thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, under the command of Amyntas, for the security of the northern provinces of his acquired empire, directed his march, with an army of probably more than a hundred and twenty thousand of all arms, first southward. Crossing, in that course, without difficulty the ridge of Caucasus, the southern boundary of Bactria, in ten days he reached his colony of Alexandria in Paropamisus. That colony he strengthened by allowing those of his army less fit for active service to remain there, in houses already provided; and he associated with them some of the neighbouring natives, who were willing to become their fellowcitizens. Dissatisfied then with the conduct of the officer whom he had left governor, he removed him, and, committing the military command to Nicanor of the band of companions, he appointed Tyriaspes, apparently a Persian, to the chief civil authority, with the dignity of satrap.

From the border of Paropamisus eastward a great extent of valuable country, held by people of the Indian nation, seems to have been claimed as a portion of the Persian empire; perhaps conquered by the first Darius, or perhaps by Cyrus; but latterly, in the weakness and troubles of the imperial government, the chiefs of districts appear to have assumed an independent authority. Nevertheless Alexander found no resistance, or none noticed by the historian, in his march to a city which the Greek writers call Nicæa; probably translating a Persian name, commemorating a victory. A peaceful transaction only is mentioned there, a sacrifice to

Minerva. Whether or no there may have been any farther view in this, it would of course be a regale for his army. Still unopposed then he proceeded without opposition to the river Copen. Here the historian indicates that, tho he claimed sovereignty beyond that stream (whether as successor to the conquests of Persian kings, or in pursuance of the Grecian claim against all Barbarians, or if any other ground might be, does not appear) he was doubtful of the acknowledgement of his claim. A herald was sent forward to the chiefs of districts, with orders for them to attend the paramount sovereign, as, in his progress, he might approach them.

At this time Taxiles, a bordering chief, powerful by his interest among neighbouring states, was at enmity with a still more powerful chief, Astes, prince of a district still eastward, which the Greeks called Peucelaotis. Under the lead of Taxiles, all the chiefs, westward of Peucelaotis, came to wait upon Alexander, bringing large presents, as the custom of India still is, and offering all the elephants they possessed. These, only twenty-five, were apparently not the produce of their northern country, but obtained from the southward.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 22.

The submission of Taxiles and his associates appears to have determined the opposition of Astes, with a powerful party adhering to him as their chief. Hephæstion therefore, and Perdicas, were sent with a strong division of the army against them. Astes shut himself within his principal town, to which siege was laid; and, after a resistance of thirty days, it was taken by assault, in which himself was killed. All the more level country then submitting as far as the Indus, Hephæstion and Perdicas, according to their instructions, proceeded to prepare means for the difficult passage of that great river.

Meanwhile Alexander was pursuing labors and dangers, perhaps with more than former eagerness, to relieve a troubled mind. Three obscure nations, the Aspics, Thyrees, and Arasacs, confident in the strength of their rough and mountainous country, and in their own valor and skill in arms, refused submission. After a troublesome march, having with difficulty crossed the river Choes, he found a country before him in which cavalry might act. Expecting then that the inhabitants would remove all

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portable



portable valuables to their fortresses or to the nearest highlands, he put eight hundred Macedonian heavy-armed foot on horseback, and with these and all his cavalry he hastened forward, leaving the main body of his infantry to follow at an easy pace. But, as he approached a large fortified town, the people, observing the smallness of his numbers, and confident in their superiority, quitted their walls to meet him in the field. His experience enabling him to estimate, better than they, his own strength and theirs, he proceeded immediately to attack them; and the charge of so considerable a body of regular cavalry, of which they had no previous idea, drove them within their gates. In the short yet sharp conflict however Alexander and two of his most active young generals, Leonnatus, and Ptolemy son of Lagus, were wounded; but the injury to himself, which was in the shoulder, through the excellence of his defensive armour, was not severe.

Next day assault was made on the town, which was surrounded with two walls. The outer was mastered with little difficulty: the inner was at first defended bravely. But the Indians, feeling soon their inability to resist, in close fight, the Grecian weapons and discipline, issued by the gates which afforded best opportunity, and fled for the mountains. The Macedonians, pursuing, angry, says Arrian, that their king had been wounded, gave no quarter; and Alexander himself, appears to have sanctioned this illiberality by destroying the town. The proximity of the mountains however gave present safety to the greater part of the people.

The success, nevertheless, and the severity together, had their effect. The next town, Andax, presently surrendered; and the principal difficulties for the reduction of that part of the country were so far overborne, that nothing inviting for Alexander's fancy remained. The business therefore of accepting or compelling the obedience of those who had not yet professed it, and of taking the measures necessary for the future administration, he committed to Craterus; who seems to have been judiciously selected as, after Parmenio, the ablest of his generals. For himself he continued to prefer the business of most labor and danger. With a chosen portion of the army, infantry and cavalry, he proceeded to a town, described only as the principal city of the Aspies, where the principal strength of the country was collected under its chief. By a forced march he reached it

c. 24.

in two days, The inhabitants, in extreme alarm, burnt their town, and fled to the mountains; yet not so timely but that many were killed by the pursuing Macedonians.

The multitude however soon recovering in some degree from their first alarm, their chief, who did not want personal courage, collected a force about him on a hill, projected from the body of the highlands into the plain, and thence observed his enemy's motions. Under a prince, so little sparing of himself as Alexander, there would of course be emulation of his conduct. Ptolemy son of Lagus, having, in the division under his command, a part of that select body called the hypaspists<sup>2</sup>, led them against the Indian prince. Protected by their armour, and powerful by their discipline, they soon compelled the very superior number of the Indians, tho very advantageously posted, to fly. Ptolemy followed; and when the steepness and roughness of the ground made farther progress with his horse difficult, he alighted and pursued afoot. The Indian prince, whether checked in retreat by increasing difficulty of the ground, or reckoning upon advantage from that already reached, engaged those about him to turn against his pursuing enemy, and himself drove his long lance against Ptolemy's breast. The point however was effectually resisted by the armour it met, and Ptolemy directing his weapon against his assailant's thigh, pierced it, and the Indian fell. Those immediately about him then fled in dismay, and the Macedonians proceeded to carry off the wounded prince. But by this time the Indians had collected in great number, on the nearest heights, and, on seeing the distress of their prince, a general effervescence of grief and indignation among them produced a strong effort to relieve him. It was however too late; for Alexander, hastening with his mounted heavy infantry to the foot of the hill, and there making them alight, presently arrived. Nevertheless the valor and obstinacy of the Indians had been so excited, that not without difficulty they were

<sup>2</sup> It has before been observed that satisfactory information of what characterized the *ὑπασπιστῶν* fails. It might seem indicated here that they were cavalry, carrying larger shields than those found most convenient for the general cavalry service, and

thence more capable of acting with the heavy-armed foot; but in other instances they are clearly marked as infantry, and neither here nor elsewhere clearly as cavalry.

driven back, and the prince's body, whose wound appears to have been mortal, remained with the Macedonians <sup>3</sup>.

Alexander then crossed the mountains to Arigæum, a town which he found deserted and burnt. Here Craterus, with the main body of the army rejoined him, having brought the province of Peucelaotis to complete obedience. Sangæus, an Indian chief, who had been driven from his territory by Astes, being connected in friendship with Taxiles, had been introduced to Alexander's protection, and so gained his esteem that he was now appointed to the government of the country which had been his enemy's principality. Neither the policy by which conquest should be maintained, nor that by which the fatigues of service (great indeed were those he often required) should be relieved, and cheerfulness under them promoted, seem ever to have failed in Alexander's mind. The situation of Arigæum appearing favorable for a colony, he appointed Craterus to superintend the rebuilding of the burnt town; directing him meanwhile to incourage the fugitive inhabitants to return with any neighbouring people who might be disposed to accept the settlement, in which he joined with them any soldiers of his army less fit for fatigues to insue, who were disposed to rest there.

But the people of the Arigæan country, far from yet showing any disposition to a general submission, had assembled themselves and their cattle in a strong situation. Alexander, with some imperfect information of their measures, leaving Craterus to his appointed employment, marched himself toward them with a chosen force. Ptolemy, on a foraging party, extending his observation far, came in view of the enemy's station; and, on his return, reported that, from the extent of the height they occupied, and also from their fires, it appeared probable that their numbers far exceeded his. Alexander, having considered the circumstances, resolved upon three simultaneous assaults. Committing one division of his army to Ptolemy, and another to Leonnatus, he took himself the immediate command of the third. To Ptolemy, who had made the obser- c. 25.  
vation, he assigned the attack where was the greatest difficulty of ground.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian has not said whether this exploit of Ptolemy was related by himself; but his narrative seems in some degree to indicate that this part of it, together with what immediately follows, was from Ptolemy.



For himself he took that where it was supposed the greater opposing force might be expected. But the Indians, observing the smallness of his numbers, confidently descended into the plain to meet him. Thus disadvantage of ground remained only for Ptolemy's division. The bravery of superior numbers then was so little availing, against superior arms and skill and science, that victory was easy. The prisoners, according to Ptolemy's account, women and children probably included, were no less than forty thousand. Neat cattle, to the amount of two hundred and thirty thousand, were the farther fruit of the contest; perhaps an exaggerated enumeration, rather to be attributed to the error to which, in repeated transcriptions, reports of numbers are so obviously liable, than to the real testimony of so informed and eminent a writer. Here again Alexander showed, in a matter generally of small interest among conquerors, his attention still to his native country, and, what he was frequently, among his military exertions and the conquests resulting from them, evincing, his attention to the general welfare of mankind. Reviewing the cattle, he observed the peculiarities of their make; and being assured of their superiority to those of Europe, especially, for working, he ordered a selection of them to be sent to Macedonia, to improve the breed there. Modern observation does credit to Alexander's judgement in this matter, so out of the ordinary course of conquerors, and to Arrian's information concerning it; the Indian cattle being found, at this day, of a form admired among our breeders for beauty, superiorly disposed to ready fattening, and, as Arrian says of them, of extraordinary strength, activity, and power of perseverance in labor; tho found inferior for another great public purpose, milking. The judicious reader, it may well be trusted, will find gratification rather than disgust in this little familiar episode, which the eminent officer, afterward founder of the Grecian monarchy of Egypt, and Arrian's guide, thought not unworthy of a place in his history of his sovereign, the greatest conqueror the world had known.

## SECTION II.

*War with the Assakene Indians. Indian mercenary troops. Questionable Deed of Alexander. Siege of Mount Aornos. Conquest carried to the River Indus.*

CRATERUS, having completed, as far as immediate occasion required, the rebuilding and fortifying of Arigæum, and the necessary arrangements for the new settlement there, joined his king with the main body of infantry of the phalanx and the besieging artillery. Next in the proposed progress was the country of the Assakenes; who, Arrian says, could bring into the field thirty thousand foot, two thousand horse, and thirty elephants; which he mentions as comparatively a great force among the small nations of these parts. No offence from that people is mentioned or intimated, unless that they declined to acknowledge themselves subjects of the conqueror of the Persians. Whether any former conquest of their country, by Persian kings, afforded a pretence to claim dominion over them history does not say. But the Indians were Barbarians, that is, not Greeks, and therefore, according to the common Grecian tenets, fair objects of subjugation. Alexander proceeded still as if fatigue and danger were his chief delights. Taking the lead of a small body, but of all arms, the river Guzæus crossed his way. Rapidity of current, and a bottom composed of round stones, denying sure footing for man and beast, made the passage, even without hostile opposition, so difficult and hazardous, that the Indians, assembled on the opposite bank, supposed it would not, in face of an enemy, be attempted. Alexander's troops however advancing in regular order to the bank, dashed, without hesitation, into the stream. Probably the fame of his invincibility operated then on the minds of the Indians, and enhanced their alarm. Without waiting to see the event of the struggle with the difficulties of the passage, they fled, and betook themselves to their towns. Alexander proceeded immediately to Massaga, their capital.

In

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 26.

Plut. v. Alex.  
p. 698.

In that age, in India, as in Greece, and as in India still at this day, war was a trade, so that a mercenary force was always to be procured for hire. The Assakenes had strengthened themselves in Massaga with such a force, to the amount of seven thousand men. Alexander, with his small advanced body, incamped before their walls. Confident in superior numbers they sallied to attack him. He, confident in superior arms and discipline, desired more space for pursuing them when he should have put them to flight; and accordingly he led hastily away from the town. The Indians, encouraged thus, pursued in much haste, and in no order. As soon then as their bowshots reached his troops, he ordered to face about, and advance speedily against them. The horse-darters, the bowmen and the Agrians preceded; Alexander himself led the phalanx. The Indians, astonished at the unexpected event, after having borne the attack of the light-armed, took to flight on the approach of the phalanx. About two hundred were killed; the rest found safety within their walls. Alexander, at the head of the phalanx, approaching these, received an arrow in his foot, but the wound was slight.

Next day the battering engines were brought against the fortification, so little adapted to resist such machines that a practicable breach was quickly made. Assault was immediately attempted, but the resistance was such that Alexander ordered retreat. Next day a wooden tower was advanced, whence bowmen, in shelter, discharged their arrows with effect, and machines threw more weighty weapons. But Grecian discipline did not give the same advantage against numbers, behind the rudest fortifications, as in the field. Such was the resistance of the garrison that the besiegers could not penetrate. On the third day therefore a bridge was thrown from the movable tower to the broken part of the wall, and the hypaspists, who, through similar arrangement, had taken the great and powerful city of Tyre, were the troops sent to storm. But through their eagerness to be forward in the assault, under their prince's eye, the bridge was overloaded, and gave way. Then the Indians pressed upon their distressed enemies, not only with missile weapons from the walls, but, issuing by small sallyports, came even to close action. They were driven back, but Alexander then prudently ordered retreat.

c. 27.

Against



Against the next day however a more perfect bridge was completed, and assault was renewed. The resistance was again obstinate, and the event still doubtful, when the chief of the Indians was killed by a shot from an engine. Then the mercenaries probably began to doubt whether they were equally sure, as before, of the stipulated reward for their service. Many however being already killed, and many more wounded, those yet able, no longer acknowledging any authority but that of their own chiefs, sent out a proposal to capitulate. Alexander, says Arrian, admiring their bravery, rejoiced in the opportunity to save them from destruction. The town was surrendered with the condition that they should pass into his service. Marching out, accordingly, with their arms, they incamped on a hill near the Macedonian camp. For what followed, Alexander has been variously censured, as the facts have been variously related and believed. According to Arrian, he was informed that these mercenaries, averse to serve against other Indians, had resolved to move in the night, and desert their engagement. Upon this, in early darkness, surrounding their camp with his whole army, he put all to the sword. Proceeding then to the town, he took possession of it as if there had been no capitulation, and the mother and daughter of the chief of the Assakenes became his prisoners \*.

The numerous small nations of India seem to have had much of the obstinate attachment of the several Grecian cities each to its separate independency, and a consequent disposition to hostility among oneanother. With no concert, or none of material efficacy, they persevered in resistance, each confiding in its own means; among which the singularly strong posts, afforded by the nature of the country, were principally encouraging. Beside these however they had towns, of which some

\* Of different accounts of this business, Arrian seems to have selected that least uncreditable to Alexander; and Diodorus, who delighted in glaring colors and strong light and shadow, that most so; for which the eighty-fourth chapter of his seventeenth book may be seen. Plutarch, adverting to the fact, without naming either people or place, observes upon it, Τοῦτο τοῖς πολεμικοῖς

ἔργοις ἀσπίδῃ, τὰλλα νομίμως καὶ βασιλικῶς πολεμήσαντος, ὡς κηλὶς πρόσσειν. v. Alex. p. 698. It is for the credit of Alexander's history altogether that, among the often varying antient accounts, the most favoring writers have not represented him blameless, while the most adverse have acknowledged great qualities and even great virtues.

were considerably populous and well fortified. Bazira and Ora appear to have been the most important. Against the former Alexander sent Cœnus; against the other Attalus; expecting, says Arrian, that information of the catastrophë of the Assakenes would produce ready submission. If however such was his expectation, he was disappointed, for the effect was the reverse. The Bazirenes trusting in the natural and artificial strength of their town<sup>5</sup>, the Orenes in support from some neighbouring people, both resolved not to commit themselves by a capitulation. Alexander then led his main body against Ora, leaving only a small force under Cœnus before Bazira. Indian walls were unavailing against the Grecian art of attack, and Indian numbers against the Grecian discipline: Ora was quickly taken, and then the Bazirenes began to despair of the defence even of their stronger situation.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 28.

But there was, within their country, an insulated mountain called Aornos, of very extraordinary advantages for a military post. Its circuit at the base was said to be twenty miles: the lowest height of its precipitous sides more than a mile. One practicable path, formed by hand, led to the champain top, where were woods, land fit for tillage enough to employ a thousand men, and running springs of fine water. The Bazirenes, making their way to this place by night, were quickly joined by the population of all the surrounding country. Aornos had the fame of being invincible. 'Report,' says Arrian, 'goes, that even Hercules son of 'Jupiter, failed in attempting to take it.' But,' he continues, 'whether 'either the Theban Hercules, or the Tyrian, or the Egyptian ever 'reached India, is more than I can affirm. Indeed I am inclined to 'believe the contrary. The disposition of men to express, rather beyond than short of the reality, whatever they would describe as extraordinary, has led to the common phrase concerning difficulties, that 'even Hercules could not surmount them; and I think it likely Hercules 'has thus been implicated in the history of this mountain.'

But with or without the passion to emulate or exceed the deeds of Hercules, Alexander's purpose being to hold the country as far as the Indus within his dominion, and connect it by navigation, with the rest

<sup>5</sup> Ἀκριῶς τετραχισμίνον. Arr. iv. 27. p. 170.

of his empire, such a passion could hardly be needful to admonish him that a post like Aornos, in the midst of a populous and fruitful country, should not be left behind him in the possession of enemies. Those previous measures then which, with these views, prudence would recommend, he proceeded to take. Improving the Indian fortifications of Ora and Massaga with Grecian art, he placed garrisons in them simply as military posts. But he gave Bazira other importance. Improving its fortifications also, he replenished it with inhabitants, and gave it a constitution as a city<sup>6</sup>.

During these transactions Hephæstion and Perdiccas had restored the deserted town of Orobatis, and, leaving a garrison there, had proceeded to the Indus and completed the projected bridge. Meanwhile, at the persuasion of the Indian princes, Cophæus and Assagetes, who had attached themselves to Alexander, the principal city of Peucelaotis had surrendered; and then many smaller towns hastened to profit from opportunity afforded to obviate greater evils by following the example. In Peucelaotis Alexander placed a garrison, and appointed Philip, undistinguished by any other name, to the command.

The northern part of India, as far as the Indus, Aornos only excepted, being now reduced to quiet subjection, Alexander committed the command of the whole, with the title of a satrapy, to Nicanor of his band of companions, and then proceeded to measures for reducing that formidable post. At the town of Embolima, not far distant from it, he stationed Craterus, with a part of his army, to collect magazines, with a view to a protracted blockade, if, through the failure of effective means for assault, that mode of siege must be resorted to. Himself, with a select division, undertook the lead of measures for a quicker execution of the purpose.

The animosities among the Indians, together with Alexander's reputation for generosity, and his means for rewarding largely, made everywhere facilities for him among difficult enterprizes. Some natives of the country

<sup>6</sup> Τὰ μὲν δὴ Ὠρα καὶ Μάσσαγα φρούρια ἰποῖησεν πρὸς τῇ χώρᾳ, τὰ Βάζιρα δὲ πόλιν ἐξετείχισε. pose this, Vulcanius's translation, is as near the original as could be in the Latin language without circumlocution.  
—Bazira in URBIS modum excoluit. I sup-



c. 29.

now undertook to show a way, not generally known, by which active men, with arms, might reach a commanding part of the mountain. A chosen body was accordingly put under the orders of Ptolemy son of Lagus. Moving by night, they succeeded in gaining the indicated post, unperceived by the enemy. It was a small hill, whence, tho in some degree detached, access to the body of the mountain was easier than from the country below. Ptolemy proceeded immediately to fortify his station; and when all was duly prepared, gave information by a concerted signal. Next day Alexander attempted an assault, hoping that the sight only of Ptolemy's troops, already in possession of a fortified post on the mountain, would so alarm and distract the enemy, that he might make his way good against the difficulties which nature offered on the other sides. But the Indians profited so ably and boldly from the advantages of their situation that they obliged him to abandon his purpose, and, not resting there, proceeded to direct nearly their whole force against Ptolemy. His situation became in consequence critical, for no assistance from friends could readily reach him. His light troops however, which were of the best of the army, with advantage of ground and from behind lines, plied their weapons so efficaciously, that the enemy, without coming in contact with the heavy-armed, at the close of day withdrew.

In the following night Alexander sent orders to Ptolemy, by a trusty Indian intimately acquainted with the ground; for their quarrels among themselves made Indians trusty for Alexander. He had resolved, on the morrow, to endeavour himself, with a powerful body, to reach Ptolemy's station by the difficult path by which he had ascended. To obviate interruption from the enemy in this difficult attempt, Ptolemy was directed, not to keep his force, as before, merely in a threatening attitude behind his lines, but to issue against the enemy, and force attention the farthest that might be from the part by which it was proposed the army should ascend. This was accordingly executed. Yet the Indians resisted with a valor and skill which compelled Alexander repeatedly to relieve the assailing body with fresh troops. Till midday the contest was quite doubtful; and not till near night, by great perseverance, with judicious conduct, the junction with Ptolemy was effected.

But

But even thus the business was far from completed. The first assault, from the army united on the hill occupied by Ptolemy, was unsuccessful, and it became necessary to incamp there for the night. Next morning at daybreak orders were issued for every man to provide himself immediately with a hundred palisades, which the growth of wood on the hill sides abundantly furnished. In this business they were uninterrupted by the enemy. The next day was employed in forming, with the assistance of the palisades, a causeway across the bottom <sup>7</sup> which separated Ptolemy's hill from the body of the mountain. Alexander himself superintending the work, it was, before night, completed to the length of a furlong, of such height that missile weapons might be efficaciously delivered from it, either by hand or by engines, against any endeavouring to interrupt the work. During the two following days therefore the business proceeded still more rapidly; and, on the fourth, it afforded such advantage c. 30. for reaching a kind of promontory projected from the mountain, that a small body of Macedonians, seizing an advantageous opportunity, by a bold exertion reached that projected height, and established themselves on it. Alexander presently joined them there, and thence urged the completion of the causeway.

The Indians now saw their means of effectual resistance gone. They sent therefore a herald to propose capitulation, and negotiation was begun. But their conduct excited suspicion that their purpose was only to obtain a suspension of attack during daylight, and in the night to withdraw with their arms. Alexander, therefore, instead of measures of hinderance, removed his troops from all situations accommodated to intercept their retreat; but, carefully watching them, when their ill faith became fully manifest, by the actual beginning of their flight, then, with his body-guards, and a division of the hypaspists, he led the way himself to the height they had occupied, and directed pursuit of the fugitives. Many perished by the sword, and many among the precipices; which made flight by night, even had no enemy pursued, hazardous, and even to those best acquainted with the ways.

<sup>7</sup> Better described in the old language, land or southern parts, by the term *DEAN*, preserved in the north of England, where on the eastern side of the country, and *GILL*, the thing is oftener found than in the mid- on the western.

If then, on this occasion, the army was gratified with the imagination of having accomplished what Hercules, with whatever force he commanded, had been unequal to, it could not be politic for Alexander to check the amusing fancy. Perhaps he promoted it by a sacrifice, which the historian mentions to have been performed next day, tho' to what deity is not said. The instances of infidelity among those of his new subjects to whom he had intrusted confidential situations did not dissuade him from persevering in that policy. Placing a garrison in the mountain rock, he committed the command to Sisicottus, an Indian; who, driven apparently from his own country, had passed to Bactria, and engaged, with a body of troops attached to him, in the service of Bessus; on whose downfall, being admitted with his troops into that of Alexander, he had, on all occasions, so conducted himself as to win his new sovereign's esteem.

While Alexander was engaged in the siege of Aornos, the brother of the prince of the Assakenes, under the hope that it would certainly detain him long, and perhaps might baffle him at last, had excited a rebellion, and, with a considerable force, taking all the elephants in the country, had withdrawn to the mountains. When therefore Aornos was reduced, Alexander marched for Dyrta, the principal city of Assakenë. In his way he found the territory deserted, and, arriving at the city, he found that also without inhabitants. Satisfied then with this evidence that the insurrection was little threatening, he committed the reduction of the rebellious Assakenes to his generals Nearchus and Antiochus, and resumed his own march for the Indus.

But the way was difficult, principally from its woods, and afforded great opportunity for an enemy to obstruct his progress. A strong body of pioneers was therefore sent forward to open the way. Proceeding thus, he was met by a deputation from an Indian army, bearing the head and arms of its chief, as a peace-offering, which Alexander's policy would not allow him to refuse<sup>3</sup>.

Not

<sup>3</sup> For this, unnoticed by Arrian, the concurring testimonies of Diodorus and Curtius, (Diod. l. 17. c. 86. Curt. l. 8. c. 12.) may be admitted, being consonant to both antient and modern accounts of the Indians.

The compilers of the antient Universal history



Not yet arrived in the climate where elephants were commonly bred, those animals, scarce and highly valued among the natives, were greatly prized by Alexander. Desirous therefore of recovering those which had been carried off by the Assakenes, he had directed Nearchus and Antiochus, among inquiries about all circumstances of the country, to be diligent in search for them. Information then was obtained that the Assakenes, when they deserted their city and plains, had turned their elephants to pasture on the banks of the Indus; and it was farther found, that, among the Indians in Alexander's service, some were professional elephant-hunters. These being sent in pursuit of the animals, brought all to the camp except two, which, as they reported, falling down precipices, had perished.

history observe upon it, 'How Arrian came to omit this event, we cannot pretend to say, unless we suppose that he doubted the truth of it, because it was omitted in the memoirs of Aristobulus and Ptolemy.' It appears to me far from clear that Arrian has wholly omitted the event, tho he has mentioned neither the chief's name (Aphrices in our copies of Diodorus, Eryces in those of Curtius) nor his catastrophe, as related by those historians. It is observable that in Arrian's account of the rebellion of the Assakenes, the name of the prince their leader is unmentioned, and that, in the accounts of the other two historians of the opposition of Aphrices or Eryces, the name of the people

is unmentioned. It seems therefore at least possible that Aphrices or Eryces was the leader of the Assakenes. The matter is little important. Nor does it clearly follow that, if the catastrophe of that prince was unnoticed by both Ptolemy and Aristobulus, therefore such a fact, so consonant with Asiatic manners in general, and Indian particularly, should be discredited; the principal object of those writers having been, as Arrian's after them, a military history of Alexander and of themselves. The conjecture, in the Universal History, that the army of Aphrices was composed mostly of mercenaries, may well be admitted, as consonant with Arrian's account of the Indian military.

## SECTION III.

*Fancies of the Greeks concerning the Expedition of Bacchus to India. Ready Submission of the City and Province of Nysa to Alexander, and Conquest as far as the River Indus completed.*

WHILE the army was within the extensive bounds of the Persian empire, tho among various nations, differing in speech, as in manners, habits, traditions and superstitions, yet the language of government would be everywhere Persian; everywhere, even among the natives, would be many who could speak Persian; and, as many among the Greeks were conversant with the Persian, means for information about any matter of extensive notoriety would not wholly fail for any who desired it. Nevertheless, concerning those Persian provinces which lay beyond all ordinary resort of the Greeks, some of their writers, whether more indulging their fancies, or pursuing a view to profit from popular curiosity and credulity, published some very extravagant stories. And now a more favorable field for them was opened. Interpreters would be found still for Alexander and his principal officers; but, for others, means to communicate with the natives would be rare and scanty. Arrian indicates a suspicion that Alexander himself, profiting from these circumstances, promoted the belief of some fictions calculated to assist his purposes; and especially to reconcile the Grecian part of his army to his ulterior views.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 2.

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 1.  
cum mult.  
al. script.  
Gr. & Rom.

Eurip.  
Sophoc.

Tradition was old among the Greeks that their god Dionysus, called also Bacchus, was taken from the womb of his dying mother Semele, at Thebes in Bœotia, and placed for maturity of birth, by his father Jupiter, in his own thigh, whence he was delivered in due time at Nysa, in that part of the country westward of the Red Sea, now reckoned a part of Egypt, but antiently attributed to Arabia. Tradition also was old that Dionysus, at the head of an army from Greece, penetrated to India, and even conquered a part of that extensive country. Concerning however all circumstances

circumstances of this conqueror, traditions greatly varied. Hence, among the Grecian writers, comparing those traditions with one another, and with matters of more authenticated, tho still obscure, history, some supposed there were three of the name of Dionysus; one Grecian, one Egyptian or Arabian, one Indian, while others inclined to believe Dionysus and Bacchus but additional names or titles of the famed Egyptian conqueror Sesostris.

In the country where Alexander now was, between the rivers Cophen Arr. l. 5. and Indus, was a principal city to which the Greeks, probably follow- c. 1. ing as nearly as they could the Indian pronunciation, gave the name of Nyssa. Alexander, on his march toward this city, had just entered the tent prepared for him, when the arrival of a deputation from it was announced. With his helmet and armour still on, and covered as he was with dust, he directed that the deputies should be introduced. Struck with the sight of so renowned a conqueror, in habit so unceremonious yet so warlike, they fell on the ground and held silence. Alexander however kindly greeting them, they rose, and Acuphis, their chief, addressed him thus: ‘The Nyssæans, O king! through us, beseech you, for the sake of  
‘the god Dionysus, whom you revere, to grant them the continuance of  
‘their actual free constitution. For Dionysus, after he had conquered  
‘India, before he returned toward the Grecian sea, founded their city,  
‘and peopled it with his invalided soldiers, who were congenial with  
‘himself, for a perpetual memorial of his victories; as you have founded  
‘Alexandreia in Egypt, and Alexandreia at Caucasus, and are now  
‘founding other cities, and will found still more; your achievements far  
‘exceeding those of Dionysus. That deity, in honor of his nurse Nyssa,  
‘gave our city its name, and its territory he called Nyssæa; and from  
‘his having, as our mythology and yours teaches, grown to maturity for  
‘birth in Jupiter’s thigh, he gave to the neighbouring mountain the name  
‘of Meron, which, in our language, as in yours, means a Thigh. From  
‘him we derive that free and regular government under which we have  
‘lived. If farther proof were needful that Dionysus was our founder, we

9 ‘Οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ Βάκχοι ἦσαν. Vulcanius has translated this, *Qui ipsi et Bacchi erant*, which the learned annotator Gronovius has allowed to pass without comment.



‘ have it in this singularity, that ivy, the plant sacred to that god, flourishes here, and is found no where else throughout India.’

Arrian, l. 5.  
c. 2.

This speech, the historian says, ‘ was grateful to Alexander, who desired that the traditions of the expedition of Dionysus to India, and of his being founder of the city of Nyssa, should have credit ; that so he might himself obtain the estimation of having already equalled the extent of conquest of Dionysus, and soon of having surpassed it ; for thus he thought the Macedonians would be led to have the same zeal with himself for farther conquest. He therefore readily granted to the Nyssæans the privileges they solicited.’

It seems here clearly indicated that official report was made to the army of what passed at the audience of the Nyssæan deputies ; and it appears highly probable that, if what is related really passed, it was preconcerted with the heads of the Nyssæan government. Nevertheless it is clearly possible that the speech of Acuphis may have differed widely from that reported. For no Greek would understand him speaking his own language ; and so opportunity was open for representing it such as might best suit Alexander’s purpose.

The Nyssæan constitution, we are informed, was aristocratical ; a senate of three hundred holding the principal powers of government. In confirming this constitution Alexander declared his approbation of it, and of the system of law and mode of administration of the Nyssæans. Probably in all his conquests he took some contribution of force to his army. Of the Nyssæans he demanded three hundred horse ; but whether through jealousy, or whether proposing honor, he required that one hundred should be of the senate, with Acuphis at their head. This distressed the Nyssæan leaders. Three hundred horse, they said, or more, they would willingly furnish ; but, deprived of one third of their most efficient numbers, they could not answer for the consequences : Double the number of another description they could well spare. In the Nyssæan, as in all free governments, there would be parties ; but whether the subtraction of one third of the senate would have endangered the preponderance of the actually ruling party, or only such a number of the senate were averse to the active and hazardous service which Alexander would expect of them, no account

shows. Alexander however conceded to the remonstrance; took only the three hundred cavalry which he had demanded, not requiring that any should be senators, and he appointed Acuphis his lieutenant of the province<sup>10</sup>; accepting his son, and his grandson by a daughter, as his substitutes for military service.

Alexander would not quit Nyssa without visiting the antiquities, which were said to prove the foundation of that city by the Grecian Dionysus, or Bacchus, and the mountain Meron, where ivy grew. In his visit to them he was attended by a considerable escort of horse and foot; and the soldiers, in ascending the mountain, delighted with the ivy, which they had not for a long time seen (for in India, says Arrian, even where vines flourish ivy is not found) eagerly gathering it, made themselves crowns; singing hymns to Dionysus, and calling on him by his various names. Farther then to establish the credit of the traditions, which possibly may have been reported to the army in the Greek language (somewhat more accommodated to former Grecian belief or fancy than they were delivered, if at all delivered, in the Indian) Alexander sacrificed there to Dionysus, and entertained the principal persons about him with a banquet.

Thus far Arrian appears to have credited the accounts in his time extant. If some writers, he adds, should be believed, some of the eminent personages, entertained on that occasion by the conqueror of Asia, emulated the extravagancies of the bacchanals at the festivals of Dionysus in Greece; running about with wild gestures, as if under inspiration from the god, and uttering the exclamations and invocations commonly used at those festivals<sup>11</sup>. ‘I leave this,’ says the historian, ‘to everyone’s opinion; but I cannot intirely agree with Eratosthenes of Cyrene, who asserts ‘that the disposition of the Macedonians, to gratify Alexander’s vanity, ‘produced or spread and confirmed the stories of conquests attributed to ‘the gods. Finding a cavern, if we should believe him, among the ‘mountains of Paropamisus, and, either hearing some story current ‘in the country, or themselves combining fancies and rumors, they

Arrian, l. 5.  
c. 3.

<sup>10</sup> ὑπάρχον. This title, not occurring in Arrian’s account of the Persian empire, we find commonly used by him to designate chiefs of provinces in India.

<sup>11</sup> For these may be seen Potter’s antiquities of Greece, ch. 20, of the Religion of Greece.

‘amused themselves with asserting that the mountain there in India was  
 ‘Caucasus, extending thus far from the Euxine sea, and that the cavern  
 ‘was that in which, according to mythology, Prometheus was chained,  
 ‘on whose bowels an eagle fed, till Hercules, in the course of his  
 ‘eastern conquests, passing that way, killed the eagle and set the sufferer  
 ‘at liberty. So also seeing, in the same part of India, neat cattle, with  
 ‘a mark burnt on their skin resembling a club, they took this for proof  
 ‘that Hercules had been there. Similar matters concerning the expedition  
 ‘of Dionysus are treated by Eratosthenes as fables. For myself, all that  
 ‘relates to both those deities I leave to the discussion of others.’

#### SECTION IV.

*Circumstances of the Northern part of India beyond the Indus: Alliances  
 formed by Alexander beyond the Indus, and War carried beyond the  
 Hydaspes: The Dominion of Porus conquered: Grecian Colonies  
 established on the Hydaspes.*

CURIOSITY appears to have been a passion of Alexander, hardly less than ambition. But with both, as we have before observed, were connected extensive views for benefit to mankind, yet not limited by a much stricter regard for the rights of any foreign people than were usually acknowledged among the republican Greeks. With such views he was especially desirous of seeing the Indian ocean, and exploring its shores; and he had accordingly directed Hephæstion to construct a bridge over the Indus for the passage of his army, that he might command both banks, and to build a number of vessels for the transport of necessaries down the stream, and for means of supporting the army on either side from the other. His inducement to postpone this favorite object for the purpose of still extending conquest eastward, not directly stated by Arrian, may yet, in his common deficiency of political information, be in some degree gathered from his military narrative; which often affords assistance for estimating the political information furnished by writers less judicious, or less careful of authority.

The



The people beyond the Indus appear to have been less divided into small states, hostile to each other, than those on the Persian side. There was however among them, at this time, extensive apprehension of the ambition of Porus, the sovereign of a large dominion beyond the next great boundary river of the country, the Hydaspes. To them therefore the arrival of a conqueror like Alexander, famed for generosity as for invincibility, was an auspicious event. The principal city in these northern parts, between the Indus and the Hydaspes, is called, by Arrian, Taxila, and its chief Taxiles. But it appears from Diodorus and Curtius that Taxiles was a title; and the name, in our editions of the former, Mophis, of the latter, Omphis. According to the probable account of Diodorus, when Alexander was in Sogdiana, an embassy from Taxiles had attended him, soliciting his imperial protection; and Curtius adds the information that, to ingage his favor, provisions were furnished, and all friendly offices done, to Hephæstion, while employed in preparing for the passage of the Indus. But, according to all the writers, it seems probable that Alexander's resolution was not decided till he had crossed that great river. Taxiles then came himself to wait upon him, and the result was, that Alexander undertook to give him security in his dominion, by invading the territory of Porus, whose ambition he dreaded.

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 8.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 86.  
Curt. l. 8.  
c. 12.

On the left bank of the Indus the army halted some time, and a solemn sacrifice was performed there, according to the Grecian ritual. A sacrifice for the army being a feast for the army, the purpose of Alexander's piety, obviously, was to infuse cheerfulness under the view of new difficulties and dangers to be encountered, when all might have been supposed already ended, with wealth and glory, beyond common measure, already acquired. The march was then resumed for Taxila. There the disposition of the people seconding that of their chief, all was made satisfactory for the army and its commander. Pleased with their conduct, Alexander granted a desired addition to their territory; at the expense of what other prince or people the historian has not said. The fame however of his liberality, combined with that of his victories, produced advantageous consequences. At Taxila where, according to the chronology of Diodorus (for Arrian is often deficient in marking seasons) he took his winter quarters,

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 7.

quarters, the brother of Ambisares, who held a principality in the Indian highlands, arrived, at the head of an embassy, soliciting friendship and bringing presents; the custom still of the Indians to those whom, fearing, they would honor; and a similar deputation arrived from Doxares, designated by Arrian as chief of the law<sup>12</sup>; perhaps a chief of the bramins.

Leisure then, on account of the season, occurring, Alexander gratified the army with another sacrifice, and added the entertainment of gymnastic games, and equestrian military exercises; whether simply horseraces, or perhaps rather contests in arms, like the tilts and tournaments of our forefathers. The disposition of prince and people to admit his sovereignty, for the sake of his powerful protection against the pretensions of one to whom they were averse, appears to have in some degree invited him to leave here, as a colony, those of his army, become by wounds or fatigue, since his last measure of the kind, less fit for service to insue. To superintend the establishment a Macedonian, Philip son of Machatas, was appointed to the dignity and authority of satrap, with a military force under his command.

The great king, Porus, whose ambition the Indians between the Indus and the Hydaspes dreaded, seems to have been checked in his purpose of invasion by information that they had gained, from a country before unheard of, so extraordinary a conqueror for their protector. Instead of crossing the Hydaspes, for which he had prepared, he sat down with his army behind that boundary river. Alexander resolved upon, what is often the most effectual mode of defence for a country, attacking the enemy; and, in the actual circumstances, it seemed the only way to give security to subjects who had voluntarily adopted his empire. With this view he ordered a sufficient number of the boats, which had been prepared for the navigation of the Indus, to be brought by land to the Hydaspes. We have seen, in the authentic narratives of Thucydides and Xenophon, intire vessels of war, of the antient construction, with the scanty means of the Grecian republics, conveyed some miles over land. For easier carriage the far greater distance for Alexander's purpose, the

<sup>12</sup> Νομάρχου.

vessels were cut in two, and some in three, to be put together again on their arrival<sup>13</sup>.

Spring was advanced<sup>14</sup>; the rainy season in that part of India, when also the melting of the snow on the range of mountains, which Arrian still calls Caucasus, assisted to fill the rivers. In summer and autumn the Hydaspes is in parts fordable. Alexander gave out that he meant to wait for that favorable season, and collected stores in his station accordingly. Nevertheless he made movements for the purpose of alarming, as if he would attempt the passage with his boats. About fifteen miles above the enemy's station circumstances afforded opportunities of which he thought he might avail himself. The shores on both sides were woody, and in the stream was a wooded island of some extent. Boats then were so conveyed by land, and so deposited, as not to be seen by the enemy, tho watchful, on the opposite shore. Skins also, the soldiers bedding, were prepared in the way usual for rafts.

Preparation being completed, the command of the camp, with the main body of the infantry, was committed to Craterus, while Alexander himself, as in ordinary course, undertook the business of most critical difficulty and danger, the passage by the island. Midway, between the camp and the island, a strong body was stationed under Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias.

Arrian, l. 5,  
c. 12.

Arrian seems to have reckoned the Indian king's force toward forty thousand foot, about six thousand horse, four hundred and twenty chariots, and more than two hundred elephants; and he says it was in good condition and well disciplined<sup>15</sup>. Alexander's numbers are mentioned by none, but it is evident that his means were great; and Arrian sufficiently shows that his force on the bank of the Hydaspes was powerful. In addition to his Grecian numbers, and those from the southern part of his new empire, he had cavalry, probably the best of Asia, from Arachosia, Paropamisus, Bactria, Sogdia, Scythia, and Daä. Probably his Asiatic infantry, in

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 14; 15.

<sup>13</sup> Cutting vessels in two, to lengthen them, is a wellknown practice of modern times.

<sup>14</sup> Ἦν γὰρ ὥρα ἔτους, ἥ μετὰ τροπᾶς μάλιτα ἐν θέρῃ τρέπεται ὁ ἥλιος. Arr. l. 5. c. 9.

<sup>15</sup> Diodorus, in our copies of his work, reports Porus's army above fifty thousand

foot, three thousand horse, more than one thousand chariots, and a hundred and thirty elephants; our copies of Curtius give him only thirty thousand foot, three hundred chariots, without notice of other cavalry, and eighty-five elephants.



consideration of the extent of country he had in view to traverse, and his desire of quick progress, was not proportionally numerous.

Depending then much on his cavalry, his fear was of the enemy's elephants, which horses, unused to them, will not approach. To provide facility therefore for landing, where he proposed, under his own lead, he directed Craterus to make all demonstration of the purpose of crossing near the enemy's station, with the view to retain his elephants there; but not actually to cross till it might be ascertained that the elephants were moving toward where the crossing had been effected. A thunderstorm, on that night, with heavy rain, assisted the purpose of concealment, and, ceasing toward daybreak, did not interrupt the passage of the river. Alexander, taking with him Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Seleucus and Perdiccas (the three former afterward known as sovereigns of powerful kingdoms) led the way in a triacontar. As they passed the island in the river, they came unavoidably in view of an outpost of the enemy; not of force to resist, but whence intelligence was hastened to Porus. Reaching land, Alexander was the first to leap ashore, and all the cavalry debarked safely; but, instead of the main land, it was found to be an island of considerable extent, with a channel intervening, not broad, but, with the rain of the night, become so deep that it was apprehended the boats would be wanted for reaching the desired shore. Thus opportunity would be given for Porus to bring up his elephants, which must make it impossible to land the horses. With diligent trial however a ford was found, which even the infantry could pass, tho with the water breast high. Thus the whole force, about five thousand horse and six thousand foot, without opposition reached the enemy's side of the river.

As soon then as arrangement for the business in view was completed, Alexander hastened forward with his cavalry; satisfied that, if Porus came against him with overbearing numbers, he could avoid contest till he might be supported; if with a smaller force he might defeat it. The bowmen, under the command of Tauron, were ordered to follow with the utmost speed, and the heavy-armed, as heavy-armed best might; all having to encounter the difficulties of marshy ground which, to a great extent, bordered the river.

He had not proceeded far when, over the flat, a hostile force was, at a distance

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 13.

distance, seen approaching. Uncertain whether this might be a part or the whole of the enemy's army, he sent forward his horse-bowmen to check them. Assured then, by his scouts, of the hostile numbers, and of their kind, about two thousand horse with a hundred and twenty chariots, he hastened at the head of his regular cavalry against them. They hardly stood a charge, to which indeed they were unequal; the chariots, from the swampiness of the ground being little capable of acting, and the cavalry too inferior in number<sup>15</sup>. In pursuit about four hundred were slain, and, among them, their young commander, the son of Porus. All the chariots were taken, with their horses.

Porus was quickly informed of this disaster. To move from his actual situation was hazardous, because of the threatening aspect of the force under Craterus. Yet, after short consideration, only leaving a small body of foot with a few elephants to disturb the landing, if that general should cross the river, he hastened, with his principal force, about thirty thousand foot, four thousand horse, three hundred chariots, and two hundred elephants, immediately against his imperial opponent. Knowing the country, or well informed of it, in a tract extensively marshy he halted on a sandy plain, sufficiently firm for the action of both cavalry and chariots, and there formed in order of battle. His elephants he placed in front, at intervals of about a hundred feet; his chariots on the same line, in the wings; his infantry behind the elephants, and his cavalry behind the chariots.

Alexander approaching, and viewing the ground and the enemy's order, presently observed their defects. In front, assault would be obviously rash. Horse would not approach the elephants, and his infantry was not sufficiently numerous for the attempt. But the wings were very infirmly supported by the ground on either side. He had acquired extensive experience of the marshes on the banks of the Hydaspes, and he judged that, swampy now with heavy rain recently fallen, they would impede the action of the enemy's chariots, yet would not deny action for his own horse. Presently therefore he determined, without

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 16.

<sup>15</sup> This, Arrian tells us, was Ptolemy's account, which he preferred; Ptolemy, having been present, and about Alexander's person. Aristobulus, he says, reported somewhat differently, and others, he adds, related circumstances which seem to have been known to neither.

waiting for his main body of infantry under Craterus, immediately to use his superior force of cavalry. With this view, taking himself the lead of the greater part of it, he committed the infantry to Seleucus, Antigonus, and Tauron, with orders to avoid engaging till they should see the arrangement of the enemy's infantry disturbed through his movement. A smaller body of horse he put under the command of Cœnus, directing him to turn the enemy's right, and, if possible, proceeding rapidly behind his whole line, to attack the rear of the cavalry of his left, which he proposed himself to attack in flank.

The action was begun in front by Alexander's horse-bowmen, in number about a thousand, against the chariots of the enemy's left. Their weapons, distressing the charioteers, and reaching the cavalry beyond them, engaged the attention of both, while Alexander, with his choicest body of horse, c. 17. gained their flank. Observing this, they were changing their front to receive him, when Cœnus, having ably executed his orders, appeared in their rear. A double front thus became necessary for them, and before they could complete the arrangement, Alexander, who had watched the opportunity, made his charge. Presently thrown into confusion, they retreated toward their elephants, as to a friendly fortification.

Thus arose opportunity, for which Alexander had prepared his generals of infantry to make advantage. The phalanx, it appears, was furnished for the occasion with darts, as the Roman legionaries with the pilum; for the long spear, ordinarily its only weapon, highly formidable against men and horses, would be of no efficacy against elephants. Their darts, the historian says, disabled many of the riders, and annoyed the beasts themselves. But wherever an elephant went forward against the phalanx, in however close order with protruded spears, he broke the order and made his way. The Indian cavalry, meanwhile, habituated to elephants, went familiarly among them, and, thus gaining protection and encouragement, formed again in a body, and again met Alexander. But Cœnus had now joined him: numbers and discipline together gave preponderance, and the Indian cavalry fled again toward the elephants for protection.

Then, in the Indian army, all became confusion. Infantry, horse, and elephants were mixed. Some of those formidable beasts, raging with

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wounds,



wounds, became ungovernable. Some had lost those riders who should have governed them, and then were no less formidable to friends than foes. Some wounded, all tired, at length, as if by consent, refusing farther efforts in the direction against the enemy, bellowing in concert, they withdrew. Alexander, observing this, directed the phalanx to take its proper formation, with closed shields and protruded spears, and press upon the no longer formidable enemy; and, the cavalry at the same time charging, the victory was quickly complete.

Meanwhile Craterus had crossed the river, and, with fresh troops, c. 18. intercepted the already fatigued retiring troops. Three thousand of the Indian cavalry are said to have been killed; mostly on the field of battle; and near twenty thousand foot: all the elephants, and all the chariots, not destroyed, were taken. A second son of Porus was among the slain, and most of his principal officers. Porus, himself, while any remained to fight about him, was, on his elephant, in the thickest of the contest. He wore a coat of mail of uncommon excellence; but that, according to the universal practice of generals among the antients, he might be an example in action for his soldiers, his right arm must be free for the use of weapons, and his right shoulder was therefore less protected. Eminent among his troops he was especially an object for the enemy's aim, and, in his right shoulder he received a wound. Disabled thus for the office of a soldier, and through the slaughter of many and flight of most of the rest of his troops, the business of a general no longer remaining for him, he at length allowed his attendants to turn his elephant, and, among the last, he withdrew. Alexander, informed that he was in danger from the indiscriminate fury of pursuers, and generously desirous to obviate it, sent Taxiles after him; who, on a swift horse overtaking him, said he brought a message from the Macedonian king. But the indignant Indian prince, seeing an antient enemy, continued his way, and, disabled as he was, threatened him with his weapon. Taxiles upon this withdrew, and hastened back to report the occurrence. Alexander, not thus driven from his purpose, sent several others, and among them Meroës, an Indian, long known to Porus, and always upon friendly terms with him. Porus, at length overtaken, was suffering severely from fatigue, and especially from thirst. Persuaded then, or, rather,

through inability to proceed, necessitated to stop for refreshment, he at length consented to return and surrender himself.

Alexander, informed of his approach, advanced toward him on horseback, attended by his band of companions. Admiring his form and size (he is said to have been a very handsome man above common height)<sup>16</sup> and still more the unbroken majesty of his demeanor, he desired him to speak his wishes. Porus answered, 'to be treated as a king.' 'That' replied Alexander, 'shall be on my own account; but I desire 'you to speak your wishes on your own.' Porus answered, 'all I desire 'is what I have already said.' Treaty was thus concluded. Alexander restored Porus to his throne; even enlarged his dominion, and ever after found in him a faithful friend. Such is Arrian's account; and, for his general scrupulousness he may perhaps be trusted here, even for words spoken; Ptolemy, his principal guide, if he did not hear them, having been in a situation to have all information from those in the way of hearing.

After the battle, among the victor's earliest cares was the burial of the slain. Perhaps official accounts, Arrian's authorities, would exaggerate the loss on the Indian side, and extenuate that on the Grecian. If our copies of Arrian should be trusted, of six thousand infantry engaged, only eighty fell; but it may seem not unlikely that he wrote eight hundred<sup>17</sup>. Of the cavalry it is acknowledged that two hundred and twenty were killed, of whom twenty were of the body intitled royal companions<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> More than five cubits. (Arr. l. 5. c. 19.) Plutarch says most writers allowed him more than four cubits and a palm. v. Alex. p. 639. B. Plutarch mentions letters of Alexander, (p. 638.) giving account of this victory over Porus. How it has been that numerous letters of Alexander reporting his progress in conquest, mentioned by Plutarch, have remained wholly without notice from Arrian, is a question that apparently should have engaged the attention of critics, but of which I have never met with discussion.

<sup>17</sup> From ΟΓΔΟΗΚΟΣΙΟΙ to ΟΓΔΟΗΚΟΝΤΑ, the change, as those who have observed the various forms of Grecian letters, in writing and engraving, will be aware, might

be less violent than the differences often found in different manuscripts of the same work.

<sup>18</sup> I am induced to hope and believe I have given fairly the sense of Arrian's succinct account of this celebrated battle; tho some of his phrases have been so disturbed by careless or ignorant transcribers, (a misfortune to which the antient military writers have been, more perhaps than all others, subject) that I would not undertake to give an exact translation of them, even with allowance to admit the learned Gronovius's proposed corrections; which however are valuable.

Without distinction they seem to have been esteemed intitled to extraordinary honors, or Alexander's policy led him to bestow such. The funeral, in addition to the ordinary rites, was celebrated with gymnastic exercises and horseraces, in the manner of the funerals of eminent men in the heroic ages, described by Homer.

Of little real importance, yet, for the extensive celebrity of the animal, and for the honor testified by Arrian to have been paid to his memory, it must not be omitted to mention that Alexander's favorite horse died here. On this occasion only he is found mentioned by that writer, whose words on the subject, as nearly as they may be rendered, will, among all that has been transmitted on it from antiquity, be perhaps most worthy of the reader's attention, if not even alone for serious history. 'On the field of Arr. l. 5. c. 19.  
' the battle, fought with Porus,' says Arrian, 'Alexander built a town, which  
' he named Nicæa, Victory-town; and, where he crossed the Hydaspes,  
' another, which he called Bucephala, in honor of his favorite horse, Bu-  
' cephalas, which, in his thirtieth year, died there. That horse was tall, and  
' of generous temper, and would admit none but Alexander to mount him.  
' From a mark of a bull's head imprinted on him, he had his name Buce-  
' phalas, bullhead; tho some say that a natural white mark on his forehead,  
' resembling a bull's head, his general color being black, gave occasion for  
' the name. This horse being, in the Uxian country, missing, Alexander  
' caused proclamation to be promulgated, that, if the horse was not brought  
' to him, he would put the whole nation to the sword; and presently the  
' horse was brought. Such was Alexander's estimation of the animal, and  
' such the fear of that prince among the Barbarians.'

## SECTION V.

*Constitutions of Indian States: Subordinate Sovereinties: Free Cities:  
Trade on the Indus: War prosecuted by Alexander in India.*

THE conquered Indian prince's magnanimity, and Alexander's generosity, have been, from their age to this, themes for declamatory writers. Alexander's policy for his Indian conquests; how he accommodated his  
political



political arrangements to his generosity, so that his acquisitions remained, not to him only, but long to his successors, has not been with equal diligence transmitted. Nevertheless Arrian's narrative, checked, as apparently it was, by his situation under a despotic government, affords indications deserving attention; and, events within our own times having brought circumstances of that great and variously interesting country more within the sphere of European information, the diligence and learning and talents of recent inquirers, some visiting the countries, others comparing all accounts, have warranted the exactness of antient reports, especially Arrian's, of Alexander's transactions there.

Arr. l. 5,  
c. 20.

Whether Porus was a completely independent prince, or, like many powerful Indian chiefs of modern times, owed a degree of fealty to some paramount sovereign, seems uncertain: but the latter appears probable. Thus he would be the more prepared to be satisfied, in his restored dominion, to acknowledge Alexander as a superior, holding, as he appears to have done, perfect friendship with him. Arrangement with that prince then being settled, Alexander committed to Craterus the business of superintending the building of the newly founded towns, and giving order to the population established there, while he proceeded himself to farther conquest.

Bordering on the kingdom of Porus was the country of the Glausecs, or Glaucaneeks; of no great extent, but highly fruitful, and, through diligent use of great opportunities for commerce, more than ordinarily populous and wealthy. Of thirty-seven towns within it, the least is said to have had five thousand inhabitants; some above ten thousand; and of numerous villages, some were hardly inferior in population to the towns. Popular government is mentioned, by Arrian, as not uncommon among the Indian nations, and such seems to have been that of the Glausecs. With the too ordinary carelessness of the antients about just cause against those they called barbarians, the historian has omitted mention of any for war with this people; unless it may be understood from him that they had been enemies to Porus, who, with all his great qualities, evidently an ambitious prince, may have put forward pretensions adverse to their claim of independency. Alexander however determining that they should be his subjects, led a select body into their country. Probably the terms he offered

offered were liberal, in the spirit of the Macedonian free constitution; and probably they felt need of a protector, and were more disposed to trust Alexander than any neighbouring potentate. However, without battle or siege, they came to a composition with him. Of the terms we are uninformed; for, from antient writers, whether themselves living under monarchies or republics, we have, on such subjects, rarely more than sparks of intelligence. The historian's expression here however implies some compact for their benefit, under which the country of the Glaucees was put under the superintendency of Porus.

The fame of the victory, and of Alexander's generosity toward the magnanimous defeated prince, operated extensively. Abissares, who, before the battle, had proposed to join Porus, now sent his brother to Alexander, with a present of money and forty elephants. Alexander, not satisfied so, commanded that he should come himself. Meanwhile it was an object, for the future peace of this portion of his now vast empire, to reconcile Porus with Taxiles. This was effected, and then the latter was dismissed, to resume, in peace, the government of his also increased dominion.

In this rich, and populous, and warlike country, tho there was not at all the ready disposition to submission which had favored Alexander in the western and southern provinces of the Persian empire, yet the divisions of the people among themselves evidently much facilitated his conquests, and also suggested the policy which should make the acquisition lasting. The highlanders everywhere, in the habit of looking upon their mountains as sure refuge, were readiest to rebel. The people of Assakene, a portion of the highlands whence flow the various streams which meet in the Indus, assassinated the commander of the forces which had been left to secure their obedience, and rose in revolt. But an Indian who had been appointed satrap of that country, Sisicottus, remained faithful, and hastened intelligence of the circumstances. About the same time Alexander was gratified with assurance of the fidelity of a Persian, Phradaphernes, to whom he had intrusted a highly important office, that of satrap of the two great border provinces of Bactria and Hyrcania. With a body of Thracians, which had been put under his command, he came, according to orders, to attend the king.

Against

Arr. l. 5.  
c. 21.

Against the revolted Assakenes then, to support his Indian satrap, Sisicottus, he joined a Persian, Tyriaspes, in command with a Macedonian, Philip. For himself the political circumstances of his new Indian friend, Porus, furnished pretence for continuing that activity in war, to which he had now, from the age of twenty, been so habituated, that it seems to have become as necessary to his injoyment as to a keen sportsman the pleasures of the chace. There was another Indian prince called Porus, whether it were name or title, hostile to the great man, his namesake, now Alexander's friend. This prince, had been forward as we have seen Taxiles, to declare his submission to Alexander; not indeed personally, like Taxiles, but by a deputation. Yet when, having done nothing farther to earn friendship, he learnt that his enemy of his own name not only was restored to dominion, but to enlarged dominion, and had gained high esteem with the conqueror, he took alarm.

c. 20.

c. 22.

His principality was separated from that of the other Porus by the great river Akesines, and from nations farther eastward by another great river, the Hydraotes. Throughout India, or at least the western part of that great country, if there was anywhere an extensive empire, it was like that of the Mogul lately, unable to maintain its claimed superiority over subject potentates. As we proceed we still find the country divided into governments under numerous chiefs, like the rajahs and soobadars of modern India. Among the various people beyond the Hydraotes, the Cathayans had obtained reputation for superior courage and military dexterity. In alliance with them were the Oxydracs and Mallians; whose country the great Porus, before his war with Alexander, had invaded, and, tho assisted by powerful allies, yet with no success. Hence their friendship was likely to be open to any who would be his enemy. The other Porus therefore, whether more decided by policy, or, as Arrian says, by passion, being vehemently hostile to his namesake, resolved to embrace the ready alliance of those people, rather than maintain his ingagement with Alexander. Despairing nevertheless of power to defend his own dominions, against which invasion was ready, he withdrew into their country, with all the military force he could ingage.

In



In this decision he seems to have failed either of courage or judgement; for the river Akesines, the boundary of his territory on the threatened side, afforded uncommon advantage for defence. It was the only Indian river, of which, Arrian says, Ptolemy had stated the width and depth. According to that eminent eyewitness, if remaining manuscripts may be trusted, the width was fifteen stades; which, according to the lowest computation of the Grecian stade, would be seven furlongs; perhaps, however, spreading so in the rainy season only, or with the melted snow from the mountains<sup>19</sup>. With this it was of great rapidity, and abounding with interruptions of rock, producing whirlpools. To cross this formidable stream, a large body of Alexander's army was embarked, some in boats, the rest on stuffed skins, or on rafts borne on such. Of the boats, many, splitting on the rocks, were lost, and skill in swimming availing little among the whirlpools, many men were drowned. The buoyant skins, less injured by collision, carried their freight more safely. This struggle with nature however was so far successful as to give footing on the enemy's land, and then Porus, in whose cause the expedition had been professedly undertaken, was sent back to raise forces, of the best kind that India could furnish, and to bring as many elephants as could be obtained: Coenus was directed to superintend the passage of the main body of the army, and to collect necessaries from the subdued and friendly territories. Alexander himself, conformably to his usual choice, took the laborious and hazardous business of pursuing (according to Arrian's description it might be called hunting) the fugitive prince, whom the historian distinguishes here by an epithet, the bad Porus<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> Credit to the MSS. for such a width of the river, in the report of such an author as Ptolemy, Dr. Vincent has been disposed to deny; perhaps having never had opportunity to see how streams, by whose channels the melting snows of extensive mountains have their vent, occasionally spread wherever the confinement of lofty banks of rock ceases, and permanently mark the extraordinary space over which their waters occasionally roll. Possibly Ptolemy may have meant to describe the width of the channel

so indicated, and not of the water which Alexander actually crossed. Nevertheless the frequent doubtfulness of numbers stated in antient MSS. must, as the learned and able commentator observes, be acknowledged.

<sup>20</sup> Porus, according to Vincent (on Nearch. p. 19.) was not a name, but a title, having only the Greek termination added to the Indian word Poor, meaning a prince or sovereign.

Vincent on  
Nearchus.

The river Hydraotes, equally broad with the Akesines, but less rapid, crossed his way<sup>21</sup>. Eager to pursue his purpose, yet provident of all circumstances, he appointed Craterus to coöperate with Cœnus in the collection of supplies to the greatest extent that might be; and, desiring to leave nothing hostile behind him, he committed two phalanges<sup>22</sup>, and two brigades of cavalry<sup>23</sup>, to Hephæstion, to bring to obedience that part of the country between the rivers, which had been under the dominion of the fugitive, called the bad Porus; with direction that all should be placed under the authority of the friendly prince of the same name. On the Hydraotes, according to Arrian, were some independent cities. Through means opened in our days it has been ascertained that a great trade has been carried on for many centuries (in the opinion of the able commentator on Nearchus, greater in antient than in modern ages) upon the Indus, and the rivers communicating with it. Alexander would be supreme wherever he could carry his arms; but he required those cities to acknowledge, under him, the dominion of Porus. Nevertheless, if the sovereignty of Porus over those Indian small republics was only as liberal as that of the Persian kings over the Greeks within their empire, they would probably not be sufferers, but rather gainers by the establishment of such superintending authority; and, allowing the credit which seems due to the arguments and opinions of the very able and careful inquirer just noticed, it could not be with the purpose of abridging their just freedom, and so checking their commerce, but, on the contrary, of assuring protection equally to both, that Alexander directed all his regulations.

His arrangements for the conquered countries being made, he proceeded on his proposed expedition, with a small army, but carefully chosen. Information reached him that the Cathayans and their allies were

<sup>21</sup> Vincent, in his variety of diligent investigation, has bestowed much care on that of the names of the principal Indian rivers; which are found, in the old language of the country, generally to have had analogy with those given by the Greek writers; but, in many instances have been totally changed by some later conquerors of the country. The modern name of the

Akesines he gives, as in our orthography, Chenab, of the Hydraotes, Ravee.

<sup>22</sup> I do not recollect any former mention by Arrian, any more than by any older writer, of the phalanx as a determinate division of the heavy-armed infantry of an army.

<sup>23</sup> ἱπποεχίαι.

assembled at Sangala, a principal city, where they proposed to wait for him. Arr. l. 5.  
 In the second day's march from the river he came to a fortified town of the C. 22, 23.  
 Adraïst Indians, who submitted under a capitulation. A day's rest was here given to the army. Proceeding on the morrow, he came in view of Sangala. There he found the Indians incamped without the town, on a hill surrounded with a triple rampart of waggons <sup>24</sup>. Alexander, after carefully observing everything, and forming his estimate of the enemy's force, resolved upon immediate attack. He sent forward first his horse-bowmen, to annoy from a distance. This not provoking the enemy to advance, and the other cavalry, with which he usually charged, being, in the circumstances, useless, he dismounted, and took the lead of his infantry. Quickly he became master of the first line of carriages. At the second the Indians made a stouter resistance; but the soldiers of the phalanx, better armed than the Indians, for defence as well as for close action, and able, with their large shields, to defend one another, removed some of the carriages, and pressing through the intervals, drove the enemy to their third line. There no stand was made; but the check it gave to pursuit was successfully used for reaching present safety within the town walls. Alexander, judging from experience of Indian practices, expected that the town would be deserted by night; and he judged the attempt would be made where a lake near the wall, tho fordable, interrupted the investment, which he had begun. His suspicion, according to the historian's account, seems to have been corroborated by information from deserters. To obviate such a purpose he placed a body consisting of three thousand hypaspists, all the Agrians, and one taxis of bowmen, under the orders of Ptolemy the historian. That general, in prosecution of the duty thus committed to him, collected the carriages deserted in the c. 24.  
 action before the town; and, in early night, placed them in the way which it was expected the Indians would take. As was expected, the Indians issued about the fourth watch; but quickly falling in with the impediments prepared, and hearing the hostile trumpets sound, they hastened back, not without considerable loss.

Presently after Porus arrived with a reinforcement of five thousand men and some elephants, and by this time engines for battering the walls were

<sup>24</sup> Ἀμάξιας. Arr. l. v. c. 22. Ἀμάξων, c. 23.



completed. But before they could be put in action, a part of the wall was ruined by mining, and the town was taken by storm. Seventeen thousand Indians, if our copies of Arrian may be trusted, were slain on the occasion; notwithstanding which, the surviving captives were more than seventy thousand. Five hundred only of these being stated to have been cavalry, and yet three hundred chariots of war being said to have been found<sup>25</sup>, it may seem probable that a large proportion of mounted men had found means to escape by flight<sup>26</sup>. Whether rather error of transcribers, or exaggeration in report from authority, which the historian, always scrupulous of authority, followed, may be most suspected in the account of the slain and prisoners, not less there appears ground for supposing a politic concealment of lives lost on the victorious side; for only about a hundred being said to have been killed, the wounded, living objects of public observation, are acknowledged to have been twelve hundred; several of them officers of high rank<sup>27</sup>, and one of the highest, Lysimachus, who afterward attained regal dignity.

Immediately after the sack of Sangala, Alexander dispatched Eumenes with three hundred horse, to two free cities in alliance with its people, with assurance that, if they submitted and received him as a friend, no ill should befall them, but they should be liberally treated, as all free Indian states, so conducting themselves, had been. Information however of the catastrophë of Sangala having reached them before Eumenes could arrive, they had deserted their town. Alexander pursued them. In the historian's account reasonable cause does not appear; but the result of his anger (it may be hoped not of his direct command) was, that tho the greater part were too far advanced to be readily overtaken, about five hundred of those who had less ability for rapid flight were killed by his pursuing troops. All the con-

<sup>25</sup> Ἀρματα. The carriages of which the Indians formed their triple rampart, are four times mentioned by the name of Ἀμάξαι, waggons or carts. The Latin translator has confounded these with the ἄρματα, by rendering both equally *Currus*; and the learned critic and editor Gronovius, insultingly severe upon him on many occasions, not more important, has left this confusion unnoticed.

<sup>26</sup> The learned commentator on the voyage

of Nearchus has supposed Arrian to have stated not only the 17,000 slain, but the more than 70,000 prisoners, together 87,000, as the number of troops in Sangala. Arrian's expression is τῶν Ἰνδῶν, Indian people, leaving it uncertain how many were soldiers. That historian's account, however, as Dr. Vincent has remarked, clearly indicates a great and wealthy population.

<sup>27</sup> Ἡγεμόνες.

quered territory he gave to those free cities which had readily accepted his offered terms. Porus was detached with his own Indian army to place garrisons where it might be judged expedient; the expediency being, apparently, to be measured by the need which the people of the friendly towns might have for protection against hostile neighbours, when the imperial army should be withdrawn<sup>28</sup>.

## SECTION VI.

*Growing Extravagance of Alexander's Purposes. Discontent of the Army. Forced Concession to its Wishes. Arrangement for the conquered Indian Provinces.*

IN proceeding southward and eastward from the vast body of high-lands, whence the many great rivers of India flow, the country still improved in richness and population. The Hyphasis was the next stream in the way<sup>29</sup>. Beyond it, according to all report, the land was highly cultivated. The nearer provinces were, according to Arrian, under a well administered aristocratical government; the people orderly; good husbandmen and good soldiers. A great sovereign was said to reside far eastward; but whether the nearer countries were within his claim of empire seems uncertain. Thus far Alexander may have pursued conquest on principles more justifiable than the republican Greek maxim, that it was lawful for Greeks to subdue, enslave, or even extirpate, any people, not of Grecian blood and language. But here the better principle, if ever regarded, seems to have been thrown by. Curiosity and thirst of conquest were so become settled passions, and a view to rest so intolerable, that, without any other motive indicated by antient writers, he would now prosecute conquest into that populous, rich, and quiet country; and accordingly he marched to the Hyphasis. ARR. 1. 5. c. 25.

Apparently he thought the fame of that country for wealth would suffice

<sup>28</sup> We have seen such a measure often necessary for the security of towns of republican Greece. But Arrian's conciseness here, as sometimes elsewhere, leaves the modern reader in some doubt of his meaning. <sup>29</sup> Now, in Vincent's English orthography of the oriental name, the Biah.

to reconcile his army to his views. War in Lesser Asia having been always inviting for the Greeks, war in a country richer than Lesser Asia, he might suppose, would now be inviting; and, as he himself delighted in laborious and hazardous adventures, others would have the same propensity. Perhaps, for his new recruits, and the younger men of the army in general, he may thus have reasoned well: to return home and have fortune still to seek would be little alluring for them. But it was not so among the older men, and especially those of the higher ranks, already possessed of great riches. Issuing from Macedonia with uncertain hopes, rising rapidly to great wealth and splendid circumstances, when only Lesser Asia, Syria, and Egypt were reduced, already many would be looking earnestly toward the enjoyment of their advancement, in other kind of leisure and other kind of independency than military service could admit. Babylon, Susa and Persepolis, with their treasuries, being now added, and the rich kingdom of Media having fallen without a blow, an end to the protracted war in the rough climate and among the fierce nations of the north, could not fail to have been anxiously looked for among all ranks. There however, tho the soldiers could neither clearly see, nor would greatly care for a reasonable object, whence, in parts of the army, vehement discontent appears to have arisen, which the military historians, to whose authority Arrian generally limited his narrative, would avoid to report, yet to the officers generally, and especially the superior officers, the expediency, or even necessity of that war, for securing the advantages beyond calculation already gained, would be obvious. But a new scene was now opened. A populous and wealthy continent was found to be yet before them, of extent utterly unknown; upon the conquest of which their prince was bent, among labors and dangers utterly incalculable, with the final object utterly undefined. Dissatisfaction grew among men of all ranks, even Alexander's greatest favorites and most confidential friends. The Macedonian constitution, as we have seen, warranted to a Macedonian army a great degree of the authority of a popular assembly. The civic troops of the Greek republics not less claimed the same privilege; but Arrian mentions the Macedonians particularly as now meeting to debate on the king's purposes. In dissatisfaction with these, he says, all seemed agreed; and some,



he adds, went so far as to declare that, if the king required them to go into new wars, his command should no longer be obeyed.

Alexander, informed of the dangerous discontent, appears to have taken, with great good temper, the course becoming the sovereign of a people claiming the rights of the Macedonian kingdom and the Grecian republics. Without distinction between them, he assembled the generals and taxiarchs of both, exclusively of the officers of the mercenaries, who served on quite other terms. Reports of words spoken in private, or in miscellaneous conversation, or in the heat of military action, must always be subject to much doubt; but as it appears to have been hardly less customary, among the Greeks of Alexander's age, than with us at present, to note and publish the speeches of eminent men in deliberative assemblies, what Arrian has given as delivered on this occasion, tho he has not precisely named his author, yet scrupulous of authority as he always shows himself, will well deserve notice<sup>30</sup>.

Alexander, he says, began the deliberation by addressing the assembly thus: ‘Macedonians and allies! Observing that you are no longer disposed, as formerly, to accompany me in hazardous enterprize, I have assembled you with the purpose that, either persuading, I may ingage you to proceed with me, or, being persuaded by you, we may together return toward our homes. If either our joint labors hitherto, or my command under which they have been undertaken, are matter for complaint, I have no more to say. But if, through those labors, Ionia, and all Lesser Asia, Phenicia, Egypt, the Grecian settlements in Africa, part of Arabia, Coelosyria, the Mesopotamian Syria, Babylon, Susa, the whole empire of the Persians and Medes, and more, the country beyond the Caspian gates and as far as the Hyrcanian sea, are ours, and the Scythians are driven to their deserts; if beyond this, the Indus and the Hydaspes, and the Akesines and the Hydraotes now flow through our empire, why should you hesitate to add to it the Hyphasis, and the country beyond the Hyphasis? Are you now afraid that barbarians will be able to resist us? So many nations as you have seen of

<sup>30</sup> Arrian has not precisely said that he for attending circumstances, and mentioning had these speeches from Ptolemy, but he him shortly after as the guide whom he nearly indicates so much, quoting Ptolemy chiefly followed.

‘them,

‘ them, some willingly submitting; some flying yet overtaken; some  
 ‘ completely abandoning their country to us; some becoming voluntary  
 ‘ subjects. For myself I reckon that the labors of a brave man  
 ‘ should be limited only by the failure of objects worthy of them. If it  
 ‘ be asked what is to be the end of our warfare, I answer, the space is  
 ‘ now small to the river Ganges and the Indian ocean. This evidently is  
 ‘ connected with the Hyrcanian sea; for the ocean surrounds the earth. I  
 ‘ desire then, Macedonians and allies, to inform you that the Indian ocean  
 ‘ communicates with the Persian gulph on one side, as with the Hyrcanian  
 ‘ sea on the other. From the Persian gulph our fleet will circumnavigate  
 ‘ Africa to the gates of Hercules, at the western end of the Mediterranean  
 ‘ sea. The interior of Africa will thus be at our command, and the bounds  
 ‘ of our empire will be those which God has made the bounds of the  
 ‘ earth.’ Adding some arguments drawn from the disposition of the  
 northern people subdued, but not yet such willing subjects as those of  
 the south, the gratification to arise from glory, the examples of Hercules  
 and Bacchus, the comparatively small part of Asia (according to his very  
 deficient notion, which the reader will have observed, of its extent) re-  
 maining to be subdued, and the difference to all whom he addressed, if  
 the conquest of the Persian empire, not having been attempted, their  
 rewards in wealth and fame were limited to what arose from wars with  
 the Thracians, Triballians and Illyrians, he concluded thus: ‘ If indeed,  
 ‘ you undergoing labors and dangers, I, as commander, avoided them,  
 ‘ and yours being the trouble, the reward was all for others, reasonably,  
 ‘ I admit, your disposition to exertion might slacken. But you know that  
 ‘ I have shared with you in labors and dangers, and you have shared with  
 ‘ me in reward. The empire is yours; you preside over it; some in the dig-  
 ‘ nity of satrap, all in eminence of rank and power<sup>31</sup>; and a large portion  
 ‘ of the revenue is yours.’ When the conquest of Asia then may be  
 ‘ completed, your desires, by heaven I swear, not only shall be fulfilled,  
 ‘ but exceeded. Those wishing to return home I will discharge, or  
 ‘ conduct myself; but those who will abide with me shall be the envy of  
 ‘ those who quit the service.’

<sup>31</sup> ἡμεῖς σαρραπέυετε αἰῶνς. This Persian-Greek phrase is not to be exactly rendered in modern language. The learned reader will judge how far faithfully I have rendered the sense.

Alexander ending, a long silence ensued. None had that knowledge of the extent of the Asiatic continent which could enable them to controvert his widely erroneous representation of it, and show the extravagance of his views, yet none were disposed to concur with him in the purpose of at all prosecuting conquest eastward. Nevertheless none was willing to be foremost in declaring opposition. Repeatedly the king desired that any who differed from him would speak freely, yet still all were silent. At length Cœnus son of Polemocrates arose; the oldest of the generals, since Parmenio was taken off, and, as we have seen, among the highest in esteem and confidence with Alexander. He began with an apology for himself; and then adding assurance of his own and the army's attachment to their king, he proceeded to say he would declare, as he reckoned might become one of his age, and experience, and services, what, tho it should be agreeable to none, he thought most advantageous for all. 'The more then, and the greater,' he said, 'are the achievements the army, under your command, O king, has accomplished, so much the more I reckon it becoming and expedient to put an end to its labors and dangers. Of the thousands of Macedonians and Greeks who set out in the expedition with you, the number remaining you know. Already, when we were in Bactria, perceiving the Thessalians less ready to proceed to new labors and dangers, judiciously, in my opinion, you dismissed them. Of the other Greeks, numbers have been left in the towns you have founded; not very willing settlers there; and the rest, who, with the Macedonians, have persevered in the course of fatigue and peril, some have fallen in battle, some are disabled by wounds, some have been necessarily left behind in different parts of Asia; numbers have died of sickness; of the many few remain; and they, in body not able as formerly, in mind are still more broken. Advantages indeed, great and splendid, they have acquired; from poor, they are become wealthy; from obscure the renowned of the earth. Hence the desire, naturally keener and therefore more deserving consideration, advanced as they are, under your lead and by your favor, in riches and honors, to revisit parents, wives, children, and native soil.' Cœnus then proceeded to observe, that the king's own family had a right to expect him; that the people of the Grecian republics, by whose choice he was their



presiding magistrate, had, for the troubles arisen in their country, in his absence and in consequence of it, a claim to his attention. ‘When duties thus obvious,’ he added, ‘are performed, then you may lead a new army, at your choice, to eastern India, or to the countries about the Euxine sea, or to Carthage, and the regions of Africa beyond Carthage. Young men, with fortune before them, will be ready, in any number, to go with willing minds on any enterprize, when they see those who have been serving under you return to enjoy, in their homes and with their families, their acquired riches and honors. It is honorable, O king, to be moderate in prosperity. With your present army, you commanding, nothing is to be feared from an enemy. But the ways of Divine Providence are not to be foreseen, and therefore not to be provided against by human power or wisdom’<sup>31</sup>.

Cœnus ending, a general murmur of approbation arose. So were minds affected by the question before them, such were the conflicting feelings of attachment to the king, their successful commander, and aversion to his purpose, that some even shed tears. Alexander, seeing the general disposition expressed so decidedly, dismissed the assembly.

But the keenness of his disappointment on the occasion was more than he could patiently bear. His conduct then will deserve observation. It was clearly not that of one habituated to despotism, or, however he might desire, at all claiming it. Next day he convened the same officers again; and, with uneasiness of mind strongly marked in his manner, declared, ‘That he would himself proceed in his purpose.’ Forbearing then to notice the republican Greeks, but directing his reproach to the Macedonians only, he added, ‘that he would not command the service of any Macedonian with him; not doubting but enough would be ready to follow their king; and, for those who desired to return home, they might go, and tell their friends that they had deserted him among his enemies.’ Not waiting then for reply, he went to his tent, and admitted nobody for two days.

According to Ptolemy, whom Arrian here quotes (and Ptolemy, we have seen, was before among his most favored friends, and, we shall find,

<sup>31</sup> Τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Δαιμονίου ἀδοκητὰ τε, καὶ τὰυτὴ καὶ ἀφύλακτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσι. ARR. I. 5. c. 27.

continued so) he hoped that some change of mind, common among soldiers in rest, would take place, of which indication would reach him. But, on the third day, perfect regularity being maintained throughout the army, and a general regret for the king's dissatisfaction clearly manifested, but no change of the general aversion to his purpose, he took the course best adapted, in yielding to the circumstances, to maintain his own dignity. He ordered a sacrifice to be performed to consult the gods about crossing the river; as if that remained his object. The symptoms were declared completely adverse. Assembling then his principal officers, he told them that, as the divine powers were favorable to his army's wishes and not to his own, he should abandon his design, and they might communicate his intention to move homeward. This being done, a universal shout of joy arose; and the soldiers crowded c. 29 about the king's tent to testify their gratitude, for that he, invincible to all others, had yielded to them. Harmony being thus reëstablished, he directed twelve altars to be erected, of the height of the highest towers ordinary in fortifications, and of more than their usual size, as thanksgiving offerings to the gods, and monuments of the extent of his victories. Rest being given to the troops while these were completed, he then sacrificed on them with the solemnities used among the Macedonians from times beyond memory, and added, as had been his custom, the amusement of gymnastic and equestrian exercises.

In arranging then the affairs of the conquered countries, he added to his former presents of dominion to his once magnanimous enemy, now apparently, of Asiatics, his most esteemed friend, Porus, placing under his protecting authority all the territory last conquered, as far as that river, the Hyphasis, which the decision of the army had made the boundary of his empire. But all his presents of dominion in India, equally as elsewhere, he reckoned still within his empire; intitled to its protection, and therefore liable to its controul, and required to pay tribute toward its support. Nor thus does he seem to have imposed anything upon the conquered princes or people beyond what they were subject to under the old constitution of their country; commanding only, as by right of conquest, the transfer to himself of that allegiance, which had been before due to some once powerful, but now decayed empire eastward <sup>32</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> Arrian describes many of the Indian Alexander, by the title of *ὑπάρχος*, clearly princes, previously to their submission to thus indicating that they acknowledged some superior.

superior. Who that superior was, and where he resided, we fail of any direct information. The able commentator on Nearchus has reckoned it indicated to be within that country about the Ganges, where the Mogul sovereigns of India chose their residences.

The compilers of the Antient Universal History, whose diligence, and also whose judgement (tho more that of the writers of some of the notes than of the text) I have heretofore found occasion to commend, have imputed fiction to Arrian, in reporting the speeches, injuriously, I think, both to the author and to the history. 'Arrian and Curtius,' they observe, 'have both given the substance of Alexander's harangue; but they differ widely; and the frame of each of the speeches agrees exactly with the genius of the author. That in Arrian is grave, solid, and at the same time very specious; whereas that in Curtius is copious, florid, and full of strong rhetorical figures, which serve rather to amaze than to persuade. We may therefore reasonably suppose that Arrian and Curtius composed each his harangue.' The characters, here given of the speeches, are just; but the conclusion, as far as regards Arrian, is false, I think, within proof. For the speech attributed to Alexander, by that careful historian, marks, in the speaker, an utter ignorance of the geography of the countries beyond Alexander's conquests. But before Arrian's

time, and indeed soon after Alexander's, as Arrian himself shows in his account of India, the defective and erroneous notions, before entertained of those countries, were largely corrected. The speech given by Arrian therefore seems clearly derived from writers of Alexander's age, uninformed, equally with himself, about those countries. Nor do I think that even Curtius has been here wholly an inventor. He had before him, apparently, the same authorities as Arrian, but he used them differently, as with different purpose. Occasionally he appears moreover to have used those which Arrian thought unworthy of notice; and, in reporting the speech in question, as on too many other occasions, he has evidently been rather aiming to move his less considerate readers by what might have momentary effect on their imagination, than careful of any authority, or at all solicitous to follow the best. His apology for his account of some wonders of nature may deserve his reader's recollection on many occasions: 'Equidem plura transcribo quam credo: nam nec adfirmare sustineo, de quibus dubito, nec subducere quæ accepi.' Q. Curt. l. 9. c. 1. It may indeed be suspected that he has not always limited himself to authorities, tho the best have evidently been within his means, but that, for scenic effect, he has frequently exerted his talent, which appears to have been considerable, of invention for himself.



## CHAPTER LIV.

## ALEXANDER'S Return from INDIA.

## SECTION I.

*Beginning Return of the Army. Care of Colonies in Northern India. Antient Law of Nations. Eulogy of Alexander. War with the Mallians : Alexander dangerously wounded.*

THE retrograde march was at length begun, with perfect good humor in the army, and Alexander more than ever its idol. The space from the Hyphasis to the Hydraotes was retraced, and from that river to the Akesines ; where the construction of the town, the superintendence of which had been committed to Hephæstion, was found so advanced as already to afford convenience for the residence of numbers. Offer was made for the less able men of the mercenary forces to settle there ; and, on a view of the immense distance of their native homes, and of the advantages which the new settlement promised, many accepted the offer ; and many of the natives of the neighbourhood, on permission given, became their voluntary associates in the colony. During the halt, on the occasion, the brother of Abisares, with Arsaces, chief of a bordering province, came to wait upon Alexander, bringing presents of great amount. From Abisares, with other valuables, were thirty elephants, accompanied with an apology for his inability on account of ill health, to pay his personal respects. Alexander, accepting the apology, appointed Abisares and Arsaces jointly his satraps over both provinces, and settled the tribute to be paid by them to the empire to which they had submitted.

Here

Here the indication concurs with what is elsewhere found, that these princes had been subordinate to some such great paramount sovereign as the late Mogul; and that, in failure of due protection from that paramount sovereign against other subordinate princes, and against the foreign conqueror, they were prepared for submission to any foreign conqueror, of power to inspire terror, and of character to afford them better hopes. Alexander then proceeded from his new town on the Akesines to his new towns of Nicæa and Bucephala on the Hydaspes. There he employed his soldiers in repairing damages, which the buildings, probably after the present manner of the country, of unbaked earth, and hastily erected, had suffered from weather, and gave his attention to whatever might be requisite toward the administration and defence of the country around.

But, in yielding to the desire of his army to return homeward, he had not engaged that it should be by the shortest way, or the easiest. On the contrary it had been among his declared and most earnest purposes to explore the shores of the Indian ocean; and the project of conquest to an unknown extent eastward, which had so alarmed his army, being abandoned, it seems to have been understood that southward, so as at least to include within his empire all westward of the great river Indus, all should be compelled to submission; for so much we find the army was yet willing to undertake.

If then, according to the better maxims of modern times, a just occasion for Alexander to carry war, even into the northern Indian provinces, is not very clearly declared by antient writers, mostly little solicitous about such matters, still less clearly is it found for his invasion of the south. Nevertheless it is to be observed, as at least probable, that the conquests of the Persian kings had, at some time, extended to the Indus, or perhaps beyond; and that all the country westward had been once held by princes acknowledging the paramount sovereignty of Persia. The claim then of right to revindicate the sovereignty, as successor by conquest to the rights of the Persian empire, would perhaps not appear any great violation of the antient law of nations, or of the notions of political justice which we have observed to prevail among antient minds.

Alexander's conquests were so extensive, so rapid, and altogether so extraordinary, that they may seem hardly to have left opportunity for  
writers,

writers, who may seem also to have supposed hardly desire in their readers, to view him in any other character than as a conqueror; unless, after some of the violent party authors of his own and presently following ages, to revile him as a tyrant, a drunkard, even a madman<sup>1</sup>; the freedom of the Greek republics affording opportunity, and the violence of party-spirit among them providing incitement for such opposite extravagances. To estimate then the merit of Alexander's administration, it may be not unavailing to look a little to that of other conquerors, and especially of the greatest of all, the Roman republic. Its conquests, less rapid, were however altogether so great and so splendid, and its able writers have so engagingly portrayed the great men who led its triumphs, that it has generally satisfied following authors, as well as readers, to admire the Roman senate as directors, and the people as instruments of its extraordinary successes; little heeding the result to the rest of mankind. If kings then only were exhibited in chains to the scoffs of the Roman populace, or, like Jugurtha, starved to death, the philosophy, which has been transmitted from the school of Callisthenes through all succeeding times over modern Europe, might teach to regard it with complacency or even with pride. But the destruction of nations, Greece reduced to a desert, Sicily depopulated, and, with Italy itself, excepting the imperial city, occupied almost only by slaves, facts reluctantly and therefore defectively indicated by Roman, and fearfully by Greek historians, but incidentally shown in clear light when the predominant purpose has not been flattery either to the Roman great or the Roman people, will hardly be acknowledged as praiseworthy by any modern school of philosophy<sup>2</sup>.

Nevertheless

<sup>1</sup> This latter epithet I believe however has been ventured only under the *quidlibet audendi* prerogative of poets: 'From Macedonia's madman to the Swede.' Two characters so different were hardly ever besides offered as parallels; but Pope had imbibed much of the French political philosophy derived from Callisthenes and others before him.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo has described, but with cautious pen, forbearing remark, the wretched state

of Greece and Sicily, as he saw them, in the age of Augustus. In describing Italy he seems to have thought still more caution and forbearance necessary; having avoided to notice the miserable condition of that fine country, under Roman sway. Our historian of the Roman republic, Hooke, has diligently investigated and ably marked the characters of the civil contests of the Roman people, but has afforded little information of the condition of the countries subjugated



Nevertheless, differently as the rights of humanity, and the due to our neighbours, have been estimated in antient and in modern ages, whence the law of nations and of peace and war has so differed, among the antients, from that acknowledged by the states, in modern times, forming what has been not unaptly called the European commonwealth, that it may be unfair to estimate the moral merit of any antient conqueror, or the justice of any antient war, strictly by that law. Among the great men of Rome, Julius Cæsar has been reckoned the fittest to be compared with Alexander. Certainly he was among the most liberal and noble-minded of any who, at any time, led Roman triumphs. Yet, for his invasion of Britain, may it be allowed to go so far for illustration, neither justification, nor any sufficient temptation, is very obvious. To tell the Roman people that he had carried their conquering arms, in the phrase of the day, beyond the bounds of the earth, and to increase the splendor of that always cruel and truly barbarian ceremony, the triumph, by exhibiting in chains prisoners of a nation before unseen in Rome, tho unjust, might be powerful motives. But, a principal object, pressed upon him by his situation as servant of a republic, and by the circumstances of that republic, seems enough marked to have been to seize prisoners for the supply of its slavemarkets<sup>3</sup>. By their sale he would find the desired, perhaps even necessary, gratification for his soldiery; and, a plentiful and

Cæs. bel.  
Gal.  
Strab. l. 4.

subjugated by them, and of the state of their population under the rule of the imperial republic. It has remained for a writer of the present day, in a work where it would be little expected, and which, on account of the necessary expensiveness of so splendid a publication, (the third volume of publications of the Dilettanti Society) cannot have the extensive circulation desirable for so important a portion of history, to collect from unquestionable authorities, and show, in clear light, the real character of the Roman republican dominion.

<sup>3</sup> ——— Ἀπήγαγεν — ἀνδράποδα καὶ τῆς ἄλλης λαΐας πλήθος. Strab. l. 4. In large amount of various plunder, here indicated, slaves, it seems, as indeed from all information of

the state of the country would be likely, were alone what the geographer reckoned of importance enough to be specified.

In Cæsar's own account (so I venture to call it notwithstanding the questions on the subject) the mention of prisoners, I think, has been avoided, except in describing his final departure from Britain, when, in accounting for the number of vessels wanted, and with difficulty collected, (apparently to obviate the supposition that his military force was larger than had been owned) a multitude of captives is noticed. The purpose of transporting these could hardly be any but to supply the slavemarkets. Altogether his invasions of Britain seem strongly marked for slave-hunting expeditions.

unexpected supply for those markets, with of course a reduced price of what, in the circumstances of Italy, under Roman policy, was a commodity so necessary for persons of all ranks, of the greatest property and the least, would be extensively gratifying. Yet, in justice to Cæsar, it should be observed that, tho such was his conduct when servant of a republic, and dependent upon the favor of a democratical party for his eminence, yet, among his first acts, when he had overborne the opposing party, was a law to limit slavery in Italy, by commanding the employment of freemen in husbandry <sup>4</sup>.

Of the slavery under the Persian empire we have hardly any information. The learned commentator on the voyage of Nearchus has supposed that, among the Indians, there was no slavery, properly so called; tho he has admitted the division of the people into casts to have been then of old establishment; and, among the casts, probably would be one, then as now, hardly above slavery. But Alexander, bred under Aristotle, who, with many other Grecian philosophers, as we have formerly observed, esteemed slavery natural and necessary among mankind, would not be likely to scruple condemning Indian prisoners, for what he reckoned offences, to that miserable state. In perfect consonance thus, not only with the practice of all the Grecian republics, but of the Roman after them, oppressing a portion, what he did for extensive benefit of mankind, being peculiar to himself, will for a just estimation of his character, as well as on its own account, especially deserve consideration.

In pursuing this subject then I desire allowance to avail myself of the very able work of the yet living author whom I have already found occasion

<sup>4</sup> ——— *Neve hi, qui pecuariam facerent, minus tertia parte puberum ingenuorum inter pastores haberent.* Sueton. l. 1. c. 41. The value of this short but important passage, imperfectly seen by the learned annotator Casaubon, stands noticed, according to its just estimation, in the introduction to the third volume of publications of the Dilettanti Society. Yet that learned and diligent annotator has, in a following note, shown his sense of the value of a passage of Livy, marking, in few words, most strongly the

desolation of Italy under the Roman republic, and the need for such a law as that of the great dictator: *Plerique enim de plebi in re facienda omissiores facti sunt, sprete agrorum cura, & servis vinctisque commissa: ex quo illa Livii gravis querela, libro sexto: ‘Olim multitudinem innumerabilem liberorum capitum in eis fuisse locis, quæ nunc, vix seminario exiguo militum relicto, servitia Romana ab solitudine vinctæ dicant.* Casaub. annot. in cap. 42. l. 2. Suet. de Cæs.

Vincent on  
Nearchus.

to quote, and, in beginning, to use his words. 'It is perhaps imputing  
' too much to that extraordinary man, Alexander, to assert that he had  
' preconceived the comprehensive scheme of commerce with India from  
' the first foundation of Alexandria in Egypt; but certain it is that, as  
' his mind expanded with his success, and his information increased in  
' proportion to the progress of his arms, the whole plan was matured.  
' Whatever vanity then may be attached to the foundation of cities, and  
' however this passion might operate upon Alexander, utility still was  
' the prevailing motive in his mind. It has been judiciously observed  
' that most of the cities founded after him, by the Syrian kings, existed  
' little longer than their founders; and, if we except Antioch on the  
' Orontes and Seleucia on the Tigris, there was perhaps not one capable  
' of existing. But the Paropamisian Alexandria, and that on the Iaxartes,  
' continue to this day cities of importance; and Alexandria in Egypt,  
' after surviving and greatly flourishing, through the revolutions of empires  
' for eighteen centuries, perished at last,' or rather its singular importance  
perished 'only in consequence of a discovery which changed the whole  
' system of commerce throughout the world.'

Alexander's way from his colonies of Nicæa and Bucephala to the ocean was nearly limited to the course of the river Indus, both by the expediency of holding communication with his fleet, and by the circumstances of the country. The great vale, through which that river flows, is bounded westward by the sandy desert, or by intervening mountains. Eastward a similar character of worthless country is found, tho of less extent. The vale between, like the region of the five rivers, in which Alexander had been engaged northward, was of extraordinary fertility; and the abundant population was famed, among neighbouring nations, for skill in arms and for courage. But it was divided into many small states, often hostile to oneanother. Thus their power for offensive war was small, and opportunity for war against them abundant; yet numerous positions in their country, of extraordinary natural strength, gave to all great means and great confidence against invasion.

It seems, as before observed, rather probable that all this country, westward of the Indus, had been, at some time, conquered by Persian armies, and had not ceased to be claimed as a portion of the Persian empire;



empire; tho, if its princes now acknowleged any superior, it appears to have been some great Indian sovereign, residing far eastward. On this supposition, Alexander's pretension to be, by conquest, the rightful successor to all the dominions of the Persian monarchs, might perhaps, according to Grecian and Roman principles, be admitted; and, against the Mallians and Oxydracs, the most powerful of the people in his way, he had moreover the ground of quarrel formerly noticed, that they were the allies and protectors of his enemy, the prince called by Arrian the bad Porus. Ch. 53. s. 5. of this hist.

It is the opinion of the commentator on the voyage of Nearchus, whose professed object has been geography, but whose observations, to which his geographical researches have led him, will rank him among the ablest historical critics, that, long before Alexander's age, a great trade was carried on from the upper provinces of India, by the Indus and the rivers communicating with it, to the ocean; little, if at all, directed thence westward; the barren shore of the Desert, for some hundred leagues, repelling; but much along the coast of Malabar, where the commodities of the rich countries in the cool climate of the north of India would be desirable, as those of the torrid regions of the peninsula would reciprocally be in request northward. He has even supposed that the vessels employed in that trade turned the southern cape, and proceeded northward along the coast of Coromandel, toward the Ganges; but that the eastern shore of the great Indian Gulph, was little if at all known to the western Indians. Thus, on the information that Alexander could acquire, his supposition that India was the extreme of the Asiatic continent, and that the ocean bounding it was connected with the Caspian, which was also supposed a portion of the farthest northern sea, may seem not utterly unreasonable<sup>5</sup>.

At

<sup>5</sup> Arrian mentions here a much greater, indeed an almost inconceivable deficiency of the geography of the age. Alexander, no doubt, would have all the geographical information that the best informed Greeks could give. Yet, crocodiles being found in the Indus, and that kind of bean which had been reckoned by the Greeks peculiar to Egypt, being observed on the banks of the Akēsines, he is said to have imagined he had discovered whence the Nile had its source; supposing it to flow through immense deserts from India to Æthiopia, whence it was well enough known to pass through Egypt to the Mediterranean sea. It is added that he actually mentioned this idea in writing to Olympias, his mother; but, before the letter was dispatched, getting better information, he effaced what he had written about the Nile. (Arr. l. 6. c. 1.) The historian neither quoting authority here, his common practice for extraordinary matters, nor mentioning how it

became

Arr. 1. 6.  
c. 2 & 3.

At his new towns on the Hydaspes Alexander had provided that, while he was engaged on his expeditions eastward, a fleet, very numerous, tho of small vessels, should be built. Beside the labor of the conquered country, which he could command, he had, in his army, many Carians, Phenicians, Egyptians, and Cypriots, practised, some in ship-building, more in navigation, all capable, beyond meer landmen, of assisting toward the building and equipment of a fleet. Of these, the historian proceeds to say, Alexander principally formed his crews; no Greeks, either of the continent, either of Europe, or of Lesser Asia being mentioned; whence it seems probable that all were of the new levies, and that the Greeks, engaged in the first of the expedition, had mostly been discharged, either to return home, or to settle among the various new colonies. The vessels, mostly boats, in our phrase, rather than ships, were of various kinds, adapted for different purposes: some for carrying infantry, some for cavalry, some for stores, and some for battle. Of the latter, no hostile fleet being to be apprehended, none exceeded the triacantor, or galley of thirty oars; the smallest of those commonly used among the Greeks, for action by water. Of every description the whole number was said by Ptolemy to have been two thousand.

During these preparations the veteran general Cœnus died; one as we have seen, most trusted by Alexander with great command, and, as Arrian's phrase bespeaks him, of his most confidential friends. The funeral obsequies were performed with suitable magnificence, apparently the utmost that circumstances would admit.

When all was ready for the proposed movement southward, Alexander called together all the attending ministers of Indian princes, together with all the principal officers of his army; and, in their presence, declared Porus king of all the conquered part of India westward of the Indus.

became known what the effaced passage expressed, it may seem not too much to doubt the correctness of his information about it. We find Plutarch quoting numerous letters of Alexander, as authority for important matters political and military. It has not fallen in my way to find the authenticity of those letters discussed, or, I think, at all noticed, by any of the numerous commentators on Alexander's

history. That they should have been unknown to Arrian, cotemporary, or nearly so, with Plutarch, seems hardly to be supposed. If then he believed them genuine, that he should have noticed, among them all, only some blotted lines concerning a question of geography would be somewhat extraordinary.

The

The Nyssæan cavalry, which seems to have been the only Indian force he had used, excepting that under Porus, he dismissed to return home. Of his remaining army, one division, under Craterus, was directed to march by the right bank of the river; another, the larger, under Hephæstion, with all the elephants, in number two hundred, was ordered, on the left side, to make the utmost speed to the capital, unnamed, of a prince called Sopeithes. Alexander himself took the immediate command of a chosen force of horse and foot to go by water; ready thus to give attention and support to either side, and also to strengthen either from the other. A fourth body, under Philip, whom he had appointed satrap of all the country westward of the Indus, as far as the confines of Bactria, probably the same person formerly described as son of Machatas, was to remain four days, apparently to manage some business not indicated by the historian, and then follow.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 3.

Ch. 53. s. 4.  
of this hist.  
Arr. l. 5.  
c. 8.

At daybreak, sacrifice was performed. Then the divisions for the left bank and for the river navigation embarked. Alexander, on reaching his galley, poured, from a golden flagon, a libation into the Hydaspes, invoking the deities of that river and of the Akeshes, which it joined at some distance, and of the Indus, which receives their united waters. After this ceremony he poured to Hercules, to Ammon, and, as ancient Macedonian custom prescribed (so the historian describes it) to other gods. This pious ceremony being concluded, the trumpet, at his command, gave the signal, and the fleet moved. Such a number of vessels, passing along the river in regular order, with signals of trumpets and words of command, heard on the shores, and occasionally reverberated by rocks and woods on the banks, the effect was greatly striking even to the Greeks; but still more to the multitude of Indians, led by curiosity from the populous neighbourhood on each side of the river, to whom everything seen and heard was new, and whose wonder, the historian says, was particularly excited by the sight of horses conveyed by water. Singularly, given to singing, he adds, their songs, on this occasion, heightened the extraordinary chorus.

On the third day of the voyage the fleet arrived where Craterus, on one side of the river, and Hephæstion on the other, according to orders, met it. Alexander directed them to proceed immediately, and still by the river's course.

Arr. l. 4.  
c. 4.



course. With the fleet he waited himself two days, while Philip, with his division, joined. This body, probably with a view to the more easily finding provisions for all, he ordered across the country to the Akesines, with instruction to follow the course of that stream to its junction with the Hydaspes, on which he himself pursued his voyage, in a width of water, according to the historian, no where less than twenty Greek stades, which, on no computation would be so little as a mile<sup>6</sup>. In five days he reached the confluence of the two rivers. There a contraction of the channel, through which the combined waters were of necessity to flow, produced what our seamen call a race, and of very dangerous violence. Of this both Alexander and the army had previous intelligence from the country people; but, for the fleet to proceed, the passing must be hazarded. On approaching the strait, the roaring of the waters was such that the rowers, appalled, as if by consent, without command, rested on their oars. Orders c. 5. were issued to proceed with the greatest and most unremitted exertion; assurance being added, that so the force of the whirlpools might be overborne or evaded. The round vessels (as the Greeks called vessels of burden, nearly such as the modern for ocean navigation) tho the irregular violence of the current alarmed those aboard, all passed safely. But the long vessels, with low sides, adapted to swift rowing, and especially those of two benches<sup>7</sup>, the rowers of the lower bench, whose rowloops were little above the level of the water when smooth, being unable to disengage their oars from the rising billows, were greatly distressed. Two of these, falling against each other, were lost, and many of the men they bore perished. Fortunately it happened that, presently below the rapid, on the right bank of the river, was a shore advantageous for receiving and refitting the damaged fleet. Alexander, attentive to the danger and suffering of his people, having himself passed safely, landed there, and diligently superintended assistance to the injured vessels and those they carried. At this place Hephæstion, Craterus and Philip, with their several divisions, joined.

Hitherto, the people, on either shore, had mostly been submissive, and the few refractory were, with little effort, compelled to obedience. But more powerful states were next in the way, those of the Mallians and

<sup>6</sup> Οὐδαμοῦ μείονα, ἐν τῷ κατάπλῳ ἑικοσι σταδίων τὸ ἔντρον. Arr. l. vi. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Ὅσων δίκροτοι αὐτῶν. Arr. l. vi. c. 5.

Oxydracs ; people, according to Arrian, living under republican government, and eminent, among the Indians, as military people<sup>8</sup>. Assurance being received that these, in alliance, were determined upon resistance, it was judged expedient to increase the force on the right bank of the river, where their territory lay. Philip's division, and Polysperchon's, and all the horse-bowmen, and all the elephants, such was Alexander's opinion of the power of that animal in battle, were conveyed across the river, and put under the command of Craterus. Of the rest of the army, one division, under Hephæstion, was sent forward a five day's march : another, under Ptolemy, c. 6. the historian, was ordered to remain three days behind. The immediate command of a chosen body of foot and horse Alexander took himself, to go upon the most active service. The fleet he directed to proceed the space of a three day's march down the river.

An object is not indicated by historians to require these measures, which yet possibly may have been ably adapted to circumstances ; and Arrian, from whom most is always to be expected, tho he rarely goes beyond his purpose of a military history, has stated, as cause for war with the Mallians, only that they declined acknowledging Alexander's imperial authority on terms he offered them ; whether claiming their allegiance as once subjects of the Persian empire, or only considering them, like all other people, out of compact, and so, according to the ordinary Grecian principle, fair objects of conquest. Simply as an addition to his vast dominion, their country could be but a small object. But all the Indian tribes, like them of warlike reputation, were predatory people. Whether the Mallians might have means to interrupt the trade on the Indian rivers, supposed eminent among Alexander's objects of protection and encouragement, we hardly have ground to judge ; but that security for the peaceful cultivators of the soil in the provinces would be precarious in the neighbourhood of a people of that character, holding complete independency, cannot be doubtful.

Vinc. on  
Nearchus.

But if just cause for engaging in the war may be supposed, neither the following severity against the enemy, nor the prince's rashness in the

<sup>8</sup> Memorials of these people, whose names the Greeks wrote *Μαλλοὶ* and *Ὀξύδρακοι*, Vincent has observed, remain in the modern names of their countries, *Mooltan* and *Ooche*.

exposure of his own person to dangers even for him beyond the common, appear at all within excuse. It may seem that, in smothered ill humor with his army, of which he knew himself, notwithstanding the recent opposition to his fancy, highly the favorite, and whose favor it greatly behoved him to cultivate, venting his spleen on the foe, he would waste the exertion upon small, for which great enterprize was denied him.

A sandy waterless desert, divided the rich country of the Mallians from the Akesines. Marching in the morning, from his camp on the bank of that river, at the distance of about nine miles he reached a smaller river, where he gave his troops midday rest. Proceeding then in the afternoon and throughout the night, and himself hastening with his cavalry before his infantry, in the morning he approached a principal town of the Mallians.

That people, refusing tribute to the mighty conqueror of the continent from the Hellespont and the African desert to the Indus, confident in the security of their situation, were found unprepared to expect an enemy. Many about the fields, unarmed, fled toward the town for safety: those overtaken were put to the sword. The horse then were stationed around the town to prevent egress. The foot arriving, assault began; and the Indians, after some vain efforts at defence, withdrew to their citadel. This was then attacked, and being carried, those within, about two thousand, were all put to death. No reason is mentioned by the historian for such severity; nor for what ensued. Perdiccas had been sent against an inferior town. At his approach the inhabitants fled. He pursued; and his light troops, practised in running, overtook many, whom they put to death. Neighbouring marshes afforded refuge for those who could reach them.

- c. 7. Alexander, resting only till the first watch of the night, proceeded, by a forced march, to the river Hydraotes, where, at daybreak, he overtook the flying and scattered Mallians. Most had crossed the river, but many were killed by his cavalry in the water, and many more in the continuation of pursuit. Some were made prisoners; of course for profit of the troops by sale to slavery. The greater part however were enough advanced to reach a town strongly situated and walled. Against these Python son of

Agenor



Agenor<sup>9</sup> was detached, who presently took the town by storm. The lives of the survivors here were spared.

Meanwhile, Alexander himself went against the town of the Bramins<sup>10</sup>: thus only the historian describes it. The Bramins were then, as now, the wisemen or philosophers of the Indians<sup>11</sup>. They seem to have encouraged the people in opposition to Alexander, as afterward the Druids, who were of nearly similar rank and character among the antient Britons, encouraged them in opposition to the Romans. But the Grecian art of sapping, used against their walls, quickly produced effect, which so alarmed them, that, without attempting to defend the breach, they withdrew into their citadel; yet in such deficient order, that some of Alexander's troops, following, entered also. These however were presently overpowered and driven out with loss. Twenty-five were acknowledged to have been killed. Alexander then ordered the sappers to the wall, and the scaling-ladders to be ready on all sides. A tower being reduced to ruin, and part of the adjoining curtain falling with it, Alexander himself led the forlorn hope. Zeal thence becoming vehement among the troops, the place was quickly carried. Most of the Indians died fighting. The less able set fire to the houses, where whole families perished: a few only, such, observes the historian, was their fortitude, were saved for slavery.

It seems to have been this passive courage, characteristical still of the Indians, that provoked the youthful conqueror. They could not resist him, yet would not yield. Nor was this stimulation single in his mind. Angry yet, tho no longer avowing anger, with his army for refusal to follow him against the powerful kingdoms of eastern India, this new incentive came upon him from those whom, in contempt, he would have left behind him, could he have prosecuted the greater object of his desire. Allowing his troops therefore only one day's rest, he detached Python and Demetrius, with a force suited to the purpose, back to the thickets on the bank of the Hydraotes, whither many Mallian families had fled, in hope of security which they found their towns could not afford them. His orders were sanguinary. Any Mallians who came to surrender at discretion might be spared, but all others found were to be put to the sword.

<sup>9</sup> Πύθωνα τὸν Ἀγήνορος. c. 17.

<sup>10</sup> Βραχμάνους.

<sup>11</sup> Σοφισταί. c. 16.

Meanwhile he proceeded himself against the principal town of the Mallian country. But the Indians had already so experienced the weakness of their fortifications against the Grecian art of attack, that, before he could arrive, the town was deserted. The people, with those of many inferior towns, having crossed the Hydaspes, occupied the farther of its lofty banks, in number, it was said, fifty thousand armed men, with the purpose of disputing the passage. Alexander, after a rapid survey, rode into the river at the head of his cavalry. He had hardly reached the middle of the channel when the resolution of the Indians failed them, and, with hasty steps, but in good order, they withdrew from the bank. He followed. But they then, seeing his infantry yet afar off, stood, and so resisted his charges that he found it expedient to wait for his infantry. The Agrian and other select lightarmed arrived first, with the bowmen<sup>12</sup>. These, together with the cavalry, began a desultory action, which they maintained till the phalanx approached; and then the Indians, of whom many were already wounded, presently fled. At no great distance a town strongly situated was their refuge, but the pursuing horse killed many.

Next day, committing one division of his army to Perdiccas, leading the other himself, Alexander assailed the town in two places. His own division, forcing a gate, entered first. Apparently the fortification was very imperfect. The Indians, no longer attempting defence of the town, withdrew into the citadel, stronger by art as well as by local circumstances. Immediately he proceeded to storm it. At the same time sapping was begun, and scaling-ladders were applied. But the efforts of his men not satisfying his impatience, he took a ladder from one bearing it, placed it against the wall, and mounted, under protection only of his shield carried over his head. Peucestas, the bearer of the sacred shield, taken, as formerly mentioned, from the temple of Minerva at Troy, immediately followed: of this hist. Leonnatus, a lord of the body-guard was third: Abreas, apparently a common soldier, but of those who, for merit, received double pay,

<sup>12</sup> Arrian here distinguishes the *ψιλοὶ* and the *τεξέται*. I think Xenophon and Thucydides always reckoned the bowmen among the *ψιλοὶ*, tho' a distinguished and superior branch of them. Arrian's *ψιλοὶ* seem to

have been the *Πελασγῶν*, middle-armed, of the elder writers; and indeed probably Alexander would not take with him to the farther end of Asia any of what Thucydides has called *ὕχλος τῶν ψιλῶν*.

mounted

mounted nearly at the same time by another ladder. The hypaspists<sup>13</sup>, (who seem to have attended Alexander's person in every action in which infantry could join) zealous to follow, overloaded the ladders and they broke. Alexander thus, with three others only, was on the top of the wall, and, for the splendor of his armour, the principal object for the enemy's missile weapons. Within the wall the soil was raised, so that he might leap down without other danger than exposing himself still more to the enemy. In advancing the hazard thus was of one kind, in retreating perhaps equal of another. In advancing there might be glory, in retreating shame. With a moment's consideration, he leaped down into the citadel, and, for defence, stood with his back against the wall. The Indians, seeing him alone, closed upon him. The excellence of his armour, with his skill in arms, protected him, while he killed an Indian chief, and wounded several. The three who had mounted the wall with him c. 10. presently joining him, the Indians no longer dared to close, but plied them with missile weapons. Abreas, wounded in the face with an arrow, fell. Alexander himself received a shot which pierced his breastplate, and the effusion of blood following was such that he presently fainted. Peucestas and Leonnatus remained to maintain the unequal contest.

But the troops, whose eagerness to prevent, had enhanced their prince's danger, so indiscreetly incurred<sup>14</sup>, soon found means for relieving it. The wall was only of earth, or unbaked clay, and, even without ladders, some of the soldiers found means to mount. A gate at hand was so infirm, or so ill guarded, that it was presently forced. Attack, from powerful numbers, insuing, was, at first, withstood by the Indians vigorously; but they could not long maintain close fight against the superiority of Grecian arms and discipline. Before however the relief arrived, all Alexander's supporters were wounded, and nearly disabled. He was himself borne away, uncertain whether to survive. There was then no restraining his victorious

<sup>13</sup> Ὑπασπιστής. Failure of desirable explanation concerning the body distinguished by this title, has been formerly observed. Taylor's edition of Hederic's Lexicon gives for version, *Clypeatus satelles*, quoting the Glossaria Veterum, and agreeing with Scapula, who may probably have drawn from the same source. But this, leaving the distinguishing ὑπο unnoticed, as a version is clearly defective, and as explanation nothing.

<sup>14</sup> Βασιλεὺς πάθη, οὐ ξὺν λόγῳ κινδυνεύων. Arr. l. 4. c. 10.



soldiery. Every man, woman and child found in the place was put to the sword; his own latter conduct having indeed, on some occasions, afforded too much incouragement for such illiberal revenge.

Such an adventure as this, of the conqueror of Asia, would be likely to be variously dressed by the numerous writers of his age, and ages following, candidates for public favor; and Arrian mentions, among other instances, one remarkably showing excess of carelessness, if not rather impudence, of some among them, while, in the scarcity and dearness of copies, examination and comparison of accounts could be within the power of very few. Some authors, he says, reported that Ptolemy, the historian, was one who mounted the ladder with Alexander, and protected him when disabled; 'whereas,' he proceeds, 'Ptolemy in his own narrative, relates that he was not then present with the army under Alexander's immediate orders, but commanding a detached body on a distant service. Ptolemy however would have full means to learn all circumstances, so as to give an exact account; and this Arrian appears to have carefully followed.

• 12.

Alexander's danger put the army, through all ranks, upon serious and anxious consideration. What might be the consequences of his death, for which no provision had been made, and who should succeed to the command-in-chief, were questions most seriously involving the interests of all, and for which none had a ready answer. Since Parmenio no one had been so distinguished by the king as to be at all marked for such pre-eminence; and the troops were rather, in their several divisions, attached to their several leaders, than generally disposed to allow to any one the command over all. What then would result among the conquered nations? Their chiefs had been not only subdued by the arms, but gained by the favors of Alexander; whose name also the people revered, as of the most glorious of sovereigns, under whose rule they enjoyed all their former advantages, with less apprehension, than before, of a troubled government. Who would be for settling in the empire gained, and fighting still, if necessary, for its maintenance; and who for the return home, the extensive earnestness for which had recently so grieved their lost leader? And for either settling in the conquered provinces, or for a length of  
6
march,

march, before so unheard of, as the return, through so many provinces, which to be friendly, which hostile, none could know, who was to decide, and what were their means ?

The news, reaching the army remaining, under Hephæstion's command, in the camp whence Alexander had set out for his expedition against the Mallians, produced even greater and more lasting anxiety than where he was present. The first report was that he was dead. Contradiction soon arrived, but did not obtain immediate credit ; suspicion arising that it was an artifice of interested leaders, desirous of gaining time for their purposes. Even when at length Alexander, unable to come, wrote himself for assurance, apprehension that this might be a forgery still gave uneasiness.

Informed of all circumstances, as soon as he could bear the motion of a litter, Alexander proceeded to the Hydaspes. On that stream a vessel bore him without fatigue to the station where his fleet, under Nearchus, lay, with the main body of his army, under Hephæstion, incamped hard by. The litter was ready for him again at the landing-place ; but, feeling himself beyond expectation able, he ordered his horse ; and, mounting, to the joyful surprize of the surrounding anxious soldiery, tho' apparently not without hazard, and perhaps injury, rode to his tent and, without assistance, dismounted. Universal acclamation, gratulation, and, the historian says, tears of joy attended him. So does personal valor commonly ingage the esteem of the multitude, especially of valor in high station, and more especially where exerted of free choice, without any pressure from necessity. But still more, with the added opinion of talent capable of directing multitudes, so as both to lead them to glory, and provide for their welfare, better than they could do for themselves, or any other for them, an enthusiastical attachment arises ; and such, Arrian describes as prevailing toward Alexander. Among his more judicious friends however, universally dissatisfied with his rashness, some took the liberty to admonish him, that the merit of the lowest soldier should not be the object of the general's ambition ; and that one whose life was so important to so many thousands, and even millions, should not so waste his safety. Alexander bore this, but with some demonstration of impatience ; which an old Bœotian officer, more a soldier than a general, observing, exclaimed,

exclaimed, in his Bœotian dialect, ‘O Alexander, such deeds become men : ‘ the proverb says, ‘Bear the evils which great actions bring, and injoy ‘ the glory.’ This is among the few anecdotes of the more private life of Alexander, authentically transmitted: Arrian having given it from the narrative of Nearchus, the commander of the fleet; who added, that the old Bœotian was thenceforward in much favor with the king.

c. 14.

The army in the Mallian country appears to have remained to complete its subjugation, and then proceed against the Oxydracs; represented as a powerful nation, whose purposed junction of forces with the Mallians had been disappointed by Alexander’s rapidity. Terrified now by experience, both of the force and of the severity of the conqueror come from afar, both people sent deputations, offering submission and soliciting pardon; the Mallians for their resistance, the Oxydracs for having failed of an earlier submission. The latter seem, on information received, to have devised a mode of flattery grateful to Alexander: ‘They ‘were desirous’ they said, ‘of freedom and independency; to which, if ‘any people, they were intitled, having injoyed them from the time when ‘Bacchus came to India: but, understanding that Alexander also was ‘of the race of the gods, if it was his pleasure to appoint a satrap over ‘them, they would submit and pay such tribute as he might require.’ The terms, on their compliance with which he insisted, were not mild. He would have a thousand of the principal men of the two nations sent to him, to be held as hostages; or, at his pleasure, to be employed as soldiers in his proposed subjugation of the rest of India. Again they seem to have had politic consideration of his character. They sent him a thousand men, selected for size and comeliness of person, with assurance also, true or otherwise, of their eminence of rank; and, with them, five hundred armed chariots, with the necessary horses and drivers, as a voluntary tribute of auxiliary force. Pleased with this, he accepted the chariots with their appendages, and dismissed the hostages; but appointed a satrap over the country, Philip, apparently the same formerly distinguished as son of Machatas, and already of satrapal dignity.



## SECTION II.

*Alexander's Navigation of the Indian Rivers: Conquest of Southern Provinces: Division of the Army for the Return homeward: Establishment of a Naval Station in the Indus: Arrival at the Ocean: Establishment of a Naval Arsenal at the Western Mouth of the Indus.*

ALEXANDER, checked by the reasonable opposition of his army in his wild purpose of extending conquest (wild certainly, yet in his very extraordinary circumstances at his yet early age, demanding consideration) and apparently somewhat sobered by the severity of his last wound and the length of confinement required for the cure, again directed his uncommon powers of mind and body and fortune to projects useful to mankind. His purpose, formerly conceived, of exploring the course of the Indus, and making known to the western nations the navigation of the ocean, from the Indian to the Persian gulph, employed his attention. During his confinement he had caused a considerable increase to be made to his river-navy; principally of the larger vessels; and, as soon as his convalescence was sufficiently advanced, he prosecuted the voyage down the Hydraotes to its confluence with the Akesines, and thence onward to that of their united streams with the Indus. There he waited the arrival of Perdikkas, who had been sent with a division against a refractory Indian nation. In this leisure examining the opportunities of the place, and finding them inviting, he resolved to found a town there, and provide it with conveniencies for a naval station. During his stay Perdikkas, successful in the business he had been sent upon, rejoined. Oxyartes, father of the queen Roxana, also arrived, reporting some misconduct of Tiristes, Tiryestes, or Tyriaspis (for the Greeks varied in their orthography of Persian names) satrap of Parapamisus; who was in consequence removed, and the satrapy was committed to Oxyartes. Philip's satrapy was then declared to extend to the confluence of the Akesines and Indus, including the new town and arsenal, the completion of which he was directed to superintend. A body of troops, including all the Thracians of the army, were left with him, to insure quiet in his province.

Arr. l. 6.  
c. 15.

For

For proceeding still downward, the ground on the left bank of the river being incommodious, and hostility being more threatened on the right<sup>15</sup>, the greater part of the division under Craterus was transported across, with all the elephants, there to continue the march toward the sea; Alexander himself, with a chosen body, being again borne on the stream. Reaching the capital of the Sogdians, apparently without resistance, he formed there again a subsidiary naval arsenal, and provided for its security by fortifications. Already, tho much remained yet to be subdued, he took upon himself to dispose of all the riverside country, some hundred miles from the confluence of the Akesines and Indus to the sea, declaring it a satrapy under the joint authority of Oxyartes and Python.

Directing the march of Craterus then by the right bank of the river, through the country which the historian describes as that of the Arachoses and Drangies<sup>16</sup>, he proceeded himself still by water to the territory, said to be the richest of India, the dominion of a prince called Musicanus. That prince had not waited upon him, to offer submission for himself and his country, nor had even by an embassy sought friendship, nor had either sent those presents which common civility required for a great king, or solicited anything for himself. These are the causes stated by Arrian for treating him as an enemy. Such then was the rapidity of Alexander's movements, that before Musicanus obtained notice of the armament's approach, it was already within his territory. Apparently however he had information of Alexander's character, as well as of his power. With the most magnificent presents he could collect he hastened to meet him, and especially with all his elephants. Being admitted to

<sup>15</sup> Ἀριστερῶν, For the interpretation here the next note is proposed to account.

<sup>16</sup> By this description it seems made sufficiently evident that Arrian, for distinguishing the banks of a river as right and left, traced the water upward, whereas, in modern Europe, it seems now agreed to name them as they stand, in tracing it from its source downward. The country of the Arachotes and Drangies, stretching westward on the

north of the great Desert, was of great importance to Alexander, being that alone by which, from his actual situation, there was any ready communication with Media, Persia and all the west of his empire. But whether Arrian was clearly aware of the geography here, or whether rather some deficiency may not be in the extant manuscripts of his work, perhaps not unreasonably may be doubted.

audience,

audience, he began with acknowledging himself wrong<sup>17</sup>; which, says the historian, commonly weighed most with Alexander toward obtaining favor. Accordingly his delinquency was pardoned; and Alexander, having viewed his capital and his country, admiring both, continued him in the presidency, but not in independency: the capital being in a commanding situation, he built a citadel, and placed a garrison there.

Musicanus, however, tho sovereign over subjects, like many now in India, was not an independent prince, and therefore apparently had it not properly in his choice to submit to another. But Alexander's claim of paramount sovereignty extended to the dominion of Oxycanus, to whom Musicanus acknowledged fealty; and Oxycanus, like his subordinate, had omitted the required acknowledgements. Alexander therefore hastened to proceed against him, leaving the superintendancy of the building of the new citadel, with the command of the forces there, to Craterus. So it appears he had now learnt to condemn the boasted Indian military, that, without any infantry of the phalanx, he took, for the expedition against Oxycanus, only the cavalry which had been conveyed on the river, with his favorite middle-armed, the Agrians, and his bowmen. Nevertheless in the field he seems to have found no resistance; and presently, with a force so unfit for sieges, he took the two principal towns, in the second of which Oxycanus himself was made prisoner<sup>18</sup>.

ARR. I. 6  
c. 16.

Meanwhile

<sup>17</sup> Arrian's expression is strong, 'Ομολογῶν ἀδικεῖν.

<sup>18</sup> It has been observed by Vincent that the name Porus signified Prince. The termination Canus, may seem to have been, in another language, a word signifying the same title, to which the Greeks prefixed the proper name, and added, in their usual way, a final syllable to denote the case. This title is found variously spelt, Can, Khan, Chan, Cham, even by English writers, who, too commonly, bowing to any foreign orthography of Asiatic names which foreign writers may reasonably have endeavoured to adapt to their several languages, misrepresent them, often grossly, for an English reader. By the more judicious, the same title has been writ-

ten Cawn or Khawn; which I apprehend, according to English orthography, best represents the word; tho, to indicate exactly all Asiatic sounds by any European alphabet is impossible. Vincent, distressed by confusion and uncertainty often thus arising, has taken pains to collate various spellings of eastern names, with the purpose of ascertaining what should be the English orthography; but, in the evident want of familiar acquaintance with the pronuntiation of any language but his own, he has succeeded little farther than to furnish some ground for any who may follow him better prepared. On the other hand, modern fashion has tended variously to increase this inconvenient confusion. French modes, puzzling for the English reader, have

been



Meanwhile information arrived that Sambus, an Indian, satrap, under Alexander's appointment, of a neighbouring mountainous region, had absconded. Alexander on this hastened to Sindomana, the principal town; Arrian here giving the name, which often fails in his narrative, for cities in India, even the residence of princes. He was surprized to find the gates open, the principal friends of Sambus ready for surrender, the treasury untouched, and not an elephant removed. Those left in authority pleaded, in excuse for their chief, that he had no purpose of hostility, or of any disobedience, to Alexander; but, being informed that his enemy, Musicanus, had been received into favor, he feared the consequences to himself, and on that account only had withdrawn. Alexander seems to have been

been adopted for forein words, even for some which had become classical in our language, as the Turkish title Bashaw. This spelling, which Johnson has followed, represents regularly, in our orthography, the sound indicated by the Italian Bascià; and both concur exactly with the French Pacha, except for the first letter. Gibbon's diligent curiosity leading him to inquiry, he learnt that, in one extensive portion of the Turkish empire the people failed, as the Welsh with us, of the faculty of pronouncing the B, and in another part that of pronouncing P; whence has arisen the difference, in regard to that first letter, which alone directs to a difference in pronuntiation, between the French and us, with whom the Italians concur. Gibbon, so far concurring with the French, has chosen for himself the peculiar orthography Pashaw, which possibly may be, as he has supposed it, the most warranted by the best Turkish custom. But it may probably have occurred to many to have observed some English speakers, and not uneducated, misled by the modern fashion of French orthography, strangely to pervert the proper sound, pronouncing as if the word were written Paka. Thus also the fashionable French orthography of the name of an Arabian people, Bedouin, variously puzzles English readers; who have no difficulty when they find it written by Shaw, and other English travellers, Bedoween; thus properly

representing the Arabic letters, and indicating the Arabic pronuntiation, as far as English letters may. Legislation in orthography, and also in phraseology, rests now principally with the daily newsprinters, as those with whose works the public eye is far most continually and extensively familiar. And considering the rapidity to which they are unremittingly urged, as in a race, their general correctness ought perhaps more to excite admiration than any occasional failure of it should induce blame. A large proportion of their materials coming to them in French, it is not wonderful if, in their necessary constant haste, they frequently relieve themselves by adopting French words, French idioms, and all the torture to which the French, scrupulous of nothing which may make everything French, put forein names: while modesty, overstrained with us (what the French call *mauvaise honte*), produces scruple of whatever may make anything English. Thus an injurious change is rapidly working in our language, to which even the government gazette, not excusable as the daily newspapers, has sometimes contributed; lending its authority for the intrusion of words and phrases out of all analogy with the English language, and needless for any purpose, unless to amuse those who are aware how English voices far mostly mispronounce them.

satisfied

satisfied with this apology for Sambus, but some bramins, accused as instigators of revolt, were put to death.

Musicanus however, urged by the bramins, probably misestimating the value of Grecian arms and discipline, and encouraged by a view of the smallness of the numbers actually attending Alexander, had revolted. Python, sent in command against him, soon took all his towns: some were destroyed, and the surviving inhabitants sold to slavery; in some citadels were built and garrisons placed. Musicanus himself, brought prisoner, was by Alexander's order sent back to his own country, to be there hanged, together with some bramins, his advisers.

The terror of Alexander's arms now extended to the ocean; the intervening country being indeed too much divided among small sovereinties, often hostile to oneanother, for any to have reasonable hope of successful resistance to such a force as he could command. A deputation waited upon him from the sovereign of the insular territory, inclosed between the two principal channels by which the waters of the Indus reach the sea. Bringing the assurance of submission, which Alexander required from all within his reach who desired to live in peace, the deputies carried back with them his promise of protection for their prince in his present power and dignity; but, with it, a requisition that, at the town of Pattala, the capital of his dominion, situated at the point of separation of the two great channels of the Indus, all convenience should be provided for his fleet and army against their arrival.

It seems, from Arrian's omission, nearly evident that the historian-generals, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, beyond whose authority he shows himself generally unwilling to pledge himself, declined to report even those accessions of strength to the army, which continued to be received occasionally from Europe, and still more would be disposed to avoid acknowledgement of the greater numbers of Asiatics, whom they styled barbarians, now forming a very important part of that, nevertheless, for its general title, called the Macedonian army. But what is not found in his history of the expedition remains stated in his account of India, that, when Alexander

Arr. Ind.  
c. 19.

imbarked on the Hydaspes, his army, in that country, was of a hundred and twenty thousand men, exclusively of those auxiliary troops of the Indian princes and states which he afterward dismissed. Between India and the center of the empire were yet objects for military measures, but

not requiring such numbers, nor in countries capable of maintaining them. To divide the army therefore being necessary, a large body was committed to Craterus, consisting of three divisions of the phalanx, commanded by Attalus, Meleager and Antigonus, with some bowmen, and all those Macedonians, among whom were some of the band of companions, who for age, wounds, or state of health, were less able for severe service. Craterus was directed to march for Persia proper; not by the shortest, but the easiest and safest road; first returning up the course of the Indus by its right bank, and then proceeding through Arachosia, a fruitful country already explored, and where nothing hostile was apprehended. At the same time Python was sent back northward on the left bank, with the Agrians and horsebowmen, to inspect the state of the colonies established, and inquire concerning the conquered countries on that side of the river; with orders, after having made all necessary arrangements, to return and follow the motions of the largest body retained for service southward, which was to proceed, under the command of Hephæstion, on the right bank, to Pattala. Alexander himself embarked for that place, with a chosen division.

Having proceeded on the water two days without any remarkable occurrence, information met him, on the third, that the chief of Pattala<sup>19</sup> had deserted his country, leading the greater part of the inhabitants with him. Accordingly, on arriving, he found the town and neighboring country deserted. Severity, overstrained, he seems now to have learnt, would defeat its own purpose. Sending in pursuit of the fugitives, therefore, he gave orders not to kill, but to bring prisoners; and these he sent back again after their still flying fellowcountrymen, to assure them that all might return, and securely occupy their houses and till their lands, as before. This had, in considerable amount, the desired effect. Pattala then was presently observed to be a place of critical importance for its command of the two branches of the river, and of a country abounding with valuable produce; fruitful of cattle, especially of camels, and, for grain, of the best rice. Works were therefore put forward for making

Arr. l. 6.  
c. 18.  
¶ m. on  
Nearch.

<sup>19</sup> On the first mention of this chief Arrian calls him Ὁ τῶν Πατάλων τῆς χώρας ἄρχων. Here he calls him τῶν Πατάλων ὑπαρχος. Under whom he was ἄρχων is not said; nor is this the first occasion on which Arrian

gives the title of ὑπαρχος without mention of a superior. This, and indeed the whole of his narrative, marks his uncertainty about the political state of India.



it a naval station, and securing that station by a citadel. Observing farther that much of the neighboring country was uninhabited only from want of fresh water, the springs might be found in digging to a moderate depth, he employed parties of his troops in that service. Altogether this southern part of India appears to have been less civilized, and less well governed, than the northern, which had been already subdued. The inhabitants of the neighborhood of Pattala, through ignorance, jealous of the beneficent works going forward, killed some of those employed, but were soon repressed by a force sent against them.

The question arose now by which of the branches of the great river, which here divided, the fleet should proceed to the ocean. Alexander resolved himself to examine both, and to begin by the western. For escort on the water he took a select squadron of the vessels which had been found the swiftest, and he put eight thousand foot and one thousand horse under the command of Leonnatus, to attend his motions, marching on the left bank. The season was adverse, being that of the stormy monsoon, blowing from the ocean; and pilots failed; those Pattalians most practised in navigation, perhaps informed of previous severities, and therefore less confiding in promises of protection, not being found among those who had returned to their homes. Nevertheless Alexander, not probably without information of what might be expected, yet not believing it in its full extent, and of a temper indisposed to yield to any conquerable obstacles, persevered in his purpose. The first day of the voyage passed smoothly. But, on the second, a violent adverse wind not only prevented progress, but, meeting the stream which favored the fleet's course, produced so troubled a surface that the vessels labored greatly: some were so injured by collision as to be rendered useless; but the crews all reached the shore. Parties then pursuing still the fugitive natives, some prisoners skilled in the river navigation were taken, and, being well treated, were found highly useful. In the farther progress of the fleet the water widened to the extent of some miles, and here another storm came on; but, the Indians showing a bay near, capable of affording shelter, damage was avoided.

Already here the river was affected by the singular tides of the neighbouring ocean. To the astonishment of the Greeks, accustomed only to the Mediterranean and Euxine seas, the ebb left all the vessels aground; and,

and, then again to their surprize, the following flood set them afloat<sup>20</sup>. Information was obtained that, near the river's mouth was an iland called Killuta, affording advantageous harbours. Two light vessels were dispatched to ascertain the circumstances. On their return, their commander's

<sup>20</sup> Very early, in the course of this work, occasion occurred to animadvert upon the too common practice of critics, ingenious as well as learned, but, who speculating much, have seen little, to assume judgement on matters of which their information has been very deficient. The annotator on Nearchus has also found occasion for such animadversion. 'The surprize of the Macedonians, and their ignorance of the tides,' he observes 'have been ridiculed by Voltaire, who thinks it incredible that Alexander should not know the nature of tides; as he must have seen the Euripus when in Bœotia, and must have known that Aristotle wrote on the subject. Major Rennell has corrected this petulance, by showing that the tide in the Indus is the Bore, which operates along the whole coast,—runs in the Hoogly river seventy miles in four hours, rises, at Calcutta, five feet in an instant, in the Megna twelve feet.' Vin. on Nearch. b. 2. p. 171. The learned commentator might have added, what Voltaire, with modest inquiry might readily have learnt, that the tides on the coast of his own country, as of England also, especially on the western coasts, are so much greater than those of the Euripus, that these would hardly furnish a conception of what was to be expected. Lord Lyttelton, in his history of Henry the Second, has wasted labor to refute Voltaire's at least equal petulance, in contradicting the report of historians, that the first William made Newforest. 'Les historiens' he says in his essay on general history, 'ne font pas attention qu'il faut au moins vingt années pour qu'un nouveau plan d'arbres deviennent une foret propre a la chasse. On lui fait semer cette foret en 1080: il avoit alors soixante trois ans. Quelle apparence,

'&c.'—Those who know the country and its history will see it every way probable that, when William subjected his new forest to the same forest laws and government, or nearly the same, which he found already established for many forests in his acquired kingdom, it was already prepared by nature to be a forest, differing little, if anything, in general character, from that it bears at this day. In large tracts oak is the weed of the soil, coming everywhere without human care, and protected in early growth by holly, but still more advantageously by hawthorn, also weeds of the soil, even against deer. Intervening large tracts, bearing nothing but heath, deny equally the growth of indigenous trees and advantageous return for tillage. That these tracts, or much of them, were then wild, cannot be doubted; and that William afterward made large additions from cultivated private estates, has been given to general knowlege since Lord Lyttelton's time, by the publication of Domesday book, compiled by William's order. Most of those estates were granted again to individuals in presently following reigns, and mostly hold, to this day, the same names by which they are recorded in Domesday book, or so nearly the same as not to be mistaken. All of these, with hardly an exception, are at this day still so wooded, among their cultivated fields, as to be perfect for all the purposes of a forest. The very ingenious French poet-historian-philosopher's argument then, contrasted with these matters of fact, can be matter only for ridicule.

This, wide as it is from the subject, it is hoped may be allowed in a note, for its tendency to warrant observations offered in former notes, and perhaps some yet to come.

report

report encouraging, the squadron proceeded thither; and Alexander himself, eager to explore the great expanse before him, went on, with some chosen vessels, some leagues, till he came in sight of another island. But he had neither vessels fit to proceed far on the ocean, nor means to be sure of his course beyond sight of land. Returning therefore to Killuta he there sacrificed to the gods, to whom the oracle of Ammon, he said, had directed him to address such worship. On the following day however he ventured to proceed as far as the island last discovered, and there sacrificed to other gods with other ceremonies; still asserting that all was done in conformity to instructions from the oracle of Ammon. Directing his course then eastward beyond the mouth of the Indus, and finding no land southward, he celebrated a magnificent sacrifice ashboard to the god Neptune. The carcasses of bulls, slain with due ceremony, were thrown into the sea. Golden cups being then filled with wine, from a golden flagon, he himself, after pouring libations upon the waves, threw in both cups and flagon.

An object worthy of this hazardous expedition in a distant corner, so separated from the body of the empire, where most important matters of regulation necessarily pressed for attention, is so obscurely and deficiently indicated by antient writers, that the pomp with which its success was celebrated, and the pretension to the favor of divine admonition concerning it, might appear even ridiculous, if the petition, which Alexander is stated to have addressed to the deity on the occasion, did not open light upon the large policy, the spring of all: he prayed ‘that the fleet, which he ‘was about to send from the Indus, by the ocean and the Persian gulph, ‘to the Euphrates, might prosperously make the voyage.’ That voyage, for vessels wholly unadapted to ocean navigation, and seamen wholly unpractised in it, whether indeed ever before performed being apparently unknown, was evidently enough of extraordinary hazard, and might well want extraordinary encouragement and stimulation for those to be employed on it.

Arrian, prosecuting his purpose of a military history of Alexander, has been often led, as here, to notice important facts beyond that particular object; and these, in the part with which we are now engaged, have attracted the just attention of the commentator on the narrative of his admiral Nearchus. ‘That Alexander,’ says that diligent inquirer, ‘had  
Vincent on  
Nearchus,  
b. 2. p. 165.  
 ‘conceived



‘ceived a plan of the commerce which was afterward carried on from  
 ‘ Alexandria in Egypt to the Indian ocean, I think capable of demonstration  
 ‘ by his conduct after his arrival at Pattala. In his passage down the  
 ‘ Indus he had evidently marked that river as the eastern frontier of his  
 ‘ empire. He had built three cities, and fortified two others on this line ;  
 ‘ and he was now preparing for the establishment of Pattala, at the point  
 ‘ of division of the river, and planning other posts at its eastern and  
 ‘ western mouths. Upon his arrival at Pattala he had dispatched light  
 ‘ troops in pursuit of the fugitive people, who, upon promise of safety and  
 ‘ protection, mostly returned. His next care was to explore the deserts,  
 ‘ to find water, and to dig wells. This is evidence rather of a commercial  
 ‘ than a military purpose ; for so all who have travelled the deserts will  
 ‘ esteem it, and such was Arrian’s opinion, who says it was to render the  
 ‘ country habitable.’

Reckoning Pattala then the advantageous place for the great emporium proposed for the east, as Alexandria in Egypt for the west, he enlarged his plan for making it a naval arsenal, and resolved to leave a part of his fleet there. Informed that the eastern branch of the Indus, having a less rapid current, afforded a more advantageous communication with the ocean than the western, he would himself explore it. In approaching the sea his pilots pointed out an extensive lake, with a convenient harbour, or landing-place, and good communication from the river. Leaving there the greater part of the landforce which had attended him, with all his smaller vessels, he proceeded with the larger only. Reaching the ocean, and landing on its shore, he employed three days in examining that part of the country, and then returned to his haven in the lake. Having directed there whatever his purposes appeared farther to require, he pursued his way back to Pattala.

He was now satisfied of the imprudence of undertaking, in that season of the adverse monsoon, with the means possessed by the antients, and vessels adapted to such deficient means, the navigation of the Indian ocean. He therefore directed the collecting of four months provisions for the force intended for that service. Even the river navigation had been found in that season hazardous. Nevertheless, in returning to his main army, he would share, with his navigators, the peril of going by water.

In his extensive survey of the shores, and, as far as time and circumstances would allow, of the country, having observed its wants, and the opportunities for relieving them, he sent additional parties to dig wells in various places, that water, that indispensable necessary, of which his vessels could not carry a supply for many days, might abound for his fleet in passing.

## SECTION III.

*Arrangement for the Return of the Army to Persia, and for exploring the means for Navigation between India and the Persian Gulph. Difficulties of the proposed March; Colony settled near the Coast. Failure of ordered Preparation. Sufferings in traversing the Desert.*

THE northern countries which now separated the recent conquests from Persia and Media, Alexander knew from having traversed them; the southern only by report. Before he detached Craterus by the known way, he had large assurance that the other was, from natural circumstances, of difficulty, for the march of an army, extraordinary, of a numerous army insurmountable. Nor were these circumstances unknown to those selected for the expedition, but, on the contrary, rather exaggerated in report and in fancy. Several armies, which had attempted to cross the wilderness, it was said, had wholly perished there, and, even of the commanders, only two had survived; Semiramis, queen of Assyria, celebrated in earliest profane history, and the great Cyrus; the former reaching her own dominion with only twenty attendants, the latter saving only seven. Alexander nevertheless persevered in an undertaking, however hazardous, indispensable toward the completion of his great design of providing advantageous communication and connection, for the body of his empire, with the highly valuable newly acquired eastern provinces. Without coöperation and occasional support from a landforce, it were beyond hope for a fleet, of the antient construction, and with only the antient means for navigation, to make the proposed voyage along such an extent of unknown coast; mostly desert, and, where inhabited, hostile. So however his liberality, his repu-

Arr. 1. 6.  
C. 21.

Arr. *ibid.*

tation for piety, the historian says, toward the gods, his pretensions to assurance of divine favor, supported by his extraordinary and constant successes, but especially his profuse unsparingness of himself, his readiness upon all occasions for any fatigue, any privation, and every danger, had gained the attachment and confidence of those under him, that no unwillingness appears to have been finally shown, either in the army or in the fleet, to proceed upon the expeditions severally proposed for them; in which he was to accompany the one, with promise of all possible support to the other.

B. C. 326.  
Ol. 133, 3.  
Vin. on  
Nearch.

It was, according to the commentator on Nearchus, founding his calculation on combined information from Strabo and Arrian, early in September that he set out from Pattala with his landforce, leaving his fleet to await there the season for navigation. The first requisite, toward his great object, being to facilitate communication by the ocean between the river Indus and the Persian gulph, his purpose was to march the nearest to the coast that the circumstances of the country would allow. Always then ready to take the business of most fatigue and danger, he committed the main body to Hephæstion, to proceed by the less forbidding road, higher up the country, while, with a chosen division, he diverged himself toward the barren shore, where he caused wells to be dug, and other provision to be made for the welfare of his fleet when it might pass.

As generally in India, so in proceeding now westward, the population was found divided into communities unable to resist, yet unwilling to obey. On the army's approach, the Arabites (called so by the Greeks from their river, the Arabis) quitting their cultivated lands, had fled to the neighboring wilds. The river was not of depth to make the passage difficult. Beyond it was a desert; of extent however not requiring much more than one night for the march across it, so as to reach, soon after daybreak, the cultivated country of the Orites. The disposition of that people being hostile, insomuch that they were prepared, not only for emigration, should it be needful, but first for resistance, Alexander hastened forward with his cavalry; and, attacking those found in arms, killed many and made many prisoners. Incamping then on the bank of a small river which crossed the way, he was there joined by Hephæstion, and the united army

proceeded



proceeded to Rambacia, which Arrian, tho describing it as the largest town of the Orite territory, calls nevertheless a village. Apparently it was unfortified; but the advantages of its situation, and the fruitfulness of the surrounding soil, engaged Alexander's attention. Not on the coast, it was yet so near that a fleet might have easy communication with it; and being, by all circumstances, says the historian, singularly promising for a great and flourishing city, he resolved to establish a colony there, and took measures accordingly.

Beyond the Orite country was Gadrosia, a province of that formerly the Persian, now his own empire, where his Grecian satrap, Apollophanes, commanded. The western part of that extensive region, bordering on Carmania and Persia, with exception for the coast, is fruitful; the middle an immense sandy wilderness: the people of the eastern part thus, under the lax rule of the Persian satraps, had been little habituated to civil restraint. For the number of important offices to which, among his extensive and rapid conquests, Alexander had often, in necessary haste, to appoint, that selection should be always fortunate would not be to be expected from the most penetrating of mankind, even if also the most experienced. Apollophanes, according to Arrian's phrase, had done nothing of what had been commanded him. The eastern Gadroses, whether through his failure, or otherwise, not only gave a friendly reception to numerous fugitive Orites, but concurred with them in occupying a strait, on their frontier, with the purpose of disputing the passage. Information of this reached Alexander at Rambacia. To be quick, and not to commit to others what he could do himself, seem to have been always his maxims in all difficulties. He gave to Hephæstion, the comparatively easy office of superintending the projected works there, while himself, with a select body, proceeded against the united Orites and Gadroses. Nor was his presence unavailing toward an easy success. Assured that Alexander in person was come to attack them, and that, on the spot, proposal or solicitation might be addressed to him, the united people deserted their strong post; and shortly the chiefs of the Orites arrived at his camp, surrendering themselves, and offering the surrender of their nation. This being precisely what, for his objects at his new colony, he desired, he dismissed them, with direction

ARR. I. 3.  
C. 26.

to inform their people 'that all who would go home should have his 'protection for person and property.'

Returning then, he constituted Rambacia the capital of a surrounding satrapy. To the charge and dignity of satrap he appointed an officer named, in our copies of Arrian, like the satrap of Gadosia, perhaps through error of transcribers, Apollophanes<sup>21</sup>, and he selected a body of horse and foot to remain there, under the command of Leonnatus. His earnestness to maintain the dominion acquired in these eastern parts, to use the advantages it offered for the benefit of the whole empire, and, with that view, to assure the safety and success of his fleet in exploring the coast, are, among numerous other indications, not lightly marked in the amount and in the selection of troops for the station of Rambacia. Beside a large body, not particularly described by the historian, he left there all the Grecian mercenary horse, those middle-armed, the Agrians, whom he had distinguished as his chosen companions in dashing enterprizes, and a complete division of bowmen. The whole was directed to await the passing of the naval armament, and meanwhile to support the satrap in measures for its relief and welfare.

In the march from the Indus, thus far, rivers had been found at no very great intervals. But, in the country next to be traversed, in the way to Persia, the inconveniencies of a very extensive sandy wilderness were to be encountered. The heat of the air there is beyond that ordinary in other the most sultry climates. Myrrh-bearing trees, and the nard plant in great abundance, are the only produce noticed. Some Phenicians, who had followed the army in this perilous march with mercantile views, loaded their cattle with these, in such quantities, that the abundant nard, bruised in carrying, perfumed the air. But here and there only a very scanty population was found; food and water were everywhere scarce; and the nearer the coast, where Alexander's great object required his course, every deficiency and every inconvenience greatest. It seems indeed indicated

<sup>21</sup> The circumstances stated by Arrian indicate that this Apollophanes was a different person from him recently mentioned by the same name to have been satrap of Gadosia, and it seems more likely that, for the description of one or the other,

transcribers may have been careless, than that Arrian would have failed to add some such distinction as that of the father's name, usual with him on other occasions, had the names of the two persons been the same.

that all were greater than might have been, had his satrap of Gadrosia executed ably and diligently the duties expected of him.

Under necessity therefore to diverge inland with his main body, Alexander detached Thoas son of Mandrodorus, with a small division of horse, to explore the country toward the sea. That officer, on rejoining, reported, that he found inhabitants only on the coast, and those few and miserable; living on fish, in huts formed of shells and fish-bones, with water in very small quantity, to be had only by digging in the sand near the shore, and all brackish.

As the army proceeded, difficulties and distresses increased. Hills of accumulated sand, crossing the way, yielded to the step as mud, or, says the historian, rather as snow. Progress for wheeled carriages soon became impossible. Horses and mules, tho not drawing, with difficulty got forward, and, through fatigue and hunger and thirst, many perished. The march, regulated necessarily by opportunity for finding water, was sometimes very long. Night was always preferred for it; both to avoid the heat of the sun, singularly scorching in that country, and to obviate as far as might be the misery of excessive thirst. Food also was scanty and bad. The summits of palmtrees, used by the few inhabitants of the desert as a culinary vegetable, were resorted to by the troops, when the rare opportunity offered. But, as the urgency for hasty progress, and of course for bodily exertion, increased, the strength of many failed. Carriages then being necessarily left behind; and cattle, still more than men, fainting through hunger and thirst, relief in conveyance, for sick, and wounded, and weak, was impossible. In necessary care for all, says the historian, regard for individuals was lost; and, through the urgency for every one to make the greatest possible speed, the disabled were left to perish unattended. In the need of provisions and unavoidable laxity of order, with this haste, and among such distresses, numbers of horses and mules, lean as they were and exhausted, were killed by the soldiers for food. On inquiry it was always pretended that they died of hunger and fatigue; and tho this, in many cases, was disbelieved, and report was made to Alexander accordingly, he judged it, says again the historian, better to seem still ignorant of the irregularity, than either to punish that for which necessity would so plead excuse, or, as knowing, yet not punishing, to appear to warrant it.

Many



Vin. on  
Nearch.

Many days these distresses had been suffered, when from a new cause, apprehension of worse arose: the guides declared they could no longer discern the way; the sand, driven by the wind, having obliterated every beaten track, and the country furnishing no landmark; not a tree, nor even any permanent irregularity of ground; while, contrary to what had been experienced in the outset, when the scorching ray had been a principal grievance, the sky was become so constantly clouded, that neither sun could be seen by day nor star by night. And this is ascertained, by modern observation, to occur regularly toward the change of the monsoon. Should they proceed, in these circumstances, they might soon become uncertain even in what direction they were going. Alexander, having considered all information, resolved, while yet the direction was known, to seek the sea. Thus far his anxious desire to explore the coast had yielded to the urgency for conducting his army, with the least delay, to a land of food and water. Now the surest, if not the shortest course to that object concurred with the other. Probably the guides, knowing yet where they were, knew that the sea was not far off. Alexander would himself lead the party for the search; tho, on inquiring for horses, only five, of the whole army, it is said, were found able for the undertaking. Fortunately however, within an easy distance, he was gratified with a view of the Indian ocean. Returning then with the best speed, and conducting his suffering troops to the shore, he had the farther good fortune, in following its direction, to find everywhere, by digging in the sand, a sufficient supply of wholesome water; an advantage not probably unlooked for, as not only common on a sandy shore, but having been recently found by the detachment, under Thoas, which had been sent to the coast. In this course, after some days progress, a farther advantage occurred. Objects came in view, so giving character to the face of the country, that the guides declared they could now safely quit the coast, and lead the more direct way toward that distinguished as the fruitful Gadosia. Soon then an advantageous change was found. Cultivation came in view, and presently corn was obtained in sufficient plenty.

Arr. l. 6.  
c. 24.

The numerous accounts, Arrian says, in his day extant, mostly concurred in asserting that the sufferings and losses of the army, in passing the Gadosian desert, were greater than in all the preceding years, since it crossed the Hellespont. Whether the march was indeed rashly undertaken,

taken, or whatever amount of the disaster may have been owing to the failure of the satrap Apollophanes to provide expected supplies, that the king should escape blame from the vulgar tongue, or from a party adverse to himself, or to his ministers, would not be within reasonable expectation. But that, in the distresses of that march, Alexander bore his share admirably, all testimonies agree. Early in its course, when the relief of carriages was lost, and those disabled by disease, wounds, deficiency of food, or its badness, or by excessive heat, were, in the urgency to reach the station where relief might be obtained, necessarily left behind, probably to perish, Alexander, instead of riding, as usually with his cavalry, dismounted, and walked at the head of his infantry. Throughout the march a party was advanced before the army to seek water, attended with pioneers to dig for it where anything might afford a promise of success; of which the growth of palmtrees is said to be sure indication. In one day's march of extraordinary length, in the course of which, under a scorching sun, no water had been found, and all were suffering, some of the light-armed discovered a very small pool remaining in the bed of a winter-torrent. Proposing from this to make a grateful offering to their king, in failure of another vessel, they carried him a helmet full. Alexander taking the helmet, and commending the intention of those who brought it, poured the water on the ground. The effect, says Arrian, in encouragement to the troops, was as if every man had been refreshed with a draught: 'And I commend Alexander,' he proceeds, 'for this, as an eminent instance of forbearance, and of conduct becoming a general.'

Arr. l. 6.  
c. 26.  
Strab.

Arr. l. 6.  
c. 26.

Having at length reached that distinguished from the desert by the title of the fruitful Gadrosia, where his army would be presently beyond want, his fleet became his care. It appears probable that he may have had information of its departure from the Indus before the appointed time; but of the delays, which in the sequel we shall find occurring, intelligence is not so likely to have reached him. Anxious therefore for its welfare, he sent a quantity of corn, in packages sealed with his signet, under an escort, to await its arrival on the barren coast, distinguished as the land of the fisheaters, which extended from the Orite country nearly to the mouth of the Persian gulph. On this desolate shore the provision for the escort itself was consumed, while no fleet yet appeared, or could be heard of. Hunger then pressing, the store in charge was invaded; and, nearly all being used, while

Arr. l. 6.  
c. 23.

while still no intelligence of the fleet arrived, the escort rejoined the army. In its report, the necessity of its situation was made so evident that Alexander, says the historian, forgave the irregularity.

But, as he proceeded, he found farther proof of what Arrian, in his commonly concise way, sums up in saying, that his satrap of that extensive province, to whom he looked for relief for his fleet, his army, and himself, Apollophanes, had done nothing of what had been commanded him. Failure to provide food for all seems to have been at least among his deficiencies. Alexander therefore, taking on himself, as usual, any office for the duties of which he was anxious, rode around the country to superintend and enforce the collection of corn and flour; which he committed to Telephus of his band of companions, and Cretheus another confidential officer, to escort to different parts of the coast, there to await the fleet's arrival. Meanwhile others were directed to procure, from the northward, flour and dates and sheep, which should follow.

Proceeding then, it was, according to Arrian and Strabo, about the sixtieth day after the departure from the Indus, and, according to Vincent's careful computation, toward the end of October, that the army arrived at Poora, the capital of Gadrosia, situated in a plentiful part of that province so extensively a barren wilderness. Here Alexander gave his wayworn troops the rest they so much needed. Apollophanes was dismissed from the satrapy, and Thoas, whom we have seen lately successful in a critical military command, was appointed to it. Probably that deserving officer had suffered from his exertions in the severe service of the desert; for he died presently after. The Gadrosian government including Arachosia, for extent, together with its critical situation, must have been a very important trust. It was committed to Sibyrtius, who previously held the satrapy of the smaller neighbouring province of Carmania, where Tlepolemus son of Pythophanes succeeded him. It seems to have been at Poora that a large supply of horses and camels arrived from the northern provinces, provided by the diligence of Stasanor, satrap of Areia and Zarangia, and Phrataphernes satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, to repair the loss of troop-horses, and baggage-cattle, which had been foreseen as hardly avoidable in crossing the desert.

The army then being refreshed, supplies obtained, and necessary arrangements settled, the march was resumed westward. Some progress had



had been made, when intelligence arrived of a mutiny in the army in India, wherein Philip, commander-in-chief there, a man apparently much esteemed by Alexander, had lost his life; with the satisfactory addition, however, that it had been completely quelled by the surviving officers, supported especially by the Macedonians of the commander-in-chief's body-guard, and that the principal mutineers, mercenaries of various nations, had been put to death. The steady and animated loyalty of the Macedonians, left in that distant province, would be the more gratifying to Alexander on account of his late difference with all the Macedonians of his army. Such was the assurance of complete order restored, that he judged it sufficient to send a written commission for Eudemus, apparently a Macedonian, and the Indian prince Taxiles, jointly to superintend the affairs of the Indian dominion, till he might appoint another satrap.

The province he was now approaching, Carmania, bordering eastward on Gadosia, westward on the Persian gulph, northward on proper Persia, was toward the coast a continuation of the Gadosian sandy desert, with intervals only of a soil somewhat, and not greatly, better; but, within-land an elevated country, of a more tempered heat of atmosphere, and eminently fruitful. The people were in manners, habits and language, Persian. Tho difficulty in the march from Poora is not specified, yet Alexander seems, not till he had reached Carmania, to have reckoned that the troubles of his painful march were decidedly over, and that he was completely returned to the body of that rich empire, so rapidly conquered, whence, separated by a range of mountains the longest in the world, and among the loftiest, and by a desert among the largest, he had been absent near six years. In Carmania Craterus was to join him with that large portion of the army which, for avoiding the desert, had been directed to march through Arachosia. In Carmania Stasanor came to wait upon him from Areia, and Pharismanes, deputed by his father Phrataphernes, from Parthia; apparently to report circumstances of the important governments over which they presided. Strab. l. 15.

In the rapidity of his earlier successes, having allowed but a few weeks of his presence in any one place of his extensive conquests, for the establishment of his dominion, it cannot be wonderful if, on his return now, he did not find the negligence of his satrap of Gadosia

alone a cause of dissatisfaction, but rather that, in such an absence from so new a dominion, so extensive, so rich and so populous, great troubles, and of difficult suppression, had not arisen. Deficient as our information is of particulars, the result enough shows that he employed able ministers, and that his own judgement in selection and direction was excellent. Nevertheless the distance to which his ambitious and roving temper had led him, his purpose declared to carry conquest to an unknown extent still eastward, his frequent serious dangers, giving occasion sometimes to reports even that he was dead, encouraged those left in command, if inclination at all prompted, to malversation in office; some only for private lucre, to the oppression of those under them, others with revolutionary purposes. Craterus arriving, according to orders, with the largest portion of the army, and all the elephants, brought with him, as a prisoner, an eminent Persian, Orsanes; who, among the people between northern India and Carmania, had been exciting revolt. In pursuance of commands also the generals Cleander, Sitalces, and Heracon arrived from Media, with part of the forces, formerly under Parmenio, and, since his death, under their command. The names indicate Sitalces to have been a Thracian; the two others Greeks, whether of Macedonia or the republics. Accusation had been preferred against all for oppression and peculation. Alexander ordered their trials; and, evidence from the army itself confirming that of the people of the country, Cleander and Sitalces were condemned and executed. Heracon was acquitted. But the fame of Alexander's severe justice, confirming former assurances of his anxiousness for the welfare of all under his empire, and of his determined impartiality in providing for it, encouraged the Susians to institute accusation against Heracon. Among other matters, robbery of the treasury of one of their principal temples was proved against him, and he then suffered death. These just severities, the historian says, were highly consolatory to Alexander's new subjects, and powerfully conciliated their attachment. The manner of the trials is not mentioned; but, considering

Ch. 50. s. 4. Alexander's recent concession, or rather submission, to the Macedonian  
of this hist. part of his army, together with the circumstance that, in these accusations, the army itself concurred with the people of the country, no dissatisfaction among the old subjects being noticed, it seems every way probable that, as  
in

in the trials of Philotas and the Lyncestian Alexander, all was conducted according to the Macedonian law.

The army being now reassembled, and business, pressing for immediate attention, being settled, the usual ceremonies of piety toward the gods, and gratification for the troops, followed. A magnificent thanksgiving sacrifice was offered for the Indian victories, and for the preservation of the king, and his surviving companions in arms, among the perils of the wilderness; and this was followed by gymnastic exercises and theatrical entertainments.

Rewards to deserving officers at the same time engaged Alexander's attention. Among these Peucestas, to whom he reckoned himself indebted for the preservation of his life, when he rashly leaped within the Mallian fortification, was eminently distinguished. Hitherto the number of those great officers of the court, intitled bodyguards, had been limited to seven. This number being full, Peucestas, now added, made an eighth.

Falshoods, affecting the characters of eminent men, if they have obtained any extensive credit, may be objects for historical notice, not only in justice to those men, but as they assist to mark the character of the times in which they were published and held credit. Arrian has mentioned the report of some authors, that Alexander traversed Carmania, lying in a vehicle formed of two of his ordinary chariots, surrounded by his favorite companions, with music continually playing, while the troops marched as in a procession of the festival of Bacchus, with licentious merriment, by short stages, at each of which luxurious fare was provided for them. Among the promulgators of that report we find Diodorus; and it was too inviting for the taste of Curtius, and perhaps of those to whom principally he looked for readers, to be omitted by him. On the contrary Arrian, after reporting the story, says, 'I do not believe it; as it is noticed neither by Ptolemy son of Lagus, nor by Aristobulus son of Aristobulus, nor by any other author worthy of credit. For my account I have followed Aristobulus.'

Diod. l. 17.

c. 106.

Curt. l. 9.

c. 10.

Arr. l. 6.

c. 28.



## CHAPTER LV.

## Voyage of NEARCHUS.

## SECTION I.

*Authority for the Narrative. Deficiency of Means for the Undertaking. The Fleet to be employed. The Monsoon. Appointment of Officers. Foreseen Difficulties of the Undertaking.*

ALEXANDER was still in Carmania when he had the satisfaction to receive information of the safe arrival of his fleet, from the Indus, at a harbour of the Persian gulph; and soon after to see his admiral, Nearchus, coming to report to him the circumstances of the voyage.

For this interesting, and singular, yet formerly neglected portion of antient history, neglected apparently because difficult and doubtful, it is no ordinary advantage, for the writer of the present day, to have it before him elucidated by the learning, talent, and devoted diligence of the late dean of Westminster, Vincent. Of his commentary on the narrative, derived, through Arrian, from that of Nearchus himself<sup>1</sup>, as of a gift to the world, free use will be made; while, nevertheless, liberty will be taken for any animadversion which the duty of a writer for the public may appear to require. If thus the account, here following, should, in some places, have more of the character of a dissertation than were desirable in the flow of history, it will be found, it is hoped, not more than the circumstances demand.

To begin then with the words of the able commentator: ‘The voyage of Nearchus is the first event of general importance to mankind in the history of navigation. In the first instance it opened a communication

<sup>1</sup> We have Arrian’s express testimony to this in his history of Alexander, “Ὅπως δὲ ἐπλεύσθη αὐτῷ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τὴν Περσικὴν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Τιγριτοῦ, ταῦτα ἰδίᾳ ἀνγράφω, αὐτῷ Νεάρχῳ ἐπόμενος. Arr. de exped. Alex. l. 6. c. 28.

‘ between

‘between Europe and the most distant countries of Asia. At a later period it was the origin of the Portuguese discoveries, the foundation of the greatest commercial system ever introduced into the world, and consequently the primary cause of the British establishments in India. The narrative of this voyage has been preserved to us by Arrian, whose peculiar felicity it has been to rise in estimation in proportion to the attention bestowed on the transactions he records. As our knowledge of India has increased, the accuracy of his historical researches has been established; and, as the limits of geography have been extended, the exactness of his information has become daily more conspicuous, and, the purity of the sources, whence he drew, more fully established’. At this day we may deem lightly of a voyage which required so much preparation to accomplish, and which a single sloop would now perform in a tenth part of the time.’ The able commentator however would be aware, as will also the reader, that the great advantage of the modern navigator is owing to the discovery of powers in nature, and the possession of instruments to profit from them, unknown till near two thousand years after Alexander; without which hardly could the voyage be rationally undertaken at all, in any of our vessels adapted to the navigation of the ocean. Vincent accordingly has well added, ‘but the merit of the attempt is to be estimated by the originality of the conception;’ and, it may be farther

<sup>a</sup> The authenticity of that narrative, which has been preserved to us as Arrian’s, is proved, I think, almost superfluously by his able commentator; for to me there seems never to have existed reasonable cause to question it. Yet among those who have endeavoured to throw doubts on it, is a critic to whom I have found occasion formerly to acknowledge no inconsiderable obligation, Dodwell; of whom however Vincent says that he has been apt to be extreme in scepticism, as some others in credulity; an assertion which I will not undertake to controvert, tho I do not recollect that it has formerly occurred to me. But I think scepticism has been not a little a prevailing passion among critics; not a few of whom may be found arrogantly, and for the matter

often ignorantly (as in the instance of Voltaire on Newforest, mentioned in a former note) and altogether mischievously, controverting antient authority. For the voyage of Nearchus, three accounts of it having, beyond question, been published by persons who performed it, and a fourth, in the same language, by Arrian, abridging that of Nearchus himself, that it should, with any imaginable view, in any imaginable age, have been attempted to impose on the world a spurious account, pretending it to be Arrian’s, and especially one so simple and concise as that which has been transmitted, appears so strikingly improbable, that the attempt to disprove its authenticity seems to me hardly more mischievous than extravagant and absurd.

added,

added, by the difficulties and dangers of the undertaking, and the judgement which saw it, with all its difficulties and dangers, not absolutely impracticable, even with the scanty means which the age afforded.

For the fleet to be employed, a small portion only was wanted of that, mostly adapted to river navigation, which had borne a large division of the army, cavalry as well as infantry, with stores for all, down the Indus, and wafted elephants from shore to shore. Of the two kinds of antient vessels, distinguished by the names of long ships and round ships, we have observed the former, tho utterly unfit to keep the sea, alone used as ships of war; being the best adapted to naval action with antient arms, and alone capable of action in the calms, to which the Mediterranean is subject. Experience of a more stormy atmosphere, with shores varying twice daily with the tide, and in some parts greatly, led the ruder people bordering on the Atlantic to a different construction. Thus those of that part of Gaul now called Brittany, with vessels better adapted to their sea, long distressed the invader of their country, the great Julius; and tho his numerous fleet would combine the improvements of the Carthaginians with those of the Greeks, yet the able use of a fortunate occurrence of very calm weather seems alone to have inabled him at length to overcome them. When Alexander proposed his expedition on the ocean, his naval advisers had had no experience of the kind; and even the Roman navigators remained so attached to their old ways, that, for the commerce between the coast of Gaul and the mouth of the Thames, the trading vessels, to avoid the North Foreland, threaded the narrow and shallow channel which formerly made Thanet an island, but now remains distinguishable hardly as a ditch.

C. J. Cæs. de  
Bell. Gall.  
l. 3.

That an enemy was to be apprehended on the seas, capable of contending with the force which Alexander might give to the expedition, seems no way probable; but, for a survey of the coast, perhaps not less than for battle, the long ships were, with the antient art of navigation, best adapted; able always to hold to the shore, to make way without wind, or, if not over violent, even against it, and to land without the intervention of boats. For a voyage of any length however they had very considerable inconveniences. To so many hands as were wanted for giving sufficient impulse with oars, they afforded, as Vincent has well observed, ‘neither space for motion nor  
‘convenience



‘ convenience for rest ; so that continuing on board at night was always a ‘ calamity.’ Beside the proper crews, therefore, liable to great fatigue with rowing, a military force was wanted for a nightly camp ashore ; and thus the vessel was still the more incumbered.

But neither of the number of the vessels employed has clear information reached us, nor of the quality, further than that they were all of the galley or row-boat kind. In the fleet on the river were some of the most powerful commonly yet used in battle by the Greeks, the triremes ; and some of the second rank, the biremes. Vincent seems clearly right in supposing that none of these were allotted to the fleet for discovery. Even the penteconter, or vessel of fifty oars, which was, to the Greek fleets of triremes, as our frigates to line-of-battle ships, is not mentioned, but only the triaconter, or vessel of thirty oars, the smallest used for war, as our sloops. And this vessel seems clearly to have been best suited to the purpose. The seamen would know it to be better adapted to bear a rough sea than the bireme, or any of the vessels which, with more than one tier of oars, were more powerful in battle ; and so much we have seen proved even for the landmen, in the voyage on the river. It was also more convenient than even the penteconter, for frequent landing, and for being lodged in safety on a beach, beyond reach of waves or surf. The number of vessels would be calculated to carry the force requisite for resisting, or deterring, hostilities to be expected, not on the waves, but ashore. Thirty-three triaconters are mentioned as of the river-fleet, and Vincent has not unreasonably reckoned all to have been probably assigned to the expedition on the ocean. Storeships attended ; but these, for power to accompany a fleet of rowboats, being necessarily also rowboats, their room for stowage would be scanty. It is indicated, in the course of the narrative, that the fleet altogether could carry water for only five days, and food for ten.

Of that extraordinary circumstance of the Indian ocean, and most important for navigators, the regularity of the winds, known by the name of Monsoon, some experience had been acquired, and no doubt much information. That the wind blew nearly six months of the year regularly from the north-east, and six from the south-west, would probably be ascertained. Its extent, which is from Madagascar to Japan, none then could know ; and even  
whether

whether it held throughout the proposed course along the coast of the ocean, complete assurance would hardly be gathered. For its fluctuations, ordinary for many days about the seasons of change, and the various disturbance to which it is liable, in approaching the coast, from mountains, capes and bays, intercepting or directing its course, and in nearer approach, the occasional but uncertain prevalence of the land and sea-breezes, which alternate every twenty-four hours, if any undertook to know, whom to trust for knowledge, and at the same time for fidelity, would be difficult to judge; and then to find interpreters able to explain clearly the information given, might be a second and not less difficulty. The existing monsoon was adverse, not only as opposing the proposed course, but as enhancing another adverse circumstance, of which, in Alexander's voyages to the ocean, not only information would have been obtained, but something would have been seen. On the shores of the Indian seas, generally, the surf is greater than in most other parts of the world; and this inconvenient agitation of the water would be stimulated by the wind of the monsoon, then existing, blowing from the sea; abated by the wind of the monsoon to come, blowing from that land, along which was to be the course. Accordingly Alexander ordered that the fleet should wait at Pattala, where he had provided great advantages, till the promised change of the monsoon were completed.

Arr. Ind.  
C. 20.

For a commander of the proposed expedition, he had difficulty. Earnest upon the enterprize, he dreaded its failure, not only for the disappointment of his great purposes, but as it might tarnish his already acquired glory, and deprive him of the advantage, not a small one, of his reputation for never-failing success. Among the antients, Romans as well as Greeks, the duties of the land and sea-service, as we have had occasion formerly to observe, were not allotted to different establishments of officers: a general commanded the fleet, as a branch of the military of the state, and the captain of a trireme had commonly his equal command in the land-service; a combination of military and naval rank which, with all its far greater inconvenience for modern naval war, remarkably enough subsisted, till of late days, in the French service. For the importance of the trust, and the glory to insue from success in it, Alexander was desirous of committing the command-in-chief to one of his most favorite and confidential generals; for so much, tho not avowed, appears

appears enough marked in the account which Arrian seems to have given in Nearchus's own words. But, for a voyage of discovery, a nautical skill was necessary, which none of those generals had had opportunity to acquire. For directing the navigation therefore two others had been principally in view; Onesicritus of Astypalæa in the island of Cos, and Nearchus son of Andromenes, born a Cretan, but become, by settling in Amphipolis, a Macedonian subject. Both appear to have been bred seamen of the Ægean; tho Onesicritus is said, at one time of his life, to have studied in the school of the celebrated Cynic philosopher Diogenes. The view, ordinary among the Greeks, to profit from military service in Asia, seems to have been the inducement for both to engage in the army, for the invasion of that inviting country; and Nearchus, whether for previous reputation, or recommending himself in the course of the expedition, had been chosen to command, under the king only, the immense fleet in the voyage on the rivers. Onesicritus, as the better educated man, probably the pleasanter companion, had been preferred to command the vessel in which the king himself sailed. Nearchus, with talent, activity, and courage, not to be doubted, has put it equally beyond doubt, that he had much vanity and self-importance, with little liberality. His own account, invidiously directed, in exalting himself, to vilify the Macedonian generals, may alone justify their unwillingness to undertake a highly important and most critical command, for the most essential business of which, the direction of a difficult and hazardous navigation, they must be dependent on such a man, commanding under them. All declined it, and none appear so to have lost anything of Alexander's estimation or favor. The command-in-chief then, according still to his own account, as reported by Arrian, was committed to Nearchus alone; but Strabo, who appears to have compared all accounts in his time extant, mentions Onesicritus as having had a joint authority with him; tho whether as equal, a mode common with both Greeks and Romans, or only second, is not clearly said; but even Arrian's narrative, in the sequel, indicates that he had a share in the command, and, moreover, that there was a third in the commission, a Macedonian of distinction, Archias son of Anaxidotus of Pella. This person had held the rank of trierarc in the river voyage; probably a young man, and little a seaman, but willing, for the honor and emolument, to share the dangers and



troubles of the expedition. In adverting to Alexander's former policy, it seems every way likely that a Macedonian would be joined with the islanders in such a trust. Nearchus, however, with all his haughty pretensions, having the suppleness and art to gain Archias, appears to have held effectually, through a majority in the triumvirate, what his own account has claimed for him, the command-in-chief.

For the success of the expedition nothing within Alexander's large means had been omitted. The fleet was not only fitted well but splendidly; a matter not indifferent toward conciliating and incouraging the many. The crews were mostly practised seamen, selected, from the army, among recruits from the various shores of the Ægean and Propontis, Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt; and, as the project appears to have been long in Alexander's view, likely to have been ingaged for the purpose. These would all have become, in some degree, practised soldiers; but, with a view to probable urgency, a chosen body for land-service was also put aboard. The officers appear to have been mostly such as Nearchus approved, inasmuch as he has given them general praise for zeal and activity in preparation for the voyage, tho for nothing farther. He seems indeed to have had more talent for commanding the cheerful obedience of those under him, necessary to his own credit and interest, than disposition either to agree with his superiors or equals, or to give merited praise to his inferiors, when he no longer wanted them. Nevertheless, readier, as on some occasions he has shown himself, for illiberal slander, than just commendation, yet he has so far done justice to his king as to acknowledge, not only the excellent condition of the fleet committed to him, but also the advantage he derived from Alexander's example in venturing himself among the first to enter the ocean, by each branch of the Indus; and he has added, that the confidence, thus excited, was strengthened by the solemn ceremonies of thanksgiving and prayer to the gods, performed on the occasion, and by the consideration of Alexander's never-failing success, in whatever he had undertaken; which Grecian piety was ordinarily disposed to attribute to the favor of the gods toward the successful adventurer.

Pilots had been found for the river, as far as the ocean, and perhaps they might have been found for proceeding along the coast of Malabar; where

where circumstances certainly afforded great invitation for trade, which Vincent, tho without any direct information from antiquity, has supposed already flourishing. But for the long and hazardous course along the barren and ill-inhabited coast, repelling for the merchant, from the mouth of the Indus to the entrance of the Persian gulph, no man, according to the narrative, was found who could serve as a pilot; and, probably enough, no man who had ever made the voyage.

Nevertheless there appears large indication that Nearchus would not be unattended by persons acquainted with the land along the coast, as far, at least, as the country of the Arabites and Orites extended, whom Alexander, in passing, had reduced to obedience. For the long desert shore of Gadrosia, in which were only scattered habitations of the fisheaters, there would be some greater difficulties, but probably also some advantages. Gadrosia, a satrapy of the late Persian empire, had now been years under Alexander's dominion. His satrap there, indeed, had not duly executed orders; but this deficiency, on his own arrival, we have seen him active to repair. Guides had been found for the army's way across the desert; so that, tho reduced, by the circumstances of the season, to difficulty for the course in the sandy plain, yet, having reached the coast, and followed its direction for some days, as soon as they could perceive the highlands, they again knew where they were. Means then hardly would be wholly wanting for Alexander's power to extend communication to most parts of the shore, and his will clearly would not fail to provide information and assistance for his fleet in its progress.

## SECTION II.

*Published Narratives of the Voyage of Nearchus. Remarkable Omissions in the extant Narrative. The Voyage begun during the adverse Monsoon: Delays in the River: Early and long Delay on the Shore of the Ocean. Arrival on the Coast of the Orite country.*

THE account of the navigation on the rivers, as far as Pattala, and down the two channels of the Indus to the ocean and back again, have been already given from Arrian's history of Alexander, drawn from the generals Ptolemy

and Aristobulus. But their narratives of naval measures are not likely to have gone farther than they accompanied the fleet. Of the adventurous following voyage on the ocean, however, three accounts were published by persons who served on it; Nearchus, the commander-in-chief, Onesicritus, either his associate or second in command, and Androsthenes, of the island of Thasus, become, by settling in Amphipolis, like Nearchus, a Macedonian subject. He had held as well as Archias the naval rank of trierarc on the rivers<sup>3</sup>, and now probably was commander of one of the vessels, or, as that rank might rather require, of a division of them. All these works have perished: of the last only one passage remains noticed by Strabo; of the second, several by the same eminent writer, and Pliny, and others: of the first, Arrian having chosen it for his guide, the essence, fortunately, has been preserved, and probably all that was valuable in it; unless that, as a singularity, among relics from the antients, a seaman's journal, as it came from his hand, might have been an interesting curiosity. The form, however, given it by Arrian, little differing from that of a journal, and his known judgement and scrupulous adherence to authority, afford every likelihood that, in using, generally his own, yet sometimes, apparently, the original words, he has given everywhere fairly the original sense, omitting nothing important, and even abridging little. Strabo, referring frequently to the original of Nearchus for geographical information, adds to Arrian's account in regard to one important matter, confirms it in others, and contradicts it in none.

The accounts then of those two eminent writers concurrently show, that the fleet quitted the port of Pattala, and proceeded for the ocean, in a most unfavorable season, near two months before the ordinary time of the change of the monsoon, for which Alexander had directed that it should wait. Arrian, without mentioning any cause for this, begins his narrative of the voyage with stating, that, in a remission of the etesian winds, his phrase for the monsoon, the fleet set out, not then from Pattala, but from a port unnamed, hardly so little as a hundred miles lower down the river, being within ten or twelve miles of its mouth; and after this, he proceeds to add the remarkable circumstance, that Nearchus had previously solemnized a

\* This, on comparing the passages, in Arrian, twice mentioning Androsthenes, appears the probably just description of the writer of the voyage.



sacrifice to Jupiter the preserver, and treated the armament with the amusement of gymnastic exercises<sup>4</sup>. But Strabo has mentioned, what is not found in Arrian, that Nearchus, in some publication, stated a cause for his measure, which necessity only could justify. The Indians, he said, desirous of throwing off a foreign dominion, and resuming courage after the king's departure with the army, came against him in arms. But here also the place, where he was so attacked or threatened, is unnamed; and this failure, in both the accounts, is the more remarkable, as the name of every the most insignificant place touched at by the fleet afterward, and of some which it merely passed, are stated by Arrian, and several are also noticed by Strabo. As far as ground then is offered for conjecture, when it is considered that even the mutiny in the army, which produced the catastrophe of the governor-general, Philip, shook Alexander's Indian dominion but for a moment, it seems utterly unlikely that any Indian force could compel Nearchus to quit Pattala, fortified as it was by Grecian art, prepared with care for a naval station, and plentifully provided.

Nor is this important failure the only one in the narrative requiring notice, and the more for causes which will appear in the sequel. The naval station provided by Alexander at Killuta, as subsidiary to that of Pattala, and on the same side of the river, the eastern, or left, appears marked by its distance from the ocean, for the place of the sacrifice offered and games exhibited by Nearchus, and whence the fleet took its departure. Yet Vincent, in his careful comparison of ancient with modern accounts, has expressed a doubt whether that place was not on the opposite bank. Thus altogether we are without any information of the circumstances of the voyage, perhaps more than a hundred miles, down the river, from Pattala, where Arrian's narrative, derived from the generals Aristobulus and Ptolemy leaves it, till the moving of the fleet from the station within ten miles of the bar against the ocean, with which his narrative, following, as he professes, that of Nearchus, begins. Where then the hostilities occurred, as reported by Strabo, seems yet more doubtful;

<sup>4</sup> Ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐτήσια πνεύματα ἐκσιμῶθη—  
τότε δὲ ὤρημνῆτο. Arr. Ind. c. 21. In prose-  
cuting the account he shows in clear terms,  
that the stormy and adverse monsoon, blow-

ing from the ocean, was not even near its  
end: Πνεύματα μεγάλα, ἐκ τοῦ πόνου, ἔπνευ,  
καὶ συνεχέα. *ibid.*

and where even was the place of the sacrifice and games, mentioned by Arrian, is far from clear; yet so far not likely to have been the same, as such ceremonies and festivities indicate secure possession and leisure; if not in perfect peace with all around, yet at least such as might have some assurance within good fortifications with a strong garrison.

Arr. Ind.  
c. 21.

The time of the departure from that station seems well ascertained, by Vincent, to have been about the beginning of October; and a month or six weeks after Alexander's departure with the army for the march across the desert. But then occurs farther difficulty. The first progress was of a dilatoriness not accounted for. In an acknowledged remission of the adverse wind, with opportunity therefore to be supposed, and in no degree denied, to profit from the tide's alternacy, the first day's course was of only about six miles. For the measure, Vincent's calculation, the result of unsparing pains, amid indeed extraordinary difficulty, is followed here, and will be in the sequel. The fleet then reaching a large creek, entered it, and the crews, landing, remained ashore two days. The name of the place, tho that of the more important previous station fails, is here given, Stoorā; but neither of inhabitants is anything said, nor of cause for the stay, nor is it in any way shown on which side of the river Stoorā lay. Circumstances only suggest the supposition that, if Killuta was the place whence the fleet took its departure, the shelter of a lee-shore, and the advantage of a shorter course by that shore toward the point to be turned at the river's mouth, would combinedly invite to cross the river at the earliest opportunity.

On the third day the fleet moved again, but to advance only about two miles, to another similar creek. Here again the name of the place is given, Caumana: but reason still for the smallness of the progress fails, tho the station is acknowledged to have been disadvantageous, as affording no water uninjured by the tide from the ocean. The progress then on the next day was of only one mile, to a third inlet, at a place called Corcatis. All these inlets are marked, by the phrase describing them, to have been, canals, partly at least artificial<sup>s</sup>; and Vincent seems justly to have supposed them such as are, at this day, numerous among the flats widely spreading from the banks of Indian rivers. Names of places commonly

<sup>s</sup> Διόρυχοι

indicate

indicate population, and such works moreover indicate commerce and wealth; yet no people are mentioned; nor any produce of the places but water. Whether then, after Alexander's protecting presence was withdrawn, exaction or other ill treatment had been suffered by the people here, or accounts from other parts had so excited apprehension that, like those of Pattala, on the first approach of the fleet and army, all had fled, must be left for such conjecture as the narrative itself, without farther help of antient testimony, may afford ground for.

The progress now made in six days, according to Vincent's careful computation, was of only about nine miles. He has supposed the opposition of the wind may have sufficed to prevent better speed. It must indeed have been violent, if it denied opportunity to use the ebbing tide for progress, under protection of a lee-shore; yet, tho, on several following occasions, hindrance from violence of adverse wind is mentioned in the narrative, it is wholly unnoticed here.

On the seventh day, however, the wind, as the circumstances related show, was not violent. Early on that day the fleet reached the bar at the river's mouth, now called the bar of Sindi; a feature of nature which, tho liable to great alterations, is yet of a kind so far permanent, as to afford some sure assistance for geographical calculation, which Vincent has not failed to use. In proceeding toward the ocean, with the view to a westerly course along its shore, it would be highly desirable for rowboats to hold to the western side of the river. But on that side, it seems, was no channel across the bar. This however, tho a great hindrance for trade westward, with vessels deep with burthen, and, for economy, carrying few hands, was little for Nearchus, whose vessels were floaty, and hands numerous. Any natural channel, indeed, the course crooked, and depth varying, and both liable to alteration from every storm, might have difficulties and obstructions, hazardous for such a fleet, under guidance of the most practised pilot. Nearchus, therefore, using the opportunity of low-water, caused a strait and even-bottomed channel to be dug through the easily moved sand, and the fleet passed on the supervening balanced flood, without accident. Wind then being still evidently moderate, it turned the western headland, and, in a course of nine or ten miles, reached the channel between the mainland and an island, whose name, written by the Greeks

Crocála,



Crocala, is nearly preserved to this day in that of a bay of the opposite coast, which our fellowcountryman Robinson, who was employed to survey it, proposing to indicate the oriental pronuntiation as nearly as might be with our letters, has written Crotchey-bay.

Here first, in the narrative, occurs any notice that the country passed, and so often landed on, was peopled. Hostility is avowed to have been apprehended. Mostly barren toward the coast, but fruitful within, this was the territory of the Arabies; a predatory hord, like the Belooches or Bloachees who now hold it, and reduced by Alexander, in passing, to but uncertain order. For better security therefore the desert iland was preferred for the repose, wanted by the crews after their labor, and they staid through the next day. Proceeding on the day following, the fleet turned the headland called by Arrian Eirus, by our navigators Cape Monze. Here, first, violence of wind is mentioned. Fortunately a little onward a haven was found, most commodious for vessels of the galley kind, protected by a small iland against the assaults of the adverse monsoon. The haven was called Sangada, the iland then Bibacta, now, by our navigators, Chilney. In three days the fleet had yet advanced hardly twenty miles on the ocean, when such was the threatening aspect of the weather, that, in apprehension of necessary delay, Nearchus fortified his station; and not meerly in the common manner of a wayfaring camp, but strengthening the outer face of the rampart with stone, which the neighbourhood fortunately afforded. No less than twenty-four days the fleet was detained here by storms violent and continual. Notwithstanding the mention of apprehended hostilities, no actual communication with inhabitants of the country, friendly or hostile, is noticed; nor is it said that the place afforded anything of value but an abundance of shellfish, with perhaps other fish<sup>6</sup>, and water, which however was all brackish. Yet Nearchus, in honor of his sovereign, the harbour itself being excellent, named the place Alexander's haven.

No doubt as soon as the fleet, having crossed the bar of Sindi, was fairly on the ocean, the adverse wind blowing, and the adverse waves rolling, without check from the farthest point of Africa, would affect rowboats very differently from what had been experienced within the river, and in a manner

<sup>6</sup> Μυττ θαλάσσιον.

they were ill calculated to bear. Surely the pressure must have been severe that could drive the admiral from the advantages of Pattala, even to proceed down the river; and it must have been actively and strongly maintained, apparently on both shores, if it could compel him to abandon all the shelter which the river afforded, and meet certain peril from adverse gales on the ocean, or seek safety in a temporary fort, on a coast, still hostile, and affording nothing but fish and brackish water. The learned commentator, in his report, anxious for the reputation of the commander of the expedition, which he so zealously devoted himself to illustrate, has imagined what seems to deserve notice only for the high character of its proposer. In Strabo's age, he observes, powerful pirates, such as in modern times have infested the Indian seas, were formidable on the coast of Malabar; and, supposing that, already in Alexander's age, a rich commerce was carried on between that coast and the Indus, piracy, having there its object, may already have been also flourishing. But in the coast eastward of the Indus, evidently, there was no maritime commerce; insomuch that Vincent himself has stated it as doubtful whether a single ship had ever performed the voyage which Nearchus had undertaken. Robbery by land, such as, according to all the histories of Alexander, was practised by so many Asiatic hords, required little preparation and little expense; but piracy much of both. No cargo that the fleet under Nearchus could carry, unless it were gold, the plunder of injured nations, could be an object for piracy; and the prospect of hard blows and no profit will not allure to that crime against nations. But hostility on the sea, had any ground or pretence for apprehension of it existed, would have been so much more an interesting matter for the narrative than the acknowledged fear of attack by land, that the failure of mention of it seems enough to prove that none existed.

When Alexander, on moving with his army eastward, left orders with his admiral Nearchus to await the change of the monsoon for moving, it could not be in his contemplation, or that of his council, that, before the fleet had advanced twenty miles from the mouth of the Indus, it would be in distress for provisions. Nevertheless, considering that the object of his perilous and painful march was to assist his fleet, and considering moreover all that is indicated in Arrian's accounts of the march and of the voyage,

it may seem probable that a supply of provisions, furnished through Alexander's care, tho not acknowledged in the narrative published after his death, was found at that place which, with the purpose of compliment to him, while living, the admiral named Alexander's haven.

Arr. Ind.  
C. 22.

After so long a stay at a place so little inviting, the adverse season was not yet ended, when, in a remission of the gales, the fleet moved; but proceeded only about six miles to a desert island which, with protection against winds and waves, afforded also the comfort of sweet water. Here however only one night was passed. On the morrow the advance was of near twenty miles, and in the evening the fleet reached a good situation, where sweet water was found within half a mile of the shore. These, and some following circumstances are interesting only as, through their accordance with modern accounts, they evince the accuracy of the narrative, wherever the private interests of the narrator are not involved. On the following day, after a nearly equal progress, a passage between two rocks, barely leaving room for the oars, led into an extensive haven, with deep water, and shelter against all winds<sup>7</sup>. Here however again only one night was passed. In issuing on the morrow by the same outlet, the swell was such that the rocks were with difficulty cleared; but, with just exertion, damage was avoided. In proceeding then choice was offered of a channel, sheltered by a woody island, but so narrow that, the narrative says, it might have seemed a work of art. Appearing however sufficient for such vessels, it was preferred to the open sea, and the fleet seems to have rested the night within it. Moving at dawn, the mouth of the river Arabis was reached early in the day. Here was shelter against wind and waves, but no fresh water. The fleet therefore proceeded immediately two miles up the river; and, having supplied itself, returned, in the afternoon, to the station at the mouth. This procedure seems to strengthen the probability that Nearchus had the assistance of persons aboard with him, acquainted, if not with the sea, yet with the shore, at least as far as this

Vin. on  
Nearch.

<sup>7</sup> Vincent assumes two days here; and of course a greater yet unascertained progress; not without some, tho, as he has professed, doubtful, ground in the narrative. For his purpose of measuring both the time and the space of the course, it has been necessary to state precisely his best conjecture where certainty has been unattainable. For a merely historical account it is little important.



river, and who could inform him where the needful supply, denied at the river's mouth, could be so obtained. An abundance of shell and other fish, found here, afforded farther refreshment, but inhabitants remain unmentioned.

Thus far the country of the Arabes, and with it, that people being of Am. Ind. Indian race and language and manners, India, in antient estimation, cx- c. 23. extended. On the western bank of the Arabis the land was claimed by the Orites, who were not Indians. Their country, as appeared in Alexander's march, within-land was good, but toward the shore, as it has been ascertained by modern navigators, a barren sand; not everywhere absolutely unproductive, nor wholly, as modern accounts show, denying habitation, but having much of the wilderness character. Along this coast the fleet having proceeded about twelve miles, a party was sent ashore for water; but, good anchorage being found, the crews passed the night aboard.

Moving again at daybreak, the progress was of hardly twenty miles, when, night already approaching, such a surf broke on the shore that it was thought advisable to lie at anchor again\*. Uneasy in this situation, tho the weather was unpromising, the course was resumed at dawn. Such then was the supervening gale that two long ships, and one of the kind called *kercurus*, apparently a store-ship, were lost; nigh enough, however, to land, for the crews to save themselves by swimming. Nevertheless the advance made was of twenty miles, but to reach only a desert shore, where still a surf deterred landing. About midnight therefore the fleet moved again, and after proceeding about twelve miles, found a place where landing was safe, and the vessels might ride at anchor safely near it. So the rowers now wanted rest that Nearchus here fortified a camp, for security against hostility apprehended from the Orites.

\* I completely admit, and gratefully accept, Vincent's interpretation of Arrian's word *επὶ χεῖμα* or *ἐπὶ χεῖμα*, as the surf. Confirmation of this interpretation will be noticed hereafter.

## SECTION III.

*Slowness of the Fleet's Progress. Supply to the Fleet from the Army. Inhabitants mentioned to have been seen: Passage along the Coast of the Fisheaters: Supply obtained by faithless Violence: Town deserted on the Fleet's approach: Entrance of the Persian Gulph: Arrival at Harmoza in Carmania.*

IN about forty days, now, from Killuta, or from whatever port near the mouth of the Indus, the fleet took its departure for the ocean, the progress, according to Vincent's reckoning, on a careful comparison of modern accounts with antient, including the delay of twenty-four days at Alexander's haven, had been of only eighty miles. Had the change of the monsoon been waited for, the narrative itself, in its sequel, appears enough to show that, unless circumstances more than commonly unfortunate intervened, the voyage might have been completed in two, or at most three, days. In no calculation therefore that Alexander or his council could have reason to make, would it be necessary for the fleet to carry stores for the time actually employed; nor probably could such vessels, even including those provided for the purpose, as it has been already observed, carry them for more than a fourth of the time. Hence arose Alexander's determination, at extreme hazard for himself and the army attending him, to march near the coast, instead of going the secure way by which he sent the larger division under Craterus; and thus his foresight and indefatigable diligence, stimulated by his anxiety for the success of his naval expedition, had provided that on this desert shore food should be found. Rambacia, the capital of the Orite country, had, according to Pliny, a seaport. It does not follow that Pliny supposed the town situated on the haven; as there has been frequent occasion to observe, that, with the Greeks, and it appears to have held equally with the Romans, the seaport of a town was any with which it could command ready communication, either by water or land. Thus Peiræus was the port of Athens, Nauplia of Argos, Ostia of Rome; the latter, tho considerably most distant

distant from its port, alone having a water-communication with it, and that only for very small vessels. Rambacia, as Arrian shows, not itself a seaport, was however not far from the coast. It seems probable that, among advantages of its situation, which recommended it to Alexander, may have been opportunity for water-carriage to its port. To superintend the civil government of Rambacia, it will be remembered, he had established a Grecian satrap, Apollophanes; and to insure the obedience of the people, and thence a friendly reception for his fleet, when it might pass, he had left a chosen military force, under one of his most approved generals, Leonnatus.

Nevertheless, after his departure with the main body of his army, the Orites, ingaging some neighboring people in their cause, revolted; and, in an insuing battle, the contest, as Diodorus seems, on good ground to have reported, was severe; for Apollophanes is stated by Arrian to have been killed in it. Leonnatus however gained a complete victory, with slaughter said to have been of six thousand of the Orites and their allies, among whom it is added were all their chiefs. Nor does this appear improbable; for it seems to have been eminently required, among the Asiatics, for the chief officers, especially in adverse fortune, if they would have those under them fight, to set the example of desperate valor; and indeed, under the misfortune of defeat, they appear to have been often in no less danger from their prince and their people than from the enemy. On the Macedonian side fifteen only of the cavalry are acknowledged to have been slain, with a few, unnumbered, of the infantry; and, considering what troops Leonnatus commanded against those whose irregular discipline would not probably be better than that of Asiatics at this day, and allowing for wounded, the account may be not very extravagant.

Through this important success Leonnatus was inabled to give the attention expected from him to the arrival of the fleet on the Orite coast, and to relieve its immediate needs. There seems indeed every probability, tho not acknowledged in the narrative, that it was a place appointed for the purpose. Nearchus, however, was not only soon freed from apprehension of an enemy, but supplied with corn sufficient to serve the armament ten days. Alexander's great means, and his earnestness for the welfare of his fleet, being considered together with the necessary construction of vessels to make way with oars, it seems probable that the supply was limited to that quantity only

Arr. exp. Al.  
l. 6. c. 27.  
Ind. c. 23.



only by the failure of stowage for more ; means however being in view for furnishing a fresh supply before this should be exhausted. But important relief of another kind is acknowledged in the narrative. Under Alexander's munificent encouragement, and through his popularity, a sufficient number of men had been found willing to risk the future difficulties of the voyage, in relief of those already disabled in body by its hardships, or indisposed in mind, for rewards in prospect, to bear a continuance of them. All such therefore were now dismissed from the sea-service, to follow Leonnatus by land. What his course afterward was we do not learn. Alexander was already engaged in the perils of the desert, whether to survive or perish among them none could tell. Possibly report of them, and probably exaggerated, might promote a disposition, among those arrived with Leonnatus, to exchange service with any desirous of relief from the experienced severities of the sea-service at the hazard of uncertain troubles and dangers by land.

Vin. on  
Nearch.

The shore, where Nearchus chose his principal station, seems to have forbidden the common practice of hauling the vessels on it, common whether for their greater safety or for giving the crews completer rest. Yet he found means to repair damages ; possibly at what Pliny has called the haven of Rambacia, which might be little distant. During his stay however, the long-wished-for advantage of the change of the monsoon took place. The wind, hitherto, had blown constantly from the south-west, over the ocean, toward the land, often violent, and generally adverse to the fleet's course, and always increasing the surf on the shore. Now, after a short period of fluctuation, it became fixed toward the north-east. Blowing thus from the land, and never with violence, it stilled the surf, and generally favored the course ; which was farther favored by a current, observed by modern navigators in that sea, setting constantly to the westward. Whether Nearchus was fully apprized of all these advantageous circumstances, may, as Vincent has remarked, be doubted, yet probably he was not without considerable information about them.

Vin. on  
Nearch.  
Arr. Ind.  
c. 24.

Toward the end of November the fleet proceeded again ; and, with the improved state of the weather, and favor of wind and current, made, on the first day, a greater progress than on any former of the voyage ; reaching at the distance of more than thirty miles the mouth of the river Tomerus. From the Indus thus far, tho the coast was mostly barren, so that modern navigators

navigators have observed little produced but brushwood, and here and there a few palm-trees, yet the inland country was fruitful and well inhabited. The Arabees, we have observed, were reckoned of Indian race: the Orites, tho of different origin and language, are described as of Indian manners; implying that they were a people considerably civilized, cultivating at least the more necessary of the arts of civil life. But westward of the Orite country was the great desert, where barrenness extended from the ocean hundreds of miles inland. Food, and raiment, and means for shelter, thus denied in the interior, were however still found on the coast, such as might maintain some unfortunate families, whom the failure of security elsewhere against human violence had driven thither. The coast abounded with fish; which was almost their only food: their dwellings were stifling huts<sup>9</sup>, formed of the bones and skins of the larger fish; of which even whales are mentioned as then frequenting that coast. Their clothing, principally wanted for defence against the burning sunbeam, was of skins, either of beasts or fish. From their dependence on fish for food came the name, by which alone they are distinguished, as a nation, by either Greek or Latin writers, in the Greek language describing their diet, *Fisheaters*. In these circumstances, to become barbarians was unavoidable. They are represented, in the narrative of the voyage, equally as in the account of Alexander's march, like the wildest of those found in modern times on any shore of the Pacific ocean; and Vincent's diligent inquiry has led him to the conclusion, that the inhabitants of the same coast, at this day, in way of life and manners nearly the same, are in condition rather worse than those described by Nearchus when he passed it.

It is remarkable enough that tho apprehension of hostilities is more than once mentioned, yet of inhabitants seen, in any of the various places of landing, notice here first occurs. If in other parts of the coast the people had fled, here, less informed, or uninformed of the power of Grecian weapons and discipline, they were prepared to resist. The shore was lined with men armed with strong spears nine feet long. To regard any rights of such people, even to their lives, we have had

<sup>9</sup> Καλύβαι πνηγδαί. 'Such are the cabins, 'when entered, you cannot stand upright.'  
 'described by Cook, in a thousand instances, Vincent on Nearchus,  
 'into which you must enter crawling, and

much occasion to see, was little within Grecian rules, either of the law of nations, or of morality, or of philosophy. Nearchus, without any endeavour to approach them in peace, made his fleet advance within bow-shot; and then, having observed that the barbarians had no missile weapons, he judiciously formed his plan of attack. Selecting, among his light-armed, the best swimmers, he ordered them to swim toward the shore; and the foremost, as soon as they could reach ground, to stand in the water till the rest arrived, so that the whole might form regularly in three ranks. Meanwhile, from bows and engines, in the vessels, he plied the barbarians with arrows and stones; so much to their astonishment as well as injury, that, when the swimmers approached, running and shouting, they presently fled. Many are said to have been killed in flight, and many taken, whence opportunity was gained for observing their persons. In the account of these, the hairiness of their bodies, and the length and strength of their nails, resembling tigers' claws, and doing the office, not only of butchers' but of carpenters' tools, perhaps may be somewhat exaggerated. Their weapons may have been truly represented as resembling those found, in modern voyages, among islanders secluded from the civilized world, of wood only, with the point hardened by fire.

Arr. Ind.  
c. 25.

This shore of hostile savages Nearchus chose for a stay of five days; the narrative says, to repair damaged vessels, tho of recent storms, or other cause of injury, no mention is made. But information concerning a more interesting matter also wholly fails: it is not said what was the fate of the numerous prisoners. The ordinary object of the Greeks in making prisoners was profit in the slave-market. If the wretches here taken were to be conveyed to a slave-market it must have been in miserable plight.

Arr. Ind.  
c. 26.

The fleet moving then in the second watch of the night, its course was of near forty miles, to a convenient haven, where was a village, named Pasira, and its people, Pasirees. The stay there was only for the night's rest, and no mention is made of communication with the people. On the next day a lofty precipitous promontory, with a surf on the shore, made difficulty for the commanders, and labor for the rowers. The following night, on account of the surf, was passed at anchor. Men were however sent ashore for water; and, by digging in the sand a sufficiency was obtained, but all brackish. On the succeeding day the fleet advanced  
little



little more than twelve miles ; but, moving again at dawn, a progress of near forty had been already made, when a village seen on the shore, with date-trees about it, seems to have been as a signal for landing.

At this village, named Carnina, another and an important novelty occurs in the narrative. Thus far communication with the natives of the coast is mentioned only on occasion of the bloodshed of a few days before : here, first, hospitality is acknowledged ; the people furnished not only fish but sheep. These, the land bearing no grass, are stated to have been fed on fish ; whence their flesh was fishy, such is the expression, like that of seabirds. Arrian, as if unwilling himself to answer for this, has particularly mentioned that it was so affirmed by Nearchus. Vincent, always diligent in inquiry, has found modern writers asserting that, in some parts of Africa, fish have been found a food not incapable of supporting cattle. Yet, as in Arrian's account of Alexander's march, it is mentioned that, among other provisions, sheep were forwarded to the coast for the fleet, it may seem the more reasonable conclusion, that the sheep, furnished by the fisheaters of Carnina, were not bred among them, but, however unacknowledged in the narrative, had been sent by Alexander from the country northward.

Vin. on  
Nearch.  
p. 231.  
n. 135.

Ch. 54. s. 3.  
of this hist.

Tho at that unnamed village, where many of the natives were killed in battle, and many made prisoners, the fleet stayed five days, yet at this place, where such accommodation was found, the stay was only of one night. The next progress then was but of thirteen or fourteen miles, when temptation to land again occurred. Fishing-boats were seen on the shore, and a village not more than two miles from it. The corn, furnished by Leonnatus, was now all consumed. So it is here observed in the narrative, without any notice of the several supplies asserted, in the account of the march, to have been afterward sent for the fleet. But the country, near the coast, had begun a little to improve, and hope was entertained that some corn might be found. The inhabitants however, whether in reasonable fear, or otherwise, had all fled, and no corn was discovered. Some goats, left wandering, being caught, made a meal for the night, and next morning the fleet proceeded.

A lofty promontory, supposed that called, by our navigators, Posmee, was then turned ; and, after a progress of about twenty miles, the fleet

entered a commodious haven, where was a village of fishermen, called Mosarna. No communication with inhabitants, even here, is acknowledged in the narrative; yet, by the mention of an important incident assurance is afforded that there must have been communication with them, and great probability that the fleet was expected, and friendship prepared for it. A practised mariner, a native of the inland Gadrosia, was found at this village, who undertook, as a pilot, to conduct the fleet the remaining length of the coast to the Persian gulph. Thus it appears evident that the Mosarnians, tho of the race of fisheaters, were not, by the circumstances of their country, so excluded from communication with the fruitful Gadrosia as those of the coast eastward. The indication indeed is strong that here was a port, by which the fruitful Gadrosia commonly communicated with the sea; and that commerce was carried on along the coast westward, tho probably none eastward. In return for what Gadrosia wanted, the nard and myrrh of the Desert, the fame of which appears to have induced Phœnician traders to hazard all the miseries and dangers of the march of the army, may have been valuable articles for export here.

Ch. 54. s. 3.  
of this list.

Having acquired a pilot, Nearchus, henceforward, for less fatigue to his rowers, used the night mostly for progress; which before, while none aboard had any knowledge of the coast, could seldom be prudently ventured. The wind also now favored, and thus the first run from Mosarna to a resting-place was of near fifty miles. In the next, the improved character of the country, within view, tempted to put ashore at little more than half that distance. About a village numerous palm-trees were observed. On landing a garden was found, where flowering plants were numerous; and the narrative distinguishes the myrtle as flourishing. Chaplets of herbs and flowers, originally used, in sultry climates, perhaps not more for ornament than relief, were a favorite luxury of the Greeks at their feasts; and the gratification of the crews, in finding here the myrtle for the purpose, is mentioned as if it were that of meeting a friend long unseen. Here moreover, first, in the course of the voyage, cultivated fruit-trees were found; and, the narrator adds, men not wholly savage. He has also given the name of the place, Barna; but what communication was had with the inhabitants, or whether any, is not said. The heat of the day only seems to have been passed there.

Whether

Whether then revenge from the assembled natives was apprehended, or what else occasioned so hasty a departure from a place, in description, more than any before, inviting to stay, the fleet proceeded to a station where the crews were exposed to the inconvenience of resting aboard: still whether fearing the inhabitants of the coast, or for what other cause, is not said. Moving however again about midnight, and advancing near twenty-five miles, a secure haven was found. But here again the inhabitants are described as of uncultivated character: their employment fishing, their vessels meer canoos, rowed, not with oars, but, what seems to have been new to the Greeks, with paddles; so that to describe their action in rowing, it is said to have resembled that of men digging the ground. No communication with the people thus seen is mentioned; nor any refreshment obtained, but from abundance of good water; which, as it had so often failed in the course of the voyage, might be a valuable relief.

Under the Gadrosian pilot's direction the fleet proceeded again by night, and the course was continued to the next evening; when, after a progress of about sixty miles, a tremendous surf was found breaking on the shore. Anchors therefore were cast, and supper was taken aboard. That such a circumstance was thought worthy of notice in the narrative, shows the character of navigation, in this voyage, to have been the same as we have seen it commonly for vessels of war in the days of Thucydides and Xenophon, when the crews of fleets, tho hastening to an object, were landed even twice in a day for meals. It may farther deserve observation here, that the provision which supplied strength for so long a run, and afforded the supper, must have been acquired in some way not acknowledged in the narrative.

Ch. 19. s. 8.  
& ch. 26. s. 8.  
of this list.

After refreshment however thus taken, and insuing repose, the fleet had proceeded about thirty miles, when an object, not probably before seen in the voyage, engaged attention; a fortified town, small indeed, but situated on a hill advantageously for defence. On nearer approach stubble was seen in the fields around, whence it was conjectured that corn would be in store in the place. Thus the cupidity of the commander, according to his own account, and probably also that of the crews, difficult for the commander wholly to restrain, was excited. He thought, however, he says, that, in a country producing corn so scantily, the people would not willingly part with



their store. His numbers, he supposed, with Grecian arms and Grecian skill, might, by open force compel surrender, but not without inconvenient delay. He therefore resolved upon fraud; and this he has not only avowed but boasted of; for to his fellowcountrymen of his age in general, tho the flourishing age of Grecian philosophy, it appears too evident he might avow it without fear of reproach. Imputation therefore perhaps should rest less upon the individual than upon the morality of the age altogether; which too clearly little fostered the nobler sentiment of Agesilaus; who, according to Xenophon, reckoned that, in war, to deceive those who refuse you their confidence is fair, but those who trust you infamous. For war with this people, however, Nearchus had not a pretence; unless universal hostility for Greeks against barbarians were allowable. It was with the avowed purpose of deceiving and robbing those who trusted him, that Nearchus directed the course of his fleet along the coast, as if to pass the place, while he landed himself with a small party from a single vessel.

The people, who hitherto, from within their walls, probably not without apprehension, had been observing all, seeing only six men approach, went out, and, with ready hospitality, presented, in baskets, some tunny-fish dressed, some cakes, which seem to have been partly of meal, and some dates. Nearchus, affecting to receive the gift graciously, told them, by an interpreter, one of his attendants, that he was desirous of seeing their town; and they, without suspicion, assented. He must then have managed very artfully to amuse the principal townsmen, so as to be inabled to abuse their confidence in the manner which he has proceeded to relate. His plan, decided before he left his ship, had been communicated to Archias, whom it appears he principally trusted in command under him. On a signal agreed on, Archias put the fleet about, landed all that could be spared from care of the vessels at anchor, and hastened toward the town. The people, seing such an armed body approaching, ran for their weapons. Nearchus, on entering the town, had left two of his escort at the gate, probably very narrow, such as are seen now in many old towns of the continent, not proposed to admit carriages. No guard of the townsmen however appears to have been there. With the other two, who were bowmen, he and his interpreter mounted the town-wall. The people assembling underneath, the interpreter ingaged their attention by a proclamation, which he concluded with telling them that 'if they would save their town and themselves

themselves they must furnish grain for the armament'. Answer was made that there was no grain in the place. Presently then numbers were preparing to attack the intruders in their lofty station. But, tho more civilized than those before met in arms, they were still of the fisheater nation, and seem, like the others, to have been without missile weapons. Some bow-shots therefore from the two who attended Nearchus, perhaps surprizing, sufficed to check them. The two at the gate meanwhile, probably in full armour, held possession of it. The whole force from the fleet then being soon near, the people, in complete consternation, declared their readiness to give all their grain, if they might otherwise be spared. Nearchus, upon this, directed Archias to take possession of the gates and the wall with sufficient numbers, while the rest were employed in seeing to the surrender of grain, wherever to be discovered. Great store of a kind of meal prepared from fire-dried fish was found, but of grain little. Without any notice of millet, or any other seeds commonly used for food in the hot climates, wheat and barley are mentioned; the barley no doubt of the round-eared kind, which we distinguish by the names of big, or bear, the ordinary barley of the south of Europe; where summer-heat denies the growth of the flat-eared sort, which we in preference cultivate.

The people here were so far civilized as to dress their fish: all formerly met with, according to the narrative, ate it raw. On fish was their principal dependence for food: bread was considered only as a sauce for their fish; a desirable delicacy, but not a necessary. Nevertheless the corn, which Nearchus took, was what he supposed would serve his people till they might reach a more fruitful country. Payment seems to have been no more in his contemplation, than in that of any of the predatory highlanders whom Alexander in his course had chastized, or our borderers of Scotland and Wales, or the Miquelets on the verge of France and Spain, when they stole their neighbours cattle; nor is there any other evidence than the author's silence, that the loss of corn was the only injury suffered. The name of the place, thus made remarkable, is not given; and this failure is certainly among those, in the narrative, of a kind to excite suspicion.

The fleet staid here no longer than to complete its commander's project of fraud: its course appears to have been resumed in the afternoon of the same day, tho to reach no advantageous situation for the night. In the evening

evening it anchored off the headland named Bageia, the western point, according to Vincent, of that now called Gutter Bay. About midnight it moved again; and, wind no doubt favoring, the run was continued to the extent of sixty miles. A good harbour, was then found, called Talmona; good, apparently, as affording convenience for the crews to rest ashore.

A progress afterward of twenty-five miles brought the fleet to a town named Canasida. If, as seems likely, Nearchus expected corn here, he was disappointed. A well is mentioned to have been found, artificially formed. Whether this might indicate advancement in civil arts among the people, beyond that of those eastward, or whether it was one of the numerous wells, mentioned in the account of the army's march, to have been provided for the fleet by Alexander's care, seems utterly uncertain; no result of that care appearing to have been acknowledged by Nearchus, with a single exception for the relief he received from Leonnatus. The town however was found deserted; for what cause is not said, and the heads of palm-trees were the only food obtained. Distress therefore urging, the fleet proceeded through the afternoon and all the following night, and still, at daybreak, was on a desert shore. Rest however being then necessary, anchors were dropped. Here Nearchus has avowed that he feared to let the crews quit their vessels; such being the dissatisfaction among them, that, rather than return aboard, he apprehended they might endeavour to join the army by land. Among the many very remarkable omissions in the narrative, the failure to acknowledge any information obtained of what must have so excited the attention of every inhabitant of the coast as Alexander's march along it, and according to Vincent's probable supposition, through Canasida<sup>10</sup>, is not the least striking. As soon as, turning inland, he had reached a fruitful country, not there so distant from the sea as farther eastward, he had hastened, it will be remembered, unsparing of his own labor, to collect and forward provisions, under escorts commanded by confidential officers, to two different parts of the coast, to await the fleet's passing. However then acknowledgement may have failed in Arrian's narrative from Nearchus, yet on comparing with it what he has given from Ptolemy and Aristobulus, it seems utterly improbable that the commanders of the fleet, even should

Ch. 54. s. 3.  
of this hist.

<sup>10</sup> Vincent's map carries the march through Canasida.

they



they have missed the supplies, were without intelligence of the army: the admiral, we have recently seen, had an interpreter, whom he esteemed worthy of confidence; and it is unlikely that such intelligence could be wholly concealed from the crews. Thus neither the project imputed to the seamen will appear so extravagant, nor the fears of the admiral so without reasonable ground, as the narrative of the voyage, unassisted by that of the march, leaves them to be supposed.

But, among indications here, as sometimes before, produced by the narrator's care to earn credit for accuracy in whatever related to the seaman's business, it is shown that not only information, but supplies, unowned, must have been received. Here first the crews are said to have been starving, and this after great fatigue; yet they were able to persevere in a run of near fifty miles, to a place called Canatë. There artificial water-courses were found, clearly indicating population and cultivation; yet neither supply is acknowledged to have been obtained, nor people seen. Nevertheless the strength of the crews did not fail; for, after no unusual time stated to have been allowed for repose, the progress was again of fifty miles. It seems to have been through this speed that the inhabitants of some small villages, of a district on the coast not wholly unproductive, called Troisi, were so far taken by surprize that, tho all fled, they left behind them not only some corn and dates, which were seized, but also seven camels. The flesh of that animal is said to be neither an unwholesome nor an ungrateful food. Accordingly all were devoured. The prize would be valuable for the fleet, if, against Alexander's intention, food could be had for it only by violence; but the loss of seven camels must have been severe upon villagers on such a coast.

The crews, thus however recruited, were allowed only short rest, the fleet moving again at daybreak. At the distance of about twenty miles it reached Dagasira, a place frequented by herdmen; sure indication that, tho still within the line of coast called that of the fisheaters, the change toward a more productive country was already considerable. But herdmen could readily move their all beyond the reach of rapacious hands, whose approach by sea might be seen afar. Accordingly nothing valuable appears to have been found there.

After rest therefore during the midday heat only, progress was resumed toward evening, and prosecuted through the night and all the following day.

The

Arr. Ind.  
c. 29.

The wind apparently favored, so that, for a course of near a hundred and fifty miles, the labor would not be severe. With this fortunate speed the boundary of that called the fisheaters coast was passed, and hope was entertained of immediately finding the relief which accounts of the adjoining country, Carmania, promised. The surf however being such as to deter landing, the repose, now necessary for the crews, was only such as they could take in the vessels at anchor.

Arr. Ind.  
c. 32.  
Vin. on  
Nearch.  
p. 300.

The general direction of the shore of the ocean from the mouth of the Indus, or near it, thus far, modern observation confirming the account of Nearchus, is remarkably direct, east and west, with only occasional indentures and projections of bays and promontories, small in proportion to the length of line of above six hundred miles. Hereabout, still coinciding with modern observation, Nearchus says the course, guided still by the coast, was turned to the north-west. Soon then the fleet reached Badis, a cultivated district of Carmania, producing corn and good wine, and all the ordinary fruits of Greece abundantly, except olives. And yet no mention is made of supply obtained, or of any inhabitants seen, in this plentiful district of a province, not only for years past governed by Alexander's officers, but in which he had himself been now some weeks, with his army.

Vin. on  
Nearch.

Important assistance of another kind, acquired on this part of the coast, and probably at Badis, is however indicated. The Gadrosian pilot had undertaken no more than to conduct the fleet to the Persian gulph. Now other persons were aboard, more extensively acquainted with land and sea in those parts. After a run of fifty miles from Badis, for which refreshment obtained there must have prepared the crews, a lofty promontory came in view, afar off; which, says the narrative, persons familiar with those parts declared to be a projection from the Arabian shore, marking the entrance of the gulph, and eminent for the trade which supplied the great cities of Assyria with perfumes and spices. Cinnamon alone is distinguished by name; probably furnished from southern Arabia, till, through Alexander's measures, the way was opened for the Arabian traders to the coast of Malabar, and thence to the island of Ceylon, which produces that ever since the most in estimation. The name of the promontory, with Arrian, Maketa, with Strabo, Makai, is now, with our navigators, Mussendon.

Here

Here difference of opinion arose, among the principal officers, concerning the course to be pursued. On the Carmanian side the shore receded, so as to form a bay, near thirty miles deep, and sixty wide, with a barren coast, as far as eye could reach, and a surf breaking on it. Onesicritus, since the fleet's outset, now first mentioned in the narrative, recommended avoiding the circuitous line of the bay, with so forbidding a shore, to stretch away immediately to the promontory on the Arabian side; the distance being estimated not to exceed an ordinary day's run with oars. Nearchus opposed this. In rather offensive phrase, according to his own account, he told Onesicritus 'that he was foolish<sup>11</sup> indeed, or 'strangely inattentive to the king's instructions, if he did not know that 'they required the examination of all shores, havens, ilands, bays, mari- 'time towns, with observation where the land was fruitful, and where 'barren. Already the principal dangers and labors of the expedition were 'surmounted, and no serious difficulty remained in view, if they proceeded 'in the course hitherto pursued; but, what might be beyond that promon- 'tory on the Arabian shore, he feared more than any on the Carmanian.' This opinion, we are told, prevailed; a phrase appearing to mark that the authority of Nearchus was not perfectly independent of colleagues or council. Accordingly the fleet, resting that night at anchor, proceeded on the morrow along the Carmanian shore, about thirty miles, to a place Arr. Ind. c. 33. described only by its name, Neoptana; and, moving again at daybreak, by a course of no more than six miles, reached Harmoza or Harmozeia<sup>12</sup>, on the river Anamis, a principal port of Carmania. There an officer of considerable rank under Alexander commanded, friendship was ready, and, as in a very plentiful country, every necessary abounded.

<sup>11</sup> Νῆπιον. The exact value of such phrases can be estimated only by those practised in the conversation of the day, and rarely can be given in another language.

<sup>12</sup> The name of Harmoza remains to this day, tho, among the revolutions to which the finest parts of Asia have been singularly liable, transferred to another place. The people, on occasion of which of three conquests of their country, which were suffered

between the beginning of the thirteenth and the end of the fifteenth centuries, is uncertain, to avoid the dominion of a conquering despot from the interior of the continent, migrated to a small island, not far from the mouth of the Anamis, completely of the wilderness character. Affording nothing but safety against hostile attack, not even water, but what fell from the sky, yet Ormuz, as we write it after the Portuguese, like Venice

and



## SECTION IV.

*Occurrences at Harmoza : Journey of Nearchus to wait upon the King :  
Return to Harmoza.*

THE merit which the learned Vincent was the first, probably, to discover, but certainly to ascertain to the world, in the narrative of Nearchus, has led that worthy person to an esteem of the author's character, surely much beyond what any, more versed among men, can be disposed to allow. His praise, that it deserves all credit, cannot be admitted (supposing, as Vincent has supposed, that Arrian has given justly the meaning if not even the words of his author) without exception for what Nearchus related of himself. The account of his conference with Alexander, previous to his appointment to the chief command for the voyage of discovery, reviling the principal officers of the army, and representing himself as the king's dearest friend, for whose welfare he was even absurdly solicitous, has evidently been calculated only for the most uninformed of the sovereign multitudes in the Grecian republics, among whom, as well as for whom, it was published, not till after Alexander's death. For the transactions of his extraordinary voyage indeed, the narrative is generally perspicuous, always probable, corresponding, beyond what might be expected, with modern observation in its geography, the sure test of its authenticity, and failing only by omission of matters of which some account most reasonably might be expected. But now, when account is to be given, no longer of the navigation, but of the narrator's conduct ashore, among a civilized and friendly people, and in communication with his king, it becomes in some parts mysterious, in others strangely extravagant.

and Amalfi in Europe, in nearly similar circumstances, flourished from commerce, eminent among the marts of the east. Even under the Portuguese it flourished; but, an

English fleet, in war with Portugal, enabling another conqueror from the interior of Asia to become its master, its prosperity soon ended.

Already

Already the fleet had coasted for many leagues a province, not only for some years commanded by Alexander's officers, but in which he actually was with his army. On that coast, in the fruitful territory of Badis, abundant supplies were found : of course there had been communication with the people ; and now a seaport was reached, apparently the principal of the province, where all was friendly, and where the governor of a considerable district resided. Nevertheless, tho Alexander's unremitted anxiety and even painful activity to afford all assistance to his fleet is, in the narrative, as in all other accounts, largely testified, yet, in the same narrative, it has not been scrupled to assert that, at this friendly port, Nearchus could obtain no news of his king, or information where any one in authority under him was to be found. Some men from the fleet, wandering, it says, as those long confined aship-board are fond of doing, to their surprize, not less than to their joy, met a Greek from the army ; who informed them where the king and the army were, and readily conducted Nearchus to the prefect of the district. It is implied that the admiral was anxious to wait upon the king the soonest that might be, and it is clearly expressed that he obtained all necessary information from the prefect for making the journey ; reckoned, at the utmost, of five days for a party afoot. Nevertheless he neither immediately went, nor sent any intelligence of himself or the fleet. His first business, after hauling his vessels ashore, was to fortify his naval camp, as if in an enemy's country, and with more than common care and labor ; for he surrounded it with a double rampart, and a ditch deep enough to be floated from the river. As a reason for such a work, it is stated that, his instructions directing him to survey the Persian gulph and meet the king at Susa, he reckoned the whole of the fleet needless for that continuance of the voyage, and therefore he would leave a part at Harmoza. Thus he seems to have assumed to himself to decide on a matter for which, if nothing else pressed for communication with his king, he should have hastened to desire orders. But the prefect, his duty requiring that the king should have the earliest information of the fleet's arrival at a port of his district, whether dissatisfied with the admiral's conduct, or having other cause, instead of sending, went to make the report himself. This displeased Nearchus, who has not scrupled to represent it as an interested interference with business which, clearly with the purpose to impose only

Arr. Ind.  
c. 34.

on those most ignorant of what would become persons in their situations, he intimates should have been left intirely to him.

Ch. 54. s. 3.  
of this hist.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 106.  
Vin. on  
Nearch.

The place of Alexander's residence in Carmania, probably the capital, had been made remarkable, as we have seen, by transactions there; and it is among those also remarkable for being, in the narrative, without a name. This however Diodorus has supplied, writing it, as we perhaps best, with Vincent, may render the Greek orthography, Salmoon; which, the first syllable being said to mean a fort, seems preserved in the modern Maaun<sup>13</sup>. That place is less distant from the port where the fleet lay than may seem implied in the narrative; in which, however, confusion, rather than clearness, appears to have been, on this occasion, studied. The tale that follows is indeed extraordinary, and even absurd; and yet may deserve notice as a sample of what might be offered for belief among the Grecian republics. Alexander's impatience at the failure of Nearchus to arrive, as expected, is described as unfit for a man, and his measures to acquire information as ineffectual as could be those of a child: he sent messenger, it is said, after messenger, to various parts of the coast, to acquire intelligence, and none brought any. Were this related as happening before the fleet reached the Carmanian shore, it might appear not only credible but likely. The narrative however goes much farther; some of the messengers, it says, never returned. For such failure no cause is mentioned; and how it should have happened, unless Nearchus himself managed to detain them, seems not easily imaginable. The king's impatience, however, the narrative proceeds to say, at length became so extravagant, that, supposing the prefect's hasty intelligence of the fleet's arrival deceptive, he ordered him to prison. Nevertheless he sent horses and carriages to conduct Nearchus; and these so took the right road (by what information or what good fortune guided, is not said) that they met him, already on the way. If it was to convey him prisoner to Salmoon, even from his own account, he seems to have deserved it. Nor indeed is the suspicion, that so it was, without some apparent ground. For, after having been at the friendly port of Harmoza several days (Vincent reckons only three, but the narrative, describing the works at that place, and the going and return of the king's many messengers, implies considerably more) Nearchus

Vin. on  
Nearch.  
p. 348.

<sup>13</sup> In the Greek it occurs only in the dative Σαλμῶντι.



set out, taking Archias only for his companion, and four inferior attendants; tho on account of the lawless state of the country, if what follows in the narrative should be credited, prudence would have recommended a stronger escort, had he shown himself in his proper character of commander in chief of the imperial fleet. But he chose (for after such delay at a friendly and plentiful seaport it must have been choice) that all should go in the same soiled clothes, soaked with brine, and with the same weatherbeaten and toil-worn looks as when they landed; in his description altogether miserable. Such, it may be observed, among the Greeks, was the kind of appearance ordinarily affected by those, who, in the character of suppliants, desired to excite commiseration. The escort sent by the king, on meeting them, not guessing who they were, would have passed them unnoticed. But they could not fail to know of what description those of the escort were; and yet they hesitated to declare themselves. At length, however, resolving to inquire where they might find the king, and explanation insuing, they were taken into the carriages, and conducted to the place of his residence.

Arrived there they presently waited upon him, still in the same soiled clothes in which they had set out from Harmoza, and altogether with the same appearance, studiously described as wretched. Alexander, like the escort they had met on the road, hardly knew them; but as soon as he had assured himself he took Nearchus, the narrative says, by the hand, and led him to a private apartment. Still supposing his fleet lost (for still the prefect's account had no credit with him) he was so overborne with joy at seeing Nearchus and Archias safe, that, for a long time, tears prevented speech. Being then informed by them that the fleet also was safe, tears of joy flowed afresh, and he swore by the Jupiter of the Greeks, and the Ammon of the Libyans, that he was more gratified with that information than with the conquest of all Asia. The prefect of Harmoza was yet under arrest. Finding opportunity however to <sup>Arr. Ind.</sup> c. 36. prostrate himself before Nearchus, and obtaining his intercession with the king, he was at length released. Alexander then solemnized a sacrifice to Jupiter the preserver, and Apollo the evil-avert, and Neptune, and (such is the expression in the original) whatever other seagods might be; Nearchus leading the procession, and the whole army throwing on him flowers,

flowers, and garlands. Gymnic games and theatrical exhibitions concluded the celebrity.

After this boast of honors to himself, and imputation of imbecility to his sovereign, follows the remarkable confession, that Alexander proposed to remove him from the command of the fleet. To disguise this disgrace the same extravagance has been resorted to, which was not scrupled to color Alexander's hesitation ever to commit to him the command in chief: the king, he says, assured him it was because he could no longer expose so dear a friend to such labors and dangers. This assertion, that a prince of such great views, and so unsparing of himself, would, in weak tenderness for any man, deny a difficult but honorable command to him whom he thought fittest for it, and who also desired it, is evidently enough what could be proposed for belief only to the most uninformed of the people who shared sovereign power among the Greek republics. The narrator's pretension, twice stated, that he was himself the object of such regard, and that Alexander was the man so to yield to it, seems indeed too ludicrous, and the publication of it too impudent, to admit comment in terms becoming the sobriety of history<sup>14</sup>.

What Nearchus has proceeded to relate we find satisfactorily confirmed by other testimony: on his earnest solicitation that he might not be deprived of the credit of completing a great undertaking, the larger, and far the more difficult part of which he had already successfully executed, Alexander finally yielded to his request.

In returning then to Harmoza, he was allowed a military escort, sufficient, he says, for a country in peace. Thus he could not avoid showing himself in his proper character of commander of the fleet. In this character, and so attended, he was attacked on the road, twice or thrice, by different parties of the country people, insomuch that with difficulty he made his way. But, in these attacks, of number so doubtfully stated, it is not said that there was slaughter, or even

<sup>14</sup> It were tedious to notice all the absurdities in the account given from Nearchus by Arrian. The reader curious about them, and they are indeed matter of some curiosity, will be best referred to the original; or, if

a translation be wanted, not to what Vincent has given, in tenderness to Nearchus omitting some things and softening others, but rather to Rooke's, which is not indeed elegant, but much more exact.

wound on either side ; nor are the assailants described as of a predatory hord, but simply as people of the country, where the satrap, Tlepolemus, recently appointed, had not had time to establish proper order. The late satrap, Sibyrtius, however it should be remembered, had been removed to a more extensive and critical command in Gadrosia, not surely for having failed to keep order in his former province. Nor are the Carmanians anywhere described as among the predatory hords of Asia ; not even in an account of those hords by Nearchus himself, preserved to us by Strabo. Strab. l. 16. p. 745. ed. Cas. Whether then the tumults mentioned were more than those of an unarmed multitude demanding reparation for plunder, or other injury, such as, on several parts of the coast it is acknowledged the people suffered from the fleet, seems left uncertain.

The supposition should not, without much caution, nor indeed without a degree of necessity, be mixed with history, yet, if important facts are found involved in mystery, and eminent characters implicated ; especially if there is any appearance of studied disguise or concealment ; and most especially if it is moreover clear that the narrator's interest has been deeply concerned, it must be the historian's hazardous duty to offer, as he best may, what may tend to show the matter in a just light.

From earliest history then, even to the present day, Piracy, we know, has been familiar and flourishing in the Ægean sea ; ordinarily patronized by sovereign power, by republics not less than by single tyrants, and suppressed, in the course of so many centuries, if completely ever, only in short periods of uncommon vigilance and vigor in the administration of the Roman dominion. In this eminent kind of highway robbery we have formerly observed the admirals of the Athenian democracy, in the zenith of its power, holding an imperial lead. When their means were checked by the successes of Philip king of Macedonia against them, the Cretans rose to the first eminence in the same line ; favored by the situation of their island, and by the failure of opportunity to controll them, when the Macedonian kingdom became again implicated in war with some of the republics. The increased traffic which Alexander's conquests afterward opened, for Greece and countries westward, with Phenicia and Egypt, and the advantage of situation for intercepting it, enabled the Cilician robbers to overbear the Cretan, and hold the superiority ;  
till,

Strab. l. 10.  
P. 477.  
ed. Cas.

Strab. ibid.



till, under the new power of the Roman republic, the evil was, perhaps for the first time, effectually stopped by the great Pompey.

Piracy thus, in its various practices, seizing ships, landing for plunder (of which men, women, and children for the slavemarkets were no small object) or, like the states of Barbary in modern days, arrogating payment for forbearance, would be familiar, at least from information and in idea, not to the commanders only, Nearchus, a Cretan, and Onesicritus, of the island of Cos, in situation between Crete and Cilicia, but to every seaman of the fleet; and what was little scrupled by the Greeks toward one another, we have had enough occasion to observe, would be less so toward Indians. Alexander's determination to protect his new subjects was sufficiently known. His promises of reward to all engaged on his favorite project of maritime discovery no doubt would be highly liberal; and probably would be trusted, as far as performance might depend on himself. Nevertheless the restraint which he put upon all under him in favor of barbarians, far beyond that of the Athenian republic in favor of Greeks, might, in the natural partiality of men for their own interest, be considered as a grievance; and that the desire to plunder the Indians, whose wealth, in Vincent's supposition, the result of his careful inquiries, even exceeded that of modern times, was very extensive in the fleet, will hardly be doubted. But moreover it could not fail to occur that, should all success attend them in their voyage, yet Alexander might perish; whether from the severity of the torrid climate, to which he was exposing himself, or from the hand of an enemy, from which recently he had so nearly met his fate; and then reward for them would be utterly precarious. If then the uncertainty of their king's life, with the consequent uncertainty of either reward for merit, or punishment for misdemeanor, together with the consideration that, even if he survived, naval command put choice both of measures and course much in their power, such temptation prevailed, no difficulty will remain for what appears otherwise unaccountable in Nearchus's narrative. The departure from Pattala, in most adverse season and against orders, might be even necessary for the purpose: the omission of all account of the voyage of not less than a hundred miles down the river, to some unnamed place near the ocean, will be no longer strange: the enmity of the Indians (reported by Strabo, but unnoticed in the narrative) which is said

to have compelled the departure from some place unnamed ; the shortness of the first advances of the fleet, in its way from that unnamed place, would also be accounted for ; as would also the failure to notice any intercourse with the inhabitants of three named places of the river-side country, at which the fleet stopped, and which circumstances noticed indicate to have been populous and wealthy. The following measures, quitting all the shelter which the river would afford, to meet the adverse monsoon in the ocean ; preferring, for a day of repose there, which seems to have been immediately necessary, an island of sand to the shore of the nearly adjacent continent ; and, presently after, through inability to contend with the violence of contrary winds, waiting near a month in such a situation as he has described that which he named Alexander's haven, and the care to fortify the naval camp there, would all be necessary consequences. The perfect acquiescence of the crews, under all hardships, difficulties, and dangers, thus, against their king's orders, undergone, which, tho implied in the narrative only by the failure of mention of discontent, has excited Vincent's admiration, would be the ready and even necessary consequence of their voluntary concurrence in a scheme of forbidden plunder. Along the fish-eaters coast nothing hostile is mentioned by the generals, in their account of the march. Whether then the hostility, found by the admiral, originated with the people of the country or with himself, remains matter of question. If wells, which Alexander had been diligent to provide in other parts, were rarely seen there, it may have been because the water obtained by digging in sand, near the sea-shore, is found to become more brackish as it lies longer exposed. But, of the stores of food which, according to the account of the generals, were sent, that none should have been received, or even heard of by the fleet, tho notice of them in the narrative wholly fails, is obviously unlikely ; and that no information of Alexander's march along the coast should have been received, tho none is acknowledged, appears utterly incredible. The pretension then, stated in direct terms, that, even at the ports of Carmania, no intelligence of Alexander was to be obtained, till some of the crews, wandering about Harmoza, accidentally met a Greek from the army, also wandering, carries the face of falsehood strongly enough to warrant the supposition of any probability to supersede it. Nevertheless, tho information

could hardly have failed that Alexander and the army had some time ago entered Carmania, it might be unknown that he remained there, and had not yet proceeded for Persia. But if, at Badis, intelligence, as seems likely, was obtained that the king was still at Salmoon, and especially if information of the execution of the generals, Heracon, Cleander, and Sitalces, had reached the place, then anxiety to avoid him might pervade the fleet; and reason would be obvious for the advice which is attributed by Nearchus to Onesicritus, to avoid the Carmanian shore, and proceed directly up the gulph on the Arabian side; tho to judge fairly between them the lost account of Onesicritus is wanting. Yet, still on the same supposition, the praise of both judgement and courage may be due to Nearchus, who did not despair of making his peace with the king. To the hope of this indeed he may have been encouraged by the consideration of more than one important difference between his case and that of the generals who had suffered: their oppression of the conquered people seems to have been for profit only to themselves, or in share with a very few; for the troops under them, we are assured, supported the accusation against them: but Nearchus, more politic, seems to have managed so as to have the whole fleet on his side. All then having a common interest with him in preserving plunder, in which all shared, the laborious work of fortifying the naval station at Harmoza, for its protection even against Alexander himself, might be cheerfully undertaken. Flight would thus be in their power, if final resistance were not; and Alexander had not another fleet with which to pursue them, whether returning to wealthy India, or whether any other course might more invite. The admiral's delay then to wait upon the king, however against his duty, might be grateful to them all. When at length he resolved to go, they would probably be encouraged by the consideration, that, what they had, beyond general hope, effected, was but a beginning of what Alexander was known to desire in the way of maritime discovery. And thence Nearchus, if he was popular in the fleet, as seems probable, might estimate his own importance and theirs with their sovereign. Alexander then, with his large experience of men, tho in early years, would know that he could find none perfect; and that, for the execution of great and extraordinary purposes,



purposes he must use the means which he could not make. Probably there was not a seaman unimplicated with Nearchus, nor another known to be, equally with him, capable of the command. Moreover for the completion of the voyage proposed, neither the temptation which India offered, nor the opportunities of freedom from observation and controul, would again occur. Nor is the admiral's boast of the favor of the army, publicly shown, on occasion of the thanksgiving procession, by throwing flowers on him and presenting garlands, at all out of probability; for the soldiery would naturally be disposed to be partial toward that very system of plunder which would excite their juster sovereign's indignation. With all these considerations it may appear not wonderful that Alexander so far smothered even a reasonable anger, that the earnest intreaty of his admiral to be reinstated in his command, was finally successful.

## SECTION V.

### *Procedure of the Fleet up the Persian Gulph.*

NEARCHUS being returned, through whatever difficulties in his journey, to the fleet at Harinoza, measures without delay seem to have been taken for proceeding on the voyage up the gulph. No further mention occurs either of the fortified naval station, or of the formerly professed purpose of leaving there any part of the fleet. Whatever then may have been Alexander's disposition toward his admiral, his usual liberality would not fail toward the fleet altogether. Accordingly, as the concluding preparation for the outset, a feast was given to the armament, in the usual manner, under the name of a sacrifice to the Preserving Jupiter, followed by the amusement of gymnastic exercises. Nearchus of course presided; and the narrative seems to claim the whole magnificence for him. But it cannot be doubted that it was under his king's order; and if at his own expense, hardly so, but also under command so to apply a portion of ill-gotten wealth.

Vin. on  
Nearch.

For the voyage now to be pursued, up the Persian gulph, the able commentator on the narrative says that its correspondence with modern observation is most satisfactory, insomuch that, through the correctness of English charts for the seaside, and the assistance afforded by the eminent French geographer D'anville, for the land, he satisfied himself, even without difficulty, of every station at which the fleet anchored. For Persia proper, or, as, conveniently enough for distinction, he writes it, with the Greek termination, Persis, the general description of the coast, he says, in Arrian's narrative is perfect, and the principal harbours as fully ascertained as in modern geography.

B. C. 326.  
Ol. 113, 2.

Arr. Ind.  
c. 37.

According to his careful reckoning it was about the first of January, of the three hundred and twenty-fifth year before the Christian era, that the fleet departed from Harmoza. The first day's course was of less than twenty miles<sup>15</sup>, to a large island, fruitful then, as now, in corn, wine and dates, which seems to have retained its name, written, by modern Europeans, Vroct, but by the Greeks, according to their common practice of adapting foreign names to their own habits of pronuntiation and the inflexions of their language, variously, Oaracta, Doracta, and Ouoracta, or, as we should perhaps rather write it, Woracta. Among European navigators of the present day the name of the principal town, Last, has prevailed as that of the island; precisely as, in the Mediterranean, the island of Crete is most known by the name of its principal town Candia. Not only all ordinary accommodation was found here, but the governor, Mazenes, a Persian, offered himself to accompany Nearchus, and assist with his advice for the whole course up the gulph, and the inland navigation afterward, to Susa; an offer which Nearchus accepted. Some explanation which the narrative ought to give and does not, is clearly wanting here. For a person intrusted with the government of a large and fruitful island, critically situated in the way of all the commerce between the coast of Arabia and the three capitals of the empire, to quit his important duties there in pure friendship to an utter stranger, and simply as an adviser for the navigation, would be carrying hospitality to a very extraor-

<sup>15</sup> For this measure, which seems sufficiently ascertained by modern observation, and its difference from that stated in our copies of Arrian, Vincent's observations may be seen.

dinary length. In the Indus such an offer might perhaps have been made, with a view to share in plunder ; and accepted to obtain useful assistance for it ; but hardly in the Persian gulph, where Alexander's just severity against oppressors and peculators would be known and dreaded. Altogether therefore, following circumstances of the voyage being found of a character to support the supposition, it seems hardly to be doubted that the advantageous reception in Oaracta was prepared by Alexander's orders, and that Mazenes was directed to accompany Nearchus, not without a share of authority ; perhaps in the room of Archias whom the narrative mentions no more. Without imputation against Archias, Alexander might reckon a noble Persian, acquainted with the sea and its coast, and known everywhere as the governor of Oaracta, a fitter associate in authority with the admiral, for the rest of the voyage, than a Macedonian who had no such qualifications.

From the unnamed port where Mazenes joined the fleet, the first day's progress was of no more than twelve miles, to a port still of the same island. The reason appears in what followed. Daybreak was waited for ; and, the fleet moving then, the rapidity of the ebbing tide was such that, notwithstanding the assistance obtained of mariners familiar with the navigation, three ships grounded, and the rest, not without difficulty, making their way through the receding surf, reached the deep water. Why the flood was not used rather than the ebb, for this troublesome passage, perhaps may be accounted for by those who know the coast. With the rising tide however the grounded vessels floated, and rejoined the fleet, apparently undamaged.

The coast of the gulph, in this part, is, to a considerable extent, barren, sandy desert. The fleet therefore, in a course of twenty-five miles, made for an island eighteen from the main, where it passed the night. But to hold that distance would not suit rowboats, for which frequent landing was necessary. Moving therefore at daybreak, the course was directed again toward the mainland, tho the country in that part was most uninviting. The inhabitants of the village of Sidodone where the next night was passed, separated as they were from the extensive coast of fish-eaters, yet, through similarity of circumstances, a sea abounding with fish,



Arr. Ind.  
c. 38.

fish, a soil almost perfectly barren, were of similar character, fisheaters. In proceeding from this place the promontory of Tarsias was doubled, and the course was again directed to an island, whose name, written by the Greeks Cataia, seems preserved in that written by our navigators, not from Greek but oriental mouths, Kaish. This island tho low and flat, is, in modern description, fruitful and even beautiful. Overagainst it, on the mainland, was the boundary of Carmania against proper Persia, or, as with Vincent we may call it, Persis.

Arr. ibid.  
Vin. on  
Nearch.

The first course then on the Persian shore was of only four or five-and-twenty miles to Ila; a name which, as Vincent has remarked, seems preserved in that which some modern Europeans, meaning to represent oriental pronuntiation, as they best might, have written Gillam and Gella; thus endeavouring to indicate the incipient guttural, to which English speech has nothing analogous, and which the Greeks would be likely to leave unnoticed. The station for the next night was an island, where then was, and still is, a pearl-fishery. Under a lofty promontory of the mainland, called Ochus, was found a harbour convenient for rowboats, where the following night was passed. This high ground seems to have been but as a point projected from the inland mountains, intersecting the general flatness of the coast. A course of about thirty miles then brought the fleet to a situation where were many vessels; and, not on the shore, but about four miles within land, a village called Apostani; whether the barrenness of a sandy soil dissuaded nearer habitation, or, the distance was preferred for better security against piratical adventurers, where the late government had given little protection.

The character of the land on the coast however now was changing for the better, while that of the sea, near it, was becoming more disadvantageous. Through the whole length of the gulph on the Persian side, at no great distance from the shore, is a range of mountains; whence, in the rainy season, numerous torrents run, drenching the flat that extends from their foot to the sea, which is shallow to a great extent. The mouths of the better rivers are obstructed by bars, the tides great, and a surf everywhere breaking on the shore. In advancing up the gulph the mountains more approach the coast, and the intervening soil has no longer the desert

character : on the contrary it is fruitful, but the sea is to a still greater extent incumbered with shoals. At the distance of four or five-and-twenty miles from Apostani was found an advantageous exception to this general character of the sea, in a bay, with a fruitful country around, bearing, beside palms, which Greece had not, all the fruit-bearing trees common in Greece. Nevertheless no stay is mentioned there. The next course, of near forty miles, was to a town called Gogana, in a populous country at the foot of the mountains, which here approach the shore ; but only a scanty harbour was found. Proceeding then fifty miles, the fleet reached Sitakus, probably the best of all the inconvenient harbours of the Persian shore. Here large store of corn, provided by Alexander's care, is acknowledged to have been found. It is remarkable enough, that with all the assurance we have of his earnestness for the accommodation of his fleet, and of the severe sufferings he underwent, and dangers to which he exposed himself, to insure such accommodation, none received from him, since that early in its voyage furnished by Leonnatus, is, till now, noticed in the narrative. Here the fleet staid twenty-five days, to be overhauled and receive necessary repairs. It seems altogether likely to have been under Alexander's strict order that, on the return of Nearchus to Harinoza, the fleet immediately proceeded on its voyage, and that Sitakus was the place appointed for any repairs, beyond what might be urgently necessary, as well as for receiving supplies.

On moving again, the first day's course was of near fifty miles, to the Arr. Ind. town of Hieratis on the river Heratemis. An artificial canal, communi-  
cating with that river, was here the anchoring place. The next day's run was to the mouth of a winter-torrent. This expression indicates mountains to have been near ; but the immediate neighbourhood was fertile, abounding especially in fruit-bearing trees. Proceeding then only twelve miles, the fleet entered a river of better character, the Granides, where was a town called Troca ; at the distance of about twelve miles from which, up the country, according to information of the inhabitants, was an antient palace of the Persian kings. Then again the mouth of a torrent afforded, for such vessels, a safe harbour. The violence of the water, running from the mountains seems to have had, on this part of the coast,  
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its singular value; keeping channels open, by which small vessels might securely reach the shore, which the shoals and the surf would otherwise have made everywhere difficult and dangerous, or even impossible. The place next resorted to, after a run of four or five-and-twenty miles, tho otherwise of similar character, had its peculiar disadvantages. The coast was rocky, and about the torrent's mouth were breakers, which, obstructing the course of the fresh water from the mountains, produced shoals; and these were troubled with a surf<sup>16</sup>. If the place was sufficiently known to the pilots, the failure only of a better, when the crews wanted rest, could have persuaded the admiral to halt there. The fleet took its station, it appears, nearly at high water, with the hope of continuing to ride at anchor; but the ebb left all aground. Crowded on their thwarts, without room to lie at length, the situation of those aboard, uneasy for sleep, even when the vessels rode on an even keel, would be still more uneasy when, being grounded, the position was oblique. The next flood however relieved them from the uneasy attitude and temporary bondage, and on the following day they reached the river Arosis, the largest yet seen in the whole course, from the Indus to the boundary of Persis against Susiana.

Arr. Ind.  
c. 40.

New difficulty for the navigation now occurred. The extent of the shoals was greatly increased, and, toward the shore, such a surf broke that landing was not prudently to be attempted. Thus rest could be taken only aboard, and, should winds be adverse, fresh water might fail. The greatest quantity, therefore, that means of stowage in rowboats would admit, was to be taken aboard, and this appears to have been limited to a five days ordinary supply. Badness of water we have observed often noticed; but absolute want, or even short allowance, nowhere mentioned as before occurring, was not suffered now.

After a progress of thirty miles from the Arosis, the fleet anchored in a channel among the shoals, abounding with fish, which would afford relief.

<sup>16</sup> Πηχὴν ἢ καὶ βραχέα, καὶ χοιράδες ἐν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀνέχον. Here is most satisfactory assurance that Vincent has been right in his interpretation of *πηχὴν* as the surf. The adoption of this interpretation in the

last edition, Taylor's, of Hederic's lexicon, does credit to the diligence of the editor. *Χοιράδες* clearly implies that character of rock which our seamen denominate a breaker.



The next day's course was of difficulty, tho the way was marked by stakes; nearly, says the narrator, as on the western coast of Greece, between the island of Leucas, and the mainland of Acarmania. Nevertheless the indication was not so perfect but that there was hazard of grounding; and then neither poles were availing, nor could the strength of men without relieve a stranded boat; for the mud was of so yielding a substance that they sunk presently to the breast: landing was everywhere impracticable; and thus, after a most laborious course of between thirty and forty miles, the crews (it is mentioned as a hardship worthy of notice) were to take their supper aboard. Fortunately however the fleet had so cleared the shoals that progress in the night might be ventured. Persevering then till next evening, in a course of between fifty and sixty miles, and overrunning the channel leading to the mouth of the river Pasitigris, by which was the navigation to Susa, it reached Diridotis, a commercial town of Babylonia at the mouth of the Euphrates; eminent as the principal interposit for the trade between Mesopotamia and Arabia<sup>17</sup>.

Mystery here again occurs in the narrative, and of the same character as before; respecting, not the voyage, but the commander's conduct only. Mazenes, who had been taken aboard to advise for the navigation, would surely be attended by the ablest pilots that his authority, supported by Alexander's, could procure. The mart of Susa must have been a considerable object for the commerce with Arabia, and the navigation to it well known; yet no cause is stated for missing the proper course and deviating so far as Diridotis. That it could here be in view of the commanders to avoid Alexander, and proceed directly for Babylon, would appear hardly imaginable, if the course taken, the most direct for the

<sup>17</sup> Πρὸς κώμῃ τινὶ τῆς Βαβυλωνίης χώρας, ὄνομα δὲ αὐτῇ Διρίδωτις, ἵνα λιθανῶλον τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπορίας γῆς οἱ ἔμποροι ἀγινέουσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα θυμίσματα ἡ Ἀράβων γῆ φέρει. Arr. Ind. c. 41. Vincent has rendered κώμῃ a *village*. Occasion has occurred formerly to observe, that the Greek word κώμῃ answers rather to the legal and technical than the familiar sense of our word *village*. Thus Manchester is a village, tho larger and more

populous than perhaps any city of Great Britain, London only excepted.

Gronovius has noticed differing translations of the phrase, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπορίας γῆς, κ.τ.ε. Neither, I must own, quite satisfies me, and that least of which the commentator has declared his preference. The learned reader will judge how far I have expressed the author's meaning.

purpose, or perhaps the only one accommodated to a fleet of row-boats, was not matter to suggest the supposition, and if the failure of due explanation, and the mysterious differences between the narrative derived from the admiral, and that from the generals, by the same writer, did not afford support to such a supposition. Likely enough it may have been necessary for the fleet, after its long course through the shoals, to touch at Diridotis for supplies. Nevertheless the stay there, not specified, seems to have been only of one night; and the course assigned for hastening away is doubly remarkable. Information was obtained, the admiral's narrative says, that Alexander was marching for Susa. But it must have been well known to him, as he had been directed to meet Alexander at Susa, that he would be marching thither, if not already arrived; and, considering the stay of the fleet at Sitakus, with Alexander's no more than ordinary rapidity of progress, notwithstanding the halt of some days at Parsagardæ, he might well have been arrived, as the narrative from the generals implies that he was. The acknowledgement then here of intelligence of Alexander is farther remarkable, as it is the first found, in the admiral's narrative, of any obtained in the whole voyage, after the meeting with Leonnatus, early in its course, excepting that at Harmoza, which is asserted to have been not official, but merely accidental; and, shortly again we shall find that where information might reasonably have been expected, it is asserted to have been unaccountably failing. Notice of these mysterious circumstances appeared requisite, tho' guide for conjecture of what may have given occasion for them fails. The fleet returned hastily, by its former course among the shoals, to the channel which it should before have entered, and, without any recorded difficulty, proceeded to the Pasitigris.

The great rivers of the south of Asia, having their sources at wide distances, in that vast chain of mountains which divides the continent in its length from west to east, are driven, by the form of the land, toward a few openings to the ocean, some joining in their courses, and others nearly approaching at their mouths. The Persian gulph receives, beside the Euphrates and the Tigris, two other rivers, inferior, yet still large, antiently named Pasitigris and Eulæus. These, for a considerable way before reaching the gulph, have their courses nearly parallel, and not very distant, through a flat country. Susa stood on the Eulæus. But this river

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was, toward its mouth, so inconvenient for navigation, that the preferable course for vessels, from the gulph to Susa, was up the Pasitigris, to a canal communicating with the Eulæus. The fleet therefore entering the Pasitigris, proceeded up it, through a rich and populous country, fifty miles, to a bridge on the great road leading from Carmania, across Persis to Susa. There was found a division of the army, not unprovided, it may be believed, with supplies as well as orders for the fleet, and directions for any needful assistance, while Nearchus and Onesicritus, in obedience to command, proceeded by land to wait upon the king at Susa<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> These, on careful comparison of Arrian's narrative of the voyage, from Nearchus, with his narrative of the march, from Aristobulus and Ptolemy, appear to me most likely to have been the circumstances, greatly amplified in the former, and wholly unnoticed in the latter. In a note at the end of the next section the matter will be farther noticed.



## CHAPTER LVI.

Transactions in the March from CARMANIA through PERSIA,  
SUSIANA and MEDIA to BABYLON: Affairs in GREECE:  
Death of ALEXANDER.

## SECTION I.

*March from Carmania to Parsagardæ.—Persia described.—Spoliation of Cyrus's Sepulcher at Parsagardæ.—Delinquency of Officers in high Authority.—Rebellion obviated: Oppression punished.*

B. C. 325. **HAVING** dismissed Nearchus to resume the command of the fleet, and proceed with it up the Persian gulph, Alexander moved with the army again westward. His presence, it appears, was urgently wanted in the rich and extensive regions, conquered so rapidly, and left so soon, and now so long, in large part confided to governors from among the conquered people. Attended therefore only by the companion-cavalry, some infantry, apparently heavy-armed, but chosen for ability to bear fatigue, and a division of bowmen, he took himself the shortest road, over a hilly country, to Parsagardæ<sup>1</sup>, the capital of Persis, committing the main body, with all the elephants, to Hephæstion, to go by a more circuitous road, through a lower country, near the coast; where provisions were plentiful, and the winter air mild.

Persis, the first dominion of the great Cyrus, a small portion only of the extensive country, which, in modern times, has borne the name of Persia, is less known, at this day, than any other country of equal

<sup>1</sup> Among the various spellings of the name of the metropolis of Persis, found among the Greek and Latin writers, I have been induced by Vincent's observations to prefer that in the text.

fame. Modern observation however, as far as it has gone, confirms the account given of it by Arrian, from Nearchus. Toward the gulph is a tract known to our navigators by the name of *Ghermeseer*<sup>2</sup>; low, with a sandy soil, mostly barren, and a torrid atmosphere. A range of mountains bounds this unprofitable country. Beyond these, the plains, holding a considerable elevation above the ocean, tho so near the tropic, enjoy a most advantageous temperature; summer not violently hot, nor winter severely cold. The soil being mostly excellent, grapes and all the fruits common in Greece, olives excepted, are plentiful: the country is well watered; in some parts the rivers expand into lakes, well stored with fish, and frequented by water-fowl; pasture is plentiful, and meadows are common; woods are frequent, affording timber and fuel, and protecting game: cattle are numerous; horses especially excellent; and the human form is said to have been, and to be still, found there in its greatest perfection. Beyond this valuable country, against Media, is a range of lofty mountains, where, in summer, the air of the vallies is suffocating, and in winter snows prevail.

Alexander, having crossed the mountains which divide the fruitful part of Carmania from the rich plains of Persis, on reaching Parsagardæ, was informed of a matter that gave him great displeasure. The magnificent sepulchre of the great Cyrus, which he had left uninjured with all its rich contents, in the care of a kind of college of magians, established for the purpose by the Persian kings, had been plundered. The description of this monument which Arrian has given, after Alexander's general and historian, Aristobulus, hardly would the modern historian excusably pass unregarded.

The sepulchre of Cyrus, he says, was in the paradise of the palace; an eastern phrase signifying those extensive pleasure-gardens, with adjoining parks, ordinary appendages of the houses of the Persian great, and adopted by the Greeks, because, to them, living mostly within city-walls,

<sup>2</sup> Vincent shows here, what is to be regretted, his almost total failure of acquaintance with any modern speech but his own. 'I have retained *Kermesir*,' he says, 'which is the orthography of Niebuhr; but Mr. Jones writes it *Ghermeseer*, which I con-

clude is more correspondent to oriental authority.' I cannot but prefer Mr. Jones's orthography as that proposed to direct English, and not foreign, voices to the oriental pronuntiation.

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and always in fear for their fields, that elegant luxury had not, in their own language, a name. The building stood on a lawn, surrounded by a wood of various trees, and invivened by a stream. In so warm a climate the lawn was admired for its luxuriant grass and unfading verdure. The building consisted of a chamber, raised on a quadrangular basement, and having the roof of the same stone with the walls. It may seem that the construction of the dome was already known in the East, and that the style of sepulchral monument, seen yet among the antient buildings of India, of considerable art, but of more magnificence than elegance, was already in practice. The door-way was so narrow that a man even of ordinary size had some difficulty to enter ; a circumstance observed of the sepulchral chambers in the Egyptian pyramids. In the chamber stood a bed with golden feet, having furniture of purple cloth, and a coverlet of Babylonian tapestry. On the bed was a coffin of gold, containing the embalmed body of Cyrus. A table bore the various articles of a splendid regal dress, with the ornamental appendages usual in the East, chains and ear-rings of gold, and cimeters with hilts of gold, all enriched with gems. An inscription on the wall, in the Persian language and characters, said, ‘ O man ! I am Cyrus son of Cambyses, who acquired empire for the Persians, and reigned over Asia ; envy me not this monument.’

Such still was the state of the sepulcher when Alexander saw it, while passing the winter at Parsagardæ. At its foot, and near the steps leading to the chamber, was a small building allotted to the residence of the magians, who had been constituted its hereditary guardians ; the sons succeeding their fathers in the office. For their maintenance a sheep was allowed them daily, with a proportionate quantity of meal and wine, and monthly a horse to be sacrificed to Cyrus. This establishment, maintained by Alexander, had not, in his absence, answered its purpose. All the rich furniture of the chamber had been taken away. The coffin and the bed remained, but not uninjured. The lid of the coffin was gone ; and upon the rest marks of violence were evident, with the purpose of cutting or breaking off parts, whence the body itself had suffered. Alexander, in vexation and anger at this sacrilege, caused the magians, so evidently in fault by connivance, or at least by negligence, if not even actively concerned in the crime, to be put to torture. Their perseverance, however,  
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in denying that they had either participated in the sacrilege, or had any knowledge of its authors, unlikely as it may seem that this could be truth, induced him to allow their release. He was then careful to have the monument restored, as far as might be, to the former state, committing the superintendence of the business to Aristobulus, from whose history of Alexander Arrian took the account here given. The door-way was then blocked up with masonry, and the impression of the royal signet was given to every joint.

Other and greater delinquents than the magians were soon after denounced. Alexander, at his departure for the conquest of Media and pursuit of Darius, had committed the satrapy of Persis to Phrasaortes, a Persian. While he was in India Phrasaortes died, and then Orxines, also a Persian, whether in office under the deceased satrap is not said, took upon himself to fill the vacant situation. That he incurred any blame simply on that account is also unsaid, but numerous complaints were now preferred against him by the Persians; that he had plundered temples, that he was the robber of the royal sepulcher; and that he had unjustly directed the execution of many persons, some of them Persians. To what manner of trial he was subjected, in consequence of these accusations, the historian has not mentioned; reporting only the result, that Orxines was publicly executed.

The appointment to the important satrapy of the antient kingdom of Persis then rewarded the fidelity and zeal of the new lord of the body-guard Peucestas; who had not merely recommended, but, in a matter of no small moment, qualified himself for it, by the diligence with which he had acquired the Persian language. This was very gratifying to the Persians. Peucestas, moreover, had been the first of the Macedonians to appear in their national dress, and by his conduct altogether he became very popular among them. Alexander approved his conduct, as tending to reconcile the proudest of his new subjects to their new situation, under the dominion of a foreign conqueror.

The urgency for a politic condescension toward the conquered nations appears in what had occurred in the adjoining kingdom of Media; which for its several advantages of situation, climate, population and wealth, was perhaps the most important province of the empire. While Alexander

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was far eastward, Baryaxes, a Mede, had led a revolt, assuming the title of king of the Medes and Persians. The satrapy of Media had been intrusted to Atropates, who also was a Mede or a Persian (for the Greek writers have been rarely solicitous to distinguish them) and with what judgement appeared in the event. Atropates had quelled the rebellion, and came now to wait upon the king at Parsagardæ, bringing Baryaxes and some of his principal supporters, prisoners. These were presently executed.

After no long stay at Parsagardæ Alexander hastened to Susa<sup>3</sup>. His

<sup>3</sup> In Arrian's narrative from Ptolemy and Aristobulus, without notice of any circumstances of the march, Alexander's arrival only at Susa is mentioned in three words, Παρελθὼν εἰς Σούσα. But in his narrative from Nearchus, matters remarkable enough are reported. Alexander, it is there said, at the head of his army, joined his fleet lying in the Tigris, and, notwithstanding the urgency for his hastening forward, indicated in the account from the generals, he delayed his progress to celebrate there the happy junction, with sacrifice, procession and games, among which Nearchus was singularly honored by the army. Vincent, earnest for the credit of his admiral, has been anxious to reconcile the two narratives, and flattered himself that he had succeeded. Wherever they may differ I cannot, for myself, hesitate to prefer that of the generals; which, as far as it goes, is clear; and they had no obvious interest in giving a false coloring to any of the circumstances. But there are awkwardnesses here as elsewhere, in the report from the admiral himself. At Diridotis, in a corner of the Persian gulph, far out of Alexander's way, intelligence of the king and the army, the admiral has acknowledged, was ready for him; yet afterward, in the rich and populous country on the banks of the Pasitigris, across which the king and the army were necessarily to pass, if indeed not already gone by, information so failed that he had to

send messengers some days journey to inquire for them. How it should be, not only that such intelligence as was ready at Diridotis should fail on the Pasitigris, but also that Alexander's care, acknowledged in the supplies found at Sitakus, also should fail, where least of all it may seem to have been likely to fail, is left for conjecture. Why, in the admiral's narrative, the bank of the Pasitigris has been chosen for the place in which he would have the Greeks at home believe that he, among sacrifices, processions and games, received from the hand of his king the honors which the testimony of the generals, surely more creditable for him, attributed to him at Susa, we also inquire in vain. His omission to acknowledge that his colleague Onesicritus, received, as the report from the generals assures us, the same honor with him, is quite in consonance with all that appears of his character.

These differences, clearly not unworthy of historical notice, it may be observed are so far from impeaching the general credit of the history that they vouch for it. Were not the more important facts beyond suspicion true, these minor matters in controversy would never have reached us. For the credit of Roman history we might desire, oftener than they are found, similarly conflicting reports from writers of different interests.

vigor, in repressing and punishing opposition to his new sovereignty, appears to have been not greater than his earnestness to prevent oppression of his new subjects, his diligence in attending to their complaints, and the strictness of his controul over those in authority among them. Information of his condescension and of his justice having preceded him, complaints preferred to him were numerous. For, says Arrian, when it had become known that Alexander was beyond the Indus, and the Hydaspes, and the Akesines, and the Hyphasis, daily exposing himself to danger, and still proposing to proceed to more unknown regions; and even afterward, when, instead of returning by the safe way of Arachosia, by which he sent the largest division of his army under Craterus, he had resolved himself to brave the horrors of the Gadrosian desert, many, left in authority, throughout the conquered countries, proceeded to enrich themselves in all ways within their power, plundering temples and sepulchers, and oppressing the people. The satrap of Susiana, Abulites, a Persian, and his son Oxathres, were accused as eminent in this course. Both suffered capitally. But the greater number, of those implicated in such crimes, were Greeks. The impartiality then with which Alexander proceeded to punish the guilty, whether Persians or Greeks, Macedonians or republicans, would not be generally approved by the conquering nation. It was imputed to him that he was extreme in believing accusations, and punishing what they called small crimes. But this imputation is left quite general; inasmuch that no particulars of either the offenders or the offences, which Arrian has mentioned as so numerous, have reached us. Excepting the generals Heracon, Cleander and Sitalces, whose eminence would make notice of their fate hardly avoidable, not even the name of any European, who suffered in any way, has been transmitted.



## SECTION II.

*Difficulties of Alexander for his Civil Government : His Purpose to make, of his various Subjects, one People : Marriages of Greeks with Persians : Bounty to the Army.*

To settle the government of his vast empire Alexander had a business before him of greater difficulty perhaps than all his conquests; never such occurred for any man besides known in history. To estimate that difficulty it will be necessary, among other considerations, to look back to the earliest evidence of that distinction of Greek and barbarian, which became so strong in Grecian minds, forming a prominent feature of the national character. Homer, as occasion has occurred formerly to observe, knew nothing of it; and even Herodotus, in whose time the prejudice was already powerful, shows that less than a century before him it hardly existed. In the age of Cræsus, the Lydians appear not to have been considered by the Greeks as any otherwise distinguished from themselves than the several modern European nations at this day from one another. Even Æschylus shows nothing of that insolent claim of superiority for those of Grecian blood and language, and that principle of uncharitableness toward all others, which however grew in his time; resulting from the Persian invasions of Greece, and encouraged by the extraordinary victories obtained by the little republics, on land and sea, which delivered them from the slavery, or even annihilation, which they had dreaded from the vast power of the Persian empire. Then grew that narrow pride, which would deny to the Macedonians and Epirots their claim to be of the Greek nation; while yet all the boasted advancement in philosophy left uncorrected that cruel selfishness, found in modern times only among the meekest savages, whence the whole population of even Grecian republics was, without remorse, reduced to slavery, and in some instances extirpated, by their fellow Greeks of other republics. But now the military glory and political importance of the Macedonians would not only raise their claim to consideration among the Greeks, but give them

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an effectual superiority ; while on the other hand the republicans, with the presumption and illiberality common to republicans, tho' hating one another, assumed still to be all superior to the rest of mankind.

Differing thus among themselves, yet the agreement was general in aversion to allow the subdued nations any equality of rank or advantages. The conquest of the greatest part of the civilized world, comprizing countless millions of inhabitants, had been wonderfully made with an army of comparatively a very few thousands. But how those millions should be held in that state of degradation and oppression, which so many of the conquerors desired, and yet continue to furnish the wealth which was their great object, and what should be the form of government to satisfy, not the conquered, but even the small proportion of conquerors, and maintain that union among them necessary to the continuance of their dominion, were problems which human wisdom would hardly solve.

Alexander, on the other hand, it appears, had early conceived the magnanimous and philanthropic project to consolidate his new empire by bringing his subjects of distant parts, and different languages, manners, and religions, to coalesce as one people. So early as in the second year of his progress in conquest he made this evident by his measures in Egypt. His successes afterward were of amount that might stimulate less capacious minds to extravagance of ambition. His purpose of carrying conquest to the extremity of the East, clearly was extravagant, and his abandonment of it, in compliance with the wishes of his army was evidently in no small amount forced ; yet, in the manner of that concession, as well as in following measures, he made the greatness of his mind conspicuous. Where just consideration must have convinced him that he was wrong, he yielded, yet with dignity. But, when the eager desires and stubborn prejudices of a large majority among all his original subjects were adverse to a good purpose, he would not yield. Nevertheless in whatever might be done toward softening their prejudices, satisfying any reasonable desires, and reconciling them to what was requisite for the permanency, not more perhaps of his own power than of their advantages, he was most liberal and most diligent.

Already, as we have seen, he had himself taken a wife from among the conquered people. Many probably before, but more after his example,

had done the same. This mode of amalgamating nations would be more adverse to the prejudices of the republican Greeks, whose illiberal jealousies forbad intermarriage even of Greeks beyond their several townships, than of the Macedonians, whose customs, warranting their princes, probably allowed subjects also to take wives from other states. Alexander resolved to prosecute it, and in a signal manner. At Susa he had left the family of the late king of Persia his prisoners. Married as he was already to the daughter of the Bactrian chief Oxyartes, he now took, as an additional wife, Barsine, eldest daughter of Darius, who, probably, when he left her at Susa, was under marriageable age. Concerning this measure, which certainly was not consonant to Grecian common rule, nor, as we learn, to Persian, what was the public opinion at the time is much less indicated by antient writers than might be expected. The marriage with Barsine, or, as others have given her name, Statira (if one of these be not rather a title) was reported by all historians of the time. Aristobulus, in his history, as Arrian assures us, added that Alexander also married Parysatis, daughter of the former sovereign of the Persian empire, Artaxerxes Ochus; not however mentioning when this took place; nor does it appear that the fact was noticed by any other cotemporary writer.

Consonantly then with what afterward, under the feudal institutions, prevailed over Europe, he was probably warranted by oriental custom as sovereign of the empire, in assuming to himself to dispose, in marriage, of the daughters of the greatest families. To cement the union of the conquering and conquered nations, he gave them to his principal officers. Whether any of these, like himself, had already wives is not said. For his eminently favored friend Hephæstion he made the most illustrious match, giving him a younger sister of his own new queen, another daughter of Darius Codomannus. He then gave Amastrine, daughter of Oxyartes brother of Codomannus, to Craterus, whom he appears to have esteemed the ablest of his surviving generals: the daughter of Atropates, satrap of Media, was betrothed to Perdikkas; one of the daughters of the venerable Artabazus to Ptolemy the historian, afterward king of Egypt; and another to Eumenes his chief secretary, eminent not so only, but as an officer perhaps inferior to none. Eumenes was not of a Macedonian family, but of the republican



republican Greek settlement of Cardia in Thrace; whose people, in Philip's reign and before, had distinguished themselves by their perseverance in resisting the tyranny of the Athenian people, and maintaining their right to prefer the alliance or patronage of the Macedonian kings. The loss of his history of Alexander, is, in the destruction of antient memorials, especially to be regretted. The services of Nearchus, recently arrived from the fleet, were rewarded with the present of a wife whose mother only was Persian, her father that eminent Greek in the Persian service, Mentor; who, had he and his brother Memnon survived, if human speculation should be trusted, were likely to have given a very different turn to the affairs of the civilized world. Extensive as their interest was among the Grecian republics, and at the same time high as their esteem in the Persian empire, not only they might probably have stopped Alexander's career, but produced another kind of a revolution, still by a union of Greeks and Persians, in which however it could hardly have been but that the Persian interest must have predominated. The match made for Seleucus, eminent afterward among the successors to the empire, was remarkable, as it tends to show the extent of Alexander's views in uniting his subjects of the two nations. To that highly esteemed officer he gave a daughter of his persevering opponent, who had fallen in the adverse cause, the Bactrian Spitamenes. Possibly Seleucus had made acquaintance with the lady, and solicited the match; tho that he could then have had any view to the splendid fortune, to which it may nevertheless have assisted to lead him, is utterly unlikely. Altogether from illustrious families of the conquered empire he made eighty matches for his principal officers.

These marriages of the most eminent being arranged, all the Macedonians who had taken oriental wives, apparently including all Greeks of that which, for a comprehensive name, was called the Macedonian army, were assembled; and, a roll of them being taken, they were found to be above ten thousand. The weddings were then celebrated after the Persian manner; a compliment which could not but be gratifying to the families of the ladies. The ceremony was followed by a magnificent supper for the men only. We have observed formerly that, in the Greek republics, women, unless of the lowest ranks, lived in much seclusion; far more than in the previous times

times of kingly government ; but among the Persians that seclusion was yet stricter. Among neither people however was allowed the society of reputable women with men at table. But after the meal, whether approved by republican manners, or, as the particularity of the description may lead to suppose, only in the Macedonian and other surviving Grecian monarchies, the ladies were introduced. Each, as she entered, was received by her betrothed husband, joining right hands, and saluting her with a kiss, and then seating her by him. This society however was of short duration. Presently, the king leading throughout the ceremony, every husband severally handed away his wife. The association thus of the king with his subjects, so contrary to that sullen tho pompous seclusion of the royal person, which had gained establishment as a rule among the Persians, was highly gratifying to the Greeks, and softened, in some degree, the ill-humor excited by the extensive favor to the conquered, and the adoption of their customs in so many instances.

That ill humor was farther obviated by a magnificent liberality. Dowers were given with all the wives ; and this was followed by a bounty more out of all expectation. The disposition, eminent among our seamen, to be eager to acquire riches, and careless of them when acquired, had grown in Alexander's army. His donations, or what we call prizemoney, rapidly gained, were rapidly dissipated. From this extravagance many profited, perhaps more of the conquered than of the conquering nation, and, with the view to further profit, gave credit to those who, having acquired expensive habits, were unwilling to forego them. Many debts however were contracted beyond all reasonable hope of means for payment. Conquest ended, the former opportunities were ended ; creditors became uneasy ; and debtors feared complaints, which might excite the severity of the king's justice against them. Alexander, informed of this, ordered a return of all debts contracted by officers and soldiers, adding a promise that they should be paid. This liberality had not immediately the proposed effect. Not improbably credit had sometimes been extorted by threats. All accounts mark that, under republican commanders, such and even greater violence to barbarians, as they were termed, could not have been either prevented or punished. Even in Alexander's army such had been the extravagance in borrowing, whether by extortion or favor, yet such the jealousy which the signal demonstration

demonstration of his determination to dispense equal justice to all his subjects excited, that, some fearing the reproach of violence, some of fraud, some, according to the historian, only of extravagance, few would acknowledge any debts.

Alexander's measure was of a kind not to be prompted by either extravagance in himself, or by simple liberality, of which indeed it could be no prudent result. He saw a storm growing which it behooved him to obviate. Not satisfied therefore with the evasion of his offered bounty, in following orders he repressed the suspicion which had been so extensively entertained. 'As it became a king' he said, 'to be strict in speaking only truth, so it ill became subjects to entertain groundless suspicion that it could be their king's purpose to deceive them.' Tables were then placed in a convenient manner throughout the camp, with a sufficiency of money on them; and, under direction of proper officers, accounts were called for, debts paid, and receipts given, without any memorial kept of the debtors names. The amount of this largess, if the copyists may be trusted for numbers, was, according to Arrian, reported to have been twenty thousand talents, between four and five millions sterling. The army, it is added, was more gratified by the generous allowance to conceal the debtors names, than even by the relief from debt, and apprehended consequences.

From this indulgence for misconduct, Alexander proceeded to reward merit. To all who had distinguished themselves he assigned largesses in proportion to their rank and services; but to a few of the more eminent he added an honorary present, ordinary, as we have formerly seen, among the Grecian republics, a golden crown, in general assembly placed on the head of the receiver, and, on this occasion, by the king in person. Peucestas, to whom he reckoned himself principally indebted for the preservation of his life, when he had so rashly leaped singly into the Mallian fortress, was the first so distinguished. The second honor was given to Leonnatus, who, beside having shared in that singularly perilous service, had distinguished himself on several occasions in India, and still more afterward in the return westward, when, left with the command in the Orite country, he had, by a signal victory, quelled the rebellion of the Orites and their allies, and then, with great prudence,  
settled



settled the government of that wild part of the empire, where any powerful hostility might have been even fatal to the fleet in passing along its coast. The king's value for the service of the fleet itself was shown in giving the third crown to Nearchus, and the fourth to Onesicritus.

Prudence, a virtue not generally attributed to Alexander, tho in his progress in achievement largely indicated, is in this distribution of honors remarkable. No man he is said to have valued as a friend and confidential adviser equally with Hephæstion, and no man was more distinguished by ordinary honors. Hephæstion appears nevertheless to have been not of splendid talents, nor so esteemed by Alexander. The qualities valued in him were good sense, sincere friendship, a sober mind and a warm heart. Accordingly the more difficult enterprizes were never committed to him, but he was selected for the highest and most confidential commands when the business was only to maintain loyalty and good order. It was on the present occasion resolved that Hephæstion, and with him all the other lords of the body-guard, whose chief he seems to have been, should receive the honor of a crown for their faithful services altogether; but secondary only to those who had earned it in laborious and hazardous enterprize. Thus Hephæstion, tho clearly first in the king's favor and confidence, was only fifth in the number of those now distinguished. Nor was the honor extended beyond those high officers, his associates; a limitation which would make it the more flattering to those who first received it.

In this, and in all measures at this time taken, there seems to have been a view to those further resolved on; apparently necessary to the consolidation of the new empire, but of a kind to be generally offensive to those by whom that empire had been acquired. Many satraps of the conquered provinces arrived at Susa, bringing recruits for the army, natives of their several countries, to the number of thirty thousand; all completely instructed in the Grecian discipline, and a considerable part of them in that of the horse-service. The whole cavalry of the army, previously in four divisions, was now arranged in five; not by adding one composed intirely of orientals, but by distributing these among all. In the number of the recruits was a body of Persians bearing among their fellow-countrymen a distinguishing title in their own language, not explained

to us: the others were all from the north-eastern countries, Bactria, Sogdiana, Arachosia, Zarangia, Arcia, and Parthia. Alexander's preference for the character of those whom he had found most difficult to subdue, is thus made evident. But for their very virtues they would the more be objects of jealousy among his old subjects, who had long been in the habit of despising the southern and western Asiatics, but could not despise these. His confidence in the men of higher rank among them was remarkably enough demonstrated; the highest commissions in his new division of cavalry being assigned to them exclusively. The chief command of the whole body was committed to Hydaspes, a Bactrian. Under him Cophes son of Artabazus, Hydarnes and Antiboles, sons of Mazaus, Pharasmanes son of Phrataphernes satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, Itanes brother of Alexander's first queen Roxana, and Ægobares, and Mithrobæus, described only as brothers, but marked, by their association with those before named, as men of eminent dignity, held the next rank. Nevertheless, however this may have been required by just consideration, not only of the general interest of the whole empire, but also of the particular interest of the people both of the Macedonian kingdom and the Grecian republics, yet it would not be satisfactory to those of either, who, now in high situations, were aspiring to higher. At the same time the mass of the Grecian army saw, with particular envy, some of the barbarians, as they were called, admitted into that distinguished body the royal-companion horse. Discontent thus was brooding, but nothing immediately broke out.

## SECTION III.

*Alexander's Voyage down the river Eulæus to the Persian Gulph, and up the Tigris to Opis. Correction of Maladministration under the Persian Government. Mutiny of the Army: Renewed Loyalty of the Army.*

ALEXANDER, already when at Pasargadæ and Persepolis<sup>3</sup>, according to Arrian, expressed an earnest desire, as he had explored the courses of the Indus to the ocean, to examine those of the rivers that discharge their waters into the Persian gulph. Some writers, he adds, have reported that he had in view to circumnavigate Africa, little as its extent southward was then known; and, entering the Mediterranean by that now called the Strait of Gibraltar, and subduing Carthage, to bring all under his dominion. Others said that his purpose was to return to Greece, and, in the way, add the Scythian and other countries about the Euxine sea to his European kingdom. According to the fancy of others again, he had been alarmed by report of the threatening progress of the Romans in conquest, whence his first purpose was to secure Sicily and the Grecian towns of Italy against them. 'For myself,' adds the historian, 'I can neither gather with any certainty what were his purposes, nor do I care for conjecture: only of this I am confident, that he would not remain idle in the injoyment of what he already possessed, and that his view would not be limited to small objects; but, on the contrary, could he have added Europe to Asia, and the Britannic islands to Europe, he would still have sought unknown lands; and, when nothing remained to contend for, the restlessness of his mind would not have ceased.'

<sup>3</sup> Ὡς δὲ εἰς Πασαργάδας τε καὶ εἰς Περσέπολιν ἀφίκετο Ἀλέξανδρος, πόθος καταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. ε. This, the only instance of the occurrence of the Greek name Persepolis in Arrian's extant works, must be what Vincent has meant to refer to as marking Arrian's distinction of Persepolis and Pa-

sargadæ, or Parsagardæ. How far Arrian has intended to mark any such distinction, the curious reader, observing the many instances in which the name Pasargadæ is found in his history of Alexander, will judge for himself.

With



With regard to the Grecian settlements in Italy and Sicily, it may be observed that, as members of that eminent nation of which Alexander was the elected head, they would of course be objects of his care; but, for his apprehension of the Romans, beside the negative evidence, formerly noticed, that even the name of Rome is not found in the works of Aristotle who survived him, the positive testimony of Roman history marks it for a vain fancy, originating in later ages. When his kinsman and contemporary, Alexander king of Molossis, lost his life in war in Italy, the power of the Roman people was not yet formidable to the Greeks, even of that country; nor became at all alarming till half a century later, when, after considerable conquests among the Italian states, it showed itself in the war with Pyrrhus, successor of the Molossian Alexander.

The next objects of the greater Macedonian Alexander's pursuit, made fully known to us, were of a kind worthy of a great prince. The bounty of nature, often not immediately obvious to man's view, nor profitable to him without exertion of his ingenuity and industry, offered to the possessors of the vast plain, about the rivers flowing into the Persian gulph, great reward for such exertion. Periodical floods brought sometimes destruction, sometimes plenty, as the season was more or less favorable. Under the Assyrian princes, commanding a great population, supported by a soil highly, but precariously, productive, measures had been taken, with great labor, to extend the inundations in some parts, to confine them in others, and to form canals for the convenience of water-carriage. Thus the land formerly valuable was protected, a very great extent, formerly barren, was made highly fruitful, and the produce was cheaply conveyed to its market.

The Assyrian kings had their residence in Mesopotamia; and, from their comparatively moderate extent of dominion, the revenue from that country would be of principal importance. With the Persian dynasty, afterward, neither the land, nor the climate, nor the people, were in favor; the flat and often flooded soil unsuitable both for their pleasure-gardens, intitled paradises, in which they delighted, and for their favorite amusement of hunting; the climate hot and moist; the people of another language and another religion; nor, in the extent of the Persian empire, was the revenue from that one, tho a very rich province, important equally as for the Assyrian princes. Thus not only improvements were discon-

tinued, but the maintenance of those already made was neglected; left, apparently to the means of the proprietors, or of the neighbouring townships, under the government of conquerors who disliked them.

Ch. 36. s. 2.  
of this hist.

The Assyrian kings appear to have thought little of maritime commerce. But the extraordinary successes of the Sidonians and Tyrians, whose merchants, like those of Florence, Venice and Genoa in modern ages, are described as princes of the earth, had excited the attention of the able early sovereigns of Palestine, and their patronage of that source of public and private wealth had been largely successful. Whether Alexander's views toward it had originated, as may seem probable, from his father's policy, whose principal revenue appears to have been derived from the commerce of the Thessalian ports, or had been excited by what he had observed in Phenicia, where he would no doubt obtain information inabling him to enlarge them, they were evidently already extensive, when, at the early age of twenty-four he took possession of Egypt, and there, in the space of a few months, laid the foundation of the greatest commercial system that had been seen in the world, and which flourished after him near twenty centuries. India offered a field in which his mind, with such a favorite purpose, would not fail to expatiate; and, on his return toward Babylon, after having not only opened the way toward that wealthy country by land, but proved the possibility of also reaching it by sea, that it employed his extraordinary diligence greatly, we have assurances from all historians. Arrian especially, expressing himself doubtfully concerning the extravagant views to farther conquest, attributed to him by some, affords evidence of his speculating on the extension of commerce, clear and decisive. Nevertheless, tho to what extent must remain utterly uncertain, yet that he meditated some farther conquest, as necessary, not only to commerce in view, but to the peace of his subjects in some of the richest parts of his actual empire, appears more than probable.

Genesis,  
c. 10.

Babylon, the capital of the first prince on record as powerful in arms, was not chosen by him with a view to those pleasures of the chase, of little danger, but no use, in which his successors in empire delighted: it would be a work of peril and labor to dislodge the lions from their thickets, and make the plain secure for the husbandman. But the beasts of the forest were not the only disturbers of the peace, and invaders of the

the property, of the industrious cultivators of that wide and rich plain, the best part of the Assyrian dominion, called by the Greeks Mesopotamia, the Midriver-land. Bounded on one side by the great sandy desert, spreading through Arabia to Egypt, on two others by rugged and lofty mountains, these became retreats for the idle and profligate of mankind, who multiplied into nations of robbers, depending on rapine for the best part of their livelihood. From earliest history to the present day such has been the character, and such the profession, of the scattered, but altogether numerous population of the extensive desert, from the border of the Euphrates to the Red Sea, and of the highlanders generally throughout Asia. As then it seems indicated that the first conqueror obtained his title of a mighty hunter, by destroying, as we are told of some of the Grecian heroes, the wild beasts which infested his country, so the more general description of him by the first known historian, as ‘a mighty one on earth,’ appears to mark that, as it is said particularly of Hercules, he was successful in supporting the industrious and peaceful of the cultivated country, against the violent and lawless of the wilds.

Genesis,  
c. 10.

Ch. 1. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Alexander, however, presently on returning to those rich plains whose state he had formerly seen, took measures for repairing the damage suffered from neglect under the Persian monarchs, and moreover for carrying improvement far beyond what had before been in contemplation; he would promote agriculture by maritime commerce, and maritime commerce by agriculture. But, bordering on Babylonia, touching on the Euphrates, if not even holding part of the country on both sides of that great river toward its mouth, were hords of Arabs, whose propensities were adverse to the quiet and welfare both of the husbandman and merchant. The allowance of the Persian government for those pirates of the Desert, appears to have been nearly such as we have formerly seen it for those of the mountains; marking either extreme weakness in itself, or extreme negligence of the welfare of its subjects. To awe, if not to subdue these would be in Alexander’s view.

Having resolved then himself to examine the circumstances both of the rivers and of the country, he began with the stream on which Susa stood, the Eulæus, by which of course would be the readiest communication with the sea, if, in approaching the gulph, it could be made as free for navigation as it was upward toward the city. With this object he embarked with



with a small escort of horse and foot, directing the main body of the army to attend his motions, marching on the bank; the whole fleet accompanying him as far as the canals which communicated, one with the Pasitigris eastward, the river by which Nearchus had ascended, another with the greater river Tigris westward. For the more difficult navigation, from the canals to the mouth of the Eulæus, he would not hazard the whole fleet, but, with a few of the lighter vessels, proceeded himself. Without accident he reached the gulph; and then, turning westward along its shore, entered the Tigris, and ascended that stream to its junction with the canal, where he rejoined the main bodies of both the fleet and the army.

This greater river also had its obstructions, now to be examined. The measures of the Persian monarchs for the protection of their Mesopotamian subjects against the inroads of the Arabs, formidable only as pirates, are indeed remarkable. Instead of proposing to facilitate maritime commerce, and repress piracy, by a powerful marine, instead of anything consistent either with their duty to their Mesopotamian subjects or their own dignity, their resource for checking depredation was to establish a perpetual blockade of their own river. Dams had been formed at intervals across the stream, to stop the ascent of vessels. Alexander, causing these to be removed, laid the navigation open <sup>4</sup>.

As

<sup>4</sup> ' Alexander removed the dikes with which the Persian monarchs had obstructed the stream. His historians delight in attributing these obstructions to the timidity of the Persians, and the removal of them to the magnanimity of the conqueror; but Niebuhr, who found similar dikes both in the Euphrates and Tigris still existing, observes, that they are constructed for the purpose of keeping up the waters to inundate the contiguous level; if so, the demolition is as derogatory from the policy and sagacity of the monarch, as it is flattering to his intrepidity.' Vin. on Nearch. p. 505.

This passage had escaped my recollection when I wrote what is on the subject in the text; but, on my best consideration, it appears

to me that the worthy and diligent dean has not used his ordinary caution here. The exact situation of Opis he acknowledges to be unknown; and therefore whether any dam, which Niebuhr saw, was below it, must be somewhat uncertain. The neglect of the beneficial works of the Assyrian monarchs, by the Persian, the dean has stated; and Alexander's general diligence of inquiry, and earnestness in improvement of his dominions, have been objects of his warm praise. Alexander's engineers surely would have had no difficulty to draw water from a higher situation to a lower, for the purpose of irrigation, without obstructing the navigation. With a little more extent of observation than perhaps the very respectable critic had opportunity for, he might have seen,

As far as Susa the promised progress of the army homeward had been interrupted only by the necessary halting for rest, or for business obviously requiring attention. But the expedition to the Persian gulph was of another character. Not only it was an interruption of the progress homeward, uncalled for by any necessity obvious to the many, but would be likely to excite jealousy of views to farther conquest, and promote rumors on the subject, which might not otherwise have arisen. The predatory habits of the bordering Arabs would be known by report; and Alexander's earnestness to reduce to civil order all such, within or bordering on his dominions, had, in the course of his progress eastward, been largely shown. But it might be farther apprehended that the fame of conquering a country like Arabia, never known to have been conquered, might allure him; and to command the whole of the sea-coast, so far at least as to repress piracy, would be readily supposed, if not even known, to be within his views. The torrid zone had been imagined, by some of the elder Greek philosophers, to be uninhabitable for heat, as the frozen for cold; and, tho heat equal to any ordinary in Arabia may have been already suffered by some of the army, yet apprehension of the unexperienced circumstances of the torrid zone might heighten an indisposition to warfare there, which had been excited by memory or report of the sufferings in the Gadrosian desert. With uneasiness thus likely to have possessed many, the general offence to all of Grecian blood and language from the assumption of the Persian dress, occasionally by the king himself, and, after his example, and through his encouragement, by some of his principal officers, concurred to make dissatisfaction extensive and violent. Nor was this limited to those of the lower orders: on the contrary it appears that some, and even many, of high rank, not only were so affected, but themselves promoted the disposition; and that, among all the Greeks, Macedonians were the leaders. Great advancement, instead of satisfying, is often apt to excite ambition; and probably no man ever experienced more than Alexander what the fourteenth Lewis of France is said to

seen, even within his own country, that a part of the waters of a river may be diverted for the purpose of irrigation without preventing navigation. Altogether I am quite disposed to adhere to the antient authority, that of Arrian, on which the account in the text rests.

have

have wittily complained of, that, when he conferred a favor, he provided ingratitude in one man and discontent in twenty. It was treated as matter for indignation, that Peucestas, appointed to govern Persia, condescended to use the Persian language in speaking to the Persians. Nor was it alone offensive that Macedonians accommodated themselves to Persian manners: the allowance of the Macedonian dress, and instruction in the Macedonian discipline, and the adoption of Macedonian manners, for those of the new levies, whom the Greeks called barbarian youths, also gave umbrage. These were matters of open and loud complaint among one another. Altogether however, in the unfortunate failure of Persian historians, it appears, even from the Greek, that the just protection afforded to conquered subjects, and the denial of that plunder, habitual to the Greeks hardly less than to the Asiatic highlanders, plunder extended even to the persons of the conquered, carried off for slavery, had principally produced the already threatening spirit of discontent in the Grecian part of the army.

Alexander, not unaware of this, had not neglected preparation for meeting it.

Arr. exp. Al.  
l. 7. c. 8. At Opis, the principal town on the Tigris, was a palatial castle, apparently such as were everywhere found at the place of residence of Persian governors of provinces, which would afford convenient opportunity for seclusion, desirable for his purpose, and means for security, which a just precaution would recommend. Arriving there about the ordinary season of the Macedonian Olympiad, he caused the festival to be proclaimed. In careful conformity then, as formerly, to the Macedonian constitution, which so far, at least, agreed with the Greek republican, he called the whole Grecian army together, and addressed it as a popular assembly: ‘ Their attendance,’ he said, ‘ he had required for the purpose of informing them of his intention ‘ immediately to discharge all whom age, wounds, or any infirmity disabled ‘ for farther active service, with ample means for those to return home ‘ who might desire it. But it was not his intention so to limit the indulgence; for any future service he desired only willing minds; and for ‘ these the advantages should be such as to make them the envy of others, ‘ and excite emulation among the youths at home, for a share in future ‘ labors and dangers.’

Numerous as the exiles were always from many of the Grecian republics,  
 the



the proportion of them among the mercenaries of Alexander's army would be likely to be large; and, for them, leave to return to their own countries would be no boon, unless they might be protected by a powerful foreign hand. Alexander therefore, according to the probable account of Diodorus, had promised them protection. Arrian's, and indeed all accounts, indicate that the leaders in the tumult were Macedonians. To go home was not their object, or, however, not their immediate object: so much he had already yielded to them in India: they would now have more. Voices exclaimed, 'He no longer cares for Macedonians; all his favor is for barbarians; Arachosians, Parthians and others, of names even unknown in Greece.' Some, in terms of complete mutiny, went so far as to vociferate 'Dismiss us all, and, for your associate in future campaigns, take your father;' alluding to his pretension, or the pretension put about for him, to be the son of Jupiter Ammon.

Alexander's conduct now, whether to be successful or not, was decisive. Leaping from the tribunal on which he was sitting, he rushed among the multitude, accompanied by his principal generals and his guard; the former no doubt prepared for such a measure; and, directing his view wholly to the Macedonians, he caused thirteen to be apprehended. This being done, apparently without resistance, he ordered them to be led away, and, as liable under military law, immediately executed. Ascending then again the tribunal, he spoke to the surprised multitude thus: 'I do not  
Arr. l. 7.  
c. 9 & 10.  
 address you now to divert you from your eagerness to return home. All are welcome to go, as far as depends on me. But I desire first to remind you of what you were when you left your home, and to what circumstances you are now advanced. In doing this, as in all duty bound, I must begin with acknowledging my obligations and yours to my father, both incalculably great.' He proceeded then to mention briefly the poverty of the Macedonian people, and their distressed circumstances at Philip's accession, and the various improvements under him: security provided for the land against invasion, before always apprehended, frequently suffered; commerce flourishing in the ports, formerly all in the hands of enemies, now restored to the kingdom; the Macedonian capital become the resort of the wealthy from all parts; and, finally, the king elected general autocrat of all the republics of Greece for war against Persia, and Macedonia raised to the first dignity

among Grecian states. ‘Succeeding my father,’ he then continued, ‘inheriting from him that kingdom, so improved for the people, but through exertions which left the treasury poor; some gold and silver plate in it, but in money not sixty talents (about twelve or thirteen thousand pounds sterling) yet loaded with a debt of five hundred talents, I found means to borrow eight hundred. Such was the fund with which, together with you, I left Macedonia; which was not yet among wealthy countries, tho already affording, for its inhabitants, subsistence in security. Soon then, through our success in arms, Ionia, Æolia, Phrygia and Lydia, were added to your dominion and made subsidiary. Cœlosyria and Palestine became yours, and, in the same campaign, the wealth of Egypt and Cyrene followed without contest. Mesopotamia, Babylon, Susa, Bactria, the Persian treasure, the wealth of India, and the command of the ocean beyond, are now yours. From among you, satraps, generals, officers in all degrees have risen. And, after so many labors in which I have shared, what distinguishes me from you but this purple robe and this diadem? Individually I have nothing. Nobody can show treasures of mine which are not yours, or preserved for your sakes. For my own use, indeed, I want no more than you possess. I sleep in the same manner, I eat the same food; or rather, I think, I fare less luxuriously than some of you; and I am sure I have sometimes watched for you, when you have slept in all quiet. Who among you can say that he has borne more fatigue for me than I for him? Look well now among you, and see who can show more scars from wounds, not only from weapons striking from afar, but also from those used in close action. For your glory and your wealth I have led you conquerors over plains and mountains, lands and seas. These labors completed, the recent business has been of another kind. Nuptials have been joyfully celebrated, and marriage portions have been given with all. Tho your ordinary pay has been beyond all former custom great, and large prize-money has accrued to many, yet to obviate uneasiness, liable to arise from extravagance perhaps thus excited, all verified debts have been paid, without inquiry why they were contracted, and without memorial kept of by whom. To all who have distinguished themselves by their merits, honors have been added, such as will be a testimony for them even to  
‘late

‘ late posterity. None have fallen in battle who, beside the ordinary  
‘ glory of such a death, have not had their merit recorded by a splendid  
‘ funeral and lasting monuments. Brazen statues have been erected at  
‘ their homes to many ; and their parents and families have not honor only,  
‘ but the advantage of immunity from those burthensome offices required in  
‘ all civil communities. This then remains for my gratification, that, under  
‘ my lead no man has perished in dishonorable flight. It was my intention  
‘ to have sent home all those less qualified for farther service, the envy of  
‘ mankind. But as it is the desire of all to go, go all, and tell those at  
‘ home that your king Alexander, who has conquered the Persians, Medes,  
‘ Bactrians and Sacians, and reduced under obedience the wilder nations  
‘ of Arrees, Arachotes, Drangies, Chorasmies, Parthians and Hyrcanians ;  
‘ who has led you over Caucasus and through the Caspian gates, and  
‘ across the rivers Oxus and Tanais, and not only afterward the Indus,  
‘ which no conqueror ever before passed except the god Dionysus Bacchus,  
‘ but also, beyond the Indus, over the Hydaspes, the Akesines, and the  
‘ Hydraotes ; and would have crossed the Hyphasis, but that your spirits  
‘ failed ; who nevertheless entered the ocean by both mouths of the  
‘ Indus, who led an army across the Gadrosian desert, which no leader  
‘ before ever attempted to cross but to the destruction of his army ; who  
‘ so equipped and provided his fleet that, at the same time, it made its  
‘ way along the inhospitable coast of the ocean, and through the difficult  
‘ navigation of the Persian gulph, so that fleet and army have together hailed  
‘ him conqueror at Susa ; tell at home, I say, that having shared with him  
‘ in all glories thus far, you then deserted him, turning him over to the care  
‘ and guard of barbarians, whom, with him, you had conquered. Such  
‘ is the account you will have to give, for your honor among men, and for  
‘ the favor you would pray for from the gods.’

Having thus spoken he descended hastily from the tribunal, went to his palace, and neither on that, nor on the following day, admitted any one to his conversation. Apparently waiting for concessions which were not made, he would not implicate, in disfavor with the army, those of his principal officers who concurred with him in the more liberal opinion of the propriety, or rather necessity, of admitting the many millions conquered to some fellowship in common rights with the comparatively few



thousands of conquerors; he would take the whole responsibility upon himself. On the third day, nothing conciliatory from the army having reached him, he proceeded to measures for dispensing with their favor. Sending for the principal of those orientals of different provinces, who, for the convenience of a common name, are often described together by that of Persians, he distributed the chief command of the several bodies of his army among them; and he limited the privilege of saluting him, in the Macedonian manner, with a kiss, to those who, by marriage, were become his kinsmen. Having before admitted many Persians into his body of royal-companion cavalry, he now formed a body of royal-companion infantry, composed intirely of orientals. A distinguished body of Persians, who, from their silvered shields, had the title which the Greeks translated into their own language, *argyraspides*, he took among his guards; and to another Persian body he gave a Macedonian title.

In this, altogether perhaps the most difficult and distressing business of Alexander's short but eventful life, he completely succeeded. Arrian's concise account implies that he implicated in disgrace, on the occasion, every Macedonian of his army; unless those become his relations, by taking oriental wives, were allowed to retain the privilege of the Macedonian salutation, in common with the Persians in the same manner connected with him. It is indeed expressly stated that, in returning to his palace, after his speech to the army, he was attended by the lords of the body-guard and his usual companions, tho not by the crowd of followers, which it seems had been ordinary. The nerves of the mutiny had been at once palsied by the bold measure of seizing the ringleaders and sending them to immediate execution. When the king left the assembly, the Macedonians, Arrian says, stood silent, as men at a loss for measures. Those looked to for leading being disposed of, and no others putting themselves immediately forward, the multitude remained quiet.

How far, in the extreme case of mutiny, Alexander's decisive measure, directing capital punishment by his simple mandate, was justifiable under Macedonian law, for the scantiness of our information concerning that law, we have means only for conjecture. In the different republican states the military law would differ, and in some would be more, in others less regular.

regular. An Athenian general might not unreasonably fear to exert the most warranted and even necessary authority over Athenian soldiers, before whom, as his sovereign judges, on returning home, he was, in regular course, to answer for the whole of his conduct in command, and whose simple displeasure might condemn him to banishment, or death. The several rights of Spartans, Lacedæmonians, and Laconians in the Lacedæmonian states, remain little explained by antient writers; but a very remarkable instance of the most despotic exercise of the power of capital punishment by a Lacedæmonian commander, not of regal rank, over those other republican Greeks, allies of Lacedæmon, had been formerly noticed, as related by the cotemporary Athenian historian, Xenophon. To assist judgment then, in Alexander's case, the analogy, also formerly noticed, between the Greek republican governments of most regular form, and the Roman, which was an improvement on them, may deserve consideration. On military service the Roman consuls claimed, and sometimes exercised, a summary jurisdiction in capital cases; and, under a special commission from the senate, in civil disturbances also. The dictator's authority, by his simple command to his lictor, to inflict death by the axe, seems never to have been controverted. The failure of imputation against Alexander, on this occasion, among extant antient writers, all advocates for free constitutions, must be considered as evidence in his favor; tho' of the less weight as, among the antient republics, the most atrocious irregularities in civil contest were familiar. The completeness of his success in the following reconciliation with his offended army, reported by all, affords perhaps the best testimony that he was, in general estimation at the time, warranted in his measures. If there remained, as doubtless would be, discontented men, their murmurs were so little heard as to have passed unnoticed in extant antient history. On the other hand, such was at least the apparent general change of mind, that the whole repentant army in a manner besieged the palace with expressions of regret for past misconduct, and intreaty for restoration of their king's favor; grounding their arms, as supplicatory offerings, and requesting admission; with a declaration that they would surrender the surviving leaders of the mutiny, if required, but would not rest day or night till Alexander would forgive them.

Ch. 18. s. 5.  
& elsewhere  
of this hist.

Ch. 20. s. 5.  
of this hist.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 109.  
Arr. exp. Al.  
l. 7. c. 11.  
Plut. v. A.  
p. 704.  
Q. Curt. l. 10.  
c. 4.

Perhaps

Perhaps allowance should be made for some partiality in the account of the generals, whose report Arrian followed. Not only, however, all the historians nearly concur in it, but insuing matters prove that, even if the picture be a little inflated, Alexander's conduct on the occasion was most politic, as well as most vigorous and most successful. The king, Arrian says, yielding at length to the general wish, strongly manifested, the palace-gate was opened, and he appeared at it. A general cry of lamentation immediately arose from the army. The king shed tears, and they shed tears. He was advancing, as if with the purpose of speaking, when Callines, an elderly officer of the royal-companion cavalry, addressed him thus: 'O king! it grieves the Macedonians that, since you have made Persians your kinsmen, and allow them the honor of saluting you with a kiss, that honor is denied to Macedonians.' How far this may have been prepared we cannot know, but Alexander was ready with a most politic answer. As if he knew of none ill-disposed toward him, 'Not so,' he said; 'on the contrary I consider you all as my kinsmen, and so henceforth will always call you.' On this Callines proceeded to salute him with a kiss, and the same honorary freedom was denied to none. Taking up their arms then, with loud hoorahs, they returned, singing the pæan, to their camp.

Previous arrangement with the principal Macedonians and principal Persians, and a perfect understanding of both with the king, is clearly enough marked in what followed. A sacrifice was offered to those gods, to whom, according to the historian's phrase, the Macedonian laws prescribed such reverence from the chief of the nation. The sacrifice would, in usual course, afford a feast for the whole army. After this, a regular supper was served, at which, if report might be credited, and the manuscripts giving that report should be trusted for notation of numbers, nine thousand persons were entertained. Alexander presiding, the principal Macedonians sat next him, and below them the principal Persians; who were prepared, it thus appears, to hold rank below the Macedonians. Others, of both nations, then took place in corresponding order.

After this conciliatory festival, all Greeks, whether Macedonians or of the republics<sup>5</sup>, who desired their discharge, received it, and they are said to

<sup>5</sup> The Greek writers themselves wanted Greeks of the kingdoms from those of the terms for readily and clearly distinguishing republics; whence, in Arrian's history, all Greeks



to have been about ten thousand; tho few, it is implied, if any, put themselves forward for it who were not, through age, or wounds, or failing health, proper objects. Every man, beside his regular pay, which was to be continued till his arrival at home, was presented with a talent, above two hundred pounds sterling, as a gratuitous reward for his services. Those who had children by Asiatic wives were required to leave them, lest the extreme aversion, common among the Greeks, to admit any of forein blood to share with them in civil rights, might be so excited as to occasion disturbance; Alexander however promising to provide that those children should have a Grecian education, and that, when they should be grown up, he would himself be their conductor to Macedonia, and introducer to their fathers, and to the rights of the children of such fathers. Here, as what follows in Arrian's account implies, Macedonians only are intended; Alexander having been careful to avoid, as Philip before him, to interfere with the meerly civil concerns of the Grecian republics, till recently, urged by the circumstances of the moment, he had pledged himself in favor of the republican exiles in his army who should desire to return home, that they should be received in their several states. Seemingly aware of disturbance hence likely to arise, and which actually did insue, he avoided now to extend his ingagement to them. The appointment of Craterus to be commander for the march home, with a commission moreover to supersede Antipater in the viceroyalty of Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly, and the protectorship, such is Arrian's expression, of the freedom of the Greeks, appears to have been grateful to all; Craterus being not higher in the king's confidence than in esteem with the Grecian forces, whose interest he had always favored in preference to that of the new Asiatic levies.

Here then it may deserve observation that, throughout the expedition, in such various trying circumstances during so many years, tho discontents of both are recorded, no failure of harmony between the republican Greek

Greeks are sometimes intended to be included under the Macedonian name, as well as Macedonians under the more properly comprehensive name of Greek. In this passage he uses the Macedonian name only, to denote all who desired and received their discharge; but a following phrase clearly proves that he meant to include all Greeks of the army.

troops

troops and the Macedonian is marked in any account. Now all the dismissed appear to have set out, on their long and difficult march, with a general spirit of perfect loyalty; shedding tears, says the historian, at the ceremony of parting with their victorious prince, who sympathized with them<sup>6</sup>.

#### SECTION IV.

##### *Affairs in Greece.*

PREVIOUSLY to this fortunate accommodation with his Grecian army, Alexander's situation appears to have been highly critical; and some knowledge of the circumstances probably had encouraged the promoters of the mutiny. He proceeded from Opis still northward into Media; wide of the direction homeward, so long since generally desired by the Grecian part of the army; with what view direct information fails; a vacuity, fortunately not large, and the only one in Arrian's valuable narrative, being found here in every known antient copy. But it is obvious that in that extensive, fruitful, and populous country, the favored seat of the Persian monarchs,

<sup>6</sup> Curtius continues to show that he had before him the same authorities which Arrian followed. He has described the mutiny, the seizure and execution of the thirteen ringleaders, the immediate stupor of the army, and its ensuing repentance and lamentation and solicitation, as if he had, in his flowery way, translated from the same Greek originals from which Arrian drew. But he has added some things, and differently reported others, from writers adverse to Alexander's fair fame; himself not adverse to it, but as he was led by his constant eagerness for high coloring, strong contrast, and great scenic effect. Hence his eagerness to relate, as certain, transactions the most secret, and his boldness to answer for words spoken either in the greatest privacy, or amid the completest tumult, with such carelessness for

consistency and probability that Horace's *incredulus odi* cannot fail to be the frequent sentiment of his more considerate readers; who nevertheless perhaps may find amusement even from his extravagancies. A man of his talents of course would adapt these to the taste of his age; and thus they may, possibly, in some degree, assist those curious to ascertain his age. Probably those extravagancies are not wholly his own, but derived from Grecian writers; yet may have been heightened in many instances by his fondness and talent for high coloring. It seems to me, tho' meer conjecture, not improbable, that Curtius's work, recent and in vogue, was among those which, as Arrian says, stimulated him to compile and publish a history of Alexander from the best authorities.

critically

critically situated in the middle of the empire, bordering southward on its richest and most submissive provinces, northward on those which had been far the most difficult to conquer, itself the seat of a rebellion while he was in India, his presence was likely to be urgently wanted. Aware of the importance of securing an interest among the warlike people of those northern countries, we have seen him remarkably attentive to ingage the attachment of the men of most influence among them. Should this fail, a Grecian force only could be depended upon for maintaining a conquest on which the quiet of the rich southern countries, and even the communication with India, unless by sea, depended.

Meanwhile matters had occurred, both in Macedonia and in republican Greece, of a kind to excite anxiety. Alexander had always treated his mother, the dowager queen, with great attention and respect. But he had intrusted her with no share in the regency, while she reckoned she ought to have been, in his absence, chief, if not sole administratrix of the royal authority. Antipater, who, as far as appears, was, for his honesty, as well as his ability and diligence, worthy of the late king's esteem and his successor's confidence, was disturbed by her attempts at interference. Mutual complaints passed from them to Alexander; and her charges against the viceroy went so far as to impute to him the purpose of rebellion. In these delicate circumstances it seems to have been a fortunate opportunity, which Alexander judiciously used, for preventing the inconvenience of farther difference between them. The declining health of Craterus afforded reason for sending that valuable officer home, in command of the large body of returning invalids; and this urgency for parting with the general, in whose military talents he had long shown the highest confidence, afforded cause, honorable to Antipater, for requiring him to supply the place thus vacated, and, instead of commanding the comparatively small kingdom, under the sovereign at a distance, to direct, with him, the affairs of the new Macedonian empire.

In republican Greece, at the same time, unquiet spirits had been stirring; encouraged, like those in office in Asia, by accounts of the distance to which Alexander was carrying his arms, and the hope that he would never return. The scrupulous attention of Philip, while he lived, and of Alexander afterward, to avoid offence to the irritable spirit of republicans, and



especially of that large portion of them which anxiously desired their patronage, is largely indicated. That the leaders of the adverse party, avowedly taking subsidies for their states, took also notoriously presents and pensions for themselves, from the great enemy of the Grecian name and of free constitutions, the despot of Asia, while they were imputing corruption to their opponents, remains abundantly asserted. If then some indulgence for the ordinary effect of party-spirit may be allowed to the Greeks, yet that so large a majority of modern writers on the subject should have concurred, not only in railing against the Macedonian kings as the oppressors of the free, but in eulogy of their opponents, so notoriously the hired associates of a despot, as the asserters of independency, is matter not incurious in the history of literature<sup>7</sup>. Pre-engaging thus the modern public mind, they have provided some hazard for the writer who desires to do equal justice. Fortunately however for the character of the Macedonian princes, and their party among the republics, testimony remains, even from their opponents, ample to overbear at least modern calumny. It is indeed remarkable, and, even after allowance for the tendency of fervent party-spirit to lead men into contradictions, appears matter for wonder, that the testimony of all antiquity, and even of those most zealous in the democratical cause, admits the patriotism of Isocrates, and the rigid virtue of Phocion; who, always, in opposition to Demosthenes and the Persian interest, were steady to the Macedonian. For a very extensive preference, among the Grecian republics, of the Macedonian supremacy to the Persian, we have observed evidence from Demosthenes himself.

The death of Memnon, perhaps relieving to Demosthenes, so far as it removed an overpowerful rival for the lead of the Persian interest in Greece, was a very severe blow to the party. Their hopes however rose again, together with those of Demosthenes, on assurance that the king of Persia was advancing in person, from the interior provinces, toward Lesser Asia, at the

<sup>7</sup> This, as observed in former notes, has been carried farther by learned men of the continent than of our own country; unless the compiler of the chronology of the antient universal history should be excepted; who, taking upon himself to go far beyond his proper office of referring to

the valuable work for which he was employed, has reported, from the stores of his own learning and judgement, many extravagancies of fact and character, as if to be found in that work, which the better judgement of its authors had wholly avoided.

head of an army formidable, not only by its numbers, and the just estimation of its large proportion of cavalry, but still more by having, among its numbers, a powerful body of Greeks their friends. The event of the insuing battle of Issus, with the rapidly following conquest of Syria, Phenicia, Cyprus, and Egypt, by the Grecian prince whom they opposed, brought them again low; and their hopes must have been finally extinguished, had the conqueror accepted the terms offered by the Persian king. But his determination still to pursue conquest eastward, beyond the great Desert, afforded new prospect. The body of friendly Greeks, remaining in the Persian king's service, was yet considerable for number, and eminent for faithful attachment to the cause in which they were engaged; and, for the Persian party in Greece, of still greater consideration on account of the Persian king's confidence in it, which insured their importance with him. Communication indeed with that body, as well as with their ministers yet attending the Persian court, would be now difficult and hazardous, yet probably not wholly precluded. But the insuing victory of Arbela, and the consequent submission of Babylonia, Susiana and Persis, were again stunning blows. Nevertheless, while Darius lived, and Grecian troops remained in his service, and the ministers of the party still attended and were respected at his court, hope of advantage was not wholly extinct. A Persian dynasty might yet be maintained on the north of Caucasus, or, what would be all they desired, a dynasty hostile to Alexander. Far more than the death of Darius then, the surrender of those faithful Greeks would be discouraging to them, and yet their perseverance remained unabated. Even their signal defeat at their own doors, in that battle in which the king of Lacedæmon, Agis, lost his life, did not reduce them to final dejection. Information that the ardent spirit of the youthful conqueror led him to persist in pursuit of endless conquest gave them new encouragement.

Ch. 50. s. 3.  
of this hist.

Meanwhile how moderately Alexander's vicegerent Antipater, tho reported to have been a man of a severe temper, had used the victory by which peace, disturbed by the ambition of the king of Lacedæmon in combination with Demosthenes, was restored to Greece, is evinced by facts, which the flatterers of democracy have blazoned, as, for them, matter for boasting and triumph. We have observed it become common, among the Grecian republics, to testify the general sense of eminent

Ch. 40. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Æsch. de  
Cor. init.

public merit, by a popular decree for the honorary reward of a golden crown, to be placed on the head of the meritorious person in solemn public pomp. This honor we have farther seen, in the testimony of Demosthenes, offered by the democratical republics of Argos and Megalopolis to Philip king of Macedonia. The Athenian people had been in the habit of so honoring their own fellowcitizens, popular favorites; and, in the wildness of democracy, had gone to such excess in it, that, in some favorable moments, prudent men had found opportunity to persuade the multitude to inact laws for restraining their own improvidence. It was forbidden to propose a crown for any man actually holding office, or till, after its conclusion, he had rendered an account of his administration, and received, what our law terms, his quietus; and it was further inacted that, if a crown were decreed by the council, it should be presented only in the council-hall; if by the people, then only in the square called the Pnyx, the ordinary place for holding assemblies of the people. Moreover, for the prevention of irregular and ill-considered decrees, it had been made penal, as we have observed formerly, to propose any alteration of an established law, without the previous measure of procuring its repeal. These provisions were obviously wise; worthy of the republic of which Solon had been the legislator. But, in an absolute democracy, which was not Solon's constitution, such precautions were ineffectual. Instances had been numerous of contravention of those salutary laws; and, what was everybody's business, being that of no one man more than another, no prosecution following, no punishment had followed.

Such was the state of things when, between the first and second Phocian wars, while the contest was warmest between the parties of Chares and Demosthenes on one side, and Isocrates and Phocion on the other, Ctesiphon, an eminent member of the former, confiding in its support, had ventured to propose that a golden crown should be presented to Demosthenes, tho then holding the office of superintendant of repairs of the city-walls, and, in virtue of that office, receiving from the treasury all the money issued for the service; and moreover that it should be presented, not in the Pnyx, where, unless when some party-purpose called for the exertion of conflicting interests, attendance was commonly small, but in the theater of Bacchus, on the first day of the representation

of



of tragedies in the feast of the Dionysia, when it would not fail to be large. The offence to the law being, in this measure, glaring, Æschines entered a prosecution against Ctesiphon, stating the penalty at fifty talents, more than ten thousand pounds sterling. But, whether restrained by the moderation of his party, or its weakness, and the consideration that an unsuccessful effort would tend to its injury, he carried the business at that time no farther. We have already seen that his opponents, if not then already holding, soon after obtained a decisive superiority; inabling them to lead the republic to the crisis which ended in their complete discomfiture at the battle of Chæroneia. According to most writers of the Demosthenic party Philip then commanded Athens. Much, certainly, came into his power; yet, such was his forbearance, that in the short interval before his death, Demosthenes again obtained an ascendancy, which, on occasion of the monarch's assassination, he used, as also formerly seen, insultingly. Taking then the lead in again exciting war among the republics, he forced those adverse to the dominion of his party to seek refuge in the patronage of Philip's youthful successor. Again brought low by Alexander's success at Thebes, the great orator fled, not from the vengeance of the conqueror, but from the indignation of his fellowcitizens.

Ch. 44. s. 3.  
of this list.

Whether then, through the usual moderation, or the over-scrupulousness, of Phocion and his party in Athens, or through negligence of the Macedonian government, or instructions from its absent king to avoid interference in the internal politics of any republic, tho in his office of captain-general accountable for the peace of all, there was indulgence, clearly rather extreme, for agitators, in Athens and throughout Greece. When that party among the republics which relied upon the captain-general, as formerly they had been accustomed to rely on the imperial republic of the day, Lacedæmon, Athens, or Thebes, for support, was most seriously threatened, Antipater was slow to interfere. Perhaps difficulties arose for him, which remaining information will not inable us to appreciate. By a novelty in the ever-troubled political system of that eminent yet not fortunate nation, Lacedæmon, for preceding centuries the determined enemy of democracy, at one time successful in abolishing it throughout the republics of Greece, Thrace, and Asia, now, under an ambitious and apparently popular king, became leader in its cause. Alexander, when in Egypt, had been apprized of this ;  
and

Ch. 49. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Ch. 50. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Demosth. de  
Cor.

Plut. v. De-  
mosth.

and he was moreover apprized that Athens was wavering, parties there being nearly balanced; insomuch that it became doubtful whether those two rival republics, which had successively tyrannized over all the others, might not now combine to recover the sovereignty in partnership. Nevertheless Antipater was unprepared to meet the growing storm. His difficulty seems to have been that ordinary in confederacies, the difficulty of procuring simultaneous, and universally ready exertion; for which it is not likely that he had the advantage of Philip's popularity or authority, or perhaps talent. The dissolution of the adverse league nevertheless being effected by the battle in which the Spartan king fell, the ensuing moderation of the Macedonian confederacy toward the vanquished was beyond all example when a republic, whether democratical or aristocratical, Athens, Thebes, or Lacedæmon, held the supremacy. The boast of Demosthenes remains, in his own words, that he had been the leading agitator, under whose advice and stimulation the Spartan king had acted; yet he was allowed not only to live undisturbed in Athens, but to prosecute his measures for maintaining a commanding influence there. Immediately however open disturbance could offer no hope for him or his party: and thus, without any reported interference from Macedonia, the republics enjoyed such unusual quiet for several years, that the ordinary troubles of the country offered nothing prominent enough for the notice of any of those recorders of military events whose works remain to us. But, during this freedom from the miseries of war, in the unrestrained licentiousness of popular governments, political contest ran high, and eminently in Athens, where, producing what has singularly interested the republic of letters through all following ages, it has been the means of preserving to us some important political information.

While Alexander, already master of the greatest and richest part of the Persian empire, was yet engaged in his arduous struggle with the northern nations, if not already moved toward India (for the time is not exactly ascertained) Æschines prosecuted his accusation of Ctesiphon, after it had rested, it is said, ten years. The party of Demosthenes then held the superiority in Athens, and that of Phocion was uneasy under it. No hostility however toward Macedonia, or toward regal government, appears to have been at the time avowed. On the contrary, complimentary intercourse,

tercourse, common among the Greeks, and similar to that of modern times, was maintained by the Athenian government; probably with the Macedonian court, as we are assured it was with a court nearly connected with the Macedonian. Alexander king of Molossis, or, as, in consequence of extension of the dominion or influence of the Molossian kings, they have been often intitled, of Epirus, losing his life in war in Italy, an embassy was sent, with compliments of condolence, in the name of the Athenian people, to his widowed queen Cleopatra, sister of the great Alexander Æsch. de  
cor. king of Macedonia; and a friend of Demosthenes, Ctesiphon, was the chosen ambassador on the occasion.

Ctesiphon was recently returned from that embassy, when Æschines resumed the prosecution against him for his illegal conduct, in moving the decree for a crown to Demosthenes. Why this time of prevalence of the adverse party was chosen for the hazardous undertaking, is marked in the opening of the prosecutor's speech; and confirmation is found in his adversary's reply. Addressing the sovereign multitude 'you see, Athenians,' Æsch. de  
cor. p. 381,  
ed. Reiske. said Æschines, 'the arrangement of the forces of my opponents; you have  
' been witnesses to the solicitations in favor of extraordinary and irregular  
' measures. I, on the contrary, offer myself to you now, desirous only  
' that the council, and you, the assembly, should abide by the constitution,  
' and support the wise regulations which Solon established for the order  
' of your proceedings: namely, that the oldest citizen should first ascend  
' the bema; that he should declare gravely, and undisturbed by noise  
' and tumult, what his experience led him to believe the assembly, for  
' the republic's good, should decree; that then, others, who might desire it,  
' should deliver their opinions, with a preference always for the older.  
' This salutary provision for order having been overborne, decrees against  
' law we have seen often proposed; presidents, not regularly chosen, have  
' declared the majority of votes in favor of what the majority disap-  
' proved; and, if any objection was made to such irregularities, and a  
' councillor, duly chosen to the presidency, claimed his right, he has been  
' threatened with citation before the people. Thus the sober judgement  
' of the courts, provided, by the wisdom of Solon, for the security of in-  
' dividual subjects of the republic, have been superseded by passionate  
' decrees of the general assembly; orators, confiding in the experienced  
' efficacy



‘ efficacy of such threats, assume sovereign power ; neither the laws nor all  
 ‘ the magistrates can restrain them ; and the constitutional right of the  
 ‘ ward, presiding in its turn, to stay the proceedings, is utterly disregarded.’

Evidently enough this accusation of Ctesiphon was adopted as a mode of attacking the great leader of his party, Demosthenes. Ctesiphon having grounded his decree of honor on that orator’s merit toward the republic, it has been the object of the adverse orator to show that Demosthenes was wholly unworthy, not only of that honor, but of any public esteem. It is remarkable then that, in favor of that authority among the republics, formerly conceded to the imperial people of Athens and Lacedæmon, and since given, in more constitutional form, successively to Philip and Alexander, he has not ventured a word ; even alliance with Macedonia he has avoided to mention as desirable ; and this is the more remarkable as, even before that kingdom had acquired any great pre-eminence, Isocrates had boldly and zealously contended, not only for the alliance, but also for the presidency of the king of Macedonia, as highly desirable for the welfare of the Athenian people and the Greek nation. But Æschines reproached Demosthenes with having been, notoriously, the pensioner of the Persian king, and moreover, at times, the flatterer of both Philip and Alexander. He then mentioned, as recent matter, or even actually going forward, that, tho, by the Athenian law, it was a capital crime for individuals to hold correspondence with foreign potentates, yet Demosthenes and his associates not only corresponded by letters with foreigners in power, both in Europe and in Asia, but received from them what the orator calls embassies<sup>8</sup>, at their own houses, and even boasted of such communication. In such contempt, he said, were the laws and constitution held by the demagogues who commanded a majority in the general assembly : so ready was that tumultuous sovereign to use its tyrannical power for dispensing at pleasure with its own enactments.

The reply of Demosthenes is a wonderful example of eloquence, and of talent for leading such an assembly as that of the Athenian people. A long exordium, boasting of his services to the republic, and thus directing the minds of the hearers to matters foreign to the accusation, has been

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 641.

<sup>8</sup> Πρεσβείαι ἀφικνουμένης εἰς ἰδιωτικὰς οἰκίας.

admirably

admirably adapted to provide a favorable reception for the very weak defence to follow. That the proposer of the decree for the crown was guilty of a breach of the law, and that the orator, to whom the honor was prostituted, had never given a regular account of his disposal of the public money intrusted to him, is not denied<sup>2</sup>. But, what particularly deserves observation here is that, while Æschines feared to speak in favor of the Macedonian connection, Demosthenes did not scruple to abuse the father of the conquering Alexander, and all connected with him, as freely as before the battle of Chæroneia; thus completely proving the hypocrisy and falsehood of the lamentations of antient writers, adopted and even exaggerated by many modern, on the fall of the freedom of Greece under the Macedonian supremacy. To judge of some assertions of Demosthenes, in answering some in his adversary's speech, it should be known what that adversary might have replied, had the course in the Athenian courts permitted; or what an able chief justice, moderating between the parties, might have remarked. But, the Athenian courts acknowledging no such moderator, reply to the accused was denied to the accuser. Indeed, for the numbers composing their courts, all standing, and in the open air, that length of discussion, which a jury of twelve, sitting under shelter, may well allow, was inadmissible. Even had it not been so, yet, in the circumstances of the Athenian constitution, altered as it was from that of Solon, and with the Athenian many, commonly eager for prosecution of any of their superiors, the denial may have been rather an advantageous and even necessary check upon the malevolent or sinister views of accusers, and altogether desirable for well-disposed subjects. Under this rule therefore, Æschines had to contend with the same disadvantage as the foremost speakers in the ordinary debates in our house of commons; he must anticipate his adversary's defence, and reply to it, as he best might, by conjecture; and to this accordingly we find him, with great ingenuity, directing much of his celebrated speech.

A law was in force, to which the multiplicity and frequent frivolousness of accusation among the Athenians had given occasion, subjecting an accuser, who did not obtain a fifth of the voices of the multitudinous court,

<sup>2</sup> That warm admirer of the politics of Demosthenes, the learned and ingenious translator, Auger, has been candid enough to notice this in his summary of the speeches on the crown.

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 857.

to banishment. Æschines, no doubt, had considered this law, as well as his own situation in Athens under the ruling faction. It is exultingly said, by the friends of the politics of Demosthenes, antient and modern, that he failed of obtaining one fifth of the voices of the Athenian people. But Æschines would hardly have ventured to prosecute his accusation without assurance of support from the party which looked to Phocion as its head; and the circumstances, not reported by antient writers, must have been extraordinary which could either have reduced that party so low, or could have led it so to neglect a powerful member in need. But, as the previous uneasiness of his situation, under the sway of the adverse party, appears to have been the stimulation for Æschines to the hazardous undertaking, so, after the loss of his cause, for which probably he would be prepared, Athens could be no pleasant, nor perhaps safe, residence for him. However, as so many men, eminent, by their civil and military services, some compelled by a decree of the despotic sovereign, others choosing among evils, had done before him, he quitted Athens, and passed the rest of his life partly in Rhodes, partly in Ionia; leaving the anti-Macedonian party in command of the republic's politics. From such a result of that celebrated contest may be estimated the justness of the imputations against Philip and Alexander, as destroyers of the freedom of the Grecian people, tyrants over the republics. Nor does the refutation rest here; whoever will investigate the history of following times will find confirmation of it in the whole tenor of succeeding events.

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
ibid.

Diog. Laert.

Ch. 49. s. 1.  
of this hist.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 108.  
Plut.  
Demosth.  
p. 857.

The magnanimous kindness of Alexander to the friend of his earliest youth Harpalus, will be remembered; kindness carried perhaps to the extreme of rash indulgence and confidence. Harpalus, apparently of the school of Aristotle and Callisthenes, was probably a man of considerable talents, and, unlike Callisthenes, of insinuating manners. Alexander had left him, at Babylon, in the office of treasurer of his newly-acquired empire, or of a large part of it, and, according to Diodorus, satrap of Babylonia. Harpalus was among those who, speculating upon the improbability of his sovereign's return, abused the trust grossly; insomuch that, fearing now to stand the accusations ready against him, he resolved upon a new and greater crime; involving, with direct treason, the extreme of ingratitude. Holding the first civil authority in a great and rich satrapy, and commanding



commanding the treasury, it would not be difficult for him to engage and arm men to proceed to Greece under his orders. But, according to the probable account of Diodorus, he found soldiers with arms and discipline ready for his purpose. For men in the unhappy condition of exiles from their republics, always very numerous, usually wandering over Greece, Thrace, Lesser Asia, Phenicia and Egypt, in search of any military service in which they might hope for a livelihood, the opportunity offered by Alexander's expedition would be a great relief; but especially after the battle of Issus, when the plunder of all the East came in view, it would be most inviting. Accordingly the republican Greeks in Alexander's army seem to have been, in large proportion, of this description, and those who had amassed wealth, with remaining constitutions to afford hope of enjoyment at home, would be likely to desire to return home; all claiming merit which would intitle them to their captain-general's patronage for their purpose. His scruple then to interfere with the civil government of any republic would be disappointing to them. Revenge was a passion commonly warm in Grecian minds, and the view to gratify both revenge and ambition, by returning in a body capable of overbearing their domestic adversaries, under a leader whose interest was united with theirs, and whose pecuniary means were large, would stimulate them. Thus it appears to have been that Harpalus was enabled quickly to collect to the number of six thousand, armed, disciplined and zealous. Arriving with these on the Phenician coast, he procured shipping, with which he conveyed his army to the promontory of Tænarus, in Laconia, where he landed. Possibly he had hope of countenance from Lacedæmon; but, tho in this he seems to have failed, yet neither opposition to his landing, nor molestation, in probably a strong post which he occupied, are mentioned. Leaving his army then in present security there, he proceeded himself by sea to Athens.

His principal hope of ultimate success, in a desperate enterprize, if he could not gain Lacedæmon, seems to have rested on his knowlege of the violence of party, which still divided Athens, and on his old connection with the leading men there, adverse to his sovereign. But, in the moment, whatever the change may have been since the victory of Demosthenes over Æschines, their party had no decided superiority. For Harpalus therefore, a rebel against the captain-general of the confederated republics, even to

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 108.  
Plut.  
Demosth.  
p. 857.

appear in Athens, but still more to prosecute his purpose there, would be highly hazardous. His resource accordingly was to go in the character and habit of a suppliant, but carrying money in large amount. The most eminent orators of the high democratical party are said to have been readily engaged to advocate his cause, Demosthenes only excepted. He, at first shrinking from the hazard of the undertaking, however, at length concurred in it; induced, according to report even of writers generally favoring his cause, by increased bribery, of which Plutarch has not scrupled to relate the particulars. But as it remains unsaid how these became known, justice may require the observation that anxiety to maintain his connexion and influence with the leading men of his party may have been a sufficient motive. However, whether through improved interest of Phocion's party, or mistrust of the character of the suppliant among their own, their interest and their eloquence in the general assembly failed; and Harpalus, in danger of being arrested, owed his escape ashore to the concealment and opportunity which his Athenian supporters provided for him.

Ch. 1. s. 2. &  
Ch. 4. s. 2.  
of this hist.

Returning then to Tænarus, which, without countenance from the Lacedæmonian government, would not be a situation for him to remain in, he passed to Crete. That fine island, celebrated, as we have seen, in earliest history, for the power of its princes, the excellence of its policy, and the civilization of its people, but naturally divided by its mountains, and, through the opportunities which these afforded, becoming civilly divided among many lawless communities, has been, in the more illustrious ages of Greece, almost without history. To Harpalus it appears to have been inviting as a country of pirates, among whom he and his followers might find association. Bitter disappointment to the latter, arising from early evidence of the utter inability of their leader to realize his promises, which had raised their hopes high, seems to have produced the ensuing catastrophe. Harpalus was assassinated; according to Diodorus, by one of his principal associates; yet the troops held together; all without resource if they separated, and looking for means of subsistence only from united strength, which might enable them to profit from the weakness or the contentions of others.

Meanwhile at Athens, minds being exasperated against those orators who would again have subjected the state to the evils of war with the general confederacy of the republics under the lead of Macedonia, accusation was preferred against them as having, under the influence of bribery, recommended

mended measures highly adverse to the common welfare, and they were cited to answer for their conduct before the assembled people. Doubting then the sufficiency of their interest with the inconstant many, who with little deliberation or none, might have condemned them to banishment or death, they procured a decree, (through the exertions, it is said, principally of Demosthenes) for referring the matter to the court of Areiopagus. Avoiding thus the severer sentence apprehended, that court however declared them guilty, and the fine set upon Demosthenes was of fifty talents, more than ten thousand pounds sterling. Rather than pay, if he was able, so great a sum, and live in Athens, while his adversaries ruled there, he withdrew, in voluntary banishment, to Ægina<sup>10</sup>.

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## CHAPTER LVII.

Transactions in the March through MEDIA to BABYLON.

Farther Measures for improvement of Territory and extension of Commerce. Civil Regulation. Death of ALEXANDER.

### SECTION I.

*March into Media: Amazons: Death of Hephæstion: War with the Cossees: Measures for exploring the Caspian Sea. March to Babylon.*

THE loss of a small part of Arrian's narrative has deprived us of his information concerning Alexander's march from Susa into Media, and occurrences there, apparently of some importance. The principal stations however between Opis and Ecbatana remain named by Diodorus, probably from good authority. In five days the army reached Sambana, and remained there seven; but for what purpose is not said. Proceeding then, it reached Celonæ, a colony of Bœotians, who, after the celebrated battle of Platæa, flying to avoid the revenge of the Greeks, confederated for common defence, had sought and obtained the protection of Xerxes. Their descendants, driven by necessity to learn the language of the country in which they

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 110.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch's account of this business, in his life of Demosthenes, grossly uncreditable to the great orator, is curious; rather as showing how, in antient as in modern times, political parties were given to scandalize

one another, than as deserving credit for all the detail, even if he had all from the eminent author of the time, Theopompus, whom, for one circumstance, he has quoted.



were settled, were found to have retained also much of Grecian speech, and much of Grecian manners. Alexander then turned from the direct road, to pass, through a tract called Bagistane, famed for both fertility and beauty, to the Nysæan plain, where was the principal stud of the Persian kings. Here, fortunately, Arrian's narrative recommences, and so holds connection with those of Diodorus and Curtius as to afford presumptive proof of their correctness concerning the matters of which his report is lost. The number of mares in that magnificent stud, he says, had commonly been a hundred and fifty thousand, but was now reduced, by robbery, or mismanagement, or both, to little more than fifty thousand<sup>11</sup>.

At this place Atropates, satrap of Media, came to wait upon Alexander, and, according to the report of some writers, such is Arrian's phrase, presented him with a hundred women, said to be of the Amazons; skilful horsewomen, equipped in the manner of troopers; except that, instead of lances, they carried battle-axes: but that careful historian adds that no mention was made of these women by Aristobulus, or Ptolemy, or any other writer of credit; and he proceeds, 'If Atropates really produced some armed horsewomen to Alexander, I should incline to suppose they were of some other barbarous nation, and not of that familiarly known to the Greeks, through tradition and fable, by the name of Amazons<sup>12</sup>.'

In

<sup>11</sup> Our copies of Curtius agree exactly with those of Arrian concerning those numbers, and those of Diodorus differ only as they give sixty, in both places, for fifty.

<sup>12</sup> The various stories of people described by the name of Amazon, are among the mysteries of early Grecian history, concerning which Strabo, Plutarch and Arrian, all curious about them, have been unable to satisfy themselves. All however appear to have held that a people of that name existed, and, emigrating from Scythia, made extensive conquest in Lesser Asia. According to the geographer, they were not such determined vagabonds as the Scythians have been commonly described, for they founded some of the principal cities afterward occupied by the Greeks, Ephesus, Smyrna, Cuma, and others. But migration of hords, men, women and children, we know has been an Asiatic practice from earliest history to this day; and the remarkable instance, in western Europe, among the Gauls, in the authentic account of the ancestors of the Swiss nation

by Julius Cæsar, is known to all. The Lacedæmonian women, we are assured, were required by law to be so exercised in the use of arms as to be qualified for battle among men, and some instances are mentioned of the practice. If Amazonian women were seen acting in arms among men, in an invasion of Attica, such a circumstance may have afforded to Grecian ingenuity and love of the marvellous, foundation for all that is fabulous in their history. That Amazon was a Greek name, signifying Breastless, appears to have been a late and an unfounded imagination. The father of history, where mentioning the reported invasion of Attica by the Amazons, to ascertain that they were females of whom he was speaking, has added a syllable, calling them Amazonids\*; thus implying that he considered the name Amazon as applicable to men equally as to women. The absurd tale, gravely told by both Diodorus and Curtius, of Thalestris, queen of the Amazons, marching some hun-

\* *Ἀμαζονίδας*. Herod. l. 9. c. 27.

dred

In the course of this march a dispute happened, necessarily distressing to Alexander, between his principal secretary, Eumenes<sup>13</sup>, a man of superior talents, much esteemed by him, and Hephæstion, in whom he had most confidence as a sincere friend and grateful companion. This was matter for Plutarch to relate in his usual way, as if he had perfect information of the most private transactions, and of words spoken in the most private conversation. A broken sentence of Arrian, where extant copies resume his narrative, assures us that such a dispute occurred; and so much farther confirms Plutarch's account, as it indicates that Alexander interfered, and that Hephæstion, probably the younger man, submitted to his decision with rather an ill grace, Eumenes showing more liberality on the occasion.

Arrived at Ecbatana, Alexander celebrated a magnificent thanksgiving sacrifice for his various and extraordinary successes, with the added amusements of gymnastic games and theatrical exhibitions. The sacrifice being a feast for the whole army, there were other feasts for more select company. Amid the hilarities here, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. It is obviously probable that the officers more immediately about Alexander's person would sometimes have very severe service. Possessing himself singular power of body, and ability to bear heat and cold and hunger and thirst, fatigue in all shapes, he would be likely to measure others by his own standard, so that those most favored by him, most emulating his exertions, would be most liable to suffer from their own. His ordinary diet, according to his own account, reported by Arrian, and according to all most authentic accounts, was abstemious; but, in times of festivity,

dred miles from her own country, between the Caspian and Euxine seas, over hardly practicable mountains, to visit Alexander in Hyrcania, utterly unworthy of political history, is yet, like some matters formerly noticed, of curiosity for the history of letters. It was no invention of those writers, or of their age, but first propagated in Alexander's; and perhaps it may justly be reckoned less wonderful that such a story should then have some degree of popular credit, when, having been, through all pre-

vious ages, limited to their own country and the shores of the neighbouring seas, the whole interior of Asia was newly laid open to the curiosity of the Greeks, than that it should have been afterward tolerated by the popular taste in the most flourishing and enlightened times of the Roman empire.

<sup>13</sup> He is intitled by Arrian Γραμματεὺς βασιλικός, (Arr. exp. Al. l. 7. c. 4.) by Plutarch Ἀρχιγραμματεὺς. Plut. v. Eum. init.

(as it is said of him by others, and even by Arrian admitted) he would indulge, as his constitution would bear, and youth and company prompt, sometimes extravagantly. Hephæstion's fever probably arose from a combination of fatigue frequent, exposure in bad air unregarded, extremes of heat and cold alternate, abstinence occasionally unavoidable, and, when temptation occurred, excess, at his age, not unnaturally following. It was on the seventh day of his illness, when he seems to have been supposed convalescent, while the principal physician who had attended him was indulging in the amusement of the gymnastic games where Alexander presided, that finding appetite return, he would have a meal of meat, of which he ate heartily; and then, finding himself oppressed, and fever returning, drank a quantity of iced wine. A paroxysm ensued, such that information of it was sent to Alexander, who instantly quitted the celebrity, at which he was presiding, to visit his suffering friend, but found him already lifeless.

His grief on this melancholy event, marking a feeling mind, was however, according to all accounts, immoderate. Numerous stories were circulated on the occasion, and reported to posterity; writers differing in them according to their disposition to extenuate or exaggerate the failings to which so extraordinary a man, as a man, was liable. All however agree, says Arrian, that, for three days, he refused both society and food. He then ordered a funeral of extravagant magnificence; with games, after the manner of the funerals in Homer's age, in which no less than three thousand persons contended for prizes<sup>14</sup>. The affection of his mind nevertheless so lasted as to cause great uneasiness to his surviving

<sup>14</sup> Of remaining historians, Diodorus has been very succinct on this subject, and, to his credit, simple and sober. Even Curtius has almost exactly concurred in what Arrian has reported as from authority, adding little; tho strange extravagances, as we learn from Arrian as well as Plutarch, were circulated on the occasion. The moral philosopher indeed, in this part of his life of Alexander, seems to have been borne away by his passion for fable the most extravagant, or even absurd, which might afford ground for moral reflection. It may seem that when Addison referred to Arrian and Plutarch together as

the writers of clearest credit for the history of Alexander, he rather hazarded the assertion on the ground of the general reputation of both, than confided in any examination of their differences. Yet it must be said for Plutarch that, for some of his most extravagant stories, he quotes authority; which so far gives them value, as they contribute to mark the extent of that bad taste, which, under the tyranny of the Roman empire, arose, in a great degree, from deficiency of general information. For the important public occurrences Plutarch agrees with Arrian.



friends; whose endeavours to relieve it were but incompletely successful, till, whether new circumstances occurred, or the matter was before less regarded, cause or pretence was found for recommending to him a new military expedition. In the extensive highlands, bordering northward on the plains of Media, southward on those of Susiana and Persis, was a numerous herd, the Cossees, who either had not acknowledged subjection to his dominion, or had renewed their predatory practices. His mind, lately devoted to projects for improving the condition of his subjects by arts of peace, but rendered torpid by the sudden loss of the most confidential partaker in all his councils, was roused to energy by the view to active exertion, which might contribute toward the previously conceived purpose. Winter was approaching; but the change from the summer fervor of the plains, in which he and his army had been living, to the frozen air of the snowy mountains of the Cossees, would not at all deter him. On the contrary, judging that to be the season for the most effectual warfare against them, he resolved to use it. For, in summer, the highlanders, dispersing among hardly accessible rocks, might defy the pursuit of regular troops; but if, in the season in which they did not apprehend attack, he could drive them from the stores collected from their neighbours' fields, they must surrender or starve. Ptolemy, who seems, like himself, to have been indowed with superior power of limb and hardiness of constitution, was the general chiefly employed with him. The Cossees being brought to submission, his measures were what our Edward, intitled the first, pursued in Wales. Building and fortifying towns in commanding situations of their territory, and placing garrisons there, he forced them to peaceful industry for their livelihood, by denying them means for preying on their neighbours<sup>15</sup>.

The Caspian sea, one of the boundaries of Alexander's empire, imperfectly known, even in modern times, till of very late years, had been best described to the Greeks by their early historian Herodotus. Succeeding writers had given such erroneous accounts of it, that, as we have formerly observed, the supposition had obtained credit that it was open northward to the Arctic, and eastward to the Pacific ocean.

<sup>15</sup> The name of this people, according to Vincent, remains among the same mountains to this day, but without any relic of the improvement of their manners effected by Alexander.

Arr. exp. Al. Alexander's strong and apparently just curiosity led him to measures for having its extent and boundaries and means for communication ascertained. He sent Heracleides son of Argæus into Hyrcania, in the command of a body of shipwrights, to build vessels, both open and decked, for the purpose.

Probability appears, in Arrian's account, that the completion of arrangements in the Cossee country was committed to Ptolemy, while in spring of the three hundred and twenty-fourth year before Christ, Alexander led the main body of the army to Babylon. No circumstance of the march is reported by any historian, till he was within thirty miles of that city, when, according to all, a very extraordinary matter occurred. A deputation from the body of Chaldean priests arrived, commissioned to represent that, as Alexander had paid just honor to their god, so their god was disposed to be favorable to him, and, accordingly, had authorized them to admonish him that to proceed to Babylon, at that time, would be unfortunate for him<sup>16</sup>.

When, presently after the battle of Arbela, while the former sovereign was yet living and yet master of half the empire, Alexander entered Babylon, he had been received with general joy, as a deliverer rather than a conqueror. He had since shown great favor to the Babylonians. A temple, of extraordinary magnificence, raised by the Assyrian kings for the worship of Baal or Beel, or, as the Greeks and Romans wrote the name, with their added termination, Belus, signifying The Lord, had been destroyed by the Persian kings, averse to the Chaldean superstition. Alexander had directed the rebuilding of this temple with increased magnificence, and committed a large revenue to the management of the priests for the purpose. He had moreover projected great works for the benefit of the city and surrounding country; and it appears that, for the advantages of its situation, he proposed to make Babylon the capital of his Asiatic dominion. To be told then that to enter that city would be unfortunate could not but be surprizing to him, even tho aware of the motive; having received information that the rebuilding of the temple had been little prosecuted; whence he gathered that the priests, like so many others in high employment under him, speculating on the improbability of his return from the East, had been using the revenue assigned for that great work

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 17.  
Plut. Alex.  
Curt. l. 10.  
c. 4.

<sup>16</sup> Μη πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ εἰ ἵναι τὴν παράδον τῆς ἐς Βαβυλῶνα ἐν τῷ τότε. Arr l. 7. c. 16.

for their own profit and injoyment. Accordingly, as Arrian, always cautious of answering for words spoken, says was reported, he replied to the extraordinary admonition, or perhaps only expressed himself to the royal companions attending, by a verse of Euripides, ‘ He the best prophet ‘ is who guesses best.’

But, with his great purpose of bringing all his subjects of all religions to friendly union, and with his especial desire to hold complete his popularity in his proposed capital, it might be important to maintain a good correspondence with the Chaldean priests. Their deputies, accordingly, tho denied their first object, finding a reception altogether favorable, ventured, with what reasonable view is not obvious, to recommend to him, at no rate to proceed by the direct road, by which he would enter the city facing the west, but, if he determined to persevere, rather to make a circuit by which he would enter facing the east. They must have known, and it is unlikely that he would be without information, that to proceed by the road they indicated was impossible. Nevertheless, as Arrian assures us Aristobulus related, he conceded so far as to take that road; and possibly a prudent consideration for Grecian as well as Chaldean superstition may have determined him to this; the Greeks, generally ready to adopt any superstitious belief not directly adverse to that in which they had been educated, being especially attentive to predictions. But, having shown his army the floods and marshes which, at that season, absolutely prevented progress in the course recommended, he turned, and entered the city by the way before proposed. The people, whether informed, or not, of any pretended adverse foreboding, received him with all demonstration of joy. That he took any severe measures against the priests, for their misconduct in the charge committed to them, is not said; whence it may seem probable that he used toward them a politic forbearance <sup>17</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> The business with the Chaldean priests was of a kind likely to be variously reported. Diodorus has been partial to them. Relating the matter in more detail than is usual with him, yet avoiding to mention the imputed peculation, he has spoken of their skill in prophecy as superior to that of the seers of his own nation. Curtius, more concise than Diodorus, appears however to have followed nearly the same authority. Plutarch

has been prudently short on the subject. Arrian, generally preferring Ptolemy's account, has here deferred to Aristobulus. Indeed, if Ptolemy, as seems indicated, had been left on service in Media, the matter may have been unnoticed in his narrative. Aristobulus appears, in Arrian's quotations from him, to have been either addicted to belief in augury, or to have had his views in promoting it.



## SECTION II.

*Embassies from Greek Republics and foreign Nations. Measures for maritime Discovery and Extension of Commerce. Slavery among the Antients. Floods of the Mesopotamian Rivers, and Works to profit from them. Regulation civil and military.*

THROUGHOUT the Grecian republics, not less than in Asia, but rather more, minds would be affected by the news of Alexander's return victorious from India, with, not only the whole of the Persian empire, but nations beyond, in peace acknowledging the sovereignty of the elected captain-general of the nation. Some citizen of almost every state, either of the party friendly or of the party adverse to that in the moment ruling, would have shared in the glorious achievements, either among those who first passed into Asia, or in the numerous levies which afterward reinforced the army. At home all would have information that, as all Greeks had always been treated as fellowcountrymen in Macedonia, and especially by the late king, so now, in the progress of conquest, distinction had become less and less between Macedonians and republicans; many of the latter had been raised to very high situations, military as well as civil; men of science, and artists of every description, were especially encouraged; extension of commerce was a favorite object of the sovereign, and all Asia was open for all Greeks, to seek fortune, or to settle in. The party adverse to the Macedonian supremacy would thus be nearly silenced; the zeal of the friendly would be forward; and ordinary compliments to the captain-general of the nation, who had so extended its renown, and so opened the commerce of the world to it, would not fail.

Accordingly many embassies from Grecian republics were arrived at Babylon, charged with various business; all with those compliments of congratulation, which appear to have been customary among themselves, and all with their ordinary token of gratitude for public services, presents of golden crowns. According to the probable account of Diodorus, here the more valuable as Arrian's is defective, those charged with representations

Arr. l. 7.

c. 19.

Diod. l. 17.

c. 113.

Plut. v. Alex.

representations concerning temples and sacred ceremonies were esteemed intitled to audience before those commissioned on political matters only, tho of no small importance; some to state controversies of republics with republics, and some, which seems to have been in itself of weightiest consideration, to object to the restoration of citizens, exiled in consequence of political differences. Such unfortunate men the history of the republics shows to have been always very numerous. Their restoration would be indispensable toward the establishment of that peace throughout the nation, the great object of the late Athenian patriot Isocrates, which, as formerly has been observed, he blamed the magnanimous king of Lacedaemon, Agesilaus, for attempting over-hastily, but for which the season, if ever to be, might seem now arrived. Those commissioned on this subject, the historian says, were last heard; probably not, tho such may seem to have been the historian's opinion, because their purpose was ungracious, but rather on account of its difficulty, and the variety of discussion to which it would give occasion. All however were received and dismissed with the honors that, among the republics were commonly esteemed gratifying <sup>18</sup>. The arrival of these embassies, while Alexander's mind was intent upon improving his Asiatic empire, seems to have put him upon considering what might be immediately gratifying to his own nation, which he showed himself disposed always duly to respect, however he might judge it improper, or even impossible, to provide for it all the advantages which, through oppression of the conquered, were expected from him. He now renewed his inquiry for statues of the gods, and of eminent men, and whatever other spoil Xerxes, carrying from Greece, had deposited either at Babylon, or Parsagarda, or Susa, or elsewhere; and all that

Ch. 43. s. 5.  
of this hist.

<sup>18</sup> That the embassies were so received and dismissed Arrian says; but adds, that he could not satisfy himself what, beyond compliment, was the object of any of them. Occasion has occurred formerly to remark that Arrian, tho sometimes venturing to show a just liberality of political principle, has been altogether extremely reserved on civil matters, and especially cautious of noticing republican affairs. Plutarch, in the same age, and under the same government,

an obscure individual, could venture more; but, failing of Arrian's advantage of practice in political business, and being under the disadvantage, common to both, of knowing no government, from experience, but a military despotism, which had already, for a century and half, pervaded the civilized world, his politics are of no consistency, vaguely directed to recommend republican principles, and altogether little better than a kind of barking at he knows not what.

could

could be found were sent back to the cities whence they were taken<sup>19</sup>.

But the fame of Alexander's conquests, and the known great means afforded by the mighty empire now at his command, with rumor, true or exaggerated, of his further ambitious views, would of course interest nations beyond the narrow bounds of Greece and the Grecian colonies.

Arr. l. 7.

c. 15.

Diod. l. 17.

c. 113.

According to historians of his age, many such embassies waited upon him at Babylon, or in his way thither. To some of these Arrian gave full credit; doubting however some and rejecting some. He mentions confidently those from Libya, and from Lucania, Brutium and Tuscany in Italy; and ground for this is obvious. The embassies from Libya probably were from the Grecian colonies on its coast, and perhaps from some neighboring Africans; to whom Alexander's favor, possessed as he was of Egypt, and commanding the eastern end of the Mediterranean sea, would clearly be important. The recent death then of his kinsman, Alexander king of Molossis, in war in Italy, might give occasion for both the friends and the enemies of that unfortunate prince there, the former to desire the protection, the latter to obviate the enmity of the great conqueror of the day. The accounts of embassies from Carthage, from Ethiopia, from European Scythia, and from some Gallic and Spanish people, which the cautious historian mentions, tho with apparently less confidence, seem yet not improbable. For the connection with the Tyrians sufficed to make the Carthaginians alive to the consequences of Alexander's conquests: Æthiopia, bordering on his kingdom of Egypt, could not be wholly uninterested; and European Scythia was in the habit of communicating, in war and in commerce, with both the Macedonian kingdom and the maritime

<sup>19</sup> There appears again in this part of Arrian's history of Alexander some indication of what has been observed in a former note of this volume, that, tho clearly intending his work for the public, he never completely prepared it for publication. In reporting Alexander's first taking possession of Susa, in his third book, he says, as it has been already mentioned in its place, that among many other things brought from Greece, were the statues of Harmodius and Aris-

tageiton, which he sent back to Athens. Here in his seventh book he mentions again those statues, as if not till now they had been sent back, without noticing his former mention of the same fact. The question when the measure took place is in some degree interesting, as it would indicate the devotion of Alexander's mind to his interest in Athens, and throughout Greece, at the time.



**Grecian republics.** An embassy from Rome, tho two Greek writers whom Arrian has named, had had the hardihood to assert it, he considered, I think justly, for reason more than he mentions, as meer fiction. Yet, for the desire of the more distant tribes of Spain to ingage Alexander's friendship, there is no improbability; the prosecution of the Carthaginian conquests there apparently sufficing to make them look out, at any distance, for connection with enemies to Carthage. The Cisalpine Gauls bordering on the Triballians and Illyrians, were quite within reach for being affected with either hope or fear from the wonderful increase of the Macedonian dominion.

In chusing Babylon for the capital of his Asiatic empire, Alexander was not led, as the Persian monarchs formerly to a preference for Susa and Ecbatana, by any pleasantness of climate, or beauty of surrounding country, or its fitness for royal sports, but wholly by political considerations. It was nearly central among the nations newly owning subjection to him. The extent of rich plain around, traversed by great rivers, was most advantageous for the production and conveyance of supplies for a great collected population; and, by the gulph, receiving those rivers and conveying their waters to the ocean, means were open for maritime communication unlimited. But these great means had been only prepared by nature, leaving the completion to the ingenuity and industry of man.

This now especially ingaged Alexander's attention. Much toward it indeed he had already done. Together with the shore of the ocean eastward the eastern side of the gulph had been explored. But the western side remained known almost only to the predatory hords of Arabs, its possessors, whose manners deterred the approach of strangers, and against whose hostility the Persian monarchs appear to have provided but very deficient protection for their people on land, and none for their seafaring subjects. Alexander would have discovery prosecuted around the whole of the Arabian peninsula, and provide means and security for maritime commerce, as eastward with India, so westward with Egypt, and through Egypt even with Greece. Hostility on the water, hardly looked for in the way from India, was in this course to be apprehended; and he prepared accordingly. The country, within any convenient distance around Babylon, furnished no timber, fit for shipbuilding, but cypress. Of this, perhaps not  
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the best for the purpose, he directed some vessels to be built; but the timbers for the greater part of his fleet were prepared in Phenicia, conveyed over land to Thapsacus on the Euphrates, and, being there duly put together, passed down the stream to Babylon.

In the naval battles of the Greek republics the trireme, or vessel of three benches of oars, had been the most powerful ship of war; and of such the majority, or almost the whole, of contending fleets hitherto had been composed. But as, with experience, art improved, the naval architects had found means to make more powerful vessels capable of naval action in the antient way. Proceeding to four, they quickly advanced to five benches of oars; beyond which, tho vessels to carry many more hands were built occasionally for stateliness and show, yet, for naval action, all being still necessarily rowboats, none appear to have been advantageous. The Phenician builders seem to have been the first to go beyond the ordinary Grecian rate; unless, which may seem probable, they gained the plan from the Carthaginians. The vessels framed in Phenicia, and conveyed to Babylon, were two quinqueres, three quadriemes, twelve triemes, and thirty triacontors, or vessels of thirty oars<sup>20</sup>.

At Babylon then a great work was undertaken for the accommodation of a fleet. By excavation and imbankment, a port was to be formed, capable of containing a thousand vessels, unmolested by either the superfluity or deficiency of the stream, and provided with shelter for them, as usual with the antients, ashore. Meanwhile, to provide crews, Miccalus, a Greek of Clazomene in Lesser Asia, was employed to ingage seamen from Phenicia; and, it being Alexander's purpose, for the security and convenience of commercial intercourse, to establish colonies on the shores of the Persian gulph and in its ilands, the same officer was authorized to offer advantages for settlers there. To prepare then for this, three others, Archias, apparently the associate of Nearchus in the voyage from the Indus, Androstenes, described only by his name, and Hieron of Soli in

<sup>20</sup> I have been surprized to find my friend Sainte Croix misled to the adoption of a criticism of a French engineer, who, calculating the burthen of an antient, as of a modern, ship of war, by the hands she bore, has reckoned it impossible that the Euphra-

tes could carry quinqueres from Thapsacus to Babylon. Sainte Croix, tho of the land-service, having served in the West Indies, would know modern ships of war. The engineer certainly had a very erroneous notion of the antient.

Cilicia, were sent, each in a vessel of thirty oars, to explore the Arabian side of the gulph, and proceed farther if it might be. The latter alone was successful enough, on that difficult coast, to reach the promontory, formerly described, at the mouth of the gulph; nor can it now be wonderful if, with such a vessel, single, he dared not proceed, or, rather, if he thought it utterly unbecoming him to hazard farther, not only the lives of those with him, but also the information which, in going so far, on a coast before unknown, he had acquired.

The Euphrates has its sources in the highlands of Armenia, so raised above the level of the ocean that, in a latitude to expect a mild winter air, Xenophon had found, and modern travellers have confirmed his account, the severity of an arctic sky. Issuing a torrent from the mountains, into the very extensive plain of Mesopotamia, there, on a bed of clay, covered with a sandy soil, the stream formed a channel, within which, during the greater part of the year, it has continued to pass, by a course of some hundred miles, to the Persian gulph. But, as other rivers whose sources lie among lofty mountains, with the melting of snow in spring, its waters are so increased as to overflow the flat country to a very great extent. In these circumstances it was observed that the sand, otherwise barren, when saturated with water resting on the retentive clay, became highly fruitful. Accordingly art was early used to assure and extend the benefit. But about fifty miles below Babylon, on the western side, the floods found a hollow in the clay; into which the waters rushing, dispossessed the sand and became a very extensive lake; whence, with farther increase, they penetrated variously through the surrounding loose soil. Here much was lost, while much so forced its way, in the course of a gentle and hardly perceptible declivity of the land, as to form a new channel to the gulph. The greater part of the flood passing thus, the benefit of irrigation for the lands lower on the river side was lost. To provide the advantage then, or restore it, the Assyrian kings had constructed a dam across the opening toward the lake, with a vent that might be regulated, so that the land below should be duly irrigated while the superfluous water might still be discharged. The lake obtained the name of Pallacopas, and the channel toward it was called the river Pallacopas.

Ch. 23. s. 4,  
of this hist.

Under the Persian kings these valuable works had been neglected, and



were gone far to decay. Alexander would not merely restore but greatly improve them. For such a business very numerous hands would be wanted. According to report, thirty thousand men at one time had been employed on it. Among the Greeks, we have observed, not only such extraordinary operations, but almost the whole of the manual labor necessary for the support of mankind, was considered, even by the philosophers, as unfit for freemen, but properly imposed on their fellow-men in the condition of slaves; so that, in every republic, the slaves would outnumber the freemen, and in the more flourishing were many times more numerous. Among European nations of old indeed, if a more liberal system anywhere prevailed, it has failed of notice from those writers to whom we owe all extant accounts. On a former occasion it has been observed that to take slaves for the Roman markets appears to have been a chief object of Julius Cæsar's invasions of Britain; the demand being urgent for large and continual supplies of men in that wretched condition; not domestic service only, but the labors of husbandry, throughout Italy, under the Roman dominion, being committed almost wholly to slaves. Julius was certainly among the most generous and humane of Roman conquerors; yet, when he had, not without difficulty brought the people of the territory of the town now called Vannes in Brittany, to unconditional submission, he condemned all of higher rank to death, and sold the whole remaining population to slavery.

Cæs. de bel.  
Gal.

Of slavery among the Asiatics, we have little from Grecian writers, and none from any other, excepting the Jews; whose institutions were so decidedly proposed to maintain a constant separation between them and other people, that what held among them can indicate nothing for any others. But when the kings of Assyria, successively conquerors of the Samaritans and Jews, carried, at unquestionably great expense and trouble, the former into Media, and afterward the latter into Babylonia, it would not be with the liberal and humane views which the modern European law of nations, and maxims of religion and morality, require toward a conquered people, and on which their practice for many centuries has been founded. The treatment, however, of those prisoners of war, condemned to slavery, as far as light is thrown upon it, appears rather to have resembled that of the Israelites in Egypt, than to have been so inhuman as was ordinary, less indeed

indeed among the Greeks than the Romans. Yet we have full assurance from the Jewish historian that the purpose was to employ them; and the pathetic exclamation of the poet, 'By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept,' may perhaps afford some confirmation to the otherwise highly probable supposition, that the great works under the direction of the Assyrian kings, which gave to the Babylonian plain the benefit, and secured it against the ravages of floods, were in large part executed by Hebrew hands.

In India, it is said, slavery, at least such as that among the Greeks and Romans, was little, if at all, admitted. But Alexander, coming there instructed in Grecian principles by Aristotle, condemned to that state some whole communities of Indians, reduced by arms to unconditional submission. Crimes indeed were alledged, to justify such severity; and modern information, concerning the various people of that extensive country, shows it probable, that a just humanity, toward a larger portion of the population, may at least have promoted the policy, so severe toward a smaller; for the transportation of some thousands of the cast of warriors, born to the profession of robbery, and bound to die in it, could hardly fail to afford relief to many more thousands of the valuable cast of husbandmen. Nearchus, we have seen, in the course of his voyage, took prisoners; but his means for carrying them to a market were scanty. Accordingly none are mentioned till the fleet was approaching the commercial towns near the Persian gulph. What became of such unfortunate people it was not in the way of antient historians to be solicitous to tell. Probably Nearchus relieved his crews by compelling his prisoners to work at the oar, till they might be sold at Mosarna, Badis, or Harmoza. But many thousands might be subsisted while attending the march of the army, under Craterus, from India through the fruitful countries northward of the great desert, and probably would be afterward employed on Alexander's great public works.

In some degree to indicate the value of those works, and so assist toward a just estimate of the great conqueror's character and policy, a summary history of their fortune, even to the present day, as given by that very diligent and able inquirer, Vincent, may be useful here: 'While Babylon was the capital of the East,' he says, 'the controll of the waters invigorated all the contiguous districts. But, when the Persian conquerors dwelt at Ecbatana,

‘ Susa, or Persepolis, due attention being discontinued, Mesopotamia, ‘ Chaldea, and their capital, declined together.’ Alexander, he proceeds, proposed to restore and improve the works. Concerning what followed under his successors, till they were dispossessed by the Parthians, extant history gives no information. The Romans then becoming masters of all westward, and the Parthians of Babylonia itself and all eastward, the latter, not only neglected the beneficial works but, ‘ encouraged the extension of a desert ‘ against the Roman frontier. In following vicissitudes of power, des- ‘ potism and neglect completed what policy might have commenced. Still ‘ it has happened, in every age, and under every government, that the ‘ neglect was not universal. The grand canals have failed; but a partial ‘ distribution of the water, has constantly been preserved; insomuch that, ‘ even under the desolating empire of the Turks, it is to this hour an object ‘ of comparative importance. While Ives was on his passage up the river ‘ he met a bashaw coming down, with a commission to direct the places ‘ where the bank was to be opened, or the outlet closed. The office is still ‘ of dignity, for this bashaw was a commander of thirty thousand men; ‘ and, as we may conclude that, under the Turkish government, every drop ‘ of water is paid for, tho the service will be performed badly, still it will ‘ be performed.’ The extent of the antient improvement, antient account of it failing, the able and diligent commentator proceeds to show thus: ‘ No traveller passes the great desert between Basra and Aleppo without ‘ finding traces of habitation, buildings and remains of towns: hardly ‘ Arabian relics, for this is not the country where the Arabs live in towns; ‘ they are probably Chaldean, Syrian or Macedonian. They must all ‘ have possessed water as the primary means of existence, and they have ‘ ceased to exist because the Euphrates has ceased to convey them the ‘ means of fertilizing the desert.’

Alexander, leaving Media, as Arrian indicates, in spring, and delayed by nothing on the march, would reach Babylon early in the season of the floods. That season, adverse to the excavation of the proposed dock, tho not perhaps to the erection of the necessary buildings around it, would be most favorable for the business which he in person executed; going by water to the mouth of the channel of the Pallacopas, and proceeding by that channel to a survey of the lake. The country around that expanse of water, in

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the neglect of the Persian government, mostly barren, and left open to the incursions of the freebooting Arabs, was capable of being made greatly productive. But, for the improvements which Alexander meditated, defence for the workmen to be employed would be necessary. Selecting therefore a convenient situation on the border of the lake, he directed the building and fortifying of a town, for a settlement for such Greeks of his army as might prefer such an establishment, under their captain general's protection, to returning to their several republics, where probably they might be at a loss for both protection and means of livelihood.

It has been formerly observed that Arrian, emulating the simplicity and candor of Thucydides, has, unfortunately for the highly interesting history which we owe to him, failed to emulate that excellent author's accuracy in marking times and seasons. Among extant historians, after Thucydides, chronology has been proposed to be regularly given only by Diodorus; whose inaccuracies, canvassed by many able critics, have been the subject of former necessary notice. Thus, among very able and diligent inquirers, there has been much question concerning a whole year, or nearly so much, following Alexander's return from the eastward to Babylon. Such assurance, however, as antient testimonies afford of what was executed, may assist the judgement where indications of time alone are doubtful. A powerful fleet was partly built on the spot, partly brought over land from a distant country. A dock was excavated on the bank of the Euphrates to receive it, and numerous edifices, such as antient use required for a naval arsenal, were erected. Possibly so much may have been previously in preparation. But, clearly after Alexander's return, very extensive surveys were made, by land and by water, preparatory to works for improving the inland navigation, and irrigating the country; a town on a hostile frontier was built, fortified, and peopled; and, meanwhile, the restoration of the temple of Belus in Babylon was going forward. To all these works Alexander is said to have attended, and, in the surveys, to have taken a leading part.

But a greater, and far more difficult, as well as more beneficial, work than all these, tho details concerning it fail, evidently was accomplished. This was such as never occurred for any man, before or since. Chief of a small limited monarchy, and of a confederacy of republics, Alexander had  
conquered

conquered a mighty empire, composed of many nations, differing among themselves in language, in manners, and in religion, but all perhaps differing more from their conquerors, through their habit of seeing their government administered with the greatest pomp, if not also with the greatest rigor, of despotism. Educated himself to cultivate popularity among the free, he had, according to all best testimony, in imitation of his father, and in conformity to his great preceptor's instructions, persevered in the practice. The well-known story of his visit to the cynic philosopher Diogenes, when, after his first successes, at the age of only twenty-one, he bore with complacency the affected pride and rudeness of that singular man, is warranted by Arrian; who has added an occurrence of similar character in India, when he already commanded the Persian empire. A bramin, whom he sent for, not only refusing sternly to stir at his command, but adding reproaches, he took all patiently, and would allow no violence toward the man. The liberality of his intercourse, at all times, with all Greeks, whether of his kingdom or of the republics, is marked by all writers; and not least by Arrian, in occasionally reporting table conversation. To maintain his popularity with his own nation was perhaps even more important after than before his conquests; for he could hold these in no security without the support of Grecian hearts, directing Grecian hands.

But he had now another pressing interest, in a manner at war with this. It was to gain the attachment, and secure the respect of those who had been accustomed to see their sovereign only surrounded with the utmost pomp, secluded almost as a divinity, commanding everything by his nod, familiar with nobody; while the subjects of the higher classes, each as far as his station would admit, imitated this pomp of despotism. It had not been indeed altogether a successful policy. In the course of this history we have observed rebellions against the sovereign frequent; in some instances long lasting; in some threateningly extensive; assassinations of members of the royal family numerous; the demise of the crown always attended with trouble, and rarely free from bloodshed. In the quietest times for the throne, wars of governors of provinces with one another, each professing to act in the cause of the throne, continual; and thus, after the first Darius, security for the subject appears to have been rarely found throughout the empire, unless under the able administration of Mentor in the  
West,

West, and Bagoas in the East, in the latter years of the energetic reign of Artaxerxes Ochus.

But Alexander, conquering this empire, and venturing, even while the contest continued, to commit, not only the highest civil, but also very high military commands to eminent men of the conquered, and blending even the armies of the two people, so established harmony throughout the many nations, so balanced the conquerors and the conquered, that on his premature death, leaving the succession singularly questionable, there was, except among the ever-troubled republics of Greece, for some years, a quiet, not perfect, not universal, but, for the circumstances, very extraordinary. The great business of arrangement, indispensable toward providing such an amount of political tranquillity, in such circumstances, is so far marked to have been Alexander's own, as no historian has said who, after Parmenio, was his adviser. No doubt he consulted many; and the talents afterward displayed by several of the persons placed by him in the highest situations, prove the judgement with which he had selected them. These were mostly, but not all, Macedonians. Even the person, who held under him the confidential office of secretary, Eumenes, was born a republican; and, considering the superior ability shown by that officer, after the loss of his great patron, it seems at least likely that he was a principal and a very valuable assistant.

For the completion of so great a business, however long contemplated, and in whatever degree prepared at Parsagarda, Susa, and Ecbatana, the leisure of one winter at Babylon clearly would be little enough; and the narrative of Arrian, and the chronology of Diodorus, tho with no exactness marking the times of transactions, concur in showing that one winter was passed there. Thus it appears every way probable that the flood of the first summer was used for the first voyage down the river to the lake. For the excavation of the dock at Babylon, the absence of the flood, and therefore winter, would be requisite. For building and fortifying and settling the town on the lake, time would be wanted, and still more for the very extensive arrangements, civil and military; which were completed, so far at least as to produce the very beneficial results already noticed.

The flood of the second spring is then sufficiently marked as the season of a second voyage to the lake. Circumstances, on this occasion related

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 22.

by



by the historian, show Alexander's personal attention to the business of the survey. The water, issuing from the river far below Babylon, had spread back again, dispossessing the sand, northward toward the city. In extending the survey in this direction, a part of the fleet became entangled among shoals. The king observing, or informed of, its difficulty, found, among the pilots attending on himself, one who undertook to know that part, and who, being immediately dispatched, conducted the erring vessels into the proper channel. But another matter, unimportant in itself, and perhaps not then much noticed, greatly engaged the public mind afterward. The plain in this part, while dry, or but partially floated, had been chosen in previous ages for the sepulchers of Assyrian kings; for which islands appear to have been, among the Asiatics, and perhaps others, favorite situations. About those monuments the collected sandy soil favored the growth of reeds. Among them Alexander, in his aversion still to inaction, as formerly when crossing the Hellespont, was himself steering the vessel which bore him, when the diadem which he wore was blown from his head by a violent gust of wind, and lodged on a bed of reeds. Some one from the vessel swam after it, and, to obviate wetting, returned with it on his own head. Among the occurrences of Alexander's active life this was little likely to be much regarded at the time. But, being recollected afterward, in other circumstances, the anecdote became popular, tho in very various report. Some related that the eminent general Seleucus was the person who swam after the diadem; thus rather making their story complete for their purpose of showing an omen verified, than regarding the real fact. According to more probable accounts, an obscure man was the adventurer; doubtful whether fortunate, or unfortunate; for, according to some, as the careful historian informs us, the king rewarded him with a present of a talent, according to others caused him to be whipped.

Returning however in safety to Babylon, Alexander found more embassies from Grecian republics arrived, with the ordinary present of golden crowns. Antient writers have noticed the spirit of adulation which had been growing among the republican Greeks, and which, in following ages, became extravagant in extreme; a natural consequence of extravagant violence in the spirit of faction. When one party proposes to rule through the favor of a licentious multitude,

Arr. ut ant.  
Vin. on  
Nearch.

multitude, its opponents, if the weaker party, being in danger of the cruellest oppression of which history tells, will not be scrupulous of extravagance in endeavours to avert or resist it; and so will be ready for any adulation to obtain powerful protection, and any subserviency to avoid destruction. This observation indeed is at least as old as Aristotle, who has reckoned Ch. 43. § 1. of this list. democracy and tyranny congenial governments, and remarked that the Grecian demagogues of his age and before, failing of their object to attain command, were commonly ready for any submission. If however there was anything extraordinary in the compliments from the republics, by their embassies to Alexander, it was not such as to attract the notice of historians; tho' favors said to have been solicited for some, nominally for their temples and religious service, appear rather extravagant. Alexander however gave a polite attention to all; his interest indeed requiring the maintenance of peace between them, and a good disposition toward him among all.

At Babylon he found also large reinforcement arrived to supply the numerous recent discharges from his army. From the eastward his satrap of Persia, Peucestas, had brought a body of twenty thousand Persians, beside a considerable force of highlanders, mostly Cossees and Tapoors. The judicious conduct of Peucestas in his government, and also the loyalty of the Persians under it, received the king's particular commendation. It appears indeed probable, from the combined accounts of Diodorus and Arrian, that the Persians, reckoning themselves unworthily neglected by the late Median dynasty, were prepared with a disposition to be ingaged by Alexander's talent for popularity. Recruits for the infantry were arrived from the westward, under Philoxenus and Menander, the former from Caria, the other from Lydia, and Menidas had brought a body of cavalry; but in what proportion any of these were Greek is not said. In admitting orientals, however, into the establishment of the army of the empire, Alexander avoided to leave them distinct bodies: he so mixed Greeks, whether Macedonian or of the republics, among them, that the Greek officers, and of these probably the Macedonian, had the greater share of command.<sup>21</sup>

While

<sup>21</sup> Here again Arrian's work seems to show the want of his revising eye. He says, together with Greeks, retained their national arms. But, on a former occasion, we have his assurance that large bodies of orientals

While thus arranging the business of the army, so as to suit the circumstances of the acquired empire, the fleet still appears to have been, for Alexander's indefatigable mind, with purposes immediately in view, the object of his more studious care. In frequent exercise on the wide summer course of the river, the rowers vied with one another; those in vessels of the old construction, the trireme, striving to equal or excel in swiftness the quadriremes and quinqueremes, proposed, with more numerous hands, to be capable of more rapid motion.

### SECTION III.

*Omens: History of an Indian Brahman: Respect for Prognostics among the Antients.*

OMENS, supposed to portend the death of eminent men, less found in earlier history, abound in that of Alexander, and of many following ages; perhaps recommended to public attention, and thence to the regard, not only of writers seeking, for their profit, to engage public curiosity, but also of statesmen, with political views, not least by circumstances about this time occurring, and rumors gaining popularity and raised to importance through Alexander's fame. Commonly, where reported by different antient writers, they are found differently reported. Arrian speaks of the admonition of the Chaldee priests to Alexander 'not to enter Babylon,' as founded on an oracle delivered to them by their god Belus, declaring that misfortune would follow, but not specifying what. Diodorus, after some other authority, says that the priests positively foretold his death as to follow if he entered Babylon, but that all misfortune might be avoided if he passed by; and that they knew this, not by any communication from their deity, but through their skill in astrology. With other particulars, unnoticed by Arrian, he has added what is perfectly probable, that the

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 16.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 112.

were completely instructed in the discipline of the phalanx, and armed accordingly. What is here said does not indeed necessarily imply contradiction: it is obviously possible that bodies of orientals, skilled in the use of the bow, might be advantageously annexed to the phalanges. But perfect coherency, or at least explanation, seems wanting.

Greek



Greek philosophers, of Alexander's retinue, held the science and the prophecy of the Chaldees together in scorn. What followed appears to have raised both in public esteem; and the historian shows largely his own respect for them, and his opinion of the inferiority of the science of the philosophers of his own nation. It appears to have been in consequence of what followed that, the public mind being greatly agitated throughout the empire, not the prophecy of the Chaldees only, but numerous occurrences, in themselves utterly unimportant, engaged public attention deeply. Recollection, and imagination, and invention, through various feelings, and with various views, all became busy. Facts were remembered, and representations of them were made, and importance was attributed, and interpretations were insisted on, which otherwise never would have occurred to thought, or would have been little regarded.

But a matter which had passed at Parsagarda, while Alexander was yet there, of neither political nor military concern, yet, as simply related by Arrian, Arr. 1. 7. c. 2 & 3. in itself interesting, becoming afterward implicated in report with following events, may perhaps best have its place in narrative here. Alexander, in the course of his conquests, appears to have met nowhere so determined an opposition as in India, from those known then, as now, by the title of Bramins or Brahmans<sup>22</sup>. Hence, as we have seen, he was induced to treat those singular men, on some occasions with great severity. Nevertheless the peculiarities, and, among these, the merits, of their doctrine and of their manners, excited his curiosity, and even engaged his esteem; so far at least that he did not refuse friendship with those among them who would cultivate friendship with him. One eminent man of their cast, Calanus, as the Greeks wrote his name, acquiring his favor, was enough gratified with it to be induced to attach himself to his court, and even to attend him in the march, threatening in outset, and dangerous and painful in experience, through the Gadrosian desert. Some writers, amid Athen. l. 10. c. 10. the profligacy of aftertimes, imputed to this man, and even generally to the brahmans, a propensity, in most decided opposition to their avowed principles, to indulge in the sensual pleasures which Alexander's court might afford, and especially to drinking. Whether there were or not, among them,

<sup>22</sup> Bramin seems French orthography, ill adopted by our writers, as suiting no language but the French. The Greek orthography, *Βραχμαν*, perhaps represented the Indian word, both of Alexander's and of the present day, as nearly as could be with Greek letters.

men of such a disposition, nothing seems to warrant the imputation against Calanus. Sensual pleasures were surely not expected in the Gadrosian desert. To study nature was among their objects on principle ; and extension of that study, in observation beyond Indian bounds, might be among his motives. But, if he had any less worthy, what followed appears to show it to have been the pride of exhibiting, among strangers, the ordinary fortitude of his brotherhood ; first in bearing great hardships, clearly expected in the march, and then in a contempt of life, when the prospect of opportunity for sensual gratification became open.

It is not said that he did not bear the evils of that desperate undertaking, the march through Gadrosia, with unreprieved constancy. But, arrived at Parsagarda, when ease and pleasure were, in ordinary course, within hope of all, being seized with severe illness, no unlikely result for one habituated to a life of the greatest abstinence indeed, but of the most perfect quiet, he became, it is said, impatient of life. According to the brahman doctrine, death is but a parting of the immortal soul from an unworthy associate, the mortal body, which every one might chuse for himself, regardless of further duties among men. Of his faith in this doctrine, and of his contempt for whatever injoyments might be reserved for him in this world, Calanus resolved to show an example ; ordinary in his own country, but which, where he now was, would be striking and memorable. Accordingly he made known to Alexander his desire to die by fire on a funeral pile, pursuant to the practice of his sect. The prince kindly remonstrated, and at first refused permission. But Calanus persevering, against all solicitation and argument, in declaring that he would use his right of chusing death for himself, and, if denied the more honorable mode, warranted by the practice of his cast, still he would die, Alexander at length reluctantly yielded.

Avoiding to be present at the mournful exhibition, he would otherwise do his wilful parting friend the utmost honor. The whole army was ordered out, under the command of the historian, Ptolemy son of Lagus. Calanus, so weak from sickness as to be unable, if not rather unwilling, to walk, was provided with a horse. A company preceded him, carrying offerings of vessels of gold and silver and royal robes. He was crowned in the Indian manner, and sang as he went. At the foot of the pile he was taken

on a couch, perhaps a palanquin, and carried by men to the top. The decent gracefulness and apparent composure with which he placed himself there were remarked by the beholders. While the flames approached him, he remained, to the admiration of all, motionless, till, with the smoke, they hid him from sight.

‘Such,’ says Arrian, ‘is the account given by writers worthy of credit,’ Arr. l. 7. c. 3. and it seems to have been all that he found given by writers whom he so esteemed. But an addition gained popularity, which he has noticed on a following occasion. ‘This is reported,’ he says, ‘of the Indian philosopher Calanus. On leaving the palace to proceed to the funeral pile, having saluted the rest of his friends, he avoided that ceremony to Alexander, saying he would salute him at Babylon.’ Such a story could hardly fail of Plutarch’s favor, who has given it, without naming authority, as an authentic prophecy of Alexander’s death. But he might have named, what may deserve notice, the authority of Cicero. That extraordinary man, who in the stormy time in which he lived, deeply engaged in political and civil business, could yet give much attention to philosophical subjects, has left, it is well known, a treatise in support of belief in prognostics, as prophetic intimations (whether from one god, or from some of the various deities of the Greek and Roman creed) and in the ability of men, versed in divination, to interpret them. In that treatise he has not scrupled to state, as an instance of true prophecy, that the Indian philosopher Calanus foretold the death of Alexander as to follow, within a few days, that to which he was going immediately to put himself. Here we have a strong instance, how much at hazard, in failure of the modern convenience of printed books and indexes, the most informed men among the ancients would refer to historical matter, when history was not their principal object. The prophecy of Calanus, disregarded (for so Arrian says) at the time, seems, most probably, to have been unheard of till after Alexander’s death.

It may appear indeed, in modern times, extraordinary, that such and so many prognostics, as here load Arrian’s narrative, should have been thought worthy of it by one of his eminence in civil and military office, and of the understanding shown in his extant writings. But, as they remain noticed not by him only, but by other eminent men, they so mark the character,



character of three ages, the most inlightened of antiquity, those of Alexander, of Cicero, and of Arrian himself, that still some further notice of them may be required of the modern historian. The authority of Aristobulus, cited by Arrian for three which he has related, indicates the importance attributed to them in Alexander's own age. One of these, involving other men in eminent situations, may most deserve attention, and may suffice for example.

When Alexander left Babylon for the eastward, committing the important satrapy of the province to the Persian Mazæus, he appointed a republican Greek, Apollodorus of Amphipolis, one of his band of companions, to the chief military command. When assurance was obtained that, in returning from India, he was proceeding to Ecbatana, Apollodorus, whether according to order, or to obviate imputations against him, repaired thither. Informed of the king's severe justice, already exercised toward oppressors, in alarm, he wrote to his brother, Peithagoras, an eminent seer, of that branch which pretended to know the future from observation of the intestines of victims killed for sacrifice, desiring prophetic information concerning his own future safety. Peithagoras, in answer, inquired from whom particularly fearing danger he desired a prophecy on the subject. Apollodorus wrote him, that he feared the king himself, and Hephæstion. Peithagoras then sacrificed first concerning Hephæstion; and, finding the victim's liver defective, wrote to his brother that there could be no danger from Hephæstion, for he would be very shortly out of the way; and Aristobulus related that Hephæstion died the next day after the letter's arrival. Peithagoras then sacrificed concerning Alexander, and found the victim's liver again faulty. Of this Apollodorus informed the king, hoping so to obtain the credit of solicitude for his welfare; and so far he succeeded, that he lost no favor. According to Aristobulus, Alexander was enough impressed by the story to be induced to communicate with Peithagoras upon it, when he arrived at Babylon. The seer assured him boldly that the failure in the victim's liver portended him great misfortune; and Alexander was so satisfied with what he esteemed the honesty of the declaration, that Peithagoras was thenceforth in more than former favor with him. Aristobulus, who related all this, in his history, as having had it from Peithagoras himself, added other instances of the skill of that seer in

§

divination,

divination, shown afterward, as he said, in foretelling the fate of other eminent men.

Considering the eminence of both Aristobulus and Arrian, we have here indeed very remarkable evidence to the estimation of that called the science of divination, in the most flourishing ages of Grecian and Roman philosophy. But in the report, from Aristobulus, of Alexander's communication with Apollodorus and Peithagoras, this moreover will deserve notice. We have there the testimony of those in the habit of conversation with Alexander, published when there could be no purpose of flattery, to the temper with which he received such communications. And this will deserve to be borne in mind by any whom curiosity may lead to the stories told by antient writers, some even by Arrian, of which two are from Aristobulus, imputing to him unworthy alarm and base resentment.

But in estimating these tales of prognostics, so solemnly and authoritatively told, still some other matters may deserve the modern reader's consideration. Both in the Roman republic, and afterward under the empire, the various offices of the priesthood, even the highest, were held by men holding at the same time, not only the highest civil, but also the highest military situations, and were no mean political engine in their hands. Arrian, with both civil and military office, is said to have held a priesthood of considerable power and emolument. Thus he would not only have a personal interest in the subject which Cicero, before him, had recommended to public respect, but would have a duty toward his office, while he held it, to consider. But, before Arrian's time, that had occurred, whence had arisen a conflict, both of opinions and of interests, which could in no degree be in Cicero's contemplation. Already the credit of the Christian religion was so advancing (to this purpose the testimony of Arrian's cotemporary, Pliny, is decisive) as to have become alarming to those, from opinion or from interest, attached to the heathen rites: and thus, in emulation of those prophecies by which the Christian faith was promoted, a desire and an interest to maintain and promote the credit of heathen prognostics was excited.

Fortunately for the short but interesting portion of Alexander's history to follow, extraordinary authority has been preserved; neither confirming nor confuting the various accounts of facts, reported as prognostics, but affording ground for estimating the value of tales transmitted of any effect from them on that extraordinary man's mind.

## SECTION IV.

*Sacrificial Feast for the Armament: Alexander's Illness and Death.*

EXTREME in bearing fatigue when business required bodily exertion, careless of bodily exercise when the mind could be employed; extreme also occasionally in watching and fasting, and occasionally indulging his power of sensual enjoyment; regardless always equally of the winter atmosphere of snowy mountains and of the summer heat of plains under a tropical sun, such was the excellence of Alexander's constitution, that, except what he had brought upon himself, at Tarsus in Cilicia, by bathing, when violently heated, in a river singularly chilling, it does not appear that he had ever suffered sickness. The transition from the summer heat of Gadrosia and Persia to the keen winter air of the Cossee mountains, and thence again to assiduous employment among the marshes of the Babylonian plain, under a burning sun by day and among rank vapors by night, would put the strongest constitution to severe trial. This however he had borne, apparently uninjured; and, after a following winter, had hazarded, in the returned heat of summer, again to employ himself assiduously, careless, it appears, of weather, in an open boat among the marshes.

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 23, 24.  
Plut. v.  
Alex.

Arrian marks it to have been shortly after his second return to Babylon, from this variously hazardous business, that, preparation for his long projected expedition to the southward being completed, he resolved to proceed upon it; trusting that, with arrangements made, he might commit the administration at home to those whom he had appointed to the several departments and provinces, while he should be absent for uncertain time in uncertain distance. In his usual way then of cultivating popularity among all ranks in his service, previously to departure he gave a magnificent sacrifice, affording a feast for the combined fleet and army, in which he shared at a table provided for himself and his more select companions.

After



After the death of Hephæstion, the person with whom he most communicated as a confidential friend and grateful companion was Medius of Larissa in Thessaly; probably of that race of Thessalian nobles who claimed kindred with the Macedonian royal family, as of the blood of Hercules, and to whom the reigning branch was largely indebted for the possession of the throne. According to report, which Plutarch has followed, and which Arrian appears to have reckoned trustworthy, Alexander was retiring from his magnificent sacrificial entertainment with the purpose of going to rest, when Medius requested him to join a company at supper.

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 24, 25.  
Ch. 34. §. 2.  
of this hist.

Mid-day being in the hot climates, for those of easy circumstances, the season of repose, when, with the light of the sun, the heated air also, for domestic comfort, even in the South of Europe, is commonly excluded from all apartments, night is the season rationally chosen for social enjoyment; and sitting late, in itself, no indication of debauch. Night of course was the preferable season for that conversation in which, as on the best authority we are assured, Alexander delighted, and in opportunities of leisure indulged; sometimes it appears drinking to excess, but according to far the most trustworthy testimony, that of Aristobulus, reported by Arrian, and confirmed by every account of what was accomplished by Alexander, generally without excess, and rather abstemiously.

The interesting sequel is given by both Arrian and Plutarch, from the royal daybook formerly mentioned; said to have been compiled under the direction of that very eminent man, Eumenes, the king's principal secretary. Their reports differ; but so only that Plutarch, confirming much, invalidates nothing of what is stated by the other far more careful writer<sup>22</sup>,

According

<sup>22</sup> These reports are noticed by Vincent, in his commentary on Nearchus, p. 524, thus: 'The extract preserved both by Plutarch and Arrian, does not materially differ in the accounts of the two reporters, except that Arrian has preserved more notices of the fleet.' Sainte Croix describes the same extracts somewhat differently, 'un fragment, conservé par Arrien, extrait avec peu de fidélité par Plutarque.'

Exam. des hist. d'Alex. p. 157. It seems evident to me that neither writer has proposed a rigidly exact copy, but that each has extracted what he reckoned for his purpose, using often the original words (as Plutarch has professed for himself to have done) but abridging and connecting with their own phrases as they saw convenient. The publication, intitled the royal daily transactions, or daybook, being a dry register of facts, and

According to both accounts Alexander, after the feast given to the whole army, joined a select company at supper with Medius. Bathing before the meal, we find, was common among the Greeks in Homer's time. In the hot climate of Babylonia it appears to have been the common practice on rising and going to rest. Alexander, according to Arrian's report from the daybook, bathed on rising from supper, and then retired, already, according to Plutarch, who apparently has meant to speak of the same day, feeling fever. The next day was passed in conversing, drinking and playing at dice with Medius, nobody being admitted on business; a course utterly adverse to what the sequel decisively marks to have then strongly engaged Alexander's mind. Thus it appears highly probable that, as Plutarch's account indicates, a disabling illness was already felt; yet such only as to leave the hope ready that, with one day's quiet, power for the usual exertion of mind and body might return. Late at night he bathed; ate a little; and, the fever then running high, retired to rest in Medius's house. Most extravagant stories were, perhaps not till long after, circulated of his drinking on this occasion; some refuted by their very extravagance, all made doubtful by their varieties, and all virtually contradicted by the daybook.<sup>23</sup>

An eminent modern physician has reckoned, from the circumstances most authoritatively reported, that the disorder was what, in modern medical phrase, is termed an irregular semitertian fever; precisely the kind of

and not a work proposed for general amusement, is unlikely, as it has been formerly observed in the text, to have been in many antient libraries. The two extracts from it, transmitted by two antient writers of the eminence of Plutarch and Arrian, however differing, together furnish authority more than commonly satisfactory for such matter in

antient history. They are indeed documents altogether so singular among the relics of antiquity, and of so interesting a kind, that I have been induced to offer translations of them side by side at the end of this chapter, to enable the curious reader the more readily to form his own judgement of the use here made of them.

<sup>23</sup> I hardly know whether fitter refutation of these extravagances could be than is virtually involved in the hyperbole of our dithy-

rambic poet, who may indeed seem to have proposed exposition of their absurdity, rather summing up than exceeding them, in saying,

‘ Alexander hated thinking,  
 ‘ Drank around the council-board,  
 ‘ And subdued the world by drinking  
 ‘ More than by his conquering sword.’

disorder

disorder which, not excessive drinking, but incautious and unlimited exposure to alternate heat, cold, and damp, with great exertion of the body, and intense application of the mind, also in alternacy, would be likely to produce.

On the third morning, impatient of idleness, tho so oppressed by illness as to be unable to rise, the king was carried on a couch to the sacrifice, which the law prescribed for every day. This, a thanksgiving to the gods for the meal, seems to have been little if anything other than a more ceremonious manner of what was practised by our fathers, and perhaps ill neglected among ourselves, in our phrase, saying grace. Lying then on his couch, he received his principal officers, and gave orders for the proposed expedition ; so trusting yet that his indisposition would be transitory, that he named the fourth day forward for the army to move, and, for the fleet, in which he proposed himself to embark, the fifth. Both accounts indicate a remission of the disorder on this day. After dispatching business, he could attend to the amusement of hearing Nearchus, and others who had made the voyage with him, relate the circumstances of the Indian ocean and its shores. In the evening, probably for fresher air than that of the palace in the city, carried still on a couch, or in a palankeen, he crossed the river to a paradise, a pleasure-ground appendant to a smaller palace, where, having bathed as usual, he rested for the night.

On the fourth day, whether feeling fatigue from the former day's exertion, or compelled by increased fever, or refraining with the hope of acquiring better power from quiet, he admitted only Medius to his conversation. The principal officers were directed to attend next morning. In the evening he ate a little, but throughout the following night the fever was high.

On the morning of the fifth day there seems to have been such a remission as to encourage him, who scarcely ever before had known illness, to hope that his disorder was wearing off ; for after having bathed, and attended the usual ceremony of sacrifice, he gave orders to the principal officers for the armament to move on the third following day.

On the sixth day, after bathing, and the never-failing ceremony of sacrifice, the fever became again high. Nevertheless he would see the principal officers, and gave farther orders for the expedition ; but, in the evening his disorder was evidently increased.



On the seventh day, perhaps again for cooler air, he was carried to a building described as that where was the great swimming-bath. There the ceremony of morning sacrifice was performed in his presence; and, tho very ill, he yet would see the principal officers, and gave some orders concerning the expedition.

On the eighth day, tho so reduced that with difficulty he attended the sacred ceremony, he would nevertheless see the principal officers, and gave some orders, showing himself still intent on the expedition.

On the ninth day, in extreme illness, he would yet attend the accustomed ceremony of sacrifice. Thus, and indeed throughout the extracts from the daybook, is marked what Arrian has attributed to Alexander, his careful attention to the ceremonies of religion prescribed by the customs of his forefathers, in which he concurred with almost every eminent man known by antient history; but in no part of them is found any warrant for the unmanly and disgraceful superstitious fears attributed to him by Plutarch, not then writing from the daybook, which are contradicted by the whole tenor of his previous conduct, as reported, in concurrence with all other historians, by Plutarch himself.<sup>24</sup> His mind remained intent upon the expedition. The officers were ready, as usual; and, tho he was in no condition to receive them, all were directed to wait; the generals within the great hall, the chiliars and pentacosiarcs without. In the course of the day it appears to have become evident that he was near extremity, and, in those circumstances, it was thought proper that he should be carried back from the paradise to the palace. There the principal officers had access to him; but, tho he showed that he knew them, he was unable to speak.

During that night and throughout the next day, the fever continued violent. Great uneasiness pervaded all the lower ranks of the army. Who was to command, and what was to become of them, in the event of the king's death, none could tell. Suspicion ran that he was already dead,

<sup>24</sup> Plutarch's excuse for himself, stated in the beginning of his *Life of Alexander*, has perhaps escaped the observations of some, and rarely obtained due consideration from others, who have quoted his authority for historical matters. 'Writing,' as he says, 'not histories but lives,' tho he has not directly claimed, yet he seems often to have reckoned upon the poet's privilege of knowing what only the muse could tell.

dead, and that the principal officers, with views of their own, concealed the catastrophe. Consistently then with what the Macedonians, even on military service, esteemed their right, they would have assurance on the highly interesting subject, and nothing under ocular evidence would satisfy them. Their importunity at length proceeding to threats of violence, should their just desire be longer denied, it was deemed expedient, or even necessary, to admit a number without arms, in civil dress, to pass regularly, in single file, through the chamber where the king lay. He showed himself yet sensible, raising his head a little, holding out his hand, and marking intelligence by his eyes, but remaining speechless.

In the severe disorder which he had brought on himself by bathing at Tarsus, he was attended by a physician; his confidence in whom has become matter of celebrity. Hephæstion also, in the illness which ended his life, we have seen, was attended by a physician. Hence it appears the more extraordinary that, among so many particularities of Alexander's last illness, in no account is an attending physician mentioned. Yet an omission of what the ordinary practice of the age in common decency would have required, had it been real, hardly would have escaped the notice of all extant authors. Probably it may have been, in failure of remaining hope from medical skill, to pacify the army, and protect physicians, together with all other attendants, against vulgar resentment, that a measure was resorted to altogether of extraordinary aspect, tho perhaps not without some near parallels among modern nations. Seven men, in the highest military offices, Python, Attalus, Demophoon, Peucestas, Cleomenes, Menidas, and Seleucus, passed a night in the temple of Serapis, to solicit relief for their suffering sovereign, and especially to seek information whether it might be advantageous for him to be lodged in the temple, and there himself solicit succour from the god. The existence of a temple of the Egyptian god in the metropolis of the Chaldee religion, seems to mark its origin from Alexander's great purpose of bringing his subjects of all religions to friendly union. The preference of it for the solemn occasion, so interesting all of Grecian race, appears rather extraordinary. Possibly however among the Greeks, whose lively fancy was commonly ready to adopt additions to their religious faith, some partiality for this new deity may have prevailed, or, possibly the men in power may have reckoned upon it

it as the most manageable of auguries within ready reach, or under direction of priests the most friendly to them. The eminent persons appointed to consult it, however, reported, that a voice, issuing from the divinity, declared that it would be better for the king not to be brought to the temple, but to remain where he was. Shortly after, on the eleventh day of his illness, Alexander expired, 'as if,' Arrian has added, 'that were best for him.'

'Alexander died in the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad; and in the archonship of Hegesias at Athens. He lived, as Aristobulus says, thirty-two years and eight months, and reigned twelve years and eight months.' Thus imperfectly Arrian has indicated the time of an event the most extensively and deeply interesting to the civilized world, of perhaps any recorded in profane history; antient chronology apparently failing to furnish means for more exactness. By his account, however, compared with that of Diodorus, it appears marked not altogether unsatisfactorily, the ordinary deficiency of antient chronology considered, that the catastrophe occurred about Midsummer of the three hundred and twenty-third year before Christ.<sup>25</sup>

Arrian, whose disposition to careful examination, and whose desire of impartial judgement will be most striking to those most versed among the antient historians, has concluded his narrative of the actions by declaring his opinion of the character of that extraordinary man thus: 'Alexander was in body most graceful, most active, most indefatigable; in mind most manly, most ambitious of glory, most indifferent to danger, most diligent in devotion to the deity. In sensual pleasures he was most temperate; of praise for the gifts of the mind only insatiable: singular in readiness to see the best to be done in the most critical emergencies, and, from what was evident, to conjecture concerning what remained obscure: in all the business of arraying, providing, and ruling an army most able; in encouraging the soldiery, filling them with hope, and, by demonstration of his own fearlessness, dispelling the fears of others, excellent: in doubtful enterprize most daring; in anticipating even the enemy's suspicion of his purposes most skillful; in his own engagements most faithful;

<sup>25</sup> A note on this subject will be found in the appendix.



‘ in avoiding to be deceived by others most acute : of expense upon his  
‘ own pleasures most sparing ; in bestowing upon others perhaps profuse.

‘ If then, through vehemence of temper, and in highly provoked anger,  
‘ he became criminal, or if, through inflated pride, he gave too much into  
‘ barbarian fashions, I think candor will find large extenuation for him ;  
‘ his youth, and his uninterrupted course of the most extraordinary great  
‘ fortune, being considered, together with the flattery with which kings,  
‘ to their great injury, are constantly beset. On the other hand, the  
‘ severity of his repentance for his faults I reckon his great, and, among  
‘ what is recorded of kings, his singular merit. Even his claim to divine  
‘ origin I cannot esteem a blamable extravagance ; his object having been  
‘ to gain that veneration from those he had conquered, which might con-  
‘ tribute to the stability of his new empire ; and the example of Minos,  
‘ Æacus, Rhadamanthus, Theseus, and Ion, men acknowledged by the  
‘ Greeks to have been sons of gods, being familiar to him and all about  
‘ him. His assumption of the Persian habit, while living among the  
‘ Persians, avoiding thus to appear a stranger in the country over which  
‘ he reigned, I consider as a just policy. His long sitting at table, Aristo-  
‘ bulus assures us, was not for the sake of wine, for he commonly drank  
‘ little, but for conversation, and to discover who might deserve his esteem,  
‘ and with such to cultivate friendship.

‘ Let then, whoever would vilify Alexander, not select, from the actions  
‘ of a man, fallible, as of mankind, only what may be blameworthy ; but,  
‘ putting together all his deeds, consider how comparatively insignificant,  
‘ in whatever situation of high fortune placed, he himself has been, engaged  
‘ through life in comparatively little matters, and not even in those doing  
‘ always well. My opinion therefore I will profess, that, not without  
‘ especial purpose of the Deity, such a man was given to the world, to  
‘ whom none has ever yet been equal.’

## APPENDIX

### TO THE FIFTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER.

*Passage in Arrian's history of Alexander, leading to the Extract from the Royal Daybook.*

SOME have written of Alexander, that, retiring from the feast given to the army and fleet, his purpose was to go to rest; but Medius, then his most favorite friend, solicited his company to supper; urging that he would find a pleasant company<sup>1</sup>. The Daybook also says as follows:

*Passage in Plutarch's Life of Alexander, leading to the Extract from the Royal Daybook.*

AFTER the magnificent feast given to Nearchus and those appointed with him for the expedition, Alexander was retiring to rest, but, at the solicitation of Medius, joined a company at supper, and drinking there all the next day, he began to have a fever. Not that he emptied the cup of Hercules at a draught, nor that he was suddenly seized with a pain in the loins as if struck with a spear, as some have thought expedient to report, supposing something superlatively tragic and pathetic necessary for the conclusion of a great drama. Aristobulus indeed relates that, being light-headed, and suffering greatly from thirst, he drank wine, and so promoted the delirium in which he died on the thirtieth day of the month Daisius. But in the Daybook it is written of the illness thus:

*Arrian's*

<sup>1</sup> Κωμάσαι παρὰ οἱ γινίσθαι γὰρ ἤδυν τὸν κῶμον.—Πίπειν παρὰ Μηδίῳ κωμάσαντα. Desirous as I have always been to avoid verbal criticism, yet the choice of modern historians and translators, and commentators, very generally to infer from these phrases something very disgraceful to Alexander, makes me reckon it right to observe that I apprehend the words κῶμος and κωμάζω do not always, among the Greek writers, imply anything disgraceful, or even at all indecorous. So much the lexicographer's quotation from Euripides, I think, sufficiently proves, Τὸν καλλίνικον μετὰ θεῶν ἐκώμασεν. Here, fur. 180. And I am not aware of any

*Arrian's Extract from the Daybook.**Plutarch's Extract from the Daybook**First Day:—<sup>2</sup>**First Day:—<sup>2</sup>*

THAT he drank in festive company with Medius, on rising bathed, and then went to rest, and

ON the eighteenth day of the month Daisius he slept in the bathing-hall, because he had a fever.

any reason for supposing the historian to have proposed those words in a sense at all differing from that, clearly no way dishonorable, intended by the poet. Nevertheless, whether those, or almost any other words, may, in common acceptance, have acquired shades of difference in Alexander's age, and whether others in Arrian's, and whether, throughout the divided portions of the Greek people, they were precisely of the same import in any age, I will leave for more diligent investigators of such matters to say.

Yet I cannot pass unnoticed the learned commentator Gronovius's remark on this passage: 'Nec commentarii regii,' he says, 'debuerunt omittere quod annotarunt alii, nempe *κλειύσαντα*. Hoc enim fuit alterum lutum in quo hæsit Alexander præter τὸ πίνων.'

A Dutch doctor of the eighteenth century, in a university near the mouth of the Rhine, thus undertakes to say what Alexander's secretary ought to have reported Alexander to have done more than two thousand years before, in private company, at Babylon. And on this occasion his inadvertency has nearly equalled his malice and his arrogance: for if he had taken the trouble to look into Plutarch's life of Alexander, he would have found there the daybook quoted for that very matter which he has so arrogantly blamed the daybook for omitting, nempe *κλειύσαντα*. Why Arrian has mentioned, as from the daybook, the *πίνων*, omitting the *κλειύσαντα*, and Plutarch has noticed the latter, omitting to claim the authority of the daybook for what he had previously said of the former, are questions I apprehend to be but on doubtful conjecture answered. The graver question perhaps would be, why, in such a register as the daybook seems to have been, either was noticed. The simplicity of what follows in both the extracts from that register may however warrant the compiler against the imputation of any malignant purpose. The probability then may seem, that the king being disabled by illness, so that no one was admitted to him on business, these trifling matters alone occurred, and, if really in the daybook, were, for their novelty, and to account for the failure of more, entered there.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, in his extract from the daybook has marked time only by the daily transactions. Plutarch has named the month and the days of the month, passing however unnoticed two days of the illness, the twenty-third and the twenty-eighth of the month. Plutarch mentions fever in the first day's report, Arrian not till the second. Whether both meant to begin with the same day therefore may be questioned.

Of the various calendars of the Grecian states the Attic is that of which most, and yet very imperfect, information remains. The very learned and diligent Vincent, after laborious comparison of different opinions of former learned and diligent inquirers, has been utterly unable to satisfy himself, with what Attic month the Macedonian Daisius corresponded, or most nearly corresponded. Considering then the varieties and perplexities of the Grecian calendars, it may be no severe imputation upon Plutarch to suppose that even he was unable to state the day of either an Attic or a Bæotian month corresponding with the eighteenth of the Macedonian Daisius, and therefore gave only the Macedonian name. The circumstances of Alexander's history seem to afford the best ground remaining for conjecture of its place in the modern European calendar, but no farther than as it is indicated to have been near midsummer.



*Arrian's Extract from the Daybook.**Second Day:—*

Next day ate again with Medius, and again sat drinking till late at night, then bathed, after which he ate a little, and slept there because he had already a fever.

*Third Day:—*

Next morning, being carried on a couch to the sacrifice, he performed the ceremony required by the law for every day; and the sacrifice being offered<sup>3</sup>, he continued lying in the great hall till evening. During the day he gave orders to the commanders for the march of the army and the outset of the fleet, appointing the fourth day forward for the former, and

*Plutarch's Extract from the Daybook.**Second Day:—*

On the nineteenth, after bathing, he returned to the bedroom-apartment, and, during the day, played at dice with Medius. Late in the evening he bathed; then, from the supper, he made the accustomed offering to the gods, and ate<sup>3</sup>, but had fever through the night.

*Third Day:—*

On the twentieth, having bathed, he again performed the customary duties of the sacrifice, and passed the day lying in the bathinghall; amusing himself with hearing Nearchus, and those who made the voyage with him, relate the circumstances of the ocean and its shores.

<sup>3</sup> Τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιθεῖς, ἐμφαγών, διὰ νυκτὸς ἐπύρεξεν. Plut. v. Alex. The pretended translation of this passage, under the names of Cruserius and Xylander, runs thus: 'Sacris operatus, cibum sumpsit avidius. Hinc nocte febre tentatus est.'

Vincent, in his commentary on Nearchus (p. 526, n. 80) has noticed the falsehood of this translation, but with mind apparently divided between a just care for the assailed character of Alexander, and respect, far more than due, for the learned assailants; who, by the insertion of the utterly unauthorized words *avidius* and *Hinc*, have been guilty of nothing less than a most impudent and malicious forgery. The occasion has occurred to notice emulation of such democratic virtue in the translator of Arrian, and also in the learned and acute commentator, yet I think neither has anywhere equalled this instance of it in the learned translators of Plutarch.

<sup>4</sup> Ἐκκομισθέντα δὲ ἐπὶ κλίνης πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ, θῦσαι, ὡς νόμος ἐφ' ἑκάστη ἡμέρᾳ. κ. τ. ε. For explanation of this, which both translator and commentator have avoided, we look in vain even to the learned archbishop Potter, in his large collection on the religion of Greece. Xenophon however has afforded some light, especially in the sixth book of his narrative of the expedition of Cyrus, noticed in the fifth section of the twenty-third chapter of this history. In comparing what is there found with what is here mentioned by Arrian, it seems clear that the sacrifice was a ceremony of thanksgiving to the deity for the meal; analogous to that religious and moral ceremony of our forefathers (now, perhaps as little to the advantage of morality as religion, grown rather unfashionable) which we call Saying Grace, and differing only by some little additional formalities.

*Arrian's Extract from the Daybook.*

and the fifth for the latter, in which he proposed himself to embark. He was then carried on a couch to the river, which he crossed in a boat to a paradise, where again he bathed and rested the night.

*Fourth Day:—*

On the following day he bathed and sacrificed, as the law required, and then going to the bedchamber-apartment<sup>5</sup> he lay there conversing with Medius. The generals were ordered to attend next morning. In the evening he took a light supper, and, being carried to his bedchamber,<sup>5</sup> had fever through the night.

*Fifth Day:—*

On the morrow again, having bathed and sacrificed, (breakfasted) he admitted Nearchus and other principal officers to audience, and gave orders for the expedition, naming the third day after for moving.

*Sixth Day:—*

Next day, after bathing, he performed again the prescribed ceremony of sacrifice; and the meal, thus sanctified, being set, tho there was no intermission of the disorder, he would see the generals, and gave orders for the expedition, requiring all to be ready. In the evening he bathed again and was afterward extremely ill.

<sup>5</sup> 'Εἰς τὴν καμάραν ἐισελθόντα.—Κομισθέντα δὲ εἰς τὴν καμάραν. It seems by these differing expressions implied, that, in a remission of the disorder, he could walk from the sacrificial breakfast to his chamber in the morning, but that, its violence returning, it became necessary or expedient that he should be carried from the evening meal.

*Plutarch's Extract from the Daybook.**Fourth Day:*

Passing the twenty-first in the same manner, the fever increased, and he had a very bad night.

*Fifth Day:—*

On the twenty-second, the fever being violent, he was carried to the great swimming bath, and lying by it, he conversed with the generals about persons fit to be appointed to some vacant commands.

*Sixth Day:—*

Account omitted.

*Arrian's Extract from the Daybook.**Seventh Day:—*

Next morning he was carried back to the house where was the great swimming-bath, (apparently within the paradise) and there the customary ceremony of sacrifice was performed. Tho very ill he would see the principal generals, and gave some orders about the expedition.

*Eighth Day:—*

On the next day he ill bore to be carried to the sacrifice, and go through the ceremony, and yet would give orders to the generals about the expedition.

*Ninth Day:—*

On the following day, tho very ill, he nevertheless attended the sacrifice, but ordered the generals to wait in the hall, the chiliars and pentacosiarchs without. The disorder becoming extreme, he was carried from the paradise to the palace. There the generals had access to him; and he knew them, but said nothing, being speechless. That night the fever was violent and

*Tenth Day:—*

Continued so the next and following night. So it is written in the Daybook. Moreover it is there said, that the soldiers were eager for admission; some anxious once more to see their king living; others,

*Plutarch's Extract from the Daybook.**Seventh Day:—*

On the twenty-fourth, tho the fever was violent, yet supported at the ceremony, he sacrificed. The generals were directed to wait in the hall, the chiliars and pentacosiarchs to pass the night without.

*Eighth Day:—*

On the twenty-fifth, being carried back to the palace, he slept a little; but there was no remission of the fever, so that when the generals came to attend him he was speechless.

*Ninth Day:—*

On the twenty-sixth he was in the same state. The Macedonians, supposing him already dead, clamored at the gate, and threatened the Royal Companions till they were admitted; and, in civil dress, without arms, they passed his bed one by one.

On the same day, Python and Seleucus, being commissioned to go to the Serapeion, consulted the god, whether he should be carried thither; but the god directed that he should remain where he was.

*Tenth Day:—*

Account omitted.



*Arrian's Extract from the Daybook.*

uneasy because it was rumored that he was already dead, and suspicion went that the lords of the body-guard desired to conceal the event; but, as I conjecture, the greater part through grief for the apprehended loss of their king, and anxiety for his safety. However their violence was such that they obtained their purpose. As then they passed him in just order, tho he was speechless, yet it is said he held out his hand to them, with difficulty raising his head a little, but with his eyes showing intelligence still remaining.

*Days unascertained:—*

The Royal Daybook also says, that Python, Attalus, Demophoon, Peucestas, Cleomenes, Menidas, and Seleucus passed the night in the temple of Serapis, to obtain information from the god whether it were advantageous and best for Alexander to be carried to the temple, and himself solicit his cure from the god; and that a voice came from the god, forbidding to carry him to the temple, and declaring that he would better remain where he was. So, according to the Daybook, the King's companions reported; and, not long after, Alexander died; as if that were best for him. Nor do the accounts of either Ptolemy or Aristobulus considerably differ from this.

*Plutarch's Extract from the Daybook.**Eleventh Day:—*

On the twenty-eighth, toward evening, he expired.

These things, mostly word for word, are so written in the Daybook.

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END OF THE FIFTH VOLUME.

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# CORRECTIONS.

## VOL. V.

- P. 10. note, *for* καὶ read καὶ  
 14. l. 16. — Aristole read Aristotle  
 25. l. 34. — Amytas, read Amyntas  
 31. l. 6. — Mosaic Law.\* [*Put the mark of a note to the word Law, and then the following words, as a note on the passage*] \* ‘Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you.’ Deuteronomy, c. 4. v. 2.  
 32,2. l. 19. — ye read yet  
 35. l. 21. — Saphanes read Laphanes  
 46. note, — Volsii, read Vossii  
 48,3. l. 25. — on Macedonian read on the Macedonian  
 48,6. l. 17. — too read to  
 53. note, — λόγοις read λόγους.  
 58. l. 26. — all powerful read all-powerful  
 63. l. 32. — alarm fled. read alarm they fled.  
 99. l. 34. — familar read familiar  
 103. note, — Ευανόραν. read Ευαγόραν.  
 105. note, — Τὴν, λοιπὴν read Τὴν λοιπὴν  
 107. l. 29. — Mentor, brother of Memnon, read Memnon, brother of Mentor,  
 118. l. 34. — Mentor’s read Memnon’s  
 119. l. 1. — Mentor’s read Memnon’s  
 123. l. 2. — restored read reported.  
 — l. 26. — if, the read if the  
 236. l. 16. — the king’s according read the king’s authority, according.  
 280. — — the note in this page ought to follow the word Ταπούρους standing by itself as a note at the bottom of the next page.  
 165. l. 14. — rein read reign  
 172. l. 10. — Antophradates, read Autophradates,  
 176. note, — who have also read and have also  
 — — about the same time, read a few years after,  
 278. l. 3. — Bactrian read Bactrians  
 297. l. 25. — was the more important read was important  
 307. l. 28. *after* to Europe. read No others are mentioned, nor is cause for the distinction stated, but, in the course of the history, it may be gathered. The Thessalians, all cavalry, would all have either property or valuable connections at home, and to Alexander popularity in Thessaly was of especial importance. Of civic troops of the southern republics, probably few, if any, now remained with the army. Alexander’s great acquisition of pecuniary means having inabled him to dispense with their service, by increasing his mercenary Grecian force, all ingaged for adventure, and in no small proportion exiles, whose republics would not receive them, and to whom therefore their discharge would be a most severe misfortune.  
 The army then crossed the Oxus.  
 348. note, *for* κρέμασθῆνα. read κρεμασθῆνα.

381. l. 16. *for* died there. [*Put the mark of a note to the word there † and then the following words as a note.*] † Error in transcription of the numeral here, according to all accounts of this famous horse, may be suspected.
393. l. 23. — settlers there ‡ [*As before, a note.*] ‡ Probably these were, in large proportion, exiles from various republics, and yet many, perhaps, unwilling settlers in so distant a country, surrounded by people of different language and manners; the hope of many having, through Alexander's favour and power, to be restored to their several republics, and perhaps to hold command over the party which had expelled them.
401. l. 25. — yet living author.—This sheet was already printed when the highly respectable person adverted to was yet living.
415. l. 31. — were *read* was.
416. l. 6. — Sogdians || [*a Note.*] || Possibly these may have been a branch of the nation formerly noticed, of the same name, near the Caspian Sea, or possibly the name here may have been corrupted in transcription.
416. l. 14. — Arachoses *read* Arachotes
419. l. 7. — sold *read* condemned
420. l. 15. — largest body *read* largest of the bodies
428. l. 27. — perfumed the air—*add*—Alexander's view to the incouragement of commerce, and his earnestness in it, are, in this incidental information from the historian, clearly and strongly shown; for the merchants could not have engaged in such an undertaking without, beyond his permission, assurance of his support. In this wilderness here and there
440. l. 7. — know, whom *read* know, yet whom
449. l. 15. — But in *read* But on
458. l. 15. — probably none eastward *read* eastward only by land. In
- 17. *after* export here. *read* A concurrence of indications moreover seems to furnish nearly assurance that Mosarna and its commerce were known by report to Alexander in India, and that the information obtained concerning them, afforded both instigation and incouragement to direct the voyage and undertake the march.
- A pilot being acquired, Nearchus
482. l. 8. *for* course *read* cause
509. l. 10. — had been *read* has been.
533. *last line of the note*—*for* knows *read* knew
538. l. 24. *for* none *read* nothing.
541. l. 17. — diligent inquirers *read* diligent modern inquirers,
- 562, *end of note 4*, “additional formalities.”—These appear hardly to have differed from what are repeatedly described by Homer, especially in the beginning of the third book of the *Odyssee*; but I know not that they are mentioned as of daily practice at ordinary meals anywhere but in extracts from the royal daybook.

*In the Table of Contents, ch. LVI. after the word Commerce, add Affairs in Greece; and, from the Table of Contents, thus corrected, the head of ch. LVI. in the course of the history is to be corrected.*



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